Socio-technical basis of the microelectronics revolution : a global perspective by Molina Fuenzalida, Alfonso Hernan
The Socio-Technical Basis of the Microelectronics Revolution:
A Global Perspective







Chapter IV.- Indigenous Microelectronics Capability in the Third World. The Case of Mexico.
4.1.- The General Socio-Economic Framework of Mexico's Development
Process: Goals and Social Forces. 304
4.1.1.- Capitalist Development in Mexico: Overview of Economic
Changes and Advances. 306
4.1.2.- Structural Characteristics and Problems of Mexico's
Capitalist Development. 320
4.1.2.1.- Relations Between the State (Government) and
Private National Capital. 322
4.1.2.2.- Relations Between the State, National Private
Capital and Foreign Capital in Mexico: The Rise
and Workings of the Social Constituency of
Mexico's Postwar Industrialization. 329
4.1.2.3.- The Contradictory Role of Transnational Capital
(mainly US) in Mexico's Postwar Development
Process: Technology and Decapitalization. 339
4.1.2.4.- The Efforts of the Mexican Government to Curb the
Contradictory Role of TNCs in Mexico's Postwar
Development Process: Legislation on Foreign
Investment and Technology Transfer. 350
4.1.3.- The Social Issues of Mexico's Process of Dependent
Capitalist Accumulation. 360
4.2.- Science and Technology and the R&D System in Mexico. 373
4.2.1.- The Science and Technology System in Mexico: Goals
and Problems. 373
4.2.2.- Mexico's R&D System: Characteristics and Social
Constituency. 379
4.3.- Indigenous Microelectronics Capability in Mexico: Characteristics
of the Electronics Infrastructure and Its Social Constituency. 400
4.3.1.- The Electronics Infrastructure in Mexico: Goals in a
Path of Capitalistic Development. 400
4.3.2.- Present State of Development of Mexico's Electronics
Infrastructure. 407
4.3.2.1.- State of Development of the Area of Control
Systems in Mexico. 415
4.3.2.2.- State of Development of Electronic Components
in Mexico. 418
4.3.2.3.- State of Development of Telecommunications
in Mexico. 423
4.3.2.4.- Development of the Computer Sector in Mexico. 429
4.3.3.- Impact of the First National Computer Plan and Recent
Computer Policies. 434
4.3.4.- Electronics R & D in Mexico. 446
4.3.5.- General Discussion. 455
Chapter V.- Bv Wav of Conclusion: From an IMC Towards a Sociotechnical Theory
of Indigenous Technological Capabilities
5.1.- Indigenous Technological Capabilities in UDCs. Technological
Self-Reliance. 466
5.2.- The Theoretical Tradition of the Sociotechnical Approach
to Technology. 475
5.3.- Towards a Sociotechnical Theory of Indigenous Technological
Capabilities. 487
5.3.1.- Some Broad Properties of the Development of Large-Scale
and Complex ITC Sociotechnical Process: Aggregate
Development Trends, the Momentness of the Sociotechnical
Process and the Role of Historical Galvanizing Forces. 490
5.3.2.- Basic Resources of an ITC Sociotechnical Process. 501
5.3.3.- Institutional Depositories of the Basic Resources
of an ITC Sociotechnical Process. 508
5.3.3.1.- Overriding and Particular Interests. 508
5.3.3.2.- Some Common Forms of Institutional
Depositories of Basic Resources. 511
5.3.3.3.- Development of Real-Life Institutions.
Transformation of Particular Socio-Cultural
Relations for Reproduction of Fundamental
Socio-Cultural Relations. 514
5.3.3.4.- Institutions, Systemic Integration of Basic
Resources and Overriding Interests. Ensembles
of Technical and Socio-Cultural Relations. 519
5.3.4.- The Networking of Institutions and Sociotechnical
Interests in an ITC Sociotechnical Process. Momentum
of the Sociotechnical System. 531
5.3.5.- Intrinsic, Dominant and Other Likely Social Constituents
in the Development of an ITC Sociotechnical Process. 541
5.3.6.- Competing and Other Likely Social Constituents in the
Development of an ITC Sociotechnical Process. 549
5.3.7.- International Dimension of the Development of an ITC
Sociotechnical Process: Interaction and Competition
Between National Sociotechnical Systems. 570
Bibliography
Bibliography Chapter I 591
Bibliography Chapter II 601
Bibliography Chapter HI 613
Bibliography Chapter IV 633
Bibliography Chapter V 645
Anoendices
Appendix I.- The Science-Related Nature of an Indigenous
Microelectronics Capability. 653
Appendix EL- Concepts Relating to the Post-World War H
Social Complex of Power. 656
Appendix HI.- The Roots of the Social Constituency of the
US's IMC: Corporate Capitalism and R&D System
During Late-19th and Early-20th Centuries. 660
List of Tables
page
4.1.- Mexico's Ranking in the World in Various Categories. 307
4.2.- Mexico: Evolution of Various Economic Indicators, 1978-1984. 308
4.3.- Mexico: Postwar Evolution of Urban and Rural Population and Growth Rates
of Total Population, Real GDP, and Real per capita GDP. 309
4.4.- Percentage Structure of Mexican GDP by Economic Sectors and Growth
Rates, 1970-1982. 310
4.5.- Mexico: Volumes of Global, Industrial and Manufacturing GDPs. Shares
of Industrial and Manufacturing GDPs in Global GDP and Share of
Manufacturing GDP in Industrial GDP. Growth Rate of Manufacturing
GDP, 1970-1982. 311
4.6.- Economically Active Population by Sectors, 1910-1985. 312
4.7.- Participation of Public and Private Investment in Mexico's Total
Investment, 1970-1980. 313
4.8.- Distribution of Imports and Exports of Products by Origin of Economic
Activity, 1970-1981. 314
4.9.- Volume and Sectoral Participation and U.S. Share of Cumulative Direct
Foreign Investment in Mexico, 1970-1980. 315
4.10.- Participation of the U.S. in the Mexican Balance of Trade,
1970-1981. 316
4.11.- Direct Foreign Investment and Structure of Remittances Abroad,
1970-1981. 341
4.12.- Distribution of Exports and Imports by Type of Goods,
1970-1981. 344
4.13.- Imports as Percentage of Domestic Availability by Type of Goods,
1973-1980. 345
4.14.- Exports as Compared to Sales of U.S. TNCs in Mexico, 1960,
1966, 1972. 348
4.15.- Distribution of Income. 1968, 1977. 361
4.16.- Mexico: Life Expectancy at Birth by Social Classes, 1977. 363
4.17.- Characteristics of Housing in Mexico, 1970 and 1980. 364
4.18.- Coverage and Structure of Social Security in Mexico,
1970 and 1979. 367
4.19.- Selected Data Regarding the Levels of Education of the Mexican
Population, 1970 and 1980. 369
4.20.- Structure of Public Sector Investment by Sector of Activity,
1970-1980. 371
4.21.- Data Relating to R & D in Mexico, 1973, 1977 and 1980. 380
4.22.- R&D Expenditure for Different Countries. 381
4.23.- Projects, Researchers and Financial Resources for R & D in
Mexico (1974). 387
4.24.- Selected Indexes of Scientific and Technological Productivity in
Mexico, 1974. 388
4.25.- Distribution and Percentage Structure of Researchers and R&D Financial
Resources in Mexico by Performance Sector. 390
4.26.- Comparison Between Mexico's and U.S.'s Electronics Markets by
Sector, 1981. 410
4.27.- Structure of the Electronics Industry in Mexico, 1980. 411
4.28.- Professional Electronics in Mexico. Summary of the Market for Finished
Products, 1973-1978. 413
4.29.- Structure of the Electronic Components and Parts Market in
Mexico, 1973-1978. 414
4.30.- Trade Balance of the Mexican Electronics Industry. 416
4.31.- Structure of the Instruments for Process Control Market in
Mexico. 1973-1978. 417
4.32a.- Structure of Semiconductor Market in Mexico, 1976. 419
4.32b.- Sectors of the Mexican Semiconductor Market which Are Locally
Supplied, 1976. 420
4.33.- Mexico's Imports of Semiconductor Components and Parts from
the U.S., 1979-1981. 422
4.34.- Structure of the Telecommunications Equipment Market in
Mexico. 1973-1978. 426
4.35.- Structure of the Computer and Calculator Market in Mexico,
1973-1978. 432
4.36.- Foreign Companies' Targets as Required by the Mexican Computer
Plan of 1981. 436
4.37.- Selected U.S. Computer Companies and Their Manufacturing Status
in Mexico. 438




4.1.- Evolution of Mexico's Expenditure on Science and Technology,
1971-1981. 383
4.2.- Mexico's Expenditure on Science and Technology as a Percentage of the
Gross National Product, 1971-1980. 384
4.3.- Cumulative Number of Scholarships Awarded by CONACYT,
1971-1981. 397
5.1.- A Comprehensive/Eclectic Approach. 472
5.2.- Constituents and Galvanizing Forces Involved in the Historical Unfolding
of a Sociotechnical System (Capitalist Science-Based). 488
5.3.- International Interpenetration of Different Countries' Sociotechnical
Systems. 489
Note on Currency Conversion
1956 - 1975 1 dollar = 12.50
Exchange Rate of Mexican Peso Against
the U.S. dollar.
Source.- B.Balassa (1983), Barclays
Bank (1984), NAFINSA (1984),






















Indigenous Microelectronics Capability in the Third World:
The Case of Mexico.
In the previous two chapters the sociotechnical nature of an indigenous
microelectronics capability has been analysed, with reference to the particular
case of the most advanced capitalist society, namely, the US. We have seen that
in the latter country the historical characteristics, tendencies and social forces
dominating the process of development of microtechnology have given rise to a
specific type of IMC ultimately related to the model of development dominated
by capital accumulation and profits at a global scale. We have also seen that the
systemic and pervasive nature of microtechnology has the potential for
transforming the entire technical base of society and that this process is
currently proceeding under the spur of the current crisis of the world capitalist
system and the ensuing need to restructure the industrial and technological base
of society.
For the Third World, the complexity, magnitude and global scale of the
above developments portend momentous implications since they threaten to create
a socio-technological whirlwind which will drag all underdeveloped countries into
it, thus deeply affecting their possibilities of breaking with the technological and
economic dependence which so patently inhibit their process of societal
development. In these circumstances, and assuming that microtechnology will
effectively diffuse into all countries to a greater or lesser extent and in some
form or another, it becomes plain that the possession of an IMC constitutes the
inescapable condition to harness and endogenize the development of
microtechnology for the specific development purposes of a given country. As we
have seen, however, there is no universal form of IMC and, ultimately, it will
be the path of development of every country which will determine the kind of
IMC being aimed at within the parameter established by the interaction between
the degree of development of the scientific and technological base and,
particularly, of the microtechnological resource-base of society, on one hand, and
the overriding interests of the social forces making up the local social
constituency of microtechnology, on the other. Indeed, given that in relation to
Third World countries, the main problem is the absence of an IMC and hence.
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the challenge of its build up, it will be the latter social factor which will first
determine whether or not such possibility is viable or consistent with stated
development goals.
On the whole, the above is basically the problem we shall be looking at in
the present chapter, focusing on the particular case of Mexico, one of the most
important and industrialized countries of the Third World and hence, one where
it is possible to think of a great deal of possibilities of achieving an IMC for
development purposes. The analysis will be divided in three parts. First, we
shall look at the general socioeconomic characteristics of Mexico, the stated goals
of its development process and the social forces actually controlling and
directing it. This will help us to identify the general framework ultimately
determining the kind of IMC Mexico is aiming at and the major social forces
most likely to dominate its social constituency. Second, we shall look at the
specific characteristics of the Mexican R&D system to see the state of
development of its scientific-technological resource base without which the
country can hardly expect to achieve self-determination in any science-based
technology such as microelectronics. Thirdly, we shall look at the
microtechnological resource-base of the country and the dominant social
constituents in its development to determine whether or not Mexico is on the
right path to achieve an IMC in accordance with its own development goals.
4.1. The General Socio-Economic Framework of Mexico's
Development Process: Goals and Social Forces
The ultimate goals of the development process of the Mexican nation are
explicitly put forward in the National Development Plan, 1983-1988.
"The essential priority of the National Project and of the political
decisions is man, hence it is the resposibility of the State to ensure
that he enjoys all the guarantees consecrated in the Constitution and
the full exercise of his liberties...The principles of the National Project
axe permanent: nationalism, freedom and justice, democracy as a
system of life, mixed economy, guidance by the State, economic
freedoms, individual freedoms and social rights and internationalism...
Promotion of a more Egalitarian Society is one of the original demands
raised in the struggle of various generations of Mexicans and
consecrated in the Magna Carta by the Constituents of 1917. Man,
that is, every single Mexican in equality of circumstances, is the
ultimate end of the National Project and of the strategy of integral
development with which the present government intends to advance...In
an Egalitarian Society individual and social rights conjugate, thus
humanizing the relationship between persons, groups and society as a
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whole. By consecrating the social rights, our Constitution intends to
make equal the opportunities for all the Mexicans and, for this reason,
it generalizes the individual guarantees and introduces the social
guarantees by establishing: the right to justice, as a recognition of
equality before the law; the right to work, as an essential requisite
for dignity and well-being; the right to education, which enables the
harmonious development of all the faculties of the human being and
which, undoubtedly, includes the right to instruction; the right to
health...the right of all families to enjoy a decent dwelling...and the
right to political participation so that equal opportunities may be
offered to all". (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1983,pp.13,15,16-17).
In pursuit of these goals the Mexican Development Plan gives an
instrumental role to the following factors: economic growth, national
independence and state guidance of national affairs. Thus,
"The National Project and the content of the mandate received by the
President of the Republic must translate themselves in a strategy of
development that reaffirms the country's sovereignty and independence,
on the basis of a greater internal strength... [This and the decision
A.M.]...to promote solidarity by means of the political, social and
cultural democracy of the Nation, confers upon economic growth the
character of an indispensable instrument... [in this process A.M.]...The
State is not a mere arbiter of social interests, it is the director of the
economic process; it represents the Nation; it is responsible for
asserting the viability of the National Project", (ibid.,pp. 14-15).
Indeed, as we shall see, the Mexican state has undoubtedly played a major
role in the country's development process, particularly, since the 1930s, in the
process of industrialization which has constituted the fundamental lever of the
model of economic growth and development. However, Mexico is far from being
a centralized planned economy. Instead, it is what the government itself calls a
"mixed market economy", i.e., an economy where private property of the means
of production coexists and interacts with an important public and social sector.
In practice, we shall see that the Mexican economy is a fundamentally capitalist
economy deeply inserted in the workings of the world capitalist system and
plainly dominated by the dynamics of profit-making capital accumulation. This
means, therefore, that all the goals stated above are in fact advocated as
achievable within the framework of a fundamentally capitalist process of
development. That is to say, that the process of capital accumulation with the
participation of, and regulation by, the state is the essential mechanism which
will lead the Mexican society towards well-being, equality, justice and national
economic independence. In practice, however, capital accumulation and hence,
expansion and diversification of the economy, i.e., capitalist development, may
well take place with little concern for goals that put man at the center of the
development process. Indeed, quite often this is the case, and, as we shall see,
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Mexico's capitalism, despite all the rhetoric, is quite far from fulfilling its
advocated ultimate goals.
4.1.1. Capitalist Development in Mexico: Overview of Economic
Changes and Advances
In more than half a century, general socioeconomic changes have projected
Mexico's presence high up in the world community of nations on many
accounts. Table 4.1 shows Mexico ranking among the first 20 nations in 22 out
of thirty major socioeconomic indicators. Only at the beginning of the 1930s, as
the Mexican president recently recalled, "we were 14 million Mexicans, still
dispersed and isolated in our vast territory. The economy was weak and
predominantly agrarian and mining-based, with wide segments dominated by
foreign capital. Society was strongly polarized and segregated with a weak and
incipient middle class. Our levels of education, health and nutrition, clothing
and housing, were at elementary stages of underdevelopment" (de la
Madrid,1985,p.846).
Nowadays the situation is different. Mexico has a population about 5.5
times that of 1930 and there have been socioeconomic transformations and
advances of quite significant magnitude. In particular, the Mexican economy has
undergone a quantitative and qualitative transformation. To quote the Mexican
president again,
"The Mexican economy has also been radically modified. It is larger,
diversified and dynamic; it has multiplied 16 times in the last 60
years and occupies the fourteenth place at a world level, in an
international community of 159 countries. We have developed an
important industrial sector, which currently is the sector that
contributes in greatest proportion and most dynamically to the growth
of national production. Agriculture continues to be a fundamental
sector of the economy. Its production has increased by a factor of six
during the last 50 years. We continue to be a country with an
important mining sector; we are the world's fourth oil producer and
now excel in fishing. Communications and transport have been
multiplied several times. Commerce and services are constantly
growing". (ibid,pp.846-847).
Tables 4.2 to 4.10 provide a statistical picture of the Mexican economy
with emphasis on industrial indicators. As we can see from tables 4.2 and 4.3,
Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) has grown in real terms for most of the
post World War II period, until 1982, the year when the internal contradictions





Largest City (Mexico City) (1978) 2 .
Population Growth Rate (1970-75) 9
Life Expectancy (1975) 44
Gross Domestic Product (1970-78) 14
Per capita GDP (1970-78) 37
No. of Tractors (1977) 24
Cereal Producer (1978) 23
Livestock (1978) 9
Fish Production (1977) 23
Oil Reserves (1979) 7
Oil Production (1979) 12
Oil Refining Capacity 13
Electricity (1977) 20
Energy Consumption (1976) 20
Volume of Railway Services (1977) 13
Motor Vehicles in Circulation
(1977) 12
No. of Telephones In Use f 15
Steel Consumption (1977) 18
Cement Production (1977) 15
Fertilizers Consumption (1977-78) 20
Volume of Foreign Trade (1977) 45
International Turism (1977) 20
No. of Medical Doctors in
Service (197^) 17
Hospital Services (1974) 33
Teachers in Service (1976) 10
■School Population (1976) 8
Book Production (1976) 29
No. of TVs and Radios (1976) 11
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Table4.10.-ParticipationoftheU.S.inMexic n BalanceofTr d ,1970-1981.(Pe cent) Source.-SPP/INEGI(1983b).
of a huge external debt and the fall in oil prices caused by the world economic
recession and the consequent oil glut in the international market (1). It is not
our purpose to deal with the crisis except to notice that this was the first time
that the Mexican economy registered simultaneously, a negative growth in the
real GDP, a rate of inflation of over 100% and an abrupt rise in the rate of
unemployment (2). Tables 4.2 and 4.3 clearly depict the fall in real GDP and
per capita GDP coupled with the rise in foreign debt, inflation and urban
unemployment.
Until 1982, however, Mexico had enjoyed, on average, substantially high
rates of growth particularly in the industrial sector (3). As it can be seen
from table 4.3, real GDP grew 5.7% in the 1950s, 7.1% in the 1960s and 7.0%
in the 1970s. Real per capita GDP also grew during these periods and, most
significantly, important structural changes took place, mainly as a result of the
strategy of industrialization pursued by successive governments (4). Table 4.4
(1) It is not our purpose to analyse the origins of the crisis in the present work. We shall
only say that it is not a sudden event but has long historical and structural roots deeply
embedded in Mexico's capitalist model of development. In this respect, see the works of
Cockcroft (1983) and Ayala et al (1983).
(2) In the National Development Plan of 1983, the critical situation of the Mexican economy
at the end of 1982 was described as follows: "doubling of the rate of unemployment and
increasing deterioration of the labour market; contraction of manufacturing and agricultural
production and a strong fall in construction activity; levels of inflation of 100% and
acceleration of the latter to an unwonted speed; contraction of the national income and a
strong reduction in the availability of resources to finance investment; public deficit of over
15 percent of the product; disproportionate relative weight of the debt service and virtual
suspension of payments abroad" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1983,p.35). Early in 1985, the crisis
was still far from over and the government was hoping its economic measures to bring
about the first increase in per capita GDP in four years (de la Madrid,1985). Of course,
Mexico was not the only Latin American country to suffer from an acute economic crisis in
the early 1980s. The crisis was to a greater or lesser extent a generalized phenomenon
throughout the Latin American region. See Iglesias (1983) for a description of the crisis for
the region as a whole. Also Serrano (1984).
(3) Even in the worst year of the 1970s, that is 1976, the GDP still grew by 1.7% (Ayala
et al, 1983).
(4) Although formally a democracy, Mexico has been effectively ruled by one party, the
Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) for most of the twentieth century. The party was
founded in 1929 under the name of Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) to give an
institutional set up to the political forces emerged from the revolution. "By 1933, the old
parties had disappeared and the PRM [Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana A.M.], a new and
very powerful mechanism to keep all the members of the "Revolutionary family' in line,
was born. In 1938, with the formation of the PRI, direct membership was replaced by
affiliation through a national organization belonging to any of the four functional sectors:
army, labor, the peasantry, and the so-called "popular" or bureaucratic sector...Since 1938,
the most important political struggles have taken place within the party and its
organizational network. The problem of succession at any level of government -municipal,
state, or national- or within the organizations that form the party was finally
institutionalized" (Meyer,1977,p.15). Today, about 56% of the population of the country
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shows how the participation of industry in the global GDP increased from 26.5%
to 35% between 1950 and 1982, while that of the primary sector fell from
19.2% to 8.8%. The service sector increased its participation by 2.6% in the same
three decades. In terms of GDP, therefore, the industrial sector has been clearly
the most dynamic of the Mexican economy -see growth rates in table 4.4- and,
to the extent that its largest contributor has been the manufacturing industry,
this has elevated the country to its current status of newly industrializing
country (NIC) or semi-industrialized country. In effect, from table 4.5 it is
possible to observe that the manufacturing GDP accounted for about one-quarter
of the total GDP and around 70% of the total industrial GDP in the early-
1980s. In addition, the average growth rates of manufacturing GDP have
remained high for most of the postwar period: 6,1% during the 1950s, 9.1%
during the 1960s (Aspra,1977) and 6.3% between 1970 and 1982 (table 4.5).
Such figures are certainly among the highest in Latin America and have
underpinned the rapid rise of Mexico's share in the gross manufacturing product
(GMP) for the region as a whole: from 21.3% in 1950, Mexico's share of the
Latin American GMP was estimated to have increased to 30.4% in 1982
(Plaetzer,1984). Mexico is now the second industrial power in Latin America (5),
behind Brazil which had an estimated 37.5% share of the region's GMP in 1982.
In that year, both countries together accounted for more than two-thirds of the
total GMP of Latin America, a substantial increase from their combined 43.7%
of 1950 when Argentina was the leader with a share of 26.6%. In per capita
GMP terms, however, with a population much smaller than Brazil's 120 million,
Mexico was estimated at the top of the region with a figure of $342 dollars in
1982 (ibid.).
belong to PRI's organizations and the control from above is such that Meyer concludes that
"in Mexico... the majority of the population have no political representation" (ibid.). See
also Calvert (1972) and for an analysis of the unfolding of Mexico's political system in
recent years Whitehead (1981).
(5) To put Mexico's progress into perspective, one has to consider that, in 1980, the Latin
American industrial sector produced 5.2% of the total world manufacturing output, an
increase of 1.2% from its 1950 level of 4%. Taking into account the Third World alone,
Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for approximately 54% of the manufactured GDP
in 1981 -$70,986 million out of $131,193 for all Third World countries. Asia accounted for
36% and Africa for 10%. In terms of exports and imports of industrial goods, the
performance of Latin America shows the effect of an strategy directed more towards import
substitution than to participation in world-wide exports. Thus, in 1975, the subcontinent
exported only 7% of its manufactured output compared with 30% for Asia and the Middle
East (without Japan and Israel) and 13% for Africa. On the other hand, Latin America
accounted for 7.2% of world imports of industrial goods in 1975, almost half its 13% share
of 1955. (Plaetzer,1984).
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Concurrently with the relative growth of the industrial and manufacturing
sectors of the economy, the structure of the economically active population has
altered considerably in Mexico since the Second World War. Thus, the industrial
workforce increased from 15.5% in 1940 70 27% in 1985 and that engaged in
the manufacturing industry increased from 11.4% to 19.1% in the same period.
Table 4.6 shows the evolution of the economically active population (EAP) by
sector between 1900 and 1985. Together, the industrial and service sectors had
71.5% of the EAP in 1985 while those working in the primary sector
(agriculture, forestry and fishing) amounted to less than a third of the EAP.
This was a complete reversal of the situation in 1930 when the EAP engaged in
the primary sector amounted to 70.4% of the total. In the last 50 years,
therefore, Mexico's development strategy based primarily on industrialization and
urbanization has completely changed the distribution of the EAP in the country.
Most economically active Mexicans now belong to the service sector (i.e.,
transport and communications, commerce, government and other services) which,
since 1940, has more than doubled to reach a share of 44.5% in 1985.
Undoubtedly, the scale of Mexico's urban and industrial advance is
impressive and explains why the country always is included among the NICs
despite some differences of interpretation as to the meaning of the concept (6).
All the more so as "during the 1970s. Mexico was a rapidly growing exporter of
technology" (Blomstrom and Persson,1983,p.494) with many reported cases of
technology exports based on what could be considered local innovation. In effect,
a study by Dahlman and Cortez (1984)
"...identified 160 technology exports transactions related to the
industrial sector by 42 different exporters. These exporters include
producers of final or intermediate goods, producers of capital goods,
industrial engineering firms and research institutes...Most of the exports
are based on the experience accumulated by these firms in assimilating,
using and adapting technology to local conditions. A number,
however, are based on what may be considered local innovations
motivated by different scale requirements, the desire to use locally
available natural resources, or the need to replicate technology which
could not be purchased from abroad" (Dahlman and Cortez,pp.614-616)
(7).
Moreover, the same study noted that the cumulative value of capital goods
exports between 1975 and 1979 was greater than that of any other type of
technology export trade. And such export performance of the capital goods sector
(6) See note 29 in Chapter I.
(7) See also Katz and Ablin (1978a,1978b), Lall (1980,1983), Jenkins (1979).
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was not without internal correspondence, for, as Bhaduri (1985) describes, in the
late 1970s, " the manufacturing sector as a whole in Mexico was undergoing
significant structural changes insofar as the capital goods sector maintained a
faster rate of expansion compared with other manufacturing production"
(Bhaduri,p.3) (8). Quantitatively, the latter sector grew at an annual rate of
8.4% during 1977-1981, while capital goods production grew at 15.5%. In fact,
in 1981-1982, Mexico was the largest investor in capital goods in Latin America,
raising its share of the total Latin American investment from about one-quarter
in 1976 to over one-third in 1981 (Plaetzer,1984).
All in all, therefore, Mexico's development process has greatly transformed
the country's economic structure, leading to an expansion and diversification of
its industrial and technological base. We shall see later on, whether this process
has been accompanied by successes of equal magnitude regarding the ultimate
development goals advocated in the National Development Plan. For the moment,
suffice it to emphasize that development in the sense of local capital
accumulation through the expansion and diversification of the country's
productive base, particularly the industrial base, is something that has certainly
taken place in Mexico.
4.1*2. Structural Characteristics and Problems of Mexico's
Capitalist Development
In the present section, we shall look at the qualitative issues behind the
quantitative picture of Mexico's capitalist development process. Our aim is to
find out what social interests have been in control and have primarily benefited
from this process and to what extent the ultimate goals of the development
process have been met or are in the process of being met. From this, we expect
to produce an insight into the potential social constituents of an IMC in Mexico,
since it is our view that, in a symbiotic relationship to the process of
development as it actually takes place, a social constituency also develops which
exercises a dominant role in the direction of this process of development. Such
social constituency, as we have argued before, results from the convergent
interests of different social forces within the context of a given development
(8) For an analysis of the historical development of the capital goods sector in Mexico, see
Lorentzen (1984). According to this author..."The overall industrial expansion of the sixties
led to the first decisive expansion of a local production of capital goods. This process was a
process of import substitution, which increased the overall internal integration of production"
(Lorentzen,p.iv.20).
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model and material limits such as the degree of development of the technical
base of society.
For our purposes, what is most relevant about the Mexican case, is that
the important industrial advances seen in the previous section took place mostly
as a result of a model of capital accumulation based on import substituting
industrialization (ISI). In Mexico, such a model had its origins in the 1930s
when, as a result of the crisis of the world capitalist system and the consequent
contraction of the international markets, the country was forced to seek methods
to produce internally the products previously imported from the developed
countries. This was the beginning of the rupture with the primary exporter
model which had predominated before and whereby the country's role in the
international division of labour was basically that of producer of raw materials
and agricultural products. Import substituting industrialization was greatly
favored in the 1930s, particularly under the administration of Lazaro Cardenas
(1934-1940), so that by the end of the decade the foundations of the
industrialization model which has dominated economic development in Mexico
until today were established. Even so, as Gutierrez (1981) states, "the
consolidation of the process of import substitution, the break with the primary-
exporter model and the firm beginning of industrialization only occur after the
Second World War" (Gutierrez,p.864). It is not our intention here to deal in
detail with the characteristics of the postwar ISI in Mexico (9), except to unveil
the characteristics of its dominant social constituency, i.e., the social forces
making up such a constituency and the inter-relations established between them
within the process of capital accumulation in Mexico.
There are various aspects in the process of IMC in Mexico which are
fundamental to the understanding of its social constituency. First, it is the fact
that ISI is, essentially, a process of local capital accumulation although, in
theory, it represented a strategy to reach the industrial levels of developed
capitalist countries and, along with it, the same levels of socioeconomic well-
being and independence (10). Through ISI, Mexico attempted to close the 'gap'
(9) Various scholars have dealt with the historical issues and characteristics of the process of
ISI in Mexico. See, for instance, Furtado (1970), Villarreal (1977), Aspra (1977), Gutierrez
(1981), Cockcroft (1981,1983), Levi de Lopez (1980).
(10) "It was thought that the strategy of import substitution would automatically generate
not only growth, but also economic development; that is to say, that it would increase
employment and improve the standards of living of the masses (through income
redistribution). All this would be accomplished with domestic autonomy, since inward-
looking growth would permit the emergence of a national industry" (Villarreal,1977,p.7l).
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with the developed countries while positing the latter as the ultimate goal to be
achieved. Second, it is the decisive participation of the Mexican government in
directing and promoting the process of industrial capital accumulation through
ISI. In this respect, in a context of prolonged political continuity and stability,
the involvement of the Mexican government greatly benefited the expansion of
national private capital as the interests of both clearly converged on this basis.
Thirdly, it is the major importance of foreign capital, particularly US's, in
Mexico's process of industrial capital accumulation, both through direct
investment and loans. It was to be the foli of foreign capital to contribute with
the technology and the financial resources which the rapid process of capital
accumulation demanded. In this respect, government and private national capital
interests converged with those of foreign capital seeking to expand its own
process of capital accumulation on a global scale. As we shall see, however, such
convergence has been limited and contradictory, resulting in a process of local
capital accumulation which is far from autonomous and self-sustaining. Let us
see the specific forms in which government, national private capital and foreign
capital have articulated themselves in Mexico's development process and how this
process has been shaped by their convergent and contradictory interests.
4.1.2.1. Relations Between the State (Government) and Private
National Capital
Without profound and protracted government participation, Mexican
industrialization could not possibly have reached the levels it has today. The
state has actively promoted the process of local capital accumulation by creating
favourable conditions for private capital both national and foreign (11) and,
also, by investing heavily in the industrial sector, thus creating a public
industrial sector of considerable magnitude (12).
In pursuing the above activities the overriding interests of the Mexican
state have been to ensure the reproduction of the present capitalist social order
and, in particular, the control and stability of the political system. In this
(11) "The State's main goal has been to promote capital accumulation. Towards this end, it
has consistently strived to create a favorable climate for private capital" (Reyna,1977,p.l57).
(12) "The State—became a public entrepreneur and key element in the orientation of the
economic process from the beginning. The State as economic administrator...becomes a full-
fledged reality during the Cardenas administration and, more particularly, with the initiation
of the industrialization process directed by the State since the Second World War. Today,
there are close to 500 enterprises, some completely public and others in majority or minority
partnership with the State, which employ more than a half million people" (Leal,1975,p.59).
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context, the state has not sought to monopolize the process of capital
accumulation in Mexico, but rather to regulate it, keeping a balance with private
national capital and foreign capital in accordance with its own goals and those
of the other social forces. In relation to private national capital, most authors
see the interests of the state clearly fusing with those of national capital in
pursuit of capital accumulation. As Weinert (1977) has put it, "...The State has
always acted within a capitalist context... and has encouraged private national
capital where possible. The State has viewed its role as complementary, not
replacing, private capital" (Weinert,p.l24) (13). The way in which the state has
complemented private national capital is reflected, according to Smith (1977), on
two basic guidelines for governmental economic policy which Mexican
entrepreneurs and politicians seem to have tacitly agreed upon since the mid-
19405.
"One has held that the state should permit the entry of desirable
foreign capital but at the same time protect national industry from
excessive international competition, principally through import controls
and regulation on foreign investment. The other guideline...has assigned
to the state the role of controlling and, when necessary, repressing the
masses -the workers, the peasant and the poor. Together, these policy
orientations have furnished a reasonably coherent and workable
prescription for maintaining the country's capitalist system"
(Smith,1977,p.141).
A similar view is proposed by Reyna (1977), who argues,
"What is specific to Mexico is the role of the state, which has been
crucial in maintaining the capitalist dynamic. The Mexican state has
created a climate very favorable to private investment, not only
through attractive incentives such as industrial protectionism or tax
exemptions but, perhaps more important, through a very effective
political infrastructure which absorbs and neutralizes demands. The
corporatist structure of the PRI is one of the key elements in the
success of this neutralization process" (Reyna,p.l58).
In the promotion of local capital accumulation and subordination of the
masses, therefore, the state and private national interests complement each other
(14). In Mexico, however, this does not mean that the state and the political
elite controlling it are the same as, or mere subservients of, private capital.
(13) See also Hamilton (1975) for a historical perspective particularly related to the role of
the Mexican state under Cardenas.
(14) In subordinating the masses' demands and by keeping the wages low, for instance, the
state clearly contribute to the process of capital accumulation by helping to raise the rate of
profit. According to Cockcroft (1983), the state's enforcement of strict labor discipline and a
low wage scale has been fundamental. "From 1939 to 1946, the manufacturing worker's real
wage dropped 50 percent; it did not recover its 1939 purchasing power (when it was
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Indeed, as Smith (1977) and Weinert (1977) have both noted, the political and
business elites are clearly distinct, with the state pursuing its own goals rather
than those of private capital. In other words, "...The business elite and the State
are...not as close as the coincidence of class interests and state policies would
suggest" (Weinert,1977,p.126). Instead, it is primarily because their goals have
coincided in the process of capital accumulation that "what has been good for
the state has been good for the country's capitalists. But this coincidence is a
result of governmental policy rather than the guiding motive for it"
(Smith,1977,pp.147-148). A good example, in this respect, is furnished by the
state control of foreign capital which while benefiting and protecting national
private capital, "seems to be prompted less by a desire to favor the upper
classes than by a commitment to nationalism and to the protection of its own
authority from the challenge to sovereignty posed by foreign capital"
(Weinert,1977,p.l26). The Mexican state .therefore, has a clear degree of
autonomy in relation to private capital and this enables it to take a longer-term
and broader view of the country's development process. Such autonomy of the
state, however, should not be construed as total lack of influence of private
national capital upon its policies. Indeed, Whitehead (1981) argues that the social
leverage of private capital vis-a-vis the state has increased with the social
changes accompanying industrialization. On this score. Whiting's position seems to
struck the right balance.
"The conclusion about the relation between the State and national
capital is not that the State is a captive of the private sector. Rather
the private sector has an effective power of veto on those chief
initiatives threatening its economic power. On its part, the State is
committed to follow a model of capitalist development and is relatively
autonomous from the short-term specific interests of national capital to
adopt policies which in the long-term will be in the interest of
national capital" (Whiting,1981,p.88).
The same primacy of the state's own interests seems also to underly its
major participation in the Mexican economy through the ownership of many key
industries and a substantial share of the national investment. A leading Mexican
sociologist, Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, has made this crystal clear.
"Public investment is part of the state's power. It entails a capacity to
generate jobs, goods and services and an ability to negotiate with other
states, particularly the U.S. The state-owned companies, through the
investments and outlays of the public sector, help to implement a
policy of concessions and negotiations with the large private foreign
and domestic companies, with smaller companies and with popular and
particularly low because of runaway inflation) until 1968" (Cockcroft,p.l54).
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political organizations. The public companies function as a stabilizing
force, as a means of stimulating the economy during recessions and as
complement to the government's system of stimulation and control"
(Gonzalez Casanova,1980,p.159).
A brief historical review of the expansion of the public sector in the
Mexican economy is given by UNIDO RCSB (1983). According to this source the
first public entities were created in the twenties, including Banco de Mexico
(central bank) and some mining enterprises. In subsequent decades, the state
sector continued to expand through expropriations and the creation of new
enterprises. In the sixties, in particular, the state sector experienced a strong
expansion. It enlarged its areas of activity to diverse sectors of the economy and
started large projects in the iron and steel, petrochemical, electric, capital goods
and fertilizer branches of activity. During the 1970s, Echeverria's administration
(1970-1976) created a larger number of public enterprises than any previous
government. Overall, by the late 1970s, the state had the control of all utilities
while dominating basic industries and finance (Weinert,1977).
As regards investment, the role of the state has been substantial. Thus,
the public sector at large contributed 43% of total investment between 1940 and
1954, 31% between 1955 and 1961, 40% between 1962 and 1970 (Gonzalez
Casanova,1980) and, after a relatively low start of 35.5% in 1970, public
investment grew to a high level of 46.3% by 1980. Table 4.7 shows the
evolution of total investment in Mexico during the 1970s and the changes in the
participation of public and private investment. As we can see, public investment
grew considerably in these years, reflecting, according to Gutierrez (1981), an
important alteration with regard to Mexico's pattern of development of the
1960s. In his words,
"The most important change occurring in recent years has been the
endogenization, by the State, of the central variable of the model of
accumulation. This is transcendental and determines a clearly defined
pattern for the economic development of Mexico in the years to come.
By taking over the "lever" of the development model, the State has
partially displaced the private sector from this privilege. Now the
durable consumer goods industry is no longer the most dynamic
industry, or at least the one which indicates best the growth trends of
the domestic product. During the last years, this primacy has been
shared with that part of the oil industry devoted to the export of
hydrocarbons" (Gutierrez,p.866).
In effect, the combination of two crucial events during the 1970s gave the
Mexican government the "lever" of the country's development process. One was
the crisis of the model of ISI based primarily on the growth of the durable
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consumer goods industrial sector (e.g., cars, electro-domestic goods, etc.) and the
other was the discovery and subsequent exploitation of enormous oil reserves in
Mexico. On the first account, by the mid-1970s, it became plain that the
contradictions accumulated throughout the period of import substituting
industrialization had reached a critical point in terms of the balance of payment
deficit and the growing foreign debt. Since the 1950s Mexico had had a
persistent deficit on its current account balance and this accelerated sharply in
the 1970s reaching a cumulative level of over 25 billion dollars (ibid.) (15).
On the other hand, and particularly since the 1960s, the government had made
the external debt a systematic mechanism to adjust the current account deficit
(external sector) as well as the internal budget deficit. By the mid-1970, the
total external debt of Mexico had reached about $30 billion
[Green(1983),Reynolds(1978)] (16). In addition, the economic crisis was
accompanied by a social crisis threatening the stability of the whole system. In
effect, ISI based primarily on the growth of the durable consumer goods sector
had proven to be regressive in terms of wealth redistribution. Its reliance on the
concentrated market of the high middle income groups demanding these goods
had resulted in these groups concentrating the lion's share of the benefits (17).
Not surprisingly, in 1968, the government had suffered a major political
challenge which was forcefully suffocated resulting in the massacre at the Plaza
of Three Cultures (Tlatelolco) on the eve of the Olympics Games the same year
(18).
Fortunately for the state, enormous oil reserves were found in Mexico,
which brought about a substantial increase in the value of the country's exports
(15) The deficit was intrinsic to the process of ISI and the rapid growth of the Mexican
economy. As Reynolds (1978) put it, "Mexico was caught in a typical dilemma. Its rapid
growth required the importation of raw materials and intermediate goods if rising internal
demand were not to place serious pressures on the price level. Exports were unable to
grow at a pace adequate to satisfy import requirements, partly because the new industrial
capacity was not yet sufficiently competitive to permit rapid growth of manufactured
exports, while growing domestic needs and a slowdown in agricultural development were
reducing the export potential from that sector" (Reynolds,p.l977). See also Aspra (1977),
Villarreal (1977).
(16) Since then the foreign debt has more than trebled (see table 4.1) and in 1982 Mexico
was unable to meet its service and the country was plunged in the worst financial-economic
crisis of the post- revolutionary era. For details about the evolution and characteristics of
the external debt problem in Mexico, see Green (1981,1982,1983), Beltran del Rio and Klein
(1984), Assereta (1984).
(17) Later we shall deal with the social issues in greater detail.
(18) "Conservative estimates put the number of dead at 49 and wounded at 500, but most
observers estimated 500 dead, 2,500 wounded, and 1,500 -mostly students- arrested...Mexico's
boasted political "stability" had come to a bloody and tragic end; a new era of crisis was
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as oil production increased rapidly throughout the seventies, reaching an annual
growth rate of 16% between 1970 and 1982 (Mendoza,1984) (19). This
translated itself into a sizeable increase in foreign exchange for the country and,
particularly, for the state, given that the oil industry is under its complete
control trough PEMEX (Petroleos Mexicanos), the state-owned company
established in 1938 after the expropriation of foreign petroleum companies. Thus
in 1980, the export of approximately 900,000 barrels a day meant for Mexico
between $10 and $12 million a day, and by 1983, it was expected that 2
million barrels a day would earn Mexico $32 million, or $11.5 billion a year at
1980 prices (Villarreal and Villarreal,198l). It was this new source of capital
accumulation coupled to the crisis of the pattern of industrialization based on
durable consumer goods that gave the state the "lever" of the new oil-based
model of accumulation.
As we said earlier, it is not our concern to discuss here the unfolding of
the 1981-1982 Mexican crisis which took place within the new oil-based model
of capital accumulation and which responded partially to the fall in oil prices in
the world market (20). Suffice it to indicate that one major economic trend has
been the so-called "petrolization" of the Mexican economy with the result that,
as Cockcroft (1983) put it, "...Once more in its history Mexico is a mono-
beginning" (CockcTOft,1983,p.24l).
(19) "A decade ago Mexico was a net oil importer with reported production of 311,000
barrels a day and holdings of 5.6 billion barrels. In his September 1, 1980, State of the
Nation Address, President Lopez Portillo proclaimed that daily output exceeded 2.3 million
barrels a day, nearly 1 million of which was for exports. On the basis of current yields,
Mexico claims fifth place (after the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Iraq)
among the world's oil producers" (Grayson,1981,p.146). On the basis of total proven reserves
which reached 72.5 billion barrels in 1984, Mexico was fourth in the world league behind
the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and Iran (Mendoza,1984). In addition, it is estimated that
the potential reserves of the country are approximately 250 billion barrels.
(20) Interestingly enough and contrary to expectations that oil would help Mexico to reduce
her dependence on foreign capital and even to eliminate the S30 billion debt it had in 1980,
what happened was a huge increase in the external debt as investments in imports soared
with the rapid expansion in oil capacity and industrial capacity in general. "Most new
investments by PEMEX are financed by foreign loans. In recent years, PEMEX's income has
been half its expenditures, leading to its mid-1982 debt of $25 billion (or one-third of the
nation's foreign debt, another 15 percent of which is owed by the state electricity complex
CFE). PEMEX export earnings do not suffice to meet the service payments on Mexico's
foreign debt, as PEMEX expansion fuels the vicious circle of technology imports/debt already
described" (Cockcroft,1983,p.262). On the other hand, since 1981, the oil prices have never
recovered forcing Mexico to cut the price of its own oil with huge losses in foreign
exchange. Only recently, in February 1986, in the lapse of two weeks Mexico reduced its oil
price by an average of $8.68 a barrel, the sharpest cut ever. Averaged over a year, it
means an approximate loss of $4.5 billion in foreign exchange for Mexico as nearly, or
nearly 40% of this year projected interest bill on the country's $97 billion foreign debt" (
Financial Times, 3 February 1986,p.l and Financial Times, 17 February 1986,p.2)
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exporter, as oil accounts for 75 percent of its exports earnings"
(Cockcroft,p.262). Table 4.8 shows the rise of oil exports during the 1970s and
the rapid fall in the relative share of other sectors, particularly, manufacturing
which accounted for more than half the exports in the first half of the 1970s.
For the moment, what is of special relevance to us is the fact that the Mexican
state has become, even more than before, an inseparable and major constituent
of Mexico's development process. The relative weight of its policies and
investments, therefore, is bound to deeply influence the socioeconomic shape of
the country and hence, of the electronics industry too.
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4.1.2.2. Relations Between the State, National Private Capital and
Foreign Capital in Mexico: The Rise and Workings of the
Social Constituency of Mexico's Postwar Industrialization
Along with government and national private capital, foreign capital is also
an important social constituent of Mexico's postwar industrial development
process. It has been so since the 1950s and, particularly since 1955 when
"...Mexican planners...deliberately encouraged foreign investment and designed
policies to attract foreign capital into new or undercapitalized areas of industry"
(Weinert,1977,p.l09). Certainly, foreign capital had been present in Mexico
before the 1950s (21), but since the second decade of the present century, a
combination of historical circumstances had meant a relative reduction of its
presence in the Mexican economy at the same time that national capital, both
state and private capital, experienced considerable expansion. The Mexican
Revolution of the 1910s, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Second World
War and also later the Korean War, were all major events that favoured the
accumulation of national capital while curtailing the activities of foreign capital
(22). For instance, local manufacturing of light consumer goods became a
dominant aspect of Mexico's economic development only after the Depression
finally brought about the collapse of the primary exporter model. The Second
World War further strengthened the local manufacturing sector (23) as the
reduction in foreign supply of manufactured products de facto protected the
growth of the infant Mexican industry. In addition, the strategy of the state
(21) For instance, until the Revolution the mining sector -the most important export sector-
was strongly dominated by foreign capital. The expansion of US capital had been
particularly swift. Thus, from 1870 to 1912, Mexico had attracted more direct foreign
investment from this country than any other nation in the world. In 1944, Britain and the
US dominated direct foreign investment in Mexico with $635 and $542 million respectively
(Evans and Gereffi,1980).
(22) "Between the Mexican Revolution and the start of the depression, there was a complete
suspension in the growth of foreign investment in Mexico—After 1912 the only important
growth of U.S.'s direct foreign investment took place in the petroleum sector. Even after
1929, when stability had been restored, the growth of direct foreign investment was slow.
In fact, in absolute terms, U.S.'s investment fell during the depression and it did not
recover the 1914 level until 1950" (Evans and Gereffi,1980,p.20).
(23) "The outbreak of World War II sufficiently distracted the major imperialist powers
from attending to Mexico's internal affairs to permit Mexico to undertake the first steps of
its industrialization program on its own. With its northern neighbor unable to export the
usual quantity of manufactured goods, Mexico increased protective tariffs for its
manufacturers and engaged in intensive import substitution; industrial production jumped 35
percent. The United States purchased copious amounts of silver to help finance its war
production, as well as other minerals and varied foodstuffs. Mexico's exports doubled
during the war. The United States also advanced large credits for Mexico's industrialization
program, and a number of private investors, fleeing U.S. wartime price regulations and high
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became one of industrialization via import substitution so that conscious
protection and incentives strongly stimulated the nascent industries. Fundamental
to it all was the existence of highly favourable financial circumstances for the
country as the demand for Mexican exports increased greatly with the Second
World War. By the early 1950, the Korean War increased even further the
prices of Mexican exports, thus giving the national process of industrial capital
accumulation an extended lease [Evans and
Gereffi(l980),Villarreal(l977),Furtado(l970)]. By this this time, it appeared as if
Mexico was on its way to become an industrial nation, thus breaking with its
deep economic dependence of the past. The same events which, as we saw in
Chapter III, had galvanized the social complex in the US (i.e., the Second World
War and the Korean War), had also help the development of industrialization in
Mexico and hence, the strengthening of the national social constituents of the
process of local capital accumulation, namely, the state and private national
capital.
By the 1950s, however, the bonanza of the international economic
conditions for Mexico had come to a close with the end of the Korean war. The
demand for Mexico's exports fell sharply after the Korean War and the country
suffered a severe recession leading to a 45% devaluation of the peso in 1954
(24). In the face of the new circumstances, the government decided to deepen
the process of ISI to include durable consumer goods, specially cars, and to try
to promote local manufacturing of intermediate and capital goods. Such step,
however, demanded investments which were much more capital- and
technological-intensive than those associated to the industrial path Mexico had
run thus far. In particular, Mexico's technological capabilities were not up to the
standards required by the new phase of development, so that in an effort to
accelerate the process, foreign capital investment was seen as the solution. For
the US capital, whose postwar transnational expansion we have discussed in
Chapter HI, this was just what it wanted (25). Foreign capital began to pour
into the Mexican industry and, for the first time, it went primarily into the
taxes, invested in Mexico as -well" (Cockcroft,1983,p.l5l).
(24) The Mexican peso fell from a value of 8.65 per dollar in 1953 to 12.50 per dollar in
1954 (NAFINSA.1981).
(25) "...toward 1940 it appeared that the Mexican State...had established the basis for
capitalistic development, with considerable autonomy vis-a-vis the imperialistic system.
Nevertheless, by the end of the Second World War, it was evident that the new standards
for the international reproduction of capital were capable of influencing, at an ever
increasing rate, the State organizations of dependent countries, no matter how nationalistic
they were" (Leal,1975,p.6l).
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Mexican manufacturing sector (26), where it sought not only gain possession of
existing concerns but also to benefit from the protectionism and incentives
afforded by government policies (27). As a result, as one commentator has
described, "...Between 1940 and 1970 foreign investment in manufacturing was
multiplied 65 times, increasing from 7 percent of all foreign investment to 74
percent" (Gonzalez Casanova.1980,p.l60) (28). Table 4.9 shows the share of
total foreign investment accounted by different sectors of the Mexican economy
during the period 1970-1980. Clearly, the manufacturing sector has remained the
most important for foreign capital, with a share of 75% in 1980. Financial
establishments and Commerce were coming far behind with a combined share of
about 20%. In addition, table 4.9 shows that US capital has been by far the
largest investor in the Mexican economy; its share of total foreign investment
was about 80% in 1970 although it fell to 69% in 1980. As we shall presently
see, this is only one of the several indexes describing the dependence of the
Mexican economy upon that of the US.
The impact of the rapid multiplication of direct foreign investment in
Mexico's manufacturing sector has been enormous. On the positive side, as
Weinert (1981) argues, along with other factors, "...Through the 1950s and
1960s foreign investment...sparked rapid growth of the Mexican economy...Mexico
put together practically twenty consecutive years of growth in the 5-8 percent
range. Few, if any countries can rival such a healthy growth rate over such a
long period" (Weinert,p.ll6). On the other hand, in the words of the same
(26) "The period following the 1954 devaluation saw a large number of U.S. TNCs setting
up manufacturing affiliates in Mexico. A study of 294 such affiliates operating in the early
1970s found that more than three-quarters of them had been established since 1955"
(Jenkins,1979,p.25). Of course, one has to keep in mind that "...By the 1940s, the state had
forced foreign capital out of such basic sectors of the economy as utilities, oil, banking,
steel, communications and railroads. This process was extended in the 1950s with the
nationalization of the telephone company and a remaining electric utility company"
(Weinert,1977,p.l 13).
(27) For instance, imports of machinery and equipment were subsidized while quantitative
controls were imposed upon imports of manufactured goods. Tax discounts were also used as
incentives [Jenkins(l979), Evans and Gereffi(l980)J. According to Cockcroft (1983), US
capitalists increased their investments immediately after the war and "began purchasing many
of Mexico's new industries. U.S. direct investment in Mexico started to rise sharply in 1946,
doubled in the 1950s, tripled in the 1960s and quadrupled in the 1970s" (Cockcroft,p.l5l).
(28) It is interesting to note that the postwar change of foreign capital investment into the
manufacturing sector did not repeat itself throughout Latin America. "Since production
outlay was geared towards internal markets, the countries with a high demand were
favoured, namely, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico" (Plaetzer,1984,p.26). In 1967, these three
countries accounted for 48.1% of total direct foreign investment in Latin America and for




"In deciding to attract foreign investment, Mexican planners committed
themselves to a development strategy that rested on what foreign
capital had to offer and in return was obliged to create and maintain
conditions that would continue to attract foreign investment...[This
A.M.],..required a certain constellation of policies. These policies were
built around rapid industrial growth, import substitution (particularly
of consumer goods), capital intensive production, the use of modern
sophisticated technology, and a production structure oriented to high
income consumers" (ibid.)
Not that foreign capital imposed this development orientation. Rather it
was the internal forces, the state and private capital, which saw in this model
and, consequently, in foreign capital, the solution to the accumulation problem
associated with the deeper and more complex stages of industrialization. In other
words, in the implementation of this model what actually took place was a
convergence of interests and hence, the crystallization of a powerful constituency
of social forces involving the state, national private capital and foreign capital,
which came to shape the postwar process of industrial development in Mexico.
In Evans and Gereffi's view,
"The local elites interested in development had found some common
ground with the transnational interested in global expansion. Local
manufacturing increased, imports as percentage of total consumption
decreased, direct foreign investment diversified and local manufacturing
became more and more the property of foreigners...The vertical ISI
created the foundations for the "triple alliance" of the State,
multinational capital and local capital" (Evans and Gereffi,1980,p.26)
(29).
In Mexico, therefore, the galvanization of the social constituency of
industrialization ("the triple alliance") was primarily the result of economic
pressures and convergence of interests. The Mexican constituents urgently needed
to revitalize and deepen the process of local industrial capital accumulation
under the more difficult post-Korean War international economic conditions. In
turn, foreign capital, mostly US foreign capital, was seeking for investments
outlets abroad, driven as much by the opportunities arising from its almost
complete hegemony within the world capitalist system as by the relatively slow
growth of the market at home (see Chapter HI). Thus, unlike the formation of
the developed countries' social constituencies we saw in the previous chapter,
ultimately, the galvanization of the Mexican constituency did not occur around a
clearly identifiable "national objective", although, on the surface, it could appear
(29) Whiting (1981) calls the alliance between national capital, multinationals and the state
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so as the constituents converged around the Mexican process of industrialization.
The key factor, however, is that the interests of foreign US capital, or of any
foreign capital for that matter, in the latter process has never been as a goal
but merely as a means to further its own process of capital accumulation on a
global scale. This becomes clear as soon as we consider that foreign US capital is
nothing but US corporate capital operating transnationally. In other words, since
the main form of direct foreign investment in Mexico has been through
corporate capital's own global organic expression: the transnational corporation
(TNC) (30), it is plain that such investments are merely carrying onto the
international arena the process of capital accumulation based on profit-making
activity which constitute corporate's capital overriding goal. In this respect, only
to the extent that there is a coincidence between the latter goal and Mexico's
industrial advance, one could argue that transnational capital has been an
effective part of this advance. However, and for the same reason, it is possible
to realize that foreign capital not only will tend to control and shape this
process but, in accordance with its own interests, will push it forward only up
to the limit where it does not contradict the convenience of its own process of
capital accumulation.
The social constituency of Mexico's postwar industrialization.therefore, is a
highly contradictory ensemble of social forces. In it, not only the constituent
forces need each other for the realization of an accumulation process in which
they all have convergent interests, but, simultaneously, they strive to control
and influence this process towards their own goals by playing on each other's
relative strength and weaknesses. In practice, it will be this interplay of
interests, weaknesses and strength that will determine the relative weight of the
diverse social constituents and, ultimately, the shape of the industrialization
process itself under given historical circumstances.
as the " nan sancta trinity".
(30) "TNCs are corporations that have their base in one country but draw much of their
income, raw materials, and operating capital from several other countries, through ownership
of foreign subsidiaries, joint ventures with foreign governments or investors, and a host of
other means. The compelling force behind the rise of TNCs is the need for corporations to
grow and maintain their profitability, as well as to gain control over as much of the
world's resources and capital as possible. The TNC, a logical outgrowth of monopoly capital
that has outgrown nations, constitutes the economic heart of modern imperialism"
(Cockcroft,1983,pp.333-334,note 15). In Mexico, "...Some 85 percent of all foreign companies
were owned or controlled by multinational firms in 1979; in 1978 of 4359 foreign
companies 79 percent were North American" (Gonzalez Casanova,1980,p.l60).
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Thus, if we assume that none of the constituents wishes to jeopardize the
participation of the others in the process of capital accumulation, we find that
within the limits set by this general objective, in Mexico, the state will tend to
make use of its legal and economic machinery of incentives, regulations and
investments in order to safeguard and further its overriding interests. For the
most part, Mexican private capital will be a beneficiary of the actions of the
state and it will tend to use its own resources with little concern for factors
other than the profitable opportunities arising from the market and from its
relations with the state and transnational capital. On its turn, transnational
capital, with its much broader interests than Mexico's industrial process, will
make use of its capital-intensive investments and, above all, its technological
strength to take advantage of the opportunities in Mexico while satisfying the
needs of its own global process of accumulation. The latter means that
technology and hence, the degree of Mexico's technological capabilities, becomes a
key factor in the interaction between the transnational corporations and national
capital as represented by both state and private capital. In this respect, and as
a general rule, it can be said that the greater the technological strength of TNCs
vis-a-vis host nations in a given industrial sector, the greater the possibility for
these companies to exercise control over the process of accumulation and,
consequently, the greater their relative weight within the social constituency of
that particular industrial sector. From here and given that, in practice, Mexico's
technological capabilities will tend to vary greatly for different industrial sectors
(31), we can realize that there can hardly be a uniform pattern of interrelations
between the transnational and the national social constituents, but that, in fact,
their relative weights will tend to differ across the entire industrial spectrum of
the productive sphere. Of course, it is not technology alone that will determine
the actual pattern of interrelations between social constituents. For instance, the
state's regulatory actions and TNCs' global interests will also play a major role.
The former because, among other things, complete industrial sectors may be
totally or partially reserved for national capital; the latter because it may
simply not suit TNCs' global interests to seek heavy investment in one
particular industry ,or one particular country for that matter. Leaving aside
these cases, however, it seems plain that, wherever transnational and national
capital have become willing social constituents of Mexico's industrial process, it
(31) We have already seen that in some areas Mexico has even become an exporter of
technology. This is particularly the case in the fields of construction, petroleum, geothermia
and also in steel, paper textiles and some chemicals (Dahlman and Cortez). But as we shall
see in the case of the electronics industry, Mexico's capabilities are relatively undeveloped.
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will be the technological variable which will have largely determined the
relative weight of these social forces within the social constituency as a whole.
In effect, if one look at the pattern of postwar investments of transnational
capital in Mexico, it is possible to observe that not only US capital has been the
dominant force (see table 4.8), but also that those investments have concentrated
primarily in the most dynamic sectors of the manufacturing industry where the
relative weakness of the country's technological capabilities make it easier for
foreign capital to exercise control. Thus, according to Ramirez and Galicia (1972),
"...it is evident that foreign capital's strategy in Mexico has as its fundamental
objective the control of the industrial sector, and, within this sector, the control
of those sectors which are the most dynamic and advanced in technological
terms" (Ramirez and Galicia,p.ll4). Hence, as Weinert (1981) has corroborated,
"Within the industrial sectors, foreign investment has predictably
flowed to newer industrial activities, where new technology and
product innovation are required. Consequently, foreign investment tends
to be most prominent in the fastest growing and more profitable
sectors of the industrial sector" (Weinert,p.ll7).
Of course, the process above could not have happened without the
participation of the government, who, as we know, actively promoted such
investments as a way of deepening the process of ISI. Through incentives such
as favourable conditions for the importation of capital goods and by protecting
those existing industries where the internal market was already adequately
supplied, the state actually created the right conditions for foreign capital to
flow towards the new sectors of manufacturing (Jenkins,1979). Thus those
industries which became the growth poles of Mexico's postwar process of ISI
(i.e., chemical products, transport equipment, electrical and non-electrical
machinery and, to a lesser extent, food processing) became the focus for most of
the direct foreign investment. In 1970, for instance, it was found that two-
thirds of the US's direct total investment in Mexico was actually concentrated
in these industries (Evans and Gereffi.,1981) (32). Furthermore, in various cases
foreign investors also contributed with high percentages of total investments:
67% in chemical products, 79% in electrical machinery, 84% in rubber and so on
(Gonzalez Casanova,1980). Such high proportion of US's direct foreign
investment, which, incidently, has been heavily financed from internal financial
sources (33), has given transnational capital a controlling role in many key
(32) Wionczek (1972) has described that from a total of 315 US firms established in the
Mexican manufacturing sector between 1946 and 1967, 70% of them concentrated their
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sectors of the Mexican industry. In Cockcroft's words,
"By 1970, U.S.-based transnational corporations...had come to obtain the
following percentages of control of key sectors of the economy:
automotive, 57 percent: petroleum products and coke, 49 percent; paper
and cellulose, 33 percent: rubber, 76 percent: mining and metallurgy,
53.6 percent; copper and aluminium, 72.2 percent; tobacco, 100 percent;
industrial chemicals, 50 percent; food and beverages, 46.8 percent;
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 86.4 percent; electrical machinery, 50
percent; non-electrical, 52 percent; transportation equipment, 64 percent;
computers and office equipment, 88 percent; commerce, 53.4 percent;
construction materials, 38.9 percent" (Cockcroft,1983,p.l58).
In addition, for the Mexican industry as a whole, a major study on TNCs
found that by 1970 foreign firms (34) accounted for 35% of the total
production and represented 45% of the capital stock of the 290 largest industrial
concerns. Also, it was found that 55% of Mexico's industrial production was
generated in sectors were at least two in four of the largest concerns belonged
to TNCs. The latter figure increased to 79% when one or more TNCs concerns
were considered (Fajnzylber,1975).
It is this degree of control achieved by foreign capital which has led some
commentators to see a growing denationalization of the Mexican industry (Evans
and Gereffi,198l). The more so, as the historical trends have shown that in fact
transnational corporations have been growing with greater rapidity than private
national enterprises. In effect, between 1962 and 1970, TNCs grew at an average
annual rate of 17.4%, while national firms grew at a rate of 11% (ibid.). This
trend was compounded by the fact that those industrial sectors where TNCs
predominate have also expanded more rapidly than other sectors. Between 1960
and 1970, those sectors having more than 75% of TNCs participation grew at an
annual rate of 16.5% while those having less than 25% expanded at a rate of
only 9.5%. But perhaps even more worrisome for a nationalistic viewpoint was
the fact that the relative growth of transnational capital within the Mexican
industry has not only been the result of its more dynamic performance. It has
indeed partially resulted from an additional trend towards denationalization,
namely, the steady postwar rise of foreign acquisitions of Mexican firms. In
effect, a US Senate Subcommittee study of US companies operating in Mexico
operations in these industrial branches. See also Barkin (1975).
(33) "Between 1965 and 1970, Mexican private or public capital financed 71% of all foreign
investment" (Cockcroft,1981,p.267). See also Fajnzylber (1975).
(34) It has become acceptable to define foreign firms in one country as those with 25% or
more of their share capital registered as being in foreign hands. It is the criteria used by the
US Department of Commerce in its studies on foreign investment and is also recommended
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found that the share of new manufacturing affiliates established by acquisition
of a Mexican firm rose from 6% in 1946-50 to 75% in 1971-72 (35). The
study further showed that these were not all failing firms. In the year prior to
takeover, 74% of the firms acquired were profitable, one-half earning 9% or
more before taxes (Weinert,1977). Additionally, TNCs tended to favour the
acquisition of large Mexican enterprises, i.e., those with a capital stock of over
$5 million. Between 1960 and 1972, 57% of the total value of acquired
enterprises corresponded to this category and US TNCs accounted for 85% of all
acquisitions (Evans and Gereffi,1981).
On the whole, therefore, it seems pretty clear that Mexico's postwar
industrialization process has given US corporate capital a major relative weight
in the Mexican industry (36). In this sense, transnational capital (mainly US)
can only be considered as an intrinsic elements of the social constituency
controlling and shaping the process of Mexican capital accumulation. Without US
transnational capital, just as without the participation of the state, this process
simply would not be the same and this is exactly what makes Mexico's
dependence upon the US a structural phenomenon as profound as the major
concentration of capital that has accompanied Mexico's TNC-based capitalist
development.
In effect, the perennial force towards concentration of capital (see Chapter
III) has naturally manifested itself in Mexico leading to the oligopolization of
industry by both foreign US and Mexican large corporate capital. For instance,
about 1.7% of the industrial enterprises create 42.3% of the employment and
generate 53.7 percent of the industrial output (Gonzalez Casanova,1980). The
by the International Monetary Fund. See Jenkins (1979).
(35) Comparing the decades 1946-1957 and 1958-1967, Wionczek (1972) has described that
the total number of TNCs setting up quarters in Mexico increased from 156 to 335. But
while the number of subsidiaries established independently increased from 80 to 119 that of
acquisitions increased much more from 49 to 149. Among the most conspicuous fields where
this particular form of denationalization has occurred are "the food industry in which
United Fruit, Heinz, General Foods and Anderson Clayton are among the most visible foreign
companies; consumer durables, chemicals, electronics, metallurgy; services like department
stores, hotels and restaurants are also among the areas in which foreign interests have
obtained control of local businesses" (Barkin,1975,p.7l).
(36) Not only 79% of the 4,359 foreign companies in Mexico were North American in 1978
but, also, "...According to a study completed in 1970...of the 2,040 companies with the
largest incomes in Mexico, foreign (mainly U.S.) capital controlled 36 percent of the income
of the largest 400 companies and strongly participated in another 18 percent, while Mexican
private capital controlled only 21 percent and the Mexican government 25 percent. Of the
largest 100 industrial firms, 47 percent were foreign, 40 percent were private Mexican, and
13 percent were state" (Cockcroft,1983,pp.l57-158). See also Jenkins (1978).
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1965 industrial census enumerated almost 135,000 firms, but most of these were
small, marginal operations with few resources, in fact, the 1,117 largest firms
(0.82 percent of the total) accounted for 64.3 percent of total production and
66.7 percent of invested capital reported that year; the concentration in Mexican
manufacturing was exceedingly high but similar to US levels (Barkin,1975).
According to Fajnzylber (1975), 114 of the 230 sectors making up Mexico's
industry showed a concentration of more than 50% (i.e., the four largest firms
in the sector accounted for more than half of the sector's production). TNCs, in
particular, were found to locate in those sectors having the highest degree of
concentration. Thus, 61% of the TNCs' production and almost two-thirds of
their investment were in sectors having over 50% concentration, while the
average level of concentration for those sectors where TNCs' participation was
over 75% reached up to 77% (37). Foreign capital has concentrated particularly
in the areas of capital goods and basic intermediate industries. On their part,
Mexican private capital has concentrated its investments in light industry,
banking, agriculture, services and tourism. Here, stimulated by its own dynamic
of capital accumulation, Mexican capital has centralized ownership in the hands
of a few firms or economic groups. At the same time, there are innumerable
examples of alliance formation between foreign capital and local-elite capital. The
Banco Nacional de Mexico group.for instance, has developed alliances with such
TNCs as Westinghouse, Celanese, Union Carbide, Kimberley-Clark, and Scott
Paper. However, the best example of the foreign-domestic alliance is two
economic groups: ALFA group (with sales of $1.3 billion) and VISA group. In
1979, these two organizations were both listed in the Fortune 500 largest
corporations in the world, and they together constitute the Monterrey group
which is involved in virtually all key sectors of the economy and the most
strategic parts of society (Velasco,1983,p.l7). For this reason, Gonzalez Casanova
(1980) has concluded that Mexico is not a case of a general dependence of one
country upon another but rather of the dependence of a country and its
government on foreign- and domestic-owned corporations. In a more precise
way, all the tendencies we have analysed above, certainly define the very nature
of the Mexican economy.
(37) "This finding is supported by a U.S. Senate Subcommittee study of U.S. firms operating
in Mexico. This study found that U.S. firms tend to operate in highly concentrated markets
in Mexico and that they are frequently the leaders within those markets. Over 86 percent
of firms surveyed ranked themselves among the four leading firms of their main product
line, and 44 percent ranked themselves first" (Weinert,1977,p.ll6).
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"Because of dependence on foreign capital and technology, because of
large scale state participation, and because of domination by domestic
and foreign monopoly capital, Mexico's economy may be described as
dependent state monopoly capitalism. U.S. capital does not control the
economy in its entirety, but it wields sufficient influence to make a
critical difference - and therein lies Mexico's structural economic
dependence" (Cockcroft,1983,p.269).
4.1.23. The Contradictory Role of Transnational Capital (mainly
US) in Mexico's Postwar Development Process: Technology
and Decapitalization
Going back to Mexico's impressive postwar industrial development, it is
clear that the quantitative picture which has attracted so much attention
actually reveals little about the deep qualitative social issues which have
characterized such a development. In contrast, from our recent discussion, we
now know that behind Mexico's advances in industrial capital accumulation there
has in fact been a contradictory social constituency containing a strong foreign
element whose interests obey purposes much broader than Mexico's own process
of capitalistic industrialization. This means that, by and large, the purposes of
this dominant social constituency is hardly consistent with the goal of an
autonomous industrial development for Mexico. For instance, transnational capital
major relative weight in important sectors of the Mexican economy mostly
translate itself in the control of these sectors to satisfy the requirements of
TNCs' own global strategies of capital accumulation. Admittedly, this can
contribute to bring about economic growth, but insofar as transnational capital is
certainly not in the business of giving away its key elements of control, for
instance, by effectively developing R&D capabilities within the host countries,
this development can only be of the dependent and subordinated kind. It seems
to us that only this understanding help to explain why after many years of the
Mexican government allowing a rather free flow of imports of capital goods and
technology, the production of these crucial aspects never actually took a strong
hold within the Mexican economy. Likewise, it help us to understand why
foreign capital is actually contributing little to Mexico's process of autonomous
capital accumulation while reaping the benefits of its investments in this
country.
In effect, if we look more closely at Mexico's industrial performance,
particularly, in the context of the country's economic relation with the US, we
shall see that the high relative weight of US TNCs within Mexico's industrial
social constituency has only reinforced the country's strong dependence on the
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US at the same time that powerfully contributing to both balance-of-payment
deficits and worsening of the foreign debt. Table 4.10 shows the extent of
Mexico's dependence upon the US for most of her imports and exports. Between
1970 and 1981, the US accounted for an average proportion of over 60% of
both Mexico's imports and exports (38). In addition, the balance of trade has
been traditionally favourable to the US, with this country accounting for an
important proportion of Mexico's deficits (39). US transnational capital has been
fundamental in reproducing this situation through a variety of mechanisms
contributing to its own process of capital accumulation but clearly having a
negative effect on Mexico's accumulation process. Contrary to common wisdom,
for instance, foreign investors have on the whole taken out much more than
capital than they have put in the Mexican economy. Table 4.11 shows the
pattern of remittances abroad as compared with direct foreign investment for the
period 1970-1981. As we can see, with the exception of 1980, every other
year, more capital went out of Mexico than it was actually put in. Cockcroft
(1983) gives figures showing that foreign investors "have been taking out more
than twice what they have been investing since from at least the 1960s"
(Cockcroft,p.l60). More conservative estimates suggest that, during the sixties,
direct foreign investment amounted to $1,600 million while gross direct
investment outflows amounted to $2,500 million; as a result the net outflow for
the decade would have been $900 million (Barkin.1975) (40).
Table 4.11 also shows that the share of profits in the annual remittances
abroad is often less than 50%, whereas the share of royalties and other
mechanisms has been correspondingly higher. This fact reflects the strategic
importance of technology in the TNCs global process of capital accumulation.
Patents, licences, trade-marks, and know-how agreements have become crucial
mechanisms whereby the technological supremacy of TNCs and, correspondingly,
the technological dependence of countries like Mexico, is transformed into a
permanent source of extraction of capital from Third World countries. Little
wonder why TNCs have almost complete lack of interest in helping to develop
Mexico's autonomous technological and industrial capabilities (41). Technology
(38) The US is also absorbing 80% of Mexico's oil exports.
(39) After an almost continuous deficit throughout the postwar period, only the 1981/1982
crisis forced the government to apply policies to alter this situation. See table 4.2.
(40) According to Ramirez and Galicia (1972), between 1939 and 1966 approximately $2.2
billion came into the country as direct foreign investment. In the same period,
approximately, $2.8 billion were remitted abroad by foreign investors. That is, there was a
negative balance of $600 million for the Mexican economy.
(41) "...the scientific and technological development of underdeveloped countries may be seen
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enables them to exercise a great deal of control on the shape of Mexico's
accumulation process while providing an effective channel to transfer capital out
of the country (42). For instance, through internal trade between the parent
company and the subsidiaries in Mexico, TNCs have used technology to reduce
their payments of taxes to the Mexican government. By increasing their declared
technological costs they have reduced their declared profits and since royalty
payments are valid for tax exemptions, they have used this mechanism to remit
untaxed profits abroad. They have further reduced their declared profits and
corresponding taxes by underpricing exports of goods produced in Mexico and
sold to the parent company abroad [Weinert(1977),Cockcroft(1983)]. Such
technique known as transfer pricing are very difficult to control by UDCs
governments since they relate to TNCs' book keeping which normally UDCs
have no access to (43). TNCs have also used technology to gain advantages in
their dealings with Mexican companies. In exchange for technology, they have
sometimes negotiated equity participation (44), charged excessive fees for often
outdated technology and imposed a variety of restrictions, including, for instance,
restriction on exports by local companies, obligation to purchase raw materials
and other inputs, etc. [ibid., Nadal(1977)]. In all these forms, transnational
capital has sought to benefit from the subordination of Mexico's industrial
development to the logic of its own interests. Therefore, control of important
sectors of Mexico's industrial structure, high remittances of profits, high level of
imports of technology, prolonged balance-of-payment deficits and the profound
technological dependence of the country, can only be seen as interrelated aspects
as a potential danger by the MNC [multinational company A.M.]. This is so because a
strong scientific and technological system will allow underdeveloped countries to: 1) increase
bargaining power by undertaking efficient screening and identification of operations in
worldwide searches for appropriate technologies; 2) improve their capacity to adapt ( and
imitate) imported technologies; 3) ultimately, it will provide the domestic scientific and
technological system with enough elements not only for the local generation of productive
information, but also to develop a critical approach towards the relation of science and
technology vis-a-vis society" (Nadal,1977,23l).
(42) For instance,"...According to available data, royalty and technical assistance payments
made to central countries by foreign companies established in Mexico, increased from $12
million in 1955 to $40 million in 1960; and from $60 million in 1965 to to $80 million in
1972" (Ramirez and Galicia,1972,pp.l29-30). According to figures provided by Chudnovsky
(1982), these payments reached $97 million in 1975, later falling in 1977 to a low of $63
million as a result of Mexico's economic recession, and raising again to $92 million in 1979.
(43) TNCs in the Mexican pharmaceutical industry, for instance, by using various tricks of
internal bookkeeping...were reported as making up to $400 million a year on transfer pricing
alone" (Cockcroft,1983,p.l63).
(44) "...one of the mechanisms for acquiring control over already existing firms is through
the suspension or non-renewal of existing licencing agreements: this powerful leverage is used
to obtain equity participation guaranteeing control of major decisions concerning the firm"
(Nadal,1977,p.224).
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of one and the same process of TNC-dependent capital accumulation.
In effect, we have seen earlier how Mexico's attempt to deepen the process
of ISI led to extensive foreign capital (mainly US) penetration of Mexico's
manufacturing base in the postwar period. We have also seen that TNCs have
concentrated their control in the most capital intensive and dynamic sectors of
this industry. Through examination of additional data, we can now see not only
that TNC-dependent ISI has resulted in heavy imports of manufacturing inputs
but also that such imports are accounted to a large proportion by the operations
of TNCs. Tables 4.8 and 4.12 give an indication of the import/export structure
of the Mexican economy for the period 1970-1981. As we can see manufacturing
industry with a share of well over 80% accounts for the overwhelming part of
Mexico's imports. Also, at the beginning of the 1970s, more than half the
exports were accounted by manufacturing, although the rise of oil exports during
the decade brought down this proportion to just about 15% in 1981. By type of
goods (table 4.12), the import/export structure shows clearly the positive affect
of ISI on import of consumer goods. Thus and notwithstanding the renewed
increase in these type of imports in the late 1970s as a result of the oil-based
spending boom, the share of consumer goods imports has been quite low with
around 10% in 1981. This means that it has been productive goods (i.e.,
intermediate and capital goods) which have accounted for most of Mexico's
imports, thus showing the dependence of the country's productive base upon
external sources (45).
Table 4.13 shows the extent to which the domestic availability of the
different type of goods was covered by imports during 1973 and 1980. The
conclusion is obvious, the capital goods sector, long acknowledged as the key
sector for an autonomous industrial capability, is the weakest in Mexico having
less than 50% self-sufficiency in 1980 (46). The statistics for technology
imports show an even more dramatic picture of dependence. According to one
commentator, "80% of the technology employed is still foreign" (Gonzalez
Casanova,1980,p.l60), and, as expected, the highest proportion of the payments
(45) "Import substitution has done little to alter the external vulnerability of the Mexican
economy. The change in the structure of imports—made it more difficult to reduce imports
without widespread effects on economic activity. What is more, despite import substitution,
import grew more rapidly than exports" (Jenkins,1979,p.24). See also Linger (1985).
(46) It is interesting to note that the trend towards import substitution was reversed in
1977, when imports in every category increased, thus "making domestic production more
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for technology, 86%, originates in the industrial sector. Clearly, foreign capital,
which possesses the technological capabilities Mexico needs, has not been
transferring them. Indeed, as we indicated earlier, it has been fully exploiting
them in accordance with the dictates of its own process of capital accumulation.
In this respect, TNCs want Mexico importing as much technology, machinery
and other products from them as possible. Not surprisingly, "...While Mexican
industrial output increased 5 times between 1940 and 1965, imports of foreign
(mainly U.S.) industrial or capital goods and replacement parts increased 12.5
times" (Cockcroft,1983,p.l62). Thus, TNCs are not interested in Mexico producing
autonomously these products since this would lead to a reduction in the flow of
imports and, perhaps, even to an increased competition against their own
products. More specifically, the latter would mean the loss of control over an
important source of profits and, consequently, a major reduction in TNCs* ability
to shape the development of Mexico's economy in accordance with their
purposes. Just consider the role of TNCs regarding imports and exports in
Mexico, to realize why TNCs would not relish the prospect of losing that
control. In the early 1970s, a major study on TNCs in Mexico found that 49%
of the private sector's imports of production goods was accounted for by the
TNCs operating in the industrial sector. This represented 28% of Mexico's total
imports. Concurrently with their concentration in the most dynamic sectors of
the Mexican industry, more than half of the TNCs total imports was accounted
by the chemical and transport materials industries. The import coefficient (47) of
TNCs more than double that of Mexican firms (7.8% against 3.4% respectively).
In addition, 74% of US TNCs* imports came from the US, that confirming the
fact that most of the trade of subsidiaries of foreign companies in
underdeveloped countries take place with the parent and other affiliates of the
same TNC (48). The study estimated that the imports of foreign subsidiaries
from their respective firms reached $600 million. Considering the impact of
technology alone, the role of TNCs was even more conspicuous. It was found
that their technology-import coefficient (49) was approximately 7 times that of
national enterprises. In fact, 80% of the payments originating in the industrial
sector were made by TNCs (Fajnzylber,1975) (50).
(47) Import of intermediate inputs over the value of production.
(48) Quite revealing of the global character of TNCs' strategies of accumulation and of its
major impact on UDCs foreign trade activity, it has been estimated that in the early 1970s
in Mexico, 41% of the country's total imports from Argentina and 35.5% of its total
imports from Brazil actually corresponded to imports carried out by TNCs' subsidiaries
located there (Fajnzylber,1975).
(49) Total payments for technology over the value of production of all foreign subsidiaries
- 346 -
In marked contrast with their import patterns, TNCs subsidiaries in Mexico
have a similar export pattern to that of national firms. Fajnzylber (1975)
estimated the export coefficient of TNCs and Mexican firms at 2.8% and 2.6%
respectively. Proportionally, TNCs' exports represented around 35% of Mexico's
total manufacturing exports. In comparison with the volume of their sales in
Mexico, however, the value of TNCs* exports from Mexico represents a very
small proportion. Table 4.14 shows that, until 1966, exports were less than 2%
of the value of TNCs' local sales and most of them took place as a result of
intra-company trade. This shows clearly that the overwhelming interest of US
TNCs in Mexico is to supply the local market. Later, in 1972, TNCs exports
jumped up to 5.1% of the value of local sales. This was mostly the result of
the Mexican government promotion of exports which started around 1970 (51)
with the aim of reducing the chronic and cumulating balance-of-payment deficit
and also of expanding a demand that was showing signs of declining in the
local market (Evans and Gereffi,198l). The trend towards the increasing
participation of intra-company trade in these exports, however, remained
unaltered. Thus in 1972, 82% of TNCs' exports took place between affiliates.
Most importantly, in line with their major relative weight in the most dynamic
sectors of Mexican industry, TNCs were actually responsible for most of the
exports from these sectors. For instance, in 1975, 70% of the exports from the
in Mexico.
(50) According to a different estimate, "...In 1971 multinational corporations covered 93% of
the payments for imports of technology" (Gonzalez Casanova,1980,p.160).
(51) In 1971, the Mexican government instituted a system of incentives to promote exports.
"This comprised the establishment of tax devolution certificates; import of productive inputs
free of taxes; expansion of the Tange of short-term credits to exports given by FOMEX;
creation of FONEI to finance investments oriented towards export and efficient import
substitution, and creation of IMCE to increase the efforts in export promotion"
(Balassa,1983,p.215). Prior to the 1971 legislation "...The most important single development
of the 1960s as far as the export of manufactures is concerned was the special incentives
granted in 1965 for the development of labour-intensive industries in the border areas of the
North of Mexico. This led to a rapid growth of the "maquiladoras" or in-bond processing
industries in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These firms almost entirely US owned, were
able to import machinery, raw materials and semiprocessed products duty-free provided that
their entire output was exported. They were also able to take advantage of industrial estate
facilities provided by the Mexican government with low rents and cheap electricity and
water supplies" (Jenkins,1979,pp.26-27). The "maquiladora" has been the Mexican version of
the labour-intensive parts of the production process relocated to the Third World countries
by TNCs. As we saw in Chapter I, this process began basically during the 1960's as US
TNCs strove to exploit the cheap labour supply in UDCs, stimulated by favourable US tax
legislation and pressures on the rate of profit. In Mexico, it is clear that not only cheap
labour was involved but a host of other benefits granted by the government. As we shall
see later on, the "maquiladora" industry has been an important part of the electronics scene
in Mexico. For a more detailed examination of the development of the "maquiladora"
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modern sector was made by TNCs (Unger,1985), and there was a heavy
concentration in a small number of industries. Chemical and transport
equipment were the most important accounting for 60% of the total exports and,
if exports of electrical machinery are added, the combined share of total exports
reached 70% (Jenkins,1978,1979). In this connection, considering the capital goods
and durable consumer goods, Dahlman and Cortez (1984) have noted,
"...the bulk of Mexico's capital goods exports are by subsidiaries of
multinational companies. Almost one-fifth of the exports are power
machinery and equipment (most of which consists of internal
combustion engines exported by multinationals to the United States
and European plants) and another 10% are office machinery (mostly
typewriters exported by multinational to Latin America), and another
7% are commercial vehicles (most of which go to Latin America).
Relatively few exports are by Mexican firms, and these appear to be
concentrated in equipment for the petroleum industry, glass-making
machinery, and some agricultural equipment" (Dahlman and
Cortez,p.606).
Now we can see, therefore, that Mexico's exports of capital intensive goods
which has been, perhaps, the most impressive factor in the country's postwar
industrial performance and hence, of its newly-industrializing status, is actually
under the control of the transnational constituent of Mexico's industrial social
constituency. Furthermore, within such social constituency, it is only a handful
of corporations which control the largest proportion of total TNCs' exports from
Mexico. According to Unger (1985), in 1975, only 36 firms, all of them
exporting over 10 million pesos that year, accounted for most of the exports of
capital and durable consumer goods from Mexico. Between them, they had a
combined share of approximately 40% of the TNCs' total exports of
manufactures from Mexico. More broadly, out of a total of 708 foreign firms
which participated in external trade in 1975, only 65 firms (with exports of
over 10 million pesos) accounted for approximately 90% of the manufactured
exports from Mexico. As we can see, within the transnational social constituent,
export, like investment, is highly concentrated in the hands of large corporate
capital. This has important implications for Mexico's foreign trade policy since
only a handful of companies have come to control the performance of crucial
sectors in any export-oriented strategy of industrialization. This means not only
that the performance of these sectors is largely dependent upon decisions taken
abroad by the TNCs parent companies but, also, that the benefits of the Mexican
government measures to promote exports are in fact accruing into the hands of
a few large firms [Evans and Gereffi(198l),Jenkins(1979)].
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In spite of its increase, the value of TNCs exports has been nothing like
the imports we have discussed earlier. Indeed, during the period 1970-73, when
TNCs exports augmented considerably (see table 4.14), their value still fell
significantly behind that of imports. The result was a commercial deficit for the
TNCs in Mexico averaging $540 million a year. For the same period 1970-73,
this TNCs' commercial deficit represented, on average, 47% of Mexico's total
commercial deficit (Fajnzylber,1975). The negative impact of TNCs operations
upon Mexico's balance of payments is thus all too clear. More importantly,
since the Mexican social constituents sought to cover the chronic deficits
through the mechanism of foreign debt and hence, through an increasing
dependence upon foreign financial capital, eventually the circle of technological-
industrial-financial dependence engulfed Mexico and put her economy under
growing pressure which in 1982 left the country almost bankrupt, unable to
meet the service of a near $90 billion debt. Since then, it can be said that
Mexico is to a large extent at the mercy of foreign capital and their willingness
to negotiate more loans and postponements of service payments (52).
4.1.2.4. The Efforts of the Mexican Government to Curb the
Contradictory Role of TNCs in Mexico's Postwar
Development Process: Legislation on Foreign Investment
and Technology Transfer
As a major social constituent of Mexico's process of industrialization,
national capital and, particularly, the Mexican government controlling the strings
of political power in the country, has thoroughly participated in the shaping of
present-day Mexico. As we have seen, in pursuit of its own interests the
Mexican government has seen in foreign capital a fundamental force for the
country's process of capital accumulation. It has designed the legislative
framework ruling the actions of all the constituents and has effectively created
the conditions for the development of a social constituency ("triple alliance")
whose overall performance is simply contradictory to the goal of an autonomous
industrial and economic development of Mexico. In other words, the quantitative
(52) Interestingly enough, the Mexican debt is so huge that it is hardly possible for foreign
banks to allow Mexico to default. Such a course of events would certainly threaten the
whole structure of the capitalist financial system. Thus, Mexico seems to be protected by a
paradoxical situation in which "the more you owe, the safer you are". Currently, Mexico
has a $97 billion debt and repayments for 1986 should be $11.5 billion. Due to the fall in
oil prices, however, it seems that far from being able to fulfill her obligations Mexico will
be needing some additional $6 billion to cover the projected deficit.
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and qualitative characteristics of the processes we have discussed above have
been the result of the interests as much of transnational capital as of the
Mexican constituents themselves. Most probably, such characteristics reflect the
practical limits of what foreign capital wants and can achieve in Mexico without
contradicting the overriding interests of the Mexican social constituents. In this
connection, as Weinert (1977) has suggested,
"...in promoting industrialization, the state was acutely concerned about
the political challenge of foreign capital but was relatively unconcerned
about effects on inequality, market distortions, or balance of payments.
After the 1950s, the state's primary goal was to direct foreign capital
into new economic activities, so that it would open up new areas of
the economy, thereby promoting industrialization. At the same time,
the state did not want foreign capital to increase its overall
importance in the economy, further threatening control over policy
making" (Weinert.p.lll).
In the present circumstances, it is at least doubtful to contest that the
Mexican government has actually succeeded in averting an increase in foreign
capital's control over the economy since the 1950s. Efforts have certainly been
made which would apparently keep the control of the industry in Mexican
hands. Indeed, since the 1950s, a policy known as "Mexicanization" was
selectively implemented by the government to contain the expansive tendency of
foreign capital (53). As a result, foreign capital has been excluded from basic
sectors of the economy such as utilities, oil, steel, communications and so on.
In 1971, the basic petrochemical industry was also reserved to the state while
60% of Mexican ownership was required for companies processing petrochemicals
and 66% for companies in mining. The requirement of 60% ownership was later
extended, in 1972, to companies manufacturing autoparts (Weinert,1977).
All the above regulations were further extended, in 1973, in the most far-
reaching attempt to provide the country with a coherent legal framework to
deal with foreign capital and promote Mexican investment. The 1973 law,
known as the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign
Investment, codified all previous regulations and incorporated various new
provisions, among which the most famous was the requisite that, from the time
of the enactment of the law onwards, foreign capital could only have a
maximum share of 49% in all new commercial ventures. There were some
(53) In 1954, the government of Avila Camacho passed the first Mexicanization decree
already worried by the increasing inflow and influence of foreign capital into the Mexican
econorny.lt required that most of the ownership of Mexican companies was in the hands of
Mexican nationals and that the majority of their directors was made up by Mexicans too
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exception requiring special permission (54). Furthermore, the law reinforced the
promotion of Mexicanization by introducing a structure of incentives which, in
most cases, was applicable only to national enterprises (Whiting,1981).
The legal effort to control foreign capital, however, did not stop at the
issues of investment. Almost simultaneously, another major law attempting to
tackle the technological issues was enacted by the Mexican government. This was
the Law on Registration of Transfer of Technology and Use and Exploitation of
Patents and Trade Marks, which complemented the law on investment by
purporting to control foreign capital's abuse of its technological power while
simultaneously improving the position of national capital in negotiations
concerning technology transfer (55). According to Whiting (1981), these two
laws formed the core of the Mexican government's strategy to deal with foreign
capital (56). In his words, "...they had as their main objective the strengthening
of the national private sector and of the national economy at large"
(Whiting,1981,p.8l) (57).
(Evans and Gereffi,198l).
(54) The law specified 17 conditions allowing for majority foreign ownership. "These
exceptions are possible when foreign investment will not constitute a monopoly, will not
displace national enterprises in industry and will offer such benefits as employment creation,
increase on exports, decentralization of industry, greater national integration of products,
preservation of the country's social and cultural values, etc." (Whiting,1981,p.82). It has to
be emphasized that since the law was not retroactive, foreign companies which had a
majority ownership before its promulgation needed not alter this situation unless they
wanted to diversify production or to take advantage of incentives. Even then, they could
still try to qualify for exception under the 17 conditions. At any rate, the spontaneous
preference of foreign capital for at least majority ownership is shown by the fact that, just
before the law, a study found that from 339 foreign subsidiaries in Mexico only 25% had
Mexican majority ownership while 50% had total foreign ownership (i.e., 95% or more. For
US TNCs alone the latter percentage was 55% (Evans and Gereffi,198l).
(55) "...the Law for the Register and Transfer of Technology purported to control the flow
of technology, reduce its costs, and eliminate certain restrictions which were often included
in foreign contracts... Among the conditions to reject or modify a contract are: payment for
technology already available free; unjustifiably high costs for technology; guarantee of
devolution of technological innovations developed in Mexico to the foreign partner; foreign
control in the direction of the company; restrictions to investment and development in
Mexico; prohibition to perform complementary technological development; requirements of
imports of personnel or equipment; restrictions to the levels of prices and of production and
the imposition of foreign courts to settle disputes " (Whiting,1981,pp.83-84). See also Nadal
(1977a) and Campos (1975). The law also established that contracts having some of these
restrictions may be accepted when the authorities consider that the acquired technology is of
particular interest for the country (Leff,1983).
(56) Later in 1976 these two laws were complemented by a new law reforming the 1942
Law on Industrial Property. This was the Law on Inventions and Trade Marks intended to
regulate the control over production exercised by the owners of patents for inventions,
innovations and commercial trade marks. Among its most important provisions was the
exclusion of patenting for processes related to fundamental sectors such as health, food, and
energy and agricultural production (Leff,1983).
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The crucial issue is to what extent these legal instruments have actually
succeeded in effectively improving the relative weight of the national social
constituents vis-a-vis transnational capital. Have they enabled a greater control
of foreign capital in accordance with the goal of Mexico's autonomous industrial
development ?, and, in this respect, have they contributed to reducing Mexico's
technological dependence ? On the basis of what we have seen earlier a
preliminary answer to the latter crucial questions is that they have not made a
fundamental difference at all. Indeed, this is the conclusion arrived at by
various scholars who have examined closely the impact of the abovementioned
laws (58). As far as Mexicanization is concerned, it has been argued that the
law on foreign investment is ineffectual not only because it can be circumvented
but also because the state lacks the means and the political will to implement it
fully. For instance, in relation to foreign investment only the names of foreign
investors must be disclosed leaving the name of nationals anonymous. This has
given origin to the practice of prestanombres ( i.e, borrowed names) whereby
many Mexicans have lent their names to foreign investors, thus enabling
effective foreign control of nominally Mexicanized enterprises
[Whiting(198l),Cockcroft(1983)]. Another practice described by Velasco (1983)
has been to construct dummy factories to circumvent the provisions requiring
that a certain percentage of a given industrial process be carried out in Mexico.
The dummy factories are shells only, with a few pieces of machinery, but with
no real productive capacity. Yet another practice strengthening foreign control of
Mexicanized companies is "the concentration of stock ownership in the hands of
one or two foreign corporations and the dispersal of Mexican participation among
a larger number of very junior partners" (Cockcroft,1983,p.l58). In the latter
respect, a study of 112 companies having foreign participation in the early 1970s
(57) The first article of the law on foreign investment put the goal in terms rather more
ambitious. It stated that its aim was to promote Mexican investment and regulate foreign
investment "in order to stimulate a just and balanced development and to consolidate the
economic independence of the country" (Quoted by Nadal,1977a,p.280).
(58) Even the current National Development Plan has acknowledged this reality even though
it uphold the adequacy of the present legislation. "Despite the existence of an adequate law
covering direct foreign investment, there has not always been a systematic policy to take
effective advantage of its contribution to national development. In practice, transnational
have often tended to benefit from market protection, through the use of obsolete technologies
and equipment in their countries of origin, and to generate excessive profits at the expense of
national consumers. It has not been possible to induce this kind of investment to promote
national technological development, to substitute imports efficiently, or to generate exports
with a positive net balance in foreign exchange. Moreover, the process of Mexicanization of
enterprises with foreign participation has been, in many instances, illusory and has had
undesirable effects on industrial concentration, pricing policy, and on the available resources
for investment" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1983,p.8l).
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showed that 35% of them had a widely dispersed Mexican participation,
probably from private capital (Evans and Gerefifi,198l). On the other hand, the
same study showed that in 52% of the cases the Mexican partner was
concentrated local private capital. Since the study was before the 1973 law,
however, such concentrated Mexican participation did entail 51% Mexican
ownership in only a minority of cases. Most importantly for the control
purposes on the 1973 law was the fact that Mexicanization has mostly benefited
local private capital which is not the same as benefiting the "national interest"
for autonomous industrialization (59). If anything , the result has been the
strengthening of the interpenetration of interests between Mexican and
transnational capital, which is clearly not the same as promoting self-reliant
technological and industrial capabilities. As long as national capital benefits from
its alliance with transnational capital, there is no reason for it to pursue long
term goals of autonomy which can only hinder the short term needs of its
process of accumulation. For instance, it has been found that national enterprises
are even more reluctant than TNCs to reduce their foreign payments for
technology and assistance (Whiting,1981). Not that TNCs are more interested in
Mexico's welfare since they can use means such as "transfer pricing" to
accomplish the same, but this fact does show that national private capital's
interests have little to do with any supposedly long-term abstract "national
interest". Thus, national capital will benefit from both the state legislation it
finds useful and its profit alliance with transnational capital. In turn, the latter
will have a number of alternatives to keep Mexico's industrialization within the
scope of its own global process of capital accumulation. "Prestanombres", whole-
ownership, joint ownership, transfer-pricing, etc., are all means which the TNCs
can resort to in accordance with their particular strategies (60).
As to the state, the "depositary" of the long-term interests for industrial self-
reliance, the reality seems to be that it is both incapable of implementing the
available legislation and unable to legislate further into areas that will provoke
strong reactions from private national and transnational social constituents. An
(59) A similar conclusion is reached by Correa (1983) in relation to the Laws on
Technology Transfer throughout Latin America. For him, although the laws entail policies
described as being in the "national interest" or "public order", "their obvious beneficiaries are
the national enterprises which resort to the acquisition of technology abroad" (Correa,p.33).
(60) For instance, apart from the "prestanombres", many firms remain 1001b foreign owned
-General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Volkswagen, General Electric, Kodack, Sears, Anderson-
Clayton and Dow Chemical. On the other hand, in booming areas like appliances, food
products, and industrial chemicals, some 153 companies in the late 1970s choose to sell a
majority interest to Mexicans. The reason: the structure of incentives since foreign capital's
participation in joint enterprises also allowed it to borrow more easily from Mexican banks
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instance on the latter score was the attempt by the government to implement
some new provisions of the law on patents and trade marks which aroused the
determined opposition of TNCs, lest that Mexico would create an example, and
which, eventually, was also opposed by national private capital as a result of
TNCs effective persuasion (61). In the face of common opposition by both
foreign and national capital, the government finally gave in in 1979, thus
indefinitely postponing the implementation of the conflictive measures. As
Whiting (1981) rightly concluded, "the State backdown before the opposition of
the strongest enterprises in the manufacturing industry" (ibid,p.86). But, as we
have said earlier, not even the available legislation has been effectively
implemented. Entangled in a \<<sf kiescjwa bureaucratic maze which gives
responsibility for the application of the laws to different ministries and even
different departments within a ministry, the administrative capacity of the state
is severely limited by "lack of information, lack of coordination, reactions to
particular interests and the shortcomings of a style of case-by-case study which
has prevailed so far" (ibid,p.88). To this it has to be added that, due to the
international nature of TNCs' operations, it is simply impossible to exercise an
effective control of its operations in any given country. The fact that they can
play one country against another with their investments is generally enough to
persuade the governments interested in their presence that they should not push
the national game too far (62). Perhaps, it is for all the above reasons, that in
the present context of critical shortage of financial resources, the Mexican
government has been quietly moving away from the ownership control imposed
upon foreign capital operating in Mexico. As Business Week ( 19 July 1984)
reported, "...Without formally changing Mexico's foreign investment legislation,
the government will now allow "systematic and selective" foreign control of new
companies in nine industrial sectors, ranging from machinery to hotels" (p.30).
The new guidelines significantly eases the ownership rules for foreign investors
in exchange for their commitment to develop local suppliers, provide them with
permanent assistance programs, and provide grants and scholarships for research
and to diversify into other lines of business. (Cockcroft.1983).
(61) The purpose of stipulating these provisions was to "increment the negotiating power of
the Mexican concessionary of the original trademark as a resort against the threat of
withdrawal of the foreign trade mark. The idea was to reduce the payments for foreign
trade marks not entailing new technology, and to enable the Mexican concessionary to also
benefit from the good will created by his own promotional efforts in Mexico"
(Whiting,1981,p.85).
(62) For instance, Anderson-Clayton which controls Mexico's leading agricultural export
product, cotton, also controls cotton production in the countries with which Mexico must
compete: Brazil and the US. Thus, "Anderson-Clayton periodically engages in cotton
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(Layton,1985,p.38). In other words, in its hour of crisis, the Mexican
government turns towards foreign capital even more deeply in the hope that the
latter can be effectively guided into contributing to the development of Mexico's
indigenous industrial and technological capabilities. Past evidence with legislation
on technology, however, suggest that this may prove a rather difficult task.
In effect, the legal attempts to enhance Mexico's technological position vis-
a-vis foreign capital have on the whole proved as disappointing and limited as
the law on foreign investment discussed earlier. Admittedly, the Law on
Registration of Transfer of Technology was never intended to bring about any
substantial qualitative change in the technological dealings between Mexican
constituents and TNCs. After all, having seen the context of interests described
above, the reason is not difficult to perceive. The general consensus about the
limited role of the law was summarized by one commentator:
"...the basic concern of the law revolves around the limitation of abuses
contained in the agreements on technology transfer. Thus, it is not a
legal instrument which contains a system of incentives to support
national technological research. Nor does it constitute a mechanism
which contributes to the formation of a national policy on technology
acquisition. It does not establish, for instance, regulation of sectoral
priorities for technology import". [B. Sepulveda, quoted by Alvarez
(I982),p.lll7].
The law has had some success in bringing down the level of TNCs'
technological abuses, at least in those areas easier to control. For instance,
between 1973 and 1975, the National Registry of Transfer of Technology
(NRTT) rejected 856 licencing agreements which included different restrictive
clauses. The most common restrictive clause was the excessive or unjustified
price of the technology found in more than 80% of the cases
[Nadal(1977a),Campos(l975)]. Other clauses appeared much less frequently and
varying percentages. Such pattern, however, did not imply the TNCs were less
fond of indulging in other restrictive practices. Rather, it reflected both the
emphasis which the law gave to the volume of payments for technology and
"the fact that MNC do not have to use a technology agreement to impose
certain restrictions" (Nadal,1977,p.225). For instance, in relation to TNCs
subsidiaries, which, actually account for most of the royalty and technical
assistance payments,
"dumping" to remind Mexico who is in control" (Barkin, 1975,p.72).
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"...the transnational enterprise need not resort to restrictive clauses in
its contracts in order to constrain a subsidiary to follow its
instructions. The parent company can limit exports, force a subsidiary
to acquire inputs only from other companies in the group, over-invoice
or under-invoice these transactions, etc., without leaving a single trace
of these restrictions in its contracts" (Nadal,1977a,p.l52).
On the quantitative side, it has been estimated that, between 1973 and
1975, the NRTT's control of technology agreements brought about a saving of
26% of the payments which would have occurred in absence of the law (ibid.).
Most importantly, the annual rate of growth of payments for technology
transfer was reduced from 15% for the period 1953-68 to only 6% for the
period 1970-1976 (Correa,1983). For most analysts of the law, however, this
quantitative success is far from even touching the fundamental problems
involved in the search for Mexico's technological autonomy. In Leff's words,
"although it is possible to regulate and improve the purchasing conditions of our
technological imports, this does not entail the creation of the basis necessary for
a reduction of our dependency on this matter" (Leff,1983,p.279). In effect, given
that, according to the law, the NRTT can only intervene once the industrial
projects have been negotiated (63), it is clear that such fundamental issues as
the choice of imported technology are simply out of the government control
(64). Furthermore, even where the law allows for some intervention, for
instance, regarding the content of the technology transferred, in practice, this
intervention has been negligible. From the 856 licencing agreements rejected
between 1973 and 1975, only 0.58% of the cases were based on the fact that
the imported technology was wholly or partially available in the country so
that its import was not justified (Correa,1983). Likewise, according to an ex-
director of NRTT, there are scores of instances of agreements and large
payments for unnecessary technologies such as cosmetic formula, foreign models
for the garment industry, administrative services in the soft-drink industry, etc.
(65). For all this, when in 1981 the government decided to review the 1972
(63) "—as a regulating instrument, the NRTT has the disadvantage of scrutinizing contracts
only once the industrial projects have been conceived and negotiated. The conditions of
financing have already been established, the sources of inputs, the technology supplier, the
location of the plant, etc., are all parameters already established when the Registry receives
the contract. Therefore, the fundamental technological decisions have already been taken
(including the decision on the goods to be produced) and the NRTT only intervenes ex post
factum in some of its formal conditions" (Nadal,1977a,p.158).
(64) "The law neither affects the process of choice of technologies, nor does it favour a
disaggregation of technological packages with the end of increasing both the technological
level of the internal industrial process and the gradual substitution of technological goods.
Nor does it promote an improvement in the level of technical capabilities for the process of
assimilation of imported technologies" (Leff,1983,p.279).
- 357 -
Law on the Registration of Transfer of Technology, such a revision was already
long-overdue. Thus, for Alvarez (1982), the government decision to review the
1972 law was justified by "the need to advance to a different phase in
technology policy that overcomes the "defensive" stage limited to the "control" of
technology imports" (Alvarez,1982,p.lll7). In this new phase, Alvarez argues for
a more aggressive promotion of the internal technological development in accord
with the country's productive structure. Indeed, the writers of the new law
themselves (66) seem to have been aware of this demand when they wrote that
the new project sought "to transcend a regime which was exclusively regulatory,
in favour of a basic mechanism ensuring commitment to an effective and optimal
transfer of technology, for the benefit of the country" (Quoted by
Alvarez,1982,p.lll7). As the same analyst concludes, however, aside from
changes legally ad jvstVn^ the 1972 law, the new document did not show any
difference regarding the fundamental issues of Mexico's technological dependence,
"it completely overlooked these aspects, thus wasting the opportunity to improve
substantially the conditions of the process of technology transfer and hence, to
increase the latter's contribution to the country's development" (ibid.,p.H18). In
this respect, our argument is that this was not actually a wasted opportunity
from the point of view of something that should have been done and it was
not done. Rather the new law, as the old, simply reflected the limits imposed
by the Mexican government by its participation within a contradictory social
constituency of interests. The law reflected the relative weight and the specific
interests of each of the constituents under given historical circumstances. For
this reason, when Alvarez (1982) warns that the next opportunity should not be
missed, we much better look at the situation of the "triple alliance" to anticipate
the answer. Our opinion is that, as long as the high relative weight of
transnational capital within the current social constituency of Mexico's
industrialization remains in force, hardly the Mexican legislation can become a
tool for appropriating TNCs' technological capabilities which, after all, constitute
the roots of the latter force's power within the constituency. An action of this
kind would entail touching deeply the interests of transnational capital, thus
almost certainly giving rise to a crisis of interests within the social constituency.
Since there is no indication that the government has the political will to risk
such a crisis, then there is no reason for the legislation to reflect a conflict of
interests which in practice has not arisen (67).
(65) Jaime Alvarez's statement referred to by Correa (1983).
(66) The Direccion General de Inversiones Extranjeras y Transference de Tecnologia.
(67) The situation thus far is summarized by Cockcroft (1983). The Mexican bureaucratic
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Recognizing its own political unwillingness, therefore, and faced with the
technological might of a social constituent whose interests do not spontaneously
entail the development of Mexico's technological autonomy, the government has
sought, for some years now, to promote the only credible non-conflict path
towards decreasing Mexico's technological dependence. This is the strengthening of
the country's own scientific and technological capabilities through a concerted
plan of national action which would lead towards the overcoming of the present
underdeveloped state of such capabilities. This was the aim of the first national
plan for science and technology launched in 1976 and spearheaded by the
formation of the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) in
1970. Both the CONACYT and the first plan represented the first serious and
systematic effort to actually face the enormous problems affecting Mexico's
science and technology system (S & T system). Below, we shall examine them
in greater detail as we come to discuss the characteristics of Mexico's R&D
system, given the crucial importance of such a system for the existence of an
indigenous microelectronics capability. For the time being, we turn our attention
to the following question, to what extent has the process of dependent capitalist
accumulation led towards the realization of the ultimate goals of the Mexican
nation as exposed in the present national development plan ? In short, to what
extent has this process led to freedom and justice for all Mexicans ?
bourgeoisie "to the extent that it is integrated with Mexican and foreign private capital, it
shares the general direction of capitalism and official politics - moved, and strongly so, by
the forces of monopoly capital. This is not to deny the many policy conflicts that the
representative of the state and of monopoly capital have to grapple with, including conflicts
among themselves; but such conflicts rarely becomes antagonistic, since the evolution of the
corporativist political system has tended to unite, more than to divide, the interest of the
state bureaucracy and those of the Mexican bourgeoisie and foreign capital" (Cockcroft,p.218).
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4.1.3. The Social Issues of Mexico's Process of Dependent
Capitalist Accumulation
"The egalitarian society is an original demand of the Mexican
Revolution. The struggle for greater equality has been a constant
element in the history of Mexico and a principal motivation of the
country's great popular movement" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1983,p.90).
In this way the current national development plan opens its section Social
Policy. The Revolution took place in the 1910s, more than 60 years later not
even the government would suggest that Mexico is in anyway near to this goal.
Certainly, there have been advances as the development plan well describes:
"...the national population has increased fivefold since the beginning of
the century: nevertheless, at the same time, it has been possible to
decrease the absolute number of families without access to minimum
levels of welfare. Life expectancy has increased from 36.8 years for
men and 38.2 for women in 1930, to an average of 64 in 1980;
illiteracy has been reduced from 50% to 15% of the population in the
same years, and the coverage of social security services has come to
reach nearly half of the total population, whereas basic health services
now assist almost the entire population" (Poder Ejecutivo
Federal,1983,p.91).
Yet, as the same document acknowledges, "acute social inequalities exists
between social groups, between the city and the countryside and between the
regions of the country" (ibid.). In effect, despite the advances mentioned above,
the fact is that in relation to the actual and potential wealth of the country,
Mexico's social conditions show a very high level of sharp inequalities and
human deprivation for millions of Mexicans. In a country where
underemployment is put at over 40% of the economically active population (68),
the ideals of the Revolution, the ultimate development purposes set out in the
National Plan, are reduced to empty rhetoric in the face of the unjust
distribution of wealth and basic resources such as housing, education, health and
social welfare. Table 4.15 gives the official estimates regarding Mexico's pattern
of income distribution for the years 1968 and 1977. As we can see, the lower
20% of inhabitants shared only 4.2% of the national income in 1977 and almost
10 years later, in 1977, this share had actually fallen to less than 3%. In the
same ten years, the upper 20% had kept its share between 55% and 54% of the
income. The reality, therefore, seems to be that far from approaching its
(68) "In 1980, of an estimated economically active population of about 20 million, 9.6
million were underemployed, and 1.8 million were unemployed. ...[In addition A.M.]...the
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ultimate development goals the Mexican society is in fact developing into an
increasingly unequal society. This conclusion has been confirmed by the findings
of various studies (Goulet,1983). For instance, a World Bank report,
"...found that in 1975 the poorest 10 percent of Mexico's population
received only 0.62 percent of total income, whereas the richest 10
percent obtained 30.57 percent of the total. The richest 30 percent of
the country enjoyed 60.18 percent of income, while the poorest 30
percent received but 4.71 percent. Comparative figures for 1963 are
revealing: the poorest 10 percent got 3.3 percent of income whereas
the top 10 percent had as its share 25.69 percent of the total. The
bottom 30 percent received 11.05 percent as against 51.41 percent for
the top 30 percent. In short, disparities grew wider" (Goulet,1983,p.29)
(69).
From a different angle, it has been estimated that, in 1958, the income of
the richest 5% of families was 22 times greater than that of the poorest 10% ;
in 1970 it was 39 times greater and in 1977 had gone up to 47 times greater
(Gonzalez Casanova(1980),Cockcroft(l983)]. As expected, this very unequal
income distribution is reflected in housing, education, health and, ultimately, life
itself. In effect, as table 4.16 shows, at the bottom of the life-expectancy league,
agricultural wage earners can expect to live around 54.2 years, that is, over 14
years less than the so-called new petty bourgeoisie who have a life expectancy
of 68.8 years. According to Narro et al (1984), for the former group, mortality
is now at the level of the national average in the 1950s. Thus, taking due
consideration of time factors affecting the figures, they conclude that "...if the
degree of "backwardness" in the health conditions of the more marginalized
classes were susceptible to measurement in chronological terms, the gap which
would separate them from the most "advanced" classes would be 40 years"
(Narro et al,p.639).
A closer look at the distribution of basic resources and social services will
help us to understand why this is so. Table 4.17 shows the characteristics of
housing in Mexico. Clearly, there has been a relative improvement from the
figures of 1970s (70). In 1980, however, considering that there was as average
of 5.5 people per dwelling, millions of dwellings had no electric energy, no
piped water of any kind (i.e., not even access to a public tap), no sewage
(69) For social figures for the 1950s and pTior to the Mexican Revolution, see Gonzalez
Casanova (1970). Reflecting about the social achievements of the Mexican Revolution,
Gonzalez Casanova echoes the question in the mind of many people "Did it not fail the
Mexican Revolution ?, Was for this that a million people died T (ibid.,p.416).
(70) As the population has grown faster, the improvement in percentages does not
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Table k .16.- Mexico: Life Expectancy at Birth
by Social Classes, 1977.
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system and only bare-earth flooring. This meant that, from a population of 69
million in 1980, 18.5 million Mexicans were living without access to piped
water and 27.5 million had no sewage system in their homes. In addition, there
was an acute housing shortage with estimates varying from a 4 million deficit
to a 7.8 million deficit (Schteingart,1984) (71). Whatever the figures, the
important fact is all too clear. There are millions of Mexicans for whom the
"benefits" of capital accumulation has meant very little or, simply, a miserable
life. Effectively, from the viewpoint of poverty, insufficient diet, lack of
education, etc., the pattern is roughly the same. For instance, a recent essay on
poverty in Latin America (Serrano,1984a) provided the following picture for
Mexico. In 1970, a national average of 34% of households were under the
poverty line (72); this included 49% of households in the rural sector and 20%
in the urban sector. In extreme poverty or destitution, there were 12% of
Mexican households involving 18% of the households in the rural sector and 6%
in the urban sector. In absolute numbers, this means that a total of 17.4
million Mexicans were under the poverty line in 1970, figure that reached 20.2
million in 1980 and is expected to reach 24.3 million for the year 2000 (ibid.).
Other scholars suggest an even worse situation, "...Some 18 million
underprivileged people in rural areas live in extreme misery; 40 million Mexicans
have a nutritionally inadequate diet, and 30 percent of the population consumes
10 percent of the food produced while the 15 percent with the most buying
power consumes 50 percent" (Gonzalez Casanova,1980,p.162). A similar diagnosis
is made by Chavez (1983) who points out that various studies, including those
by the National Institute of Nutrition, suggest that two-thirds of the country's
population has an insufficient diet. Moreover Chavez (1983) estimates that
"...From the 3 million children who are born annually, at least two and a half
million do so in an ecological environment propitious to malnutrition and
infection, and, therefore, cannot develop all their human capacities"
(Chavez.p.226).
(71) "There is a housing shortage of 6 million units, and 40 percent of the existing "homes"
consist of only one room with primitive roofing. A million families are homeless, and about
half the population lacks sewage services, toilets, potable drinking water, floors other than
dirt, social security, adequate footwear, or an income of more than $0.25 (U.S.) per person
per day" (Cockcroft,1983,p.3).
(72) In this essay, "poor families" are defined as "those whose pattern of expenditure in food
and other consumer products (clothing, etc.) does not enable them to satisfy their minimum
nutritional needs". A complementary definition is that of "destitute families" as those "which
would not satisfy their minimum nutritional needs even in the case of assigning the totality
of their resources to the purchase of food" (Serrano,1984a,p.757).
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It is not surprising, therefore, that infant mortality is still very high in
Mexico. For instance, between 1971 and 1972, deaths of less than five year old
children amounted to 43% of total deaths, while for the same category and
years, the figures in Cuba, Canada and the US were 18%, 4.6% and 4.2%,
respectively (Lopez,1980). Officially, the death rate for less than 1 year old
children was 48.9 per 1000 registered births. More realistic estimates, however,
put the figure as high as 73.3 deaths, with great disparities for different areas of
the country. In one particularly deprived area, death rates of 227 per 1000
births are estimated. In 1978, Mexico was among the 10 American countries
with the highest infant mortality rate. It had a rate 3 times greater than
Cuba, and 15 and 14 times greater than Canada and the US, respectively.
Among the most common causes of infant deaths were infectious diseases
accounting for 50% while nutritional deficiencies occupied the seventh place.
With regard to general mortality, again Mexico was high in the American
ranking. It occupied the eighth place in mortality due to infectious diseases and
enteritis; fourth place in mortality due to influenza and pneumonia; and fifth
place in mortality due to tuberculosis [Lopez(1980),Narro et al(1984)]. All these
causes of death have a much lower incidence in other countries such as Cuba,
Canada and the US. Just consider tuberculosis, a disease which causes 2.2, 0,8
and 0.7 annual deaths per 100.000 in Cuba, Canada and the US, respectively. In
Mexico the same statistics is 16.5 persons (Lopez,1980).
It seems pretty clear that, as a social phenomenon, deaths in Mexico follow
the general pattern of social inequality. As Almada (1982) has put it,
"
The avoidable character of a significant number of these deaths cannot
he ignored, given that causes of deaths which have been controlled or
eliminated in other countries, take in Mexico a heavy toll of lives...[In
addition A.M.]... The distribution of deaths, diseases and disabilities
does not follow an arbitrary path, instead it affects predominantly the
sector of the population which lacks potable water, sewage, adequate
housing, balanced and sufficient diet..f(Almada,pp33-34).
It is primarily the task of the state to tackle the roots of the unfair
distribution of life and death in Mexico. A look at table 4.18, however, shows
that the proportion of the total population protected by some form of social
security institution is still less than 50%. In effect, although between 1970 and
1979 there was an important increment in the number of people covered by
some form of social security, the fact is that in 1979 almost 60% of the
population, that is, some 40 million people, were not part of any institution. In
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(Railways) had their own systems. The health needs of the 40 million
inhabitants out of the social security system was thus left to the Ministry of
Health and Assistance and hence, to the facilities this institution could provide.
In 1976, these facilities meant a "capacity of hospitals, assistance centres and
services which could cover between 15 and 18 million persons. That is to say,
between 20 and 25 million of Mexicans lack permanently of any health service"
(Lopez,1980,p.196).
Finally, to bring our excursion into the social conditions of the Mexican
society to an end, table 4.19 provides a quantitative picture of the educational
situation in the country. Again, we see advances between 1970 and 1980. Yet in
1980 almost 9 million from a total of 55.8 million people over 6 years old
were illiterate. In addition, for the majority of Mexicans the level of education
hardly goes beyond the primary level. Thus, in 1980, from a total of 47.6
million people over 10 years old, more than 30 million, or 64.4%, found
themselves in this category. For the case of people over 40 years old, the
situation was even worse: from a total of 12.5 million, 71.6% or approximately
9 million never went beyond the primary level. In fact, 3 million people alone
had no instruction at all. The number of persons with some post-primary
instruction was less than a quarter of the population of over 10 years old,
although the actual level of education reached was not clear. At any rate,
university education has benefited only a tiny minority, since in 1970 only 3%
of those over 24 years old held some university degree (Fuentes,1983). In terms
of geographical distribution, all these inequalities became even worse. For
instance, the rate of illiteracy for the states of Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero
was over 35% in each one of them, while for the Federal District (Mexico City)
and Baja California the rate was 5.9% and 6.6% respectively. Likewise, there is
a marked sexual discrimination insofar as illiteracy affects more the women than
the men population (Islas,1984).
All in all, it is abundantly clear that Mexico's path of dependent capital
accumulation has led to nothing like the freedom, equality and justice
proclaimed as the ideals of the Mexican Revolution and the ultimate goals of
the country's development process. The mass of the people has benefited little
from the accumulated wealth which has accrued primarily to those social sectors
involved in the control and stability of the prevailing power structure. There is
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inequality within the Mexican society. Rather, it has been the result of a
definite social choice primarily exercised by those social forces who control and
benefit most from the particular process of Mexican capital accumulation. As
Purcell (1981) has put it,
"The problem for Mexican society as a whole, which can be seen most
clearly in the rural areas, is not simply the lack of sufficient material
resources, nor, as some think, a matter of bringing "traditional" or
"backward" peasants, whose culture makes them inefficient producers,
into the modern world. Rather, it is a problem inherent in the social,
economic, and political structure of Mexico" (Purcell,p.46).
This judgement can be repeated in relation to each one of the social
indicators reviewed above: housing, health, etc. For instance, for Eckstein (1977),
the extremely non-egalitarian distribution of wealth "can be traced to a variety
of factors, among them regressive fiscal policies, protection of oligopolistic
enterprises, spotty enforcement of the existing tax laws, and inflationary
government policies" (Eckstein,p.23). Likewise, in relation to malnutrition, Chavez
(1983) argues that an improvement in the present situation is something that
can be achieved by the present society. "The real cause of malnutrition is not
the shortage of food but its distribution... The poor die because they lack food
while the rich die from metabolical and cardiac problems because they have
plenty of food" (Chavez,pp.227 and 229). In the same vein, for Lopez (1980),
"...Health and disease are social phenomena insofar as there exists a social and
political structure which allows that "man is affected by diseases whose
mastering is at the reach of its hand when he organizes, in a more just social
manner" (Lopez, p.219). The problem is that, in Mexico, that more just social
manner will hardly grow out of the present form of capitalistic industrial
development. The social priorities are simply not there. Look, for instance, at
table 4.20 where the pattern of government's investments are given. The major
relative decline suffered by the category of social welfare during the 1970s -a
drop of more than 10%- is in fact clear indication that it is simply not in the
overriding interest of the postwar social constituency made up by the state,
transnational capital and private national capital, to lead the way towards a
substantial social change. After all, is it not true that the present state of
affairs is primarily the result of the domination of Mexico's development process
by these same forces? Or as Cockcroft (1983) has put it in a more detailed
questioning referring to the distribution of the benefits of the oil wealth.
"Why doesn't the oil benefit the poor ? Why can't the money pay for
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can it go for the people's needs if the bureaucrats and capitalists
spend it on wine, women and song ? How can capital investment
increase or profits be maintained without a low wage scale, and how
can this be guarantee unless under- and unemployment in turn
guarantee a reserve army of unemployed ? This is the dilemma of the
capitalist state" (Cockcroft.p.4).
For our purposes the important fact is that it is the same capitalist state
and process of development which provide the framework for the problem of
indigenous microelectronics capability. Hence, as we shall corroborate later on,
IMC for development purposes in Mexico actually means the development of a
capitalist IMC. The fundamental question thus arises. Is a Mexican IMC a viable
proposition given both the findings of Chapters 3 and 4 and the internal context
we have just examined ? To this we now turn our attention by looking first at
the state of development of Mexico's R&D capabilities and then at the
country's electronics capabilities.
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4.2. Science and Technology and the R&D System in Mexico
The intrinsic science-based nature of microtechnology makes the possession
of an R & D capability an inescapable requisite for an indigenous
microelectronics capability. In Chapter III, we discussed this fact and showed
that, in principle, science was the only social force which could be considered as
intrinsic to the dominant social constituency of an IMC. Consequently, we
discussed the postwar evolution of the US's R&D system and the workings of
the corporate capital-government-military-science social complex of power which
has effectively been its dominant social constituency in contemporary US. In so
doing, however, we discussed the evolution and shaping of an existing and
developed system in accordance with the interrelating interests of a complex of
social forces involved in its development. In other words, the reality of the US's
R&D system and its social constituency was accepted (73) and our concern
was its historical evolution. In the Mexican case, the latter is something we
cannot afford to do, for such R & D is hardly in existence and its social
constituency, as we shall presently see, is yet to involve private capital in a
country which is seeking capitalistic forms of development. Likewise, the
conspicuous absence of a science constituent from the process of industrialization
we discussed in the previous section is but another manifestation of the same
reality. In the following, given the importance of a national R&D system for
the possession of an IMC, we shall first examine the broad context of Mexico's
science and technology, and then, more closely, the characteristics of the Mexican
R&D system, its social constituency, and the efforts being made to foster its
development.
4.2.1. The Science and Technology System in Mexico! Goals and
Problems
Nowadays, it has become almost a matter of faith among Mexican policy
makers and government that an autonomous development of science and
technology is the only way to ensure autonomous development and national
self-determination. This view which began to take deep roots in the spheres of
government in the early 1970s (74) and only after the process of ISI came into
(73) This we could do on the basis of our discussion in Appendix III where we examined
the origins and early development of the US's R&D system and its social constituency.
(74) In 1971, the National Council foT Science and Technology (CONACYT) was established
to give shape to Mexico's science and technology policy. In 1976, CONACYT produced the
first major policy document in this area; it was the National Indicative Science and
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crisis with its sequel of technological dependence and balance of payments
problems, was given prominence in the current National Development Plan.
"In the international ambit, the differential solution to the crisis of the
1980s will rest partly on the capacity of industrialized countries to
generate and apply knowledge. Mexico cannot isolate itself from this
dynamics without jeopardizing its development potential or its national
independence in the long run. By means of national research and
development the aim will be to seek the country's scientific and
technological self-determination and to ensure that the external transfer
of technology is optimally exploited....Science and technology will seek
to offer alternative solutions to the country's social and economic
problems, among which the most salient are: those activities in which
strategic national interests are involved, the satisfaction of the basic
needs of the population, the creation of an internationally competitive
industrial sector, and the integration of the national productive
structure" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1983,p.6l).
The national development plan devotes a complete section to outlining a
diagnosis and guidelines for action in relation to Mexico's scientific and
technological development, all of which was later incorporated in the National
Programme of Technological and Scientific Development, 1984-1988 (Poder Ejecutivo
Federal,1984) (75). It is this document which constitutes the official philosophy
and policy currently dominating Mexico's search for an autonomous S & T
capability. Thus, in line with the national development plan, the T & S
programme defines as its two general objectives:
To increase the technological self-determination of the country.
To integrate scientific research to the stock of national resources for the solution
of the problems of all sectors of national life.
The T & S programme makes it clear that Mexico is not seeking scientific
and technological autarchy but, rather, the gradual transformation of an
"excessive dependence into a relation of interdependence with the technologically
Technology Plan, 1976-1982 launched in the last year of Echererria's administration. This plan
was practically abandoned by the incoming administration of Lopez Portillo who in 1978
launched his own National Science and Technology Programme, 1978-1982. These are the
direct precursors of the current S & T plan launched under the administration of Miguel de
la Madrid. To a large extent the three documents represents the S & T response of different
government to different historical circumstances but they also represent an evolution in the
search for an S & T approach which is appropriate to the government interests and needs.
Thus, although practical policies and instruments differ from one document to the other
there is a basic continuity in the fundamental objective of using S & T to achieve both
technological self-determination and the solution of the country's major social problems.
(75) From now on the T & S programme.
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advanced countries" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1984.p.37). In this context, it
specifically defines technological self-determination as,
"...having the capacity to apply scientific knowledge to the solution of
national problems without having to resort to external solutions unless
it is to complement the national solutions. Technological self-
determination includes the capacity to choose technologies which
increase the international competitiveness of our productive structure;
it also means a tendency to invest more in assimilation, adaptation
and local development of technology rather than in its importation"
(ibid.p.38) (76).
In the fulfillment of technological self-determination, the T & S programme
identifies two crucial aspects which highlight the breath and complexity of the
task facing the development of the autonomous Mexican S & T system. First is
the possession of a strong scientific capability since " it is no longer possible to
conceive a technological development without a development of scientific research"
(ibid.). Second is the effective demand by the Mexican productive system since
"the scientific flourishing of a country is only possible if it is sustained on the
demand for national technology by the economic structure...[This means that
A.M.]... The country's scientific and technological development is a task that
involves as much the science and technology system as the production system"
(ibid.,p.39). In brief, the T & S programme has put in the agenda of Mexican S
& T policy the goal of integrating into one cohesive system the activities from
science to production. Self-determination will emerge from such a system and,
conversely, the latter will be the expression of self-determination.
How this can be achieved within the context of social forces discussed
above is an issue that the document is basically not concerned with. Indeed,
there is an implicit belief in the capacity of the government to bring about the
necessary conditions for the flourishing of an autonomous S & T system in
Mexico. Through direct investments, legal incentives and regulatory controls
within the context of a correct strategy, the assumption is that the government
can redirect the thrust of the Mexican economy towards the development of a
national S & T capability. All this without the need to confront transnational
(76) This idea is basically the same as in the first (1976) national S & T plan. There
technological self-determination was defined as the "construction of a domestic capacity that
would permit the demand for technology to be oriented progressively—towards local sources
of technical knowledge; that would rationalize purchases of foreign technology and help to
assimilate and adapt imported know-how, using it as the basis for internal generation of
technology" (Wionczek,1979,p.224). Later, the second (1978) S & T plan defined
technological self-determination as the capacity to take, independently, those decisions which
will define the future development of Mexico (CONACYT,1978).
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capital but, merely, of curbing its excessive practices through such legislation as
we aw in the previous section. Thus, what seems to matter most in the view
of Mexican policy-makers is the unilateral strengthening of the country's own S
& T capability through the creation, support and integration of all the
institutions and legal instruments considered necessary for this goal to
materialize. In this sense, the underlying philosophy seems to be that the
technological advantage of transnational capital with its sequel of consequences is
not just the result of TNCs' technological strength but, primarily, the result of
Mexico's own S & T weakness which does not allow the country to benefit
fully from the presence of TNCs. And this is what the T & S programme sets
out to change by seeking to integrate "science and technology in the tasks of
national development" (ibid.). To what extent this can or is to be accomplished
from within the framework of the "triple alliance" is hard to say. But given the
previous historical record of the Mexican constituency, one has every reason to
doubt the likelihood of any major change in Mexico's technological dependence
(77). On the other hand, the extent and deepness of the present crisis in
Mexico may be just creating the galvanizing pressures for the emergence of a
new path of economic and technological development which may lead towards a
more genuine effort for greater autonomy (78). In this respect, however, the
recent and renewed drive to rely on foreign capital which we saw in the
previous section seems to indicate that such a new path will not come about,
and that, if anything, a deepening of the interrelations of the "triple alliance"
and its dependent model of capital accumulation is actually taking place. In the
latter context, one can only say that the unilateral strengthening of Mexico's
(77) Discussing the same issue in relation to the first (1976) national S & T plan, Nadal
(1977a) wondered if it was really possible "to transform the 'model of technological
development' without altering the model of economic development. It is clear that the
answer is negative since the latter is the fundamental conditioning factor of the
former there is at present a 'pattern of dependent technological development'...[and]... this
state of affairs is a direct consequence of the model of socio-economic development"
(Nadal,pp.34-35).
(78) Interestingly enough, the T & S programme itself acknowledges not only the failure of
regulatory legislation but also the need for galvanizing pressures in order to generate
effective change. In reference to the present economic CTisis, it somehow welcomes the lack of
foreign exchange currently affecting Mexico as a boon for the development of the country's
own technological capabilities. "Thus far the cultural and commercial relations with foreign
nations have meant for the country a negative balance in technological matters. Despite the
legal instruments to regulate its import, embodied and disembodied technology has been
acquired in a practically indiscriminate form and without concern for its assimilation. It is
expected that in the future the lack of foreign exchange will reduce markedly the
possibilities of maintaining this attitude; in these conditions there will have to be a better
use of the financial and technical resources available to the country, and the start of an
endogenous development based on the diffusion of mature technologies, the assimilation of
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own S & T capabilities looks more urgent them ever before. Let us see,
therefore, what the current state of development of Mexico's S & T capabilities
is, or to put it differently, What are the major structural problems the
government will have to solve in order to achieve its advocated goal of
technological self-determination ?
As part of their exercise in S & T planning, Mexican policy-makers have
carried out an extensive diagnosis of the country's S & T system. The most
relevant features transpiring from this diagnosis, which can be found not just in
the three official S & T plans (79) but also scattered in a variety of studies
through the 1970s and 1980s (80), are basically two: first, the remarkable
resilience of the fundamental problems of Mexico's S & T system
notwithstanding the support and advances since the 1970s; second, the extensive
nature of the problems and interrelations involved which, emerging from the
all-pervasive reality of technology itself, has led to an integrated view
identifying and linking Mexico's deficiencies from scientific research to production,
education and S & T policy itself. Reflecting the latter, the current T & S
programme for development has adopted a system view of what it calls the
National Science and Technology System (SINCYT) and which defines as the
interrelated set of the following set of six subsystems and their corresponding
functions:
"a) research, whose function is to generate new scientific and
technological knowledge
b) research-production linkage, which must orientate the choice of
technologies, apply technological knowledge to the production of goods
and services, and translate the needs of national production into
specific demands for technology.
c) research-education linkage, whose function is to educate professionals
and researchers of the highest level for the productive system
d) social communication, which must diffuse through society
information about the nature, functions, problems and products of
science and technology
e) regulatory and planning, which must provide political and legal
framework for the science and technology system; and establish,
monitor and evaluate the national strategies and actions in this area
f) coordination, whose function is to facilitate the interaction of the
system components among themselves and with other sectors of
society" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1984,p.24).
new technologies and the innovation and transfer of advanced technologies" (ibid.,p,43).
(79) See note 74 above.
(80) See Wionczek (1979), Chavez et al (1974), Schoijet (1979), UNESCO (1978), Marquez
(1982), Alvarez et al (1982), Waissbluth and Gutierrez (1982), Ortiz and Torres (1975),
Campos (1972).
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Clearly this concept of national S & T system fails to recognize the crucial
role of specific social interests (81). Nevertheless, it is still useful on at least
two accounts. First, because it shows clearly the complexity and the large
number of parameters involved in the task of achieving an integrated S & T
system in a country such as Mexico; and, second, because it enables the
distinction of the major aspects involved in such a system for purposes of
diagnosis and analytical treatment (Chavez et al,1974). On the first account, the
complexity of the task of achieving an integrated S & T system can be readily
seen from the more specific list of institutions involved in such a process.
According to Marquez (1982),
"At present day, Mexico's technological and scientific infrastructure is
made up of the following elements: practically all the Secretaries of
State; a national organism of coordination and promotion (CONACYT);
the universities, the technological and higher education institutes; the
institutes, research centres and industrial services; the laboratories of
certification, quality control and metrology; the specialized technical
information centres; the institutions of financial promotion; the
engineering and consultancy firms; the research and development units
of public and private enterprises; the juridical-legal framework in
matters of science and technology (laws, regulations and official
dispositions); the human resources qualified in R & D; and. finally, the
foundations, academies and related associations" (Marquez,p32).
On the second account, the systemic distinction of the aspects, relations and
institutions involved in Mexico's S & T system has made possible the necessary
detailed diagnosis, analysis and goal-setting exercise which constitute the
foundation of all serious policy-making (82). As a result, the analysts of
Mexico's S & T system have generated a pretty detailed picture of the state of
development of the system as a whole and of the problems affecting each one of
its subsystems. Overall, the picture that emerges is hardly one of an integrated
system. In the words of the current T & S programme,
"...the science and technology system is still very deficient because it is
small, incomplete and uncoordinated. All the subsystems are
insufficiently large in relation to the national context and, although
there are some vigorous components, others are very weak or lack
certain key elements. The greatest defect of the system is perhaps the
scant interconnection between subsystems and between components of
each one of them, which is necessary for a greater internal efficiency
and for a global efficiency" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal.1984,p.24) (83).
(81) For a discussion and critique of the systems view of S & T in the UDCs, see Amadeo
(1979).
(82) We are not suggesting here that this "will ensure the correctness of the resulting plan.
(83) According to Waissbluth (1982), "...The Mexican scientific and technological system
currently has five main features: it is small, it has a high rhythm of growth, it is
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In a more specific fashion, a study carried out by CONACYT in the 1970s
identified, among others, the following problems as hindering the development of
Mexico's S & T system,
"...deficient coordination between science and technology and the
production of goods and services; absence of effective mechanisms of
international cooperation; transfer of inadequate technology; lack of a
satisfactory informative infrastructure facilitating decision-making in
the choice of technologies; relative lack of human resources qualified to
carry out research and experimental development; small proportion of
national expenditure devoted to these activities, and difficulty in
acquiring and maintaining scientific instrumentation" (Alvarez et
al,1982,p.64).
At the level of each subsystem, the picture that emerges from the diagnosis
of Mexico's S & T system is also one of deficiency and relative weakness. In
the present work, we shall not attempt to review the state of affairs of each
one of the subsystems since that is not necessary for our purposes. Instead, we
shall focus on the major features of the first two subsystems distinguished
above, namely, those of research and research-production linkage since, together,
these subsystems more directly constitute the core of the R&D system so
crucially important for the possession of an IMC.
4.2.2. Mexico's R&D System: Characteristics and Social
Constituency
Quantitatively, Mexico's R&D system is of a very modest size when
compared with that of the developed countries, while, qualitatively, it shows the
typical problems and imbalances of a dependent and underdeveloped system.
Table 4.21 shows the magnitude of the total financial resources Mexico spent in
R & D in various years. In 1980, the total expenditure was about $370 million
which amounted to approximately 0.249b of the country's GDP. In per capita
terms, this amounted to 5.4 dollars for every Mexican. If we consider that IBM
and AT & T alone spend about $2 billion each on R & D (84), it is possible to
realize how modest the Mexican R&D effort is. Table 4.22 gives a
comparative picture (85). As we can see in per capita terms and as a
heterogeneous, it has problems of linkage with users, and, paradoxically, it is non-existent as
a formalized system" (Waissbluth,p.ll8). A similar statement had been made by Chavez et
al (1974) almost a decade before, "...The examination of the present conditions of the SCT
[scientific-technological system A.M.], reveals that in Mexico there exists no integrated system
of generation, diffusion and utilization of scientific and technological knowledge" (Chavez et
al,p.270).
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percentage of national income, Mexico's R&D expenditure is well behind that
of the most advanced countries (86). Such a situation is mirrored, for instance,
in the fact that Mexico counted in 1984 with only 6,000 researchers having
some kind of postgraduate study, which means a relation of less than 0.8 per
10,000 inhabitants as compared with figures of between 20 and 45 for the most
industrialized countries (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1984). However, a slightly better
picture emerges as we consider the total expenditure for science and technology,
which includes expenditure in formation human resources and social diffusion of
information (87). Figure 4.1 illustrates the evolution of the volume of S & T
expenditure in current and constant prices for the 1970s. Whereas figure 4.2
illustrates the evolution of this expenditure as a percentage of the country's
GDP for the same period. Clearly, in real terms, S & T expenditure has reflected
the ups and downs of the Mexican economy with the biggest jump taking place
in the late 1970s as a result of the impact of the oil boom. On the whole, in
1981 Mexico was spending 4 times more than it did in 1971. This amounted to
an annual growth rate of 11.5% through the decade (Marquez,1982). As a
percentage of GDP, however, the increase from 0.39 in 1971 to 0.47 in 1981
was not impressive. Indeed, if we consider that the national S & T programme
1978-1982 put 1% of GDP as a goal to be achieved by 1982 (CONACYT.1978),
we can see not only how modest was the actual performance but also how
disparate the goals in official plans may be. The current T & S programme
brings a new figure of 0.54% for 1982 (88), but this does not alter things very
much since it is clear that the economic crisis that began to bite the same year
must have had a negative effect once again. In the words of the director of
CONACYT at the time,
"During 1982, we have had to decrease the size of the editions of our
journals, suspend granting new scholarships, and stop financing new
research, infrastructure projects, and important international cooperation
programs. The decision has been difficult since we are fully aware that
it will have long-term repercussions on the development of a scientific
effort that was growing and creating gratifying perspectives"
(85) Note that for Mexico the figures are for 1980 while for the other countries they are
mostly for the mid-1970s.
(86) One has to take into account that the level of R & D expenditure before the 1970s
was very low indeed. Spaey (1970) gives figures of 0.1% of GNP for the mid-1960s, while
Nadal (1977) gives a figure of 0.06% for the same period. Spaey (1970) also gives a per
capita figure of 0.5 dollars. See also Soberon and Poveda (1973).
(87) For instance, "...according to a study carried out in 1975 by the Exchequer and
CONACYT, the public sector devoted 50.5% of its science and technology expenditure to R
& D activities, and the remainder 49.5% to education, diffusion and support activities"
(Marquez,1982,p.52).
(88) Flores (1983) gives a figure of 0.6% for 1982, but this is in relation to Mexico's GNP.
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(Flores,1983.p.l40l).
As it has been indicated earlier, it is not only the size of the Mexican R &
D system that constitutes a problem. Undoubtedly of greater significance are the
qualitative unbalances typical of a dependent and underdeveloped system which
will not be solved simply by raising the level of financial resources. Among the
most prominent of these unbalances, the following have been identified (89).
a) Mexico depends to an exaggerated degree on the development of science and
technology in more advanced countries, thus limiting its output in many cases to
purely imitative quasi-research activities in fields in which serious local R&D
is badly needed.
b) It is estimated that the proportion of human resources devoted to the
activities of basic research, applied research and technological development is
40%, 55% and 5% respectively. In contrast, in developed countries, the relative
weight of basic research tends to range between 12% and 20% while that of
technological development ranges between 48% and 65%. This shows how little R
& D in Mexico is actually concerned with technological advance. In addition, the
functional distribution of R & D expenditures is equally deficient. Almost 70%
of financial resources is spent on salaries and wages, while less than 15% is
available for the purchase of equipment indispensable for serious research.
c) National scientific equipment and materials are expensive and scarce; and
specialized workshops for their maintenance are insufficient and in some places
non-existent. This means that numerous projects must be delayed or interrupted
due to lack of equipment and materials at the appropriate time. On the other
hand, there are cases of overequipped laboratories, where the equipment may
become obsolete even before it has been put into use.
d) Most R&D institutions face a critical lack of researchers. Less than 10% of
the total existing research entities employ more than 20 people each, the
minimum needed for relevant research in most fields. Those research centres
with more than 100 researchers amounted to 10 in 1979, and between the 53
main research centres, together they employed 5,000 researchers and technicians.
Compare this with the 17,000 professional staff employed by Bell Labs in the
(89) See Poder Ejecutivo Federal (1984), CONACYT (1978), Wionczek (1979), Chavez et al
(1974), Schoijet (1979), Alvarez et al (1982), Marquez (1982).
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late 1970s (Braun and MacDonald,1978). In addition, there is a relatively wide
dispersion of scarce resources as the latter are shared among too many projects.
Table 4.23 shows that the rate of project per researcher was 1.22 in 1973 and
that the funding per project was less than 12,000 dollars (90).
e) The ratio of research workers to auxiliary technicians is much higher in
Mexico than in developed countries. It has been estimated at about 6:1 in
Mexico against 1:2 in the UK and 1:1 in West Germany. This means that often
researchers have to devote themselves to tasks other than research, thus affecting
the productivity and the quality of the research.
f) Overall the scientific and technological productivity in Mexico is quite low as
it is shown by the various indexes given in table 4.24. For instance, the
proportion of researchers who published their work was only 0.08 by the mid-
1970s. In relation to patenting, productivity was equally low with an index of
just 0.02 patents registered by resident researchers. Thus, it is not surprising to
find that from a total of 2,552 patents granted in 1982, 93.2% corresponded to
non-resident applicants (Sagasti,1984). In addition, most of the patents granted to
Mexicans have related to improvements on equipment, processes or materials.
g) Geographic and institutional concentration is enormous. Research institutions
located in Mexico City account for 80% to 90% of all researchers, and more
than 40% of the researchers belong to just 5 institutions.
h) The development of science and technology is highly unbalanced sectorally
and by disciplines, with consequent neglect of important areas of research. There
are research groups relatively vigorous and developed, specially in disciplines
such as agricultural sciences, biomedicine, physics and some areas of engineering
and social sciences. On the other hand, it is remarkable the disparity between
Mexico's needs and the lack of strong groups in earth sciences research,
meteorology, marine sciences, biology, economy and chemistry. Furthermore,
(90) Years later, this situation seems to have changed little as it is illustrated by the case
of IMEC (Mexican Institute of Research in Metal-Mechanic Manufacturing), a research
institute established in 1976 to offer technological assistance to the engineering industries and
develop projects of applied technology and technological development in relation to the
concrete needs of these industries. Initial government plans were for a large institution to
support the development of this crucial sector of the capital goods industry. However, in
1982, IMEC employed only 40 persons, of which 8 were engineers and the rest were
employees, workers and technicians of a workshop. In spite of its limited resources IMEC
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search for technological knowledge is neglected in such areas of importance as
subsistence agriculture, non-renewable resources, capital goods, transport and
communications, and urban development and housing.
i) The links between the R&D effort and the educational and productive
systems are very weak. The weakness of technical diffusion and extension
services obstruct the transmission of knowledge to the productive system,
specially in non-commercial agriculture and consumer goods industry.
These and a host of other less obvious problems (91) are part of the basic
structural characteristics of the R&D system in Mexico. As it is possible to
observe, the country is still far from the R&D reality of developed countries.
Indeed the more so, if we consider the characteristics of the social constituency
which is necessary to advance the development of the system in accordance with
its overriding interests. In effect, in Mexico there is nothing like the powerful
social complex of interests advancing and shaping the development of the US' R
& D system for instance. To start with, the relative weight of Mexico's intrinsic
science constituent is quite reduced, given not only all the problems and
limitations we have just described, but perhaps of greater importance, the lack
of immediate importance of the product of the science constituent for the
overriding interests of other social forces commanding, for instance, the necessary
financial resources to advance the interests of science. In the US, as we saw in
Chapter III, galvanizing economic and politico-military forces have made science a
fundamental element for the fulfillment of the overriding interests of capital,
government and the military. In consequence, the science constituent has
obtained huge resources to grow and fulfill its social purpose in exchange for
shaping the product of its activity in accordance with the interests of the other
social forces. In the Mexican context, however, this is hardly the case, for, in
practice, apart from the government, there is no other force seeking to advance
its own interests through the advance of Mexican science. This statement is
clearly supported by the situation depicted in table 4.25, where the distribution
of researchers and R&D financial resources is given. As it is possible to
(91) For some organizational and cultural problems affecting research work in the most
important Mexican university (UNAM), see Lomnitz (1977,1979). For instance, an interesting
feature is that "the prevailing structure within the university (as in the country at large)
places great rewards on administrative positions, since such positions are awarded as a form
of recognition and represent practically the only available kind of promotion. Hence the
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observe, between the public sector and universities, they account for 91.4% and
86.3% of researchers and financial resources respectively. Private capital's share
of researchers and financial resources is a meagre 6.9% and 8.5% respectively. In
contrast to the case of the US, therefore, in Mexico not only the military plays
a negligible role in the unfolding of the country's R&D system (92), but,
most significantly, the fundamental force of capitalist development, namely,
capital itself, plays almost no role when compared with the US where,
currently, capital is the most important social constituent of the R&D system
in terms of both source of funds and performance (93).
In more specific terms, the weak relative weight of capital in Mexico's R &
D system means that private national capital and foreign capital alike are little
interested in funding, demanding and shaping the products of Mexican science
for purposes of their own specific interests. On the part of TNCs, they simply
do not need to resort to such products nor they are truly willing to carry out
R&D activity to generate them in Mexico. This is consistent with what we
have found regarding the role of TNCs in the process of Mexican
industrialization. Thus, in Schoijet's words, "...A nearly total lack of interest of
multinational enterprises in local research and development is evident in Mexico.
The pharmaceutical industry, a typically multinational industry, spends a lot on
research in its central laboratories in the advanced countries but in Mexico it
•spends 26 times more in advertising than in research" (Schoijet,1979,p.409). In
fact, studies carried out in Mexico in the 1970s showed that the source of the
(92) Although Mexico's military expenditure has been increasing quite markedly in recent
years -the joint anny and air force budget increased by 55% in 1980- overall spending has
been rather low by Latin American standards, for instance, Cuba with a population of 10
million has armed forces twice as large as Mexico with its 70 million inhabitants. Likewise,
in 1980, Mexico's military expenditure ($563 million) was almost half that of Cuba ($1,907
million) and less than a third that of Brazil ($1,907 million). See Goldblat and Millan
(1982) and Tullberg and Millan (1983). In addition, it has also been noted that, as a share
of GDP, Mexico has one of the smallest defense budgets in the world, only about 0.5%
(Davidson,1986). Traditionally, the Mexican military have been very much out of the
political realm. Some observers, however, have seen in the increased expenditures and other
political concessions to the armed forces, a possible trend towards the alteration of this
situation (Granados,1982).
(93) In the US, in 1982/1983, capital contributed 51.2% of all the funds for R&D; 68%
of all the funds for industrial R&D; and performed an equivalent of 74.3% of all the
funds for R&D (see tables 3.3 and 3.4 in Chapter III). In contrast, as the current
National Development Plan acknowledges, in Mexico the contribution "of enterprises to
national technological development is very limited; some industries have groups devoted to
solving their own problems, but the scale of such activity is of little significance; in general,
small and medium-scale industry shows no interest in research, whereas large industry pays
excessive explicit royalties for imported technology or implicit royalties in the equipment
which buys. This is true as much for private enterprise as for public ones" (Poder Ejecutivo
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technology used by foreign firms operating in Mexico was chiefly the corporation
or parent company [Nadal(1977),Wionczek(l973)]; and when they have relations
with local scientific and technological institutions, these are basically for services
such as troubleshooting, tests and quality control (94). On the part of private
national capital, as Alvarez (1982) has put it, "...As a general rule, Mexican
private enterprise has had neither the tradition nor the interest to support
research and experimental development" (Alvarez,p.68). For some commentators
the reason for this situation lies in the infrastructural weakness of Mexico's S &
T capabilities and industry itself. Thus, "...Conditions are unfavourable for
indigenous private enterprises to create important laboratories, because of the
small size and poor managerial and technical skills available in such enterprises"
(Schoijet,1979,p.409) (95). The current national T & S programme follows a
similar line. It argues that the inability of the small and medium industry to
develop new products is due to the following factors: lack of skills from its
technicians, engineers and administrators: inadequate infrastructure for the
development of technologies; obsolete equipment; lack of access to test
laboratories and lack of capital (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1984). Along with these
factors, some scholars have also pointed to the Mexican entrepreneur and the
lack of profit-making incentives or pressures existing in the Mexican economy.
According to Campos (1972), Mexico has not had an innovative and risk-taking
entrepreneur. Instead, thanks to a captive market, the entrepreneur has not only
been able to afford inefficiency while obtaining large profits, but has been quite
oblivious of the fact that production at low cost and high quality is one of the
condition for successful competition in the international market. In specific terms,
Campos (1972) identifies the following reasons for the lack of R & D
capabilities in Mexican companies. Firstly, they have lacked the main incentive
for research, that is, the presence of efficient competitor-enterprises. Second, the
small size of the internal market in which most of the enterprises concentrate
Federal,1983,p.l64).
(94) "Out of 27 firms that were visited, twelve stated that they had no relations at all
with local scientific and technological institutions. The other fifteen firms used local facilities
for quality control activities (10), manpower training (6), technical troubleshooting (2),
minor adaptations (l) and for process development (l). This last case is that of a firm
which has strong ties with the Mexican Petroleum Institute in order to develop a suitable
process for one of its by-products" (Nadal,1977,p.244).
(95) The relevance of the skills of existing human resources is another factor. For instance,
while in the US 29% of all physicists worked in industry in the late 1970s, in Mexico there
seemed to be no physicist employed as such in industry. The reason "is not only because
industry could not use them or because it has never heard of them, but also because of the
fact that until quite recently very few Mexican physicists were trained in fields which are
most pertinent to industry" (Schoijet,1979,p.386).
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their operations makes it difficult to afford research. Thirdly, research activities
characterize themselves by their high degree of uncertainty while there are
abroad proved technologies, involving no risk for the users (96). Hence, as the
1978-82 S & T plan acknowledged, "...Foreign technology continues to be for the
Mexican entrepreneur the most expeditious and efficient option in order to make
industry grow and to improve the quality of its products"
(CONACYT,1978,p.l529) (97).
Thus far, therefore, it is plain that we have very little in the shape of a
social constituency of Mexico's R&D system. On the one hand, the intrinsic
science constituent has a very weak relative weight and, on the other, the
fundamental constituent of its capitalist development, namely, capital, does not
incorporate such R&D system as a crucial factor for the fulfillment of its
overriding interests. This means that the government alone is effectively left as
the dominant social constituent of the R&D system insofar as the latter has
come to be perceived, increasingly, as an important factor in the process of
economic growth and political stability that sustain its political power.
Historically, however, this commitment to R & D by the government is rather
recent. As we indicated at the beginning of the present discussion, it only goes
back to the early 1970s to the establishment of CONACYT and the generation
of the first national S & T plan in 1976 (98). Consequently, there is no long-
(96) Wionczek (1973) also identifies similar problems along with the weakness of Mexico's S
& T infrastructure and the major technological Tole of foreign private investment. He
mentions "the high level of protection enjoyed by industrial activities in Mexico and the
control of supply by a relatively small group of large enterprises in proportion to the
magnitude of the national market. These factors explain the passive attitude of industrial
enterprises in relation to costs, quality and adaptability of imported technology since, in the
final analysis, it is the national consumer who pays the cost of inadequate technologies and
of the subsequent inefficiency of the industrial process" (Wionczek,pp.245-246).
(97) A clear illustration of the behaviour of Mexican entrepreneurs is furnished by the
pattern of investments in the capital goods sector in the context of Mexican policies of
industrialization. "For the national investor the capital goods productive sector has been less
attractive than those of intermediate and consumer goods, mainly because in the former
sector there are no protectionist policies, but also because it is technologically more complex,
thus requiring highly qualified personnel and a sustained R&D effort...The promotion of
industrialization implied facilities for the import of capital goods; for the national producer,
private or public, foreign equipment was cheaper, offered under better financial conditions,
and of better quality..."(Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1984,p.l5).
(98) Before CONACYT, there had been in Mexico national organizations dealing with the
promotion and coordination of science, but none of them had any significance on the
generation of a R & D system as such. Thus, in 1935, president Cardenas established the
National Council of Higher Education and Scientific Research which operated until 1938; then
the Scientific Research Promoting and Coordinating Commission was created in 1942, followed
by the National Institute of Scientific Research in 1950. The latter organization was reformed
in 1961. [Amadeo(l979),Marquez(l982)]. See also Soberon and Poveda (1973).
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term experience to make a more definitive judgement about the true extent and
depth of the government's commitment and, above all, of its ability to actually
make possible the development of an autonomous R&D system. Even so, the
fundamental approach implicit in the planning exercises and subsequent
developments to the 1976 plan suggest a picture that casts serious doubts about
the attainment of the latter possibility. In effect, at a fundamental level, since
the government is committed to a model of development and social alliance of
which it itself is a major social constituent, all the S & T planning simply
ignores the fact that the present state of affairs is largely the result of the
general model of development which has dominated Mexico since the postwar.
As Leff put it in relation to the 1976 national plan,
"...[it]...establishes as its fundamental objectives scientific development,
cultural autonomy and technological self-determination... But it avoids
the analysis of the economic and political structure that
produces...[the]...blocking effects, veiling capitalist dependence in the
mist of nationalism, autonomy, liberty, etc. It is stated that
scientific-technological policy must be integrated to the country's
general development policy, but it is not made clear that the country's
scientific-techno logical policy...has always been and will be the
articulated outcome of a global policy of development"
(Leff,1980,p.276).
Ultimately, what the government fails to recognize is that the present
model of dependent capitalist development is based on a social constituency
whose interests not only do not lead spontaneously to the development of an
autonomous R&D system but, also, at least in the case of transnational
capital, tends strongly to contradict such a development. In other words, what it
fails to recognize is that within the context of the present process of capitalist
development, the dominant social constituency of such a process is at the same
time the social constituency of what we may call Mexico's R&D uncapability.
Of course, being itself part of the complex of interests of such social
constituency, one can hardly expect the forces in control of the government to
accept such a proposition. After all, the present state of Mexico's R&D system
is also the result of many explicit and implicit government policies which for
long neglected the search for its autonomous development, in this sense, it is
possible to say that there is nothing permanent in the current interest of the
Mexican government for the R&D system and, indeed, one may even doubt
about the future of this interest too. To a large extent, all will depend upon
the existence of societal pressures which put and keep S & T as an important
goal in the strategy to fulfill the government's overriding interests. Past events
clearly bear out the validity of this statement. For instance, the very creation
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of CONACYT is said to have been prompted for economic as well as political
pressures threatening the stability of the country (99). On the economic front,
according to Wionczek (1973),
"...the preoccupation of the state for the cost, quality and adaptability
of the technology available in the country has emerged only at the
moment in which the saturation of the internal market and the
difficulties of the balance of payments have faced Mexico with the
need to change its industrialization policies passing from import
substitution to others more effective which tend to promote the export
of part of industrial production. It was at this moment that the
inconveniences of the country's almost complete dependence upon
imported technologies began to be discovered...Hence the creation, by
the Executive's initiative in the late 1970s, of the National Council for
Science and Technology (CONACYT)" (Wionczek,p.246).
On the political front, Lazcano (1982) points to the role of the political
unrest in universities in 1968 which ended up in the Plaza de Tlatelolco
massacre where scores of students were killed (100). In this connection, the
foundation of the CONACYT also fulfilled the political need to channel resources
to the R&D community as a means to both healing the wounds of 1968 and
keeping a closer control on the activities of the academic community. This view
was acknowledged by CONACYT itself in the 5th edition of its national S & T
programme (1978-1982). There it is stated that,
"The CONACYT was born not only because there was awareness of
the country's scientific and technological backwardness...but also as a
probable solution to an acute political need detected as a result of the
events of 1968, when the State realized that the conflict had been to a
large extent exacerbated due to the lack of channels of institutional
communication with the university scientific and technological
community. that is, students and lecturers" (Quoted by
Lazcano,1982,p.346).
As we saw in figure 4.1, it was in the early 1970s that the expenditure in
S & T began to rise. Since then, the Mexican R&D community has received
(99) There are two other exogenous factors which are often mentioned. First, the influence
of the developed countries' S & T planning policies and the enormous growth of the R&D
budgets in these countries with the consequent effect on the productive sectors. Second, the
emergence of the "planning" fashion in Latin America which was stimulated by the US
policy of Alliance for Progress and officially began in 1967 with the Conference of Latin
American presidents at Punta del Este, Uruguay. With the Alliance for Progress -which was
itself the US response to the alternative open by the Cuban Revolution- the US offered a
new model for the granting of financial aid, which demanded from the receiving nations a
clear definition of their needs, specified in time and by projects, that is, planning. Thus, it
was at Punta del Este where for the first time the need was stated for the generation of
national S & T policies that supported the economic and social development of Latin
American countries. See Amadeo (1979), Leff (1980).
(100) See note 18 above.
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important benefits through CONACYT's major S & T programmes. For instance,
as figure 4.3 illustrates, the number of scholarships granted by the council
reached a cumulative level of 28,000 during the decade 1971-1981. Members of
the scientific community have also participated in the S & T planning exercises
headed by the council and have benefited from the policy of promotion of
scientific and technological international cooperation. Likewise, CONACYT's
programme of research centres also involves the participation of institutions of
higher learning along with state governments, industrial groups and other
agencies. Through CONACYT, therefore, the government has attempted to give
the R&D community an institutional channel for closer incorporation into the
political system (101), thus diffusing a political tension which might have had
threatening consequences for the stability of the system. At the same time, in
response to economic pressures, CONACYT has become the spearhead of the
strategy to strengthen Mexico's S & T capabilities in pursuit of the goal of
technological self-determination.
As we have seen from figure 4.2, however, the political and economic
pressures of the 1970s were not strong enough as to ensure that total S & T
expenditure reached the advocated goal of 19b. In fact, the real levels achieved
seem to have been enough for political stability, but it is quite clear that they
fell far short from the requirements implied in a committed effort to attain
technological self-determination. Of course, we already know that, during this
period, the pressure of economic forces did in no way altered the fundamentals
(101) President Echeverria, who set up CONACYT, was at pains to emphasize that this
organization truly represented the interests of the scientific community above all others. "The
council is a decentralized organ, with an independent status, and under its own control. Its
sole point of contact with the government is a secretary of state, the Secretary of
Communications and Transport, who was named its director-general by me, since the legal
authority is vested in the President. He is a member of the scientific community, is
considered by them to be one of theirs, and in this post he is well placed to provide them
with economic assistance, mobility and contacts" (Echeverria,1972,p.46). Some members of the
scientific community, however, have strongly criticized what they see as the mediatization of
Mexican science by an enormous bureaucratic apparatus that seeks to control its
development. Perez Tamayo (1982) criticizes CONACYT as political organism whose directors
are appointed more in response to political interests than technical interests. He sees
bureaucracy growing to intimidating levels and argues that there is more interest in the
promotion of CONACYT itself rather than S & T for the country. He proposes the
dismantling of CONACYT and its replacement by a small agency directed by members of
the scientific community instead of politicians. Bellinghausen (1982) and Lazcano (1982)
basically agree with Perez Tamayo although they have little hope that CONACYT will be
dismantled. One of the reasons, according to Lazcano (1982), is that "bureaucrats, unlike the
rest of matter and energy existing in the Universe, do not obey at all the First Law of
Thermodynamics, that is, bureaucracy never destroy itself, it only creates and transform
itself" (Lazcano,p.345). Of course, from our viewpoint, this is true for all interest groups,
including science itself.
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of the model of dependent capital accumulation dominated by the "triple
alliance" of government, private national capital and foreign transnational capital.
If anything, it became stronger by the late 1970s when the flood of imports
clearly had the effect of increasing technological dependence, thus making a
mockery of the technological self-determination efforts based on both legislative
controls to curb the excesses of transnational capital and the national S & T
planning promoted by CONACYT. Perhaps the clearest illustration of the
fragility of any long-term government interest in, or commitment to, Mexico's S
& T autonomy in the context of the "triple alliance" was the demise of the first
national S & T plan of 1976, abandoned in the wake of the change of
administration and a serious economic and political crisis in the country. As
Wionczek (1979) explains,
"Under this conditions, the scientific and technological problems lost
importance relative to the many other pressing problems that the
government and public sector had to face, particularly because its
authors insisted on the long-term nature of any effort in the field, and
were unable to offer politically attractive solutions to the country's
short-run problems" (Wionczek,p.230) (102).
It seems, therefore, that although S & T capabilities have come to be
perceived as important for the realization of government interests, in practice,
such importance is dampened by the long-term nature of the problem and, above
all, by the permanency of a model of development whose social constituents not
only do not advance spontaneously but, indeed, contradict the development of an
autonomous R&D system in Mexico.
Nowadays, we are in the face of a new national S & T programme and
the worst postwar economic crisis Mexico has ever suffered. Again S & T is
talked about as a fundamental factor for the future of the Mexican nation and
a detailed set of objectives, strategies and tasks, both general and specific, have
been elaborated. Underlying it all, however, is the unquestioned permanence of
the model of dependent capitalist accumulation and of the social complex of
interests associated with it. The hope of the government is that, this time, due
to the major restrictions created by the current crisis, particularly in foreign
exchange, capital will be forced to decrease its dependence on foreign technology,
thus searching for, using and developing national capabilities. Through
(102) According to Schoijet (1979), there was no organized protest of any kind against the
shelving of the plan "which shows both the fragile nature of the concensus achieved and the
lack of coherence of the Mexican scientific community" (Schoijet,p.41l). In other words, this
shows the non-existence of an effective social constituency and the fact that the government
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infrastructural support, incentives and controls, the government expects to
reinforce this process to bring about the crucial integration between the R&D
institutions and the productive sector. In the view of the programme,
"...the challenge facing the country in this respect is technological
development at the level of productive plant, since in spite of the fact
that in the last decade there have been notable advances in the
endowment of infrastructure and formation of human resources highly
qualified in research and development, an effective scheme of
technological development at the industrial plant level has not been
achieved" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1984,p.l2l).
Ultimately, under the galvanizing pressures of the present critical context
and through a mammoth techno-bureaucratic effort, what the government is
attempting is to stimulate and manage a process of reorientation of practices
within the social constituency of Mexico's dependent capitalist accumulation in
order to gradually transform a pattern of technological dependence into one of
self-determination (103). In practice, this would amount to little less than
creating from above the capitalist social constituency of Mexico's R&D system
or, even more exacting, transforming what has effectively been the social
constituency of Mexico's R&D uncapability into that of Mexico's R&D
capability. It would be in the latter constituency where finally the interests of
government, capital and science would integrate each other in the manner we
have seen in the most developed capitalist countries.
However, given the historical record and context that has predominated for
several decades, the above goals seem hardly realistic. Instead, it seems much
more realistic to expect that in a few years time we shall again be faced with a
new national plan, the fourth, but very much in the same situation as far as
the social constituency of Mexico's R&D system is concerned. Let us turn our
attention to Mexico's electronics capabilities since we now have all the necessary
elements to put into its proper societal perspective the analysis of the problem
of indigenous microelectronics capabilities in a country such as Mexico.
is the completely dominant social constituent. See also Amadeo (1979).
(103) One of the challenges the national plan poses to the country is "...The need to
transform substantially the strategy of industrialization, replacing the pattern of
technological dependence"...so as to divert..."present and future demand towards local sources
of technological supply and, in this way, gradually and progressively to achieve self-
determination" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1984,p.l20).
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4.3. Indigenous Microelectronics Capability in




The development of the electronics infrastructure in Mexico constitutes a
particular manifestation of the processes and tendencies we have discussed in
relation to the country's industrial and R&D capabilities. As such, it contains
the essential sociotechnical features characterizing the development of the latter
capabilities at the same time that those pertaining to the specific nature of the
electronics infrastructure itself. In this respect, we shall see for instance that
this is a technology whose dominant constituency not only brings together the
same social forces of Mexico's industrialization process but it brings them
together in a particular form of interrelations where the conspicuous fact is the
large relative weight of transnational capital (104).
4.3.1. The Electronics Infrastructure in Mexico: Goals in a Path
of Capitalistic Development
For the Mexican government electronics technology has assumed increasing
importance as the realization deepens that its impact is bound to have strategic
repercussions in the development efforts of the country. Very much in the same
way as science and technology have been identified as crucial factors in the
process of breaking with Mexico's dependence, thus electronics has began to be
perceived as particularly crucial for the future success of this strategic objective.
As the current national development plan puts it,
"Because of its ever closer incorporation into the capital goods
industry, because of the radical transformation which it induces in the
production of certain services such as communications, health and
education, because of the growing importance that its products have in
final consumption, the electronics industry, and its associates such as
optical technology, play a central role in the evolution of the
organized production of goods and services, increments in productivity
and the pattern of private and social consumption...By changing the
relative productivity of factors, the introduction of electronics and its
associated technologies in productive processes change the structure of
comparative advantages at the international scale, the relative
profitability of economic activities and enables the cheapening of the
costs of services while increasing their efficiency. The unplanned
development of these industries might be a cause of serious upheavals
in the national economy, above all, if there is not an adequate choice
of products and services to support the priority activities of the
(104) This is a situation that we would not find in Mexico's oil industry, for instance.
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country" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1983,pp.l43-144).
With such a perception, it is not surprising that the Mexican government
should consider electronics as a high priority industry for the development of
the country. In practice, however, such priority began to take root within
government spheres only by the early 1980s when the first major policies for
partial sectors were produced (105). Until then Mexico had had no formal
policy on the matter, let alone a strategy to deal with the increasingly
integrated development of the electronics infrastructure. The latter concern is
something that one begins to find only in the current National Programme for
Technological and Scientific Research, 1984-1988, where, among the 11
technological R&D programmes related to national priorities, a complete
programme is devoted to the development of the Mexican electronics capabilities.
In the latter document, the present government exposes the reasons and
establishes the guidelines and goals for the development of technological
capabilities in various electronics areas which, taken together, would lead Mexico
a long way towards the build up of an indigenous microelectronics capability.
The areas identified are: materials used in the electronics industry, manufacturing
of electronics components, development and application of instrumentation and
automation, development of integrated digital networks in services, computer-
aided design of integrated circuits, software, and personal microcomputers. In all
these areas some definite achievements are envisaged during the present
administration (1982-1988) and the ultimate goal is Mexico's appropriation of
these particular technologies in fulfillment of the country's search for electronics
self-determination. For instance, in relation to materials, the programme makes it
clear that "...As long as Mexico is unable to process the materials required by
the electronics industry, it will not be possible to break with the external
dependence of this industry, even if the country were to count on the
technological capability to produce components and equipments" (Poder Ejecutivo
Federal,19S4,p.317) (106). In this perspective, among the explicit technological
objectives of the programme, one finds: development of technological capabilities
to manufacture electronics in the country. In the short term, the fabrication of
(105) In 1981, Mexico produced its Development Programme for the manufacture of
Electronic Computing Systems, Central Units and Peripheral Equipment. Its aim was "to
accelerate the objective of producing computer electronic systems, their central units and
peripheral equipment, locally, so as to increase the internal level of self-determination in a
branch of fundamental importance for development" (SEPAFIN,1981,p.4).
(106) Similar concepts are contained in the computer programme of 1981 in relation with
the importance of possessing a computer capability. "Technological development in this sector
is seen as an aspect of major importance which must contribute to increasing the capacity of
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discrete semiconductor components is envisaged; these include diodes, transistors
and circuits with a small number of elements. In the medium- and long-terms
the country will develop the technological capability to produce LSI and VLSI
integrated circuits and other components of major importance. A related objective
here is the development of national technological capabilities for computer-aided
design of ICs, including the equipment and testing technology of such ICs. In
instrumentation and automation, one of the objectives is to implement advanced
systems of instrumentation, data acquisition and automatic control in the
productive and service sectors, and also to develop the area of industrial
robotics. In telecommunications, a major aim is to promote the technological
capability to modernize and expand the present digital network of the country
and to develop components -particularly for optical communications- equipment
and basic programmes. In software the aim is to develop technological
capabilities to produce systems of computer programs in the areas of basic
programs, advanced programming techniques and application systems. Finally, in
the field of computers, the explicit objective is to develop the technological
capability to specify, design and produce a low-price personal microcomputer
along with its programs and peripheral equipment. Such microcomputer capability
is conceived as a focal point for the development and integration of the
country's other electronics capabilities, and its evolution is envisaged to reflect
the rapid pace of advances characteristic of the electronics sector. For this
reason, the programme states that,
"...it will be necessary to promote the country's technological capability
in microelectronics, development of systems of programs, computer-
aided design and computer-aided manufacturing techniques
(CAD/CAM), design of peripherals such as keyboards, floppy disks,
mass storage, low cost printers, digital graphic equipment, etc. Some of
these aspects are considered in other focal objectives and their
implementation and results will have to be incorporated into this
microcomputer programme" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1984,p.336).
There is little doubt that were Mexico to achieve the abovementioned
electronics capabilities, the country would have taken an important step towards
the development of an IMC. However, as we have argued in the present work,
the actual possession of such capabilities is not something that can be judged in
relation to technological facts alone, abstracted from the country's socioeconomic
reality and particularly from the specific development purposes such technological
capabilities are suppose to contribute to. Indeed, were we to refer to technical
facts alone, it is quite conceivable that all the capabilities abovementioned might
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be acquired, for instance, at the level of laboratory or prototype without having
any true and widespread impact, say, in the market place, the welfare of the
population or whatever development goal has informed the search for their
acquisition in the fiist place.
Of course, we have discussed Mexico's ultimate development goals before,
and we have also seen that such goals are far from being fulfilled as the
country treads the path of dependent state monopoly capitalism under the aegis
of the state-transnational capital-national private capital social complex of power.
In practice, this means that for purposes of the present discussion it is not the
ultimate goals but the goals emanating from the latter complex of power which
truly furnish the framework of reference dominating the purpose and hence, the
very nature of Mexico's IMC. In this connection, it is necessary to remember the
most crucial finding of our general discussion on Mexico's R&D capabilities,
namely, that in Mexico the social constituents of the capitalist power complex
have clearly contradictory interests regarding the autonomy of the country's
industrial and technological capabilities, in such a way that it is overwhelmingly
the government interests which constitute the driving force of the efforts to
achieve such technological self-determination. Furthermore, to the extent that
such government commitment is itself constrained by its very participation in
the social complex of power and a deeper commitment to a model of dependent
capitalist industrialization, it has been the logical consequence of such a context
that the very concept of self-determination has been basically understood within
the parameters of capitalistic forms of development. In the case of electronics,
this has been explicitly reflected in the government policies for the build up of
an IMC in Mexico which clearly have posited the particular capitalistic form of
IMC as the long-term objective of the government interests. In effect, with little
regard for the way in which the pursuit of such microelectronics capability will
effectively bring Mexico closer to its ultimate development goals, government
planners in the field of electronics have argued for the need to follow the
pattern of electronics development dictated by the international market. As a
document describing the present administration's strategy for the electronics
sector has made it clear,
"The present administration has decided to act energetically, designing
and applying an integral and selective strategy which will help to
restructure the existing sectors of industry and promote the generation
of those sectors in which we do not yet participate. The strategy
self-determination and to reducing the factors of external dependence" (SEPAFIN,1981,p.5).
- 403 -
pursues four main objectives: international competitiveness, exports,
national integration and technological development" (SECOFI,1985,p.l)
(107).
In particular, in relation to international competitiveness the goal is for the
national electronics industry to supply products having the quality, price,
technology, delivery times, and servicing up to international standards. Unless
this conditions are fulfilled, it is argued, "in the medium term we shall see that
we cannot participate in new sectors and that those sectors we now have are in
danger of extinction" (ibid.). This is all the more important given that the
second main objective is exports which are envisaged as a springboard for a
number of processes: to generate the foreign exchange necessary to acquire those
inputs which are not produced in the country: to increase the volume of
production and make national production more efficient: and to diminish
dependence upon the fluctuations of the internal market. International
competitiveness up to the standards of developed countries, therefore, is what
specifically guides Mexico's electronics strategy as conceived by the interests of
the government social constituent. Put in a different perspective, the government
social constituent has chosen, as a means towards self-determination, an IMC
development path which not only will engage Mexico's resources for years to
come (108) but, most importantly, whose content and dynamics will be
effectively shaped by the interests of the dominant social constituents of the
developed countries' (mainly US's) IMC. Thus, it is primarily an exogenously-
determined strategy which, in the light of past experience, offers little evidence
that it will lead to the goal of self-determination and, above all, to the solution
of some of the most pressing problems affecting the country's fast growing
population. In the latter respect, it seems that, limited by the requirements of
its own model of TNCs-dependent capitalist accumulation, the government is just
being guided by both fears and hopes into following the electronics development
patterns of advanced capitalist countries. For instance, a clear illustration of this
fact is found in the current national T & S programme where the need to
(107) Similar concepts were used in the 1981 computer plan. "The industrial sector of
electronic computer systems, central units and peripheral equipment must be oriented not
only to import substitution but fundamentally to the penetration of international markets.
It must be highly competitive internationally and must promote national technological
development" (SEPAFIN,1981,p.5).
(108) As president de la Madrid warned the country recently, "...Several years are required
to establish a stable and solid export platform, taking into account a maturation period for
projects, learning curves, organization of technology transfer, assimilation and development
efforts as well as the formation and qualification of human resources. It may seem a long¬
time, but it is the only viable path and it is necessary that we should follow this direction
immediately" (de la Madrid,1985,p.ll87).
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introduce automation is argued as follows,
"The purpose of this strategy is not merely the implantation of a
technological pattern imitating that of developed countries, but rather
to prevent low productivity affecting in the medium term the
production and supply of basic goods for a growing population and
translating itself as reduced purchasing power, worse income
distribution, and loss of competitiveness in international markets; this
would increase the country's vulnerability in the face of world
economic phenomena" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1984,p.123).
All this for a country which has more than 40% of underemployment with
high levels of social deprivation and as if such social malaise were to be a
problem of productivity alone. In fact, we have already seen that for all the
increments in industrial productivity since the 1950s, Mexico's income
distribution has actually got worse during the years. Nevertheless, with very
little study about the likely impact of automation in Mexico's social structure,
government's hopes for its application are running high. As the T & S
programme has argued in relation to R & D in instrumentation and automation,
"In industrial sectors it will help to improve productivity, quality of
products and safety and working conditions, thus enabling a better use
of capital investment and available manpower. It will strengthen some
branches which are still weak in the productive sector, and thus will
have an impact on the durable and capital goods industry. In the
service sector, it will be possible to achieve savings and improvements
and, most importantly, the size of some of the systems in this sector
(power network, potable water and sewage, etc.) makes their operation
already practically impossible without the incorporation of automatic
devices for instrumentation, data acquisition and control. The private
and public sectors will be able to co-participate in the programme as
generators of technology, as sources of problems, as sources of funds
and as direct users and recipients of research and development
results...The programme will contribute with scientific and technological
inputs to promote the creation, or strengthening, of mixed capital
enterprises. Also, it will increase the country's industrial sector
competitiveness in the international market, both because of possible
improvements in quality and productivity...and because of the
development of patentable and tradable technologies at an international
level. It is envisaged that this will be achieved in the medium-term
and, in certain cases, even in the short-term" (ibid.,pp.323-324).
All in all, therefore, the process of building up an IMC in Mexico clearly
reflects the fundamental tenets of the country's global development strategy.
Thus, the government's role in such an IMC process is being fundamentally
determined by its deeper commitment to the global development strategy and its
dominant social constituency. The result is that the advocated goals of self-
determination and the very development purposes of an IMC can only be
conceived within the limits imposed by the interplay of interests of all the
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social constituents in the circumstances of particular historical conjunctures. As
we shall presently see, in the past such interplay of interests has meant little
for Mexico's electronics capabilities. Whether government promotion and the new
historical pressures created by the crisis will be enough to radically alter the
prevailing situation is something that remains to be seen. In the present work,
however, an informed judgement will be attempted on the basis of a detailed
examination of Mexico's present state of electronics development, the particular
characteristics of its social constituency and the way the government constituent
expects to influence the entire social constituency into advancing the cause of an
IMC in Mexico. Before doing so, however, a few words are necessary about the
Mexican in-bond or "maquiladora" electronics industry given that in the sections
that follow we shall not be dwelling upon this sector notwithstanding its
important magnitude within the Mexican electronics scene. The reason for this
decision is that, qualitatively, such "maquiladora" industry is practically a
foreign enclave with little relation to the Mexican industrial structure. In this
sense, Rivas' conclusion for the "maquiladora" industry as a whole is also valid
for the particular case of electronics. "There is no association with the industrial
activity of the country. They are virtually isolated operations which provide
work to an important number of workers but possess no link with the
industrial base" (Rivas,1985,p.l079). A brief quantitative description of the
electronics "maquiladora" industry has been given by Warman (1984). "The
electronics sector represents 36% of the total number of "maquiladora" enterprises
and 30% of their social capital, but 60% of their employed personnel and 61%
of the total value of production of the "maquiladora" industry...The electronics
"maquiladora" industry is oriented towards those areas of less technological
content and greater labour content...the electronics "maquiladora' industry
generates 65,000 jobs, 30% more than the national electronics industry, and in
1979 it exported 30 times more" (Warman,p.73) (109). To a certain extent, the
latter comparison already suggests an idea of what may be the degree of
development and magnitude of the national electronics industry. But let us not
jump to conclusions without the necessary detailed examination to which we
now turn our concern.
(109) For other works touching upon the Mexican electronics "maquiladora" industry, see
Grunwald (1985), UNCTD (1983), Minian (1981), US Department of Commerce (1979),
UNCTAD (1975).
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4.3.2. Present State of Development of Mexico's Electronics
Infrastructure
The state of development of Mexico's electronics infrastructure has been the
subject of serious studies only since the late 1970s. Until then little statistical
analysis had been made of the separate electronics sectors with the result that
quantitative data may vary for different studies depending upon the sources and
criteria used for their calculation (110). This fact, however, does not affect the
fundamental agreement that exists regarding the basic features and tendencies
characterizing the development of the electronics infrastructure in Mexico. In this
respect, whatever disagreement we may find, it will be more the result of
perceptions and perspectives regarding the concept of IMC than the result of any
actual qualitative problem.
In effect, from the view point of Mexico's IMC, there are some analysts
who typically focus their attention on the technological fact of existing local
capabilities and resources, normally at university or R & D level, but with little
regard for the social context mediating the uprooting of those capabilities in the
development of the techno-productive base of society. For instance, two of such
analysts, after surveying the microelectronics situation in four Latin American
countries (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) concluded that,
"There already exists in Latin America an installed microelectronics
capacity both at the governmental level and in the industrial sector as
such. This potential varies from country to country, but all the
countries visited possess the necessary assets for rapid expansion in the
microelectronics area" (Fernandez and Octavio,1985,p.l).
Such optimistic view, however, is hardly found in those studies which have
dealt with the Mexican electronics infrastructure in greater detail (111). Rather,
the picture that emerges simply reproduces, most of the time in a magnified
form, all the structural problems we have seen in relation to Mexico's industrial
and S & T development. This is particularly the case for the crucial electronics
sectors of semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, and measuring and
control systems, given that Mexico's electronics base has been basically oriented
(110) This means that in the present analysis we shall use statistics more as an indication
of characteristics and tendencies than as any exact quantification of reality.
(111) Discussion on the characteristics of Mexico's electronics infrastructure can be found in
various documents, particularly, government documents. See, for instance, Poder Ejecutivo
Federal (1984), NAFINSA/ONUDI (1979), SPP (1980), SECOFI (1985), Moreno (1982),
Calderon (1982), Warman (1982,1984), Marquez (1982), Nochteff (1985), Briceno and Rivera
(1981), Villela (1981).
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to consumer electronics goods (112). In relation to the former sectors -which
form the core of what Mexican literature refers as professional electronics (113)-
all diagnosis coincide in that Mexico's electronics base possesses the following
characteristics: a) high dependence on foreign technology and capital: b) low R &
D effort and lack of integration between R&D institutions and the productive
sector; c) high costs of production and low productivity and heterogeneous levels
of quality. For instance, the wide-ranging NAFINSA/ONUDI study of the
professional electronics industry in Mexico provided the following account
regarding the structure of this industry in the late 1970s.
"...the Mexican professional electronics industry is chiefly an assembly
industry. Most of the main companies are the partial or total property
of foreign companies, upon which they depend for the technology and
design of their product. Those companies which are completely
Mexican, generally have technological agreements or manufacture their
products under licence from foreign companies and only a few, mostly
small companies are completely independent...The dependence of local
industry on foreign technology means that there is neither design nor
development of national products. Due to the fact that Mexican
electronics firms are subsidiaries of foreign companies, their production
and commercialization policies are, to an important extent, determined
by the parent companies and there are no incentives to develop
products locally...The Mexican electronics industry faces a number of
problems which enterprises in other countries do not have: high costs,
insufficient quality and erratic delivery of raw materials and parts,
lack of availability of electronic components, restrictions and long
waiting-time for imports, etc... the greater product efficiency and
quality is found in subsidiaries of foreign companies, which are
organized and managed according to the pattern of the parent company
abroad" (NAFLNSA/ONUDI,pp.81-82).
The overall development of Mexico's professional electronics industry,
therefore, is pretty weak and subject to major barriers. Certainly, in Mexico one
finds no indication of what our analysis in Chapter II identified as one of the
fundamental technical characteristics of an IMC, namely, the systemic and
synergistic nature of the development process of microtechnology (114). Instead,
as we shall see below, in Mexico complete sectors are virtually missing as far as
national capabilities is concerned. In this sense, the fact that microelectronic
(112) In the view of the 1978 S & T plan, "...Technological adaptation and development in
electronics have been oriented about 90% towards industrial goods such as radios, televisions,
toys, etc., and have not supported in an efficient manner the development of instruments for
production and research" (CONACYT,1978,p.l537).
(113) Professional electronics includes telecommunications equipment, measuring and testing
instruments, process control instruments, computers and calculators, biomedical equipment,
and electronic components and parts.
(114) As an example, Calderon (1982) notes that in Mexico only one of every 20 computers
installed is used or interconnected via telephone lines, with the result that computer
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components are not produced nationally cannot be taken as solely the result of
lack of technology but, also, the result of the lack of fertile ground due to the
minimal national production of microtechnology. In effect, the internal market is
relatively small and mostly supplied by foreign companies whereas the
international market is a far away possibility and whenever exports take place,
these are done by foreign companies. In these conditions, Mexican market
oriented technology cannot flourish and the synergy intrinsic to the development
of microtechnology is structurally distorted or crippled as far as the build up of
a Mexican IMC is concerned.
the analysis of Mexico's electronics industry sector by sector will reveal
clearly the extent and depth of its structural weakness and dependence upon
foreign capital. Table 4.26 provides a comparison between the structures of the
Mexican and the US electronics markets. It shows not only that the total
market for electronics products is about 90 times smaller than that of the US,
but also that there are significant structural differences in terms of the
electronics sectors dominating the development of the industry. Thus, unlike in
the US, in Mexico it is the consumer electronics sector which clearly constitute
the dominant market. The immediate consequence of such a situation is that
most individual companies operating in Mexico have geared their activities
towards this particular sector. Table 4.27 shows that from a total of 443
companies operating in Mexico in 1980 (115), more than 50% of them were
oriented towards the consumer electronics market (116). Such concentration in
the latter market, however does not mean that Mexico is self-sufficient in
consumer electronics, nor that it has achieved anything like the technological
standards of developed countries. Indeed, as Warman (1984) states, "the
consumer sector which has developed in Mexico is that of less technological
content" (Warman,p.72). Traditionally, this sector has been highly protected
which, compounded to the effect of a relatively small market, has meant little
pressure or incentive to invest in technology and produce high quality products
at internationally competitive costs (117). For this reason, Mexico still imports
networks have had a slow development in the country.
(115) The figure of 508 for the total number of enterprises which appear in the table is
explained by the fact that some companies operated in more than one sector of the market.
(116) Warman (1984) has estimated that more than 75% of electronics enterprises in Mexico
are oriented towards the consumer electronics market. This estimate, however, assumes that
enterprises in parts and components supply almost exclusively the consumer electronics
sector.
(117) "Clearly, the minimal investment in technology and Mexico's high costs of production







































































































a significant part of its consumer goods despite the existence of protectionist
measures. Figures from the National Confederation of Electronics Industries put
imports of consumer goods at 9% of total electronics imports in 1979. These
figure, however, seriously underestimate the true level of consumer goods
imports given that in Mexico smuggling plays quite an important role. Indeed,
"diverse estimates indicate that from 30 to 50 percent of the national market is
supplied with illegal imports" (Warman,1984,p.72) (118).
We see, therefore, that the strongest sector of Mexican electronics industry
is in fact far behind the high standards demanded by international
competitiveness. This means that we can hardly expect a better performance
from Mexico's professional electronics sector. Tables 4.28 and 4.29 provide the
quantitative picture of the evolution of this sector from 1973 to 1978. Starting
from 1978, however, the trends implicit in the data from 1973 to 1978 were
substantially altered as a result of the oil boom and subsequent crisis began in
1981 and which is still affecting the Mexican economy. Nevertheless, the 1973-
1978 data are still useful because they provide an overall relative picture
between production, imports, exports and consumption for the main professional
electronics subsectors of finished products and components. This will enable us
to gain a global and sectoral insight of the structural characteristics of the
crucial professional electronics industry in Mexico, in the knowledge, later to be
corroborated, that the oil-boom period brought about a major upsurge in
electronics imports (119) and consumption followed by a marked decline of
production and imports during the crisis.
From table 4.28, among the most salient structural features of professional
electronics in Mexico, it is possible to distinguish the following. The market as a
whole was heavily dependent on imports as total national production of finished
which cannot be exported; the latter aspect is largely due to the lack of scale economies
which results from the production of mass consumer goods for a relatively small market.
The expenditure in technology is seldom directed towards innovation and, as a general rule,
is devoted to the adaptation of obsolete models in order to make them adequate to the
national conditions of production and commercialization" (Warman,1984,p.72).
(118) Smuggling is not just confined to consumer electronics. In 1981, there were also
reports of serious distortions of the Mexican microcomputer market due to smuggling. "Ruben
Tovar, whose firm, Electronica M y M, distributes Radio Shack microcomputers, reckons to
have sold no more than 300 during the three years he has been in business, and his
competitors may have sold the same, but there could be between 2,000 and 3,000 TRS-80 in
the Federal District" ( Latin America Weekly Report, 1981,p.lO).
(119) The upsurge in electronics imports was merely part of the general rise in imports of
all sorts of goods and, particularly, capital goods which, as we discussed earlier, took place
during the oil-boom period.
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Table 9 .28.- Professional Electronics In Mexico. Suraxary of the Market for




Category 1973 197* 1975 1976 1977 1978(0
Total Components
and Parts
Production 360.50 186.50 207.65 219.70 227.00 241.30
Imports 28.76 31.63 28.57 26.98 25.53 24.34
Exports 2.50 5.60 11.01 13.05 14.48 18.70
Consumption 186.76 212.53 225.21 233.63 238.05 246.94
Vacuum Tubes
Production *5.50 59.00 62.00 70.00 73.00 77.45
Imports 4.26 3.82 2.90 2.41 2.20 2.00
Exports 1.50 2.80 7.47 8.45 9.90 il.50
Consumption *8.26 60.02 57.43 63.96 65.30 70.71
Semiconductors
Production 7.60 12.50 15.65 16.70 18.00 22.05
Imports 3.50 4.10 4.33 3.57 2.85 2.50
Exports 0.60 2.00 2.44 3.52 3.48 6.00
Consumption 10.50 1*.60 17.5* 16.75 17.37 18.55
Passive Components
and Parts
Production 107.*0 115.00 130.0O 133.00 136.00 141.80
Imports 21.00 23.71 21.3* 21.00 20.46 19.84
Exports 0.40 0.80 1.10 1.08 1.10 1.20
Consumption 128.00 137.91 150.24 152.92 155.38 160.44
Table *.29.- Structure of the Electronic Components and Part* Market In




products covered less than one third of total consumption with imports covering
about 70%. At the same time, exports constituted a small fraction of total
production , about 12%, meaning that Mexico's professional electronics industry
contributed heavily to the country's foreign trade deficit. Indeed,
NAFINSA/ONUDI (1979), following the trends implicit in the data of table
4.28, had expected a deficit of $279 and $313 million for 1979 and 1980
respectively. In practice, as table 4.30 shows, such deficit was considerably
higher as Mexico began to experience the effect of the oil-based economic boom.
Admittedly, the latter data includes consumer goods imports but, to the extent
that in 1979 these were only about 9% of total reported imports, it is clear
that the bulk of the total volume of imports corresponded to professional
equipment and components.
The overall picture for the professional electronics industry, however, hides
major differences between each one of the sectors. Thus, while in both test and
measuring equipment and biomedical equipment Mexico was totally dependent
with none or insignificant levels of local production, in other sectors, namely,
telecommunications, computers, control and components things appeared to be
somewhat more favourable. Let us examine more closely the situation in each
one of the latter sectors, starting with control and components and then
telecommunications and computers. The reason for this sequence is that global
figures for the first two sectors actually hide a situation of profound weakness
when it comes to electronics control and semiconductor components. In contrast,
telecommunications is the strongest sector in the country's electronics
infrastructure while the computer sector offer the first major government effort
in wide-ranging policy-making aimed at developing the country's electronics
capabilities.
4.3.2.1. State of Development of the Area of Control Systems in
Mexico
The detailed statistical picture for the field of process control is given in
table 4.31. As it is possible to see, the largest proportion of local production
corresponded to non-electric controls and control valves. The production of
electronics control systems and analytical instruments was minimal and the
latter markets were satisfied almost completely with imports, particularly from
the US. In addition, the control sector as a whole was widely dominated by











Table4*30.-radBal nceotheMexican ElectronicsIndustry, Source.-H.Nochteff(1985),p.26, (l)Excludesth"maqulladora"Industry.
Category 1973 197* 1975 1976 1977 1978*1)
Total
Produc tion 8.90 11.*0 13.60 16.70 19.90 23.70
Imports 17.10 23.10 31.*0 *3.00 *9.60 57.00 .
Exports 0.25 0.30 0.A0 0.30 0.50 0.50
Consusrptlon 25.75 3*.20 **.60 59.*0 69.00 80.20
Electronic Control
Production - 0.10 0.20 o ** o 0.90 1.80
Imports 6.05 8.85 13.20 20.20 2*. 60 29. *0
Exports - - - - - -
Consumption 6.05 8.95 13.*0 20.60 25.50 31.20
Non Electric Control
Production *.90 6.25 7.10 7.20 8. *0 9.60
Imports 2.75 3.36 *.30 5.78 6.00 6.20
Exports 0.25 0.30 o.*o 0.30 0.50 0.50
Consumption 7.*0 9.31 11.00 12.68 13.90 15.30
Analytical Instru¬
ments
Production - - - oV-4ao 0.20 0.30
Imports 1.30 1.70 2.20 2.90 3.20 3.70
Exports - - - - - -
Consumption 1.30 1.70 2.20 3.00 3.*0 *.00
Control Valves
Production *.00 5.05 6.30 9.00 10.*0 12.00
Imports 7.00 9.19 11.70 1*. 12 15.80 17.70
Exports - - - - - -
Consumption 11.00 1A.2* 18.00 23.12 26.20 29.70
Table *.31.- Structure of the Instruments for Process Control Harket




companies) were subsidiaries of US companies (NAFINSA/ONUDI,1979). By the
late 1970s, numerical control and computers for continuous process control had
only a limited application in Mexico, so that the production of these crucial
components of microtechnology was seen as only a long-term possibility (ibid.).
By and large , the situation for the early part of the 1980s remained
substantially the same (120) despite the important expansion of the control
market due to the oil-based economic boom. It was estimated that in 1982 the
consumption of instruments for process control had reached $140 million.
Imports accounted for 70% of this market and for almost the totality of the
demand for electronic sensors, transducers and actuators (Poder Ejecutivo
Federal,1984).
43.2.2. State of Development of Electronic Components in
Mexico
The detailed structural picture of the electronic components and parts sector
is contained in table 4.29 and tables 4.32a and 4.32b. from table 4.29 the
impression may be gained that Mexico is nearly self-sufficient in all areas of
electronic components. In particular, in the crucial area of semiconductors, total
production was greater than consumption in 1977 and exports clearly
outperformed imports in the same year. In addition, projections for the period
1978-1982 suggested that this favourable situation would continue deepening so
that semiconductors exports would more than double the amount of imports in
1982 NAFINSA/ONUDI (1979). Closer examination of Mexico's semiconductor
sector, however, reveals a much less optimistic pattern of fundamental
weaknesses. In effect, if we look at the structure of the semiconductor market
for 1976 given in table 4.32a, we can see that three-quarters of semiconductor
consumption in Mexico was accounted by discrete semiconductors. Integrated
circuits accounted for the remaining quarter but, of these, less than 10% (i.e.,
around $1.7 million) actually corresponded to digital circuits, the technology at
the center of the microrevolution. Yet more important for Mexico's
microtechnological capabilities, the level of local production of ICs -as table
4.32b shows- was just 20% of the total consumption, which means that only
$0.34 million worth of digital components was being produced in Mexico by the
(120) In this connection , the current national T & S programme reports that "...From the
computers installed in the country, only 8 percent are used in tasks of industrial
automation (1 percent in real-time control, 2 percent in machine tools, 4 percent in
programming of administration and production and 1 percent in other industrial
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Tablek.32b.-SectorsofthMexicanS miconductor MarketwhichrLocallySupplied,1976. Source.-NAFINSA/ONUDI(1979).
mid-1970s.
Furthermore, in terms of the production process of those semiconductor
components being produced in Mexico, the country possessed none of the most
crucial capabilities (e.g., design), being limited to the performance of the simpler
and more labour-intensive stages of the whole process of production. As
NAFINSA/ONUDI (1979) described, "...In most cases the finished semiconductor
wafers are imported and only cutting, splitting, mounting and encapsulating is
performed upon them" (NAFINSA/ONUDI,p.66). In other words, Mexico's
semiconductor industry was basically an assembly industry of products designed
and partially manufactured abroad, which leads us to another of the major
weaknesses of Mexico's semiconductor capabilities, namely, that most of the
companies in the field are subsidiaries of transnational capital producing in
Mexico in pursuit of their own strategies of capital accumulation (121). In
practice, therefore, it is possible to say that there is no national semiconductor
capability in Mexico, and. as Moreno (1982) described it, the main characteristics
of the existing group of semiconductor companies is that "it is a 'maquila'
group" (Moreno,p.34). For the same analyst, this situation leads to the paradox
that "the national market is supplied almost entirely by the "national" industry
but the latter has not generated any technological-scientific contribution to the
country" (ibid.).
Given the above context, it was only inevitable that, towards the latter
1970s, the impact of the oil-based boom which pervaded the entire Mexican
economy coupled with the fast-growing demand for quality components, were to
combine themselves to sharply alter the mid-1970s development of Mexico's
semiconductor sector. The result was that, as table 4.33 reveals, imports largely
exceeded the previously estimated levels (see table 4.29) reaching a peak for
integrated circuits and other semiconductor components in 1980. In particular,
imports for ICs grew fast to reach $27.1 million from the US alone in 1980; an
increase of more than 130% over the level of the previous year (122) before
(121) For instance, the "product lines that are manufactured in Mexico are those which have
been gradually displaced within the parent companies, not because they are obsolete, but
because the large multinational manufacturers are changing to a completely automated
production, in which the minimum economically acceptable production is greater than the
demand for some specific products" (NAFINSA/ONUDI,1979,p.67).
(122) This increase in imports affected the components sector as a whole. Thus, "...The
imports of electronic components have reached very high levels in the last years (21.8
million dollars in 1978 and 397.5 million in 1981). The average annual rate of growth of



















Table4,33.-Mexico1aImp rtsofSemic nductorsComponents andPartsfromtheU.S.,1979-1981. Source.-PoderEjecutlvoFed al(1984),p.321. (1)NotIncludedInthfiguresf rcomponents.
falling in 1981 to $20.7 million, probably, due to the worldwide recession that
affected the semiconductor industry during that year. The late-1970s surge in
ICs and other semiconductors demand, however, had finally brought into the
open the fundamental weakness and dependence of Mexico's semiconductor sector
upon the technology and products of transnational capital. Such a situation is
not expected to change as the current national T & S programme makes it plain,
"Imports of semiconductors, in general, and of integrated circuits, in
particular, show particularly high growth rates and without doubt in
the future they will be the most important items, given the industry's
tendencies towards a greater level of integration in semiconductor
circuits" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1984,p.321).
4.3.2.3. State of Development of Telecommunications in Mexico
Clearly, the most important sector of Mexico's professional electronics
industry is the telecommunications equipment sector. In 1978, it represented the
largest market of finished products (i.e., excluding components) accounting for
more than 50% of total consumption and was estimated at $286 million in 1985
(Hobday,1985) (123). The importance of the telecommunications market is
reflected in the very high share of national production of finished products
accounted by local production of telecommunications equipment. This was
approximately 70% as compared with around 18% and 10% for process control
and computers/calculators respectively. The telecommunications sector, therefore,
is by far the strongest Mexican professional electronics sector and that where
one should expect the greatest development of national technological capabilities.
The latter is particularly the case since, as we shall presently see, in Mexico the
state effectively controls the telecommunications market. On closer examination,
however, and as the current national development plan itself acknowledges, the
situation is far from satisfactory.
"The evolution of communications is associated with an accelerated
technological advance, closely linked to the development of electronics.
This situation has led to a great external dependence and loss of
foreign exchange due to the growing and disorganized importation of
materials and equipment, not coordinated with the promotion of the
(123) NAFINSA/ONUDI (1979) had projected a figure of $320 million for telecommunications
equipment sales in 1982. The fact that this figure is more than the one estimated above for
1985 seems to reflect mainly the impact of the economic crisis which between 1983-1984
severely depressed the level of government purchases. For instance, SECOFI (1985) reports
of a 50% reduction in the personnel employed by the industry due to the combined effect
of the crisis and the technological displacements brought about by the changes from
electromechanical to digital technologies.
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incipient national electronics industry. Technological research and
development in telecommunications in Mexico is small; the lack of
qualified personnel constitutes the main limitation, made worse by the
deficient coordination between the efforts of the educational sector,
research centres, industry and the service-suppliers" (Poder Ejecutivo
Federal,1983,p.l67).
Obviously, the telecommunications sector has not escaped the general
malaise affecting the development of Mexico's industry and R&D system. And
it is not just the quantitative fact that the R&D effort has been small or that
imports still account for a larger share of consumption than local production. It
is. above all, the qualitative realities which underly such quantities and which,
as we have argued, involve a socio technical process whereby specific technologies
and social interests interpenetrate each other deeply. In Mexico's
telecommunication sector this is quite clear as its development has reflected the
fundamental tenets of the country's dependent model of capital accumulation
which brings together the interests of the state, foreign and private national
capital. The major partners, however, are the state which possesses almost total
control of the market, on one hand, and transnational capital which possesses
overwhelming control of the production of telecommunications equipment, on the
other hand.
The government control of the market is exercised mostly through its
ownership of Mexico's telecommunications network where the most important
company is Telefonos de Mexico. Originally created by foreign companies, the
Swedish L.M. Ericsson and the North American ITT, the telephone system was
taken over by the government in 1947, giving rise to Telefonos de Mexico which
currently owns 96% of the country's telephone system and has 51% of
government participation with the remaining 49% in hands of Mexican private
capital (NAFINSA/ONUDI,1979). On its part, transnational capital's control of
the production of telecommunications equipment is exercised through its
possession of key telecommunications capabilities which the government has been
content to depend upon, in line with its global industrialization strategy. Thus,
most of the important telecommunications TNCs have established themselves in
Mexico (124) with the aim of supplying the market either through imports or
through local assembly and production. From these, Teleindustria Ericsson S.A.
(60% Ericsson capital and 40% national capital) and Industria de
Telecomunicacion S.A. (INDETEL) (40% ITT capital and 60% Mexican capital)
(124) AT & T does not figure in the Mexican market for until the recent 1983 divestiture
agreement, this company was not allowed to operate internationally.
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have the greatest share of the market since, for historical reasons, these two
companies have been the only suppliers (90%) of telephone equipment (e.g..,
switching systems for local and long-distance public exchange, PBXs, multiplex
equipment, etc.) to Telefonos de Mexico. As a result, other TNCs have operated
in other sectors of the market. For instance, the third largest telecommunications
company in Mexico, Siemens Telecomunicaciones, has concentrated in telex,
telegraphic equipment and teleprinters where it practically monopolizes the
market. After, it comes GTE whose activities include operators' equipment and
public and private subscription systems. Many other names such as Philips, NEC,
Thomson, and Motorola also figure in Mexico's list of foreign companies active
in the country (125), covering a variety of areas such as PCM, microwave, FM
and radiocommunications equipment.
All in all. it can be said that Mexico's telecommunications industry is
largely dominated by transnational capital which control most of the technology
and supply most of the equipment. The role of the Mexican producers is small
and they devote themselves mostly to activities of low technological complexity.
For Mexico, the result of such heavy dependence upon transnational capital has
been quite momentous. It has meant that, in spite of the sector accounting for
more than 70% of the value of the country's total professional electronics
production, most of the telecommunications equipment consumed in Mexico is
actually imported from abroad. In effect, as table 4.28 shows, around 60% of
such equipment was covered by imports. Furthermore, closer examination of the
type of equipment produced in Mexico (table 4.34) reveals that "...Only in the
area of telephone and telegraphic equipment local participation is important, and
here the national industry is well established due to the fact that most of the
equipment is less complicated" (NAFTNSA/ONUDI,1979,p.25). Thus, in Mexico,
the production of sophisticated equipment such as transmission, microwave and
data-communication equipment is insignificant, meaning that transnational capital
is not actually in the business of developing Mexico's telecommunications
capabilities beyond what is necessary for the benefit of its own process of
capital accumulation.
Some analysts have looked at the behaviour of some telecommunications
TNCs in Mexico and have found relevant variations in their import/export and
(125) "There are about 150 subsidiaries and sale agents of this [telecommunications A.M.]
equipment in Mexico, but there are only a few major suppliers"
(NAFINSA/ONUDI,1979,p.26).
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Category 1973 197* 1975 1976 1977 1978^
Total
Production 33.65 *5.30 50.90 63.70 68.69 81.58
Imports 78.52 79.** 9*.75 92.8* 102.2* 113.02
Exports 3.*0 *.00 *.70 5.*0 6.20 7.07
Consumption 108.77 120.7* 1*0.95 151.1* 16*.73 187.53
Telegraphic and T«l®~
phonlc Equipment
Produc tlon 33.32 **.92 50.30 63.02 67.95 80.78
Imports *9.85 57.68 61.9* 56.30 59.6* 65.50
Exports 3.*0 *.00 *.70 5.*0 6.20 7.07
Consumption 79.77 98.60 107.63 113.92 121.39 139.21
Radlocommunlcatlons
and Microwaves
Production - - o•o 0.12 0.1* 0.16
Imports 22.25 i*.81 2*.*6 27.38 33.86 38.1*
Exports - - - - - -
Consumption 22.25 1*.81 2*.56 27.50 3*.00 38.30
Data Communication
Equipment
Production 0.33 0.38 0.*0 0.53 0.56 0.60
Imports 2.12 2.50 3.35 3.62 3.97 *.*8
Exports - - - - - -
Consumption 2.*5 2.88 3.75 *.15 *.53 5.08
Transmission
Equipment
Production - - o • o p-fc 0.03 0.0* 0.0*
Imports *.00 *.*5 5.00 5.5* *.77 *.90
Exports - - - - - -
Consumption *.00 *.*5 5.01 5.57 *.81 *.9*
Table * .Ik.- Structure of the Telecommunications Equipment Market In Mexico,
~
1973-1978. (■lllion dollars)
Source.- NAFINSA/ONUDI (1979). »
(1) Estimated figure.
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technological strategies. Siemens Telecomunicaciones, for example, is the main
exporter and the only major company having a foreign trade surplus
(Unger,1985) (126). Its strategy follows specialization in exports of finished
products for the regional market, in particular telex equipment and teleprinters,
which in the 1970s enjoyed preferential duty treatment under the provision of
the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) (127)
[Jenkins(l979),Unger(1985)]. As a result, Siemens Telecomunicaciones exported
about 80% of its production to other Latin American countries and, more
recently, to the US market where some 35% to 40% of its exports are currently
directed. In the case of its teleprinters the company's productive and
technological strategy has been to produce exact copies of the machine
manufactured by the parent company in Germany. Until the late-1970s the
machine produced was electromechanical having a fairly high level of national
content (60%) (128). As the technology changed from electromechanical to fully
electronics, however, a substantial drop in the level of the national content of
the teleprinters was expected, since the labour content of the new electronics
model was only 25% of the old one and Mexico's electronics capabilities cannot
provide anything like its mechanical capabilities could in relation to the previous
model. This may be seen as a typical case of loss of comparative advantages
due to technological innovation.
The strategy of the main telecommunications companies, Teleindustria
Ericsson and INDETEL, has been quite different from that of Siemens in that
they are the main suppliers of the internal market. Thus, imports by these
companies have by far exceeded their exports with data for 1975 showing a
relation of around 10 to 1 (Unger,1985) (129). In terms of their contribution
to Mexico's technological capabilities, however, there has been some important
differences between Ericsson and INDETEL, reflecting the policies of their parent
companies. According to Hobday (1985), Ericsson has far less local technological
(126) Siemens, however, has another subsidiary in Mexico -Siemens S.A.- which produces
mainly for the internal market importing more than the external surplus of Siemens
Telecomunicaciones. This produces an overall deficit for Mexico.
(127) LAFTA ceased to operate in 1981 and it was replaced by a new organization, the
Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion (ALADI).
(128) Most of the precision mechanical parts were produced in Mexico with some electronic
components and raw materials coming from abroad.
(129) Most of Mexico's imports and exports in electronics are carried out by a few TNCs
which include Ericsson and INDETEL. "Siemens Telecomunicaciones, IBM, Teleindustria
Ericsson, RCA and Industria de Telecomunicaciones carried out 93% of exports and 70% of
imports in 1975. These five companies and Control Data, National, IEM and NCR,
accumulated 94% of the sector's total imports; the rest was accounted for by other 22
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capacity, specially in the area of fully digital technology. All system design and
adaptation is carried out almost exclusively in the parent company in Sweden,
and local engineering capacity is confined to very low level digital products and
electromechanical crossbar technology. On the other hand, ITT's activities seem
to have contributed more effectively to the building up of technological capacity
in Mexico. As we shall see later on, even a telecommunications R&D centre,
INDETELEC, has been organized as a joint effort between ENDETEL and the
government. For Hobday (1985) this may reflect the global profit-making
strategies of the two TNCs. "Unlike Ericsson, ITT has a strictly decentralized
profit cost centre (PCC) strategy which means that each plant must be
independently profitable. All inputs, including technology, have to be paid for by
local subsidiaries and this has led to the building up of local technological
capacity in Mexico" (Hobday,p.32).
Company by company, therefore, there are some relevant differences of
strategy which the government constituent of Mexico's telecommunications
capability may be able to exploit, particularly, since it exercises a virtual
monopsonistic control of the market. On the whole, it is the transnational social
constituent which control the technologies at the heart of telecommunications
capabilities and through them it is able to exercise an oligopolistic control of the
Mexican market, producing, importing and exporting very much in accordance
with the needs of its global process of capital accumulation. For Mexico, the
result has been a telecommunications sector -the strongest of its electronics
industry- fundamentally dependent upon foreign technology and one which, in
spite of its importance, we can hardly see as making an effective contribution to
the building up of Mexico's IMC. For the latter to have any possibility at all,
it seems clear that the government constituent should take a much more direct
and positive role in the development of such capabilities. As we shall see below,
there is evidence that the government is taking some positive steps in relation to
telecommunications R&D, although, as it has been its policy with R&D
capabilities in general, this is being done very much within the limits of its
strategic dependence upon foreign capital and as a way of strengthening its own
relative position within the social constituency rather than directly weakening
that of transnational capital.
relatively small companies" (Unger,1985,p.440).
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4.3.2.4. Development of the Computer Sector in Mexico
In the area of computers, the development of Mexico's capabilities has been
rudimentary, with transnational capital playing an almost completely dominant
role within the technology's social constituency. In fact, until quite recently, the
government social constituent had been content with letting foreign capital
shape not just the development process of computers in Mexico but, literally,
the country's computer policy as well. Indeed, as a government study stated,
"...Until 1977, the subsidiaries of transnational companies controlled government
policies regarding the development of data-processing ['informatica' (130) A.M.]
in Mexico, above all in the aspects of imports of goods and acceptance of new
suppliers in the national market" (SPP,1980,p.59). Such a control by
transnational capital reflected the almost complete lack of national computer
capabilities in the country, on one hand, and the general government
development strategy of dependence upon foreign capital, on the other. These
two aspects acted to reinforce each other leaving transnational capital reaping the
benefits of the country's computer market and Mexico in an utter condition of
dependence and disorganic structural development. Soriano and Lemaitre (1985),
who have studied Mexico's first decade of computing development since the first
computer was installed at the National Autonomous University in 1958 (131),
have described in the following terms the situation of the 1960s.
"As regards advances in electronics sciences, it can be said that Mexico
in particular is characterized by a weak (or null) scientific and
technological infrastructure, which along with private foreign
investment, created a Mexico more ignorant every day: Mexico
imported technology and did not create it" (Soriano and
Lemaitre,p. 140).
Admittedly, there is one sense in which it could be said that foreign
computer companies helped to develop local technological capabilities. This is
the generation of human resources able to run and manage the equipment they
provided. In effect, since without this personnel computer companies could
hardly expect a rapid commercialization of their products, courses soon were
organized to fulfill this need. Thus, in Mexico, "...At the beginning, most of the
(130) The Spanish term 'informatica' has no direct equivalent in English language, and its
meaning broadly encompassing human resources, equipment and software for use, application
and production of computers seems to be best expressed by the English terms data-processing
or computing.
(131) SPP (1980) put 1956 as the year of the beginning of electronics data-processing in
Mexico. In that year, the Federal Commission of Electricity bought and installed an
UNIVAC 60/120. The computer installed in the university was an IBM-650.
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professional and training courses were organized by the manufacturers, often in
their own premises" (SPP,1980,p.78). The disadvantage of such a situation was
that structural rigidities were created since the courses, by pursuing primarily a
profitable purpose, were not oriented to the needs of the users but mostly
towards the products and equipment offered by the manufacturers (ibid.). In
1977 a survey carried out by the government (SPP) revealed that the main
source of education for computing personnel in Mexico had been the suppliers of
computing equipment (85%) and, particularly, IBM which had given courses to
67% of this personnel (132). The structural rigidities resulting from this
particular situation were further exacerbated by the aggressive commercial
policies of computer companies which generated a proliferation of models totally
disproportionate to the number of users and size of the Mexican market. For
instance, from a total of 235 models of general purpose computers -most of
them incompatible with each other- in the market in 1979, more than 140 were
sold in Mexico (SPP,1980). The result has been the existence of small groups of
users organized around the 140 models; fact which has conspired in a number of
ways against the efficient use, let alone, the development of computers in
Mexico. For instance, some of the most important effect which have been
identified include lack of incentives for the organization of specialized computer
courses other than those prepared by the parent companies; market fragmentation
preventing adequate development even in sectors where there are greater
opportunities such as software and terminals; impossibility of developing an
independent capability for maintenance of computer equipment; and serious
problems of under-utilization of the equipment reaching, in some cases, up to
45%-55% of idle capacity [SPP(1980),Lahera and Nochteff(1982)].
Given the above pattern of TNCs-controlled diffusion of computing
technology in Mexico (133), it is not surprising to find that the country's
(132) Commercial private schools came after in importance with a participation of 23% and
university institutions with 20%. The total percentage is more than 100% because many of
the people had received education in different centres. In terms of educational facilities
provided by TNCs, the importance of the Mexican computer market is reflected in the fact
that IBM has here one of the two Regional Education Centres in Latin America. The other
is in Brazil. In addition, as part of its image of "corporate responsibility", IBM has a
Scientific Centre in Mexico which in the mid-1970s was engaged in research in the areas of
air pollution, agricultural models, and the application of terminal-oriented APL (Automatic
Programming Language) in education. Other Scientific Centre was due to be created in Brazil
(Bennett,1975). Clearly, this reflected the fact that Mexico and Brazil have been the most
important Latin American import markets as a study of the 50 world's top markets has
showed. In 1978, Brazil ranked 16th in the world with near $200 million worth of imports
and Mexico ranked 20th with $160 million worth of imports (Szuprowicz,198l).
(133) In the 1970s, the active role of the government was limited primarily to such
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computer technological and productive capabilities have undergone little advance.
In table 4.28 an overview of the volume and supply of the Mexican market for
computers and calculators is given. As it is possible to see, in 1977, more than
90% of the market was supplied with imports, mostly from the US, the country
where some 90% of all the computers installed in Mexico had come from. At
the same time, there was a rather significant volume of production and exports
equivalent to 20% and 12% of the value of the total market respectively. On
closer examination, however, as table 4.35 reveals, most of the value of
production and exports was actually explained by calculators and a small
contribution from peripheral equipment. The production of computers as such
was insignificant in 1977 and there were no exports. In fact, all there was in
terms of local production was two companies assembling minicomputers and
which had sold only ten units and two companies producing computer terminals
with some 40% of national content (NAFINSA.1979). A subsequent study carried
out by the government (SPP.1980) found that in 1979 there were in Mexico 8
companies which "may be considered as national suppliers of some importance"
(SPP,p.65). Of these, 5 were completely Mexican and independent (134) while
the other 3 had close connection to transnational capital. Thus, one of the latter
companies Micromputadora S.A., although Mexican was closely linked to its
source of technology: Digital Equipment. The other two were subsidiaries of
TNCs manufacturing in Mexico: GTE (General de Telecomunicaciones S.A.) and
NCR de Mexico S.A. All of the 8 companies were operating in small niches of
the market, primarily, in the area of data-transmission systems where the
acquisition and installation of such equipment were under direct control of the
government. The latter, therefore, offered a protected market without the
competition of large computer TNCs and this acted to stimulate the development
of local production. This is corroborated by the fact that, in 1979, sales of
data-transmission equipment accounted for 90% of the total sales of these
companies with the remaining 10% being accounted for by sales of
microcomputers. In terms of productive capacity, due to their concentration in
small segments of the market these companies counted on small economies of
scale so that even the oldest and most productive of them, Sistemas y
quantitative measures as establishing import quotas in response to conjunctural economic
pressures. In 1975, for instance, such quotas were established with a consequent slow down
in the growth of the market. Towards the late 1970s, however, as the economic pressures
subsided due to the oil bonanza, such restrictions were lifted producing a major surge in
imports.
(134) The companies were Sistemas y Componentes S.A., Transdata S.A., Informatica y
Telecomunicaciones S.A., Sistemas Computacionales Avanzados S.A., and Industrias Digitales
S.A.
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Componentes S.A., produced only 1,000 modems per year, which means a rate
of productivity of around 3 modems daily.
Obviously, this is hardly a base to build up indigenous microelectronics
capabilities, in particular, as the main markets were virtually closed to national
producers due to the overwhelming presence of imports by the large US
computer companies. According to Lahera and Nochteff (1982), six of the latter
enterprises controlled the Mexican market and one of them, IBM, has a 55%
share of the total market (135), followed by Honeywell with a share of 15%.
In Mexico, all the main computer TNCs have operating companies and these
were either completely owned by the parent company or had 51% of national
capital ("Mexicanized") if they had been established after the Law on Foreign
Investment (136). For all of them, however, the main activity has been that of
imports and sales of the parent company's equipment (137) although, as we
shall now see, this situation has began to change due to the conditions created
by the late-1970s oil boom and the subsequent economic crisis which prompted
the government to play a more active role in shaping the development of
computers in the country.
In effect, although NAFINSA/ONUDI (1979) had expected growth rates of
between 10% and 24% for the imports of diverse computer equipment for the
years 1978-1982, in practice, such rates did not include the effects of the oil
boom which resulted in a very fast increase in the computer market followed
by an equally fast increase in imports as the government brought to an end the
mid-1970s import restrictions. The restrictions were lifted in 1979 and between
this year and 1980 "imports grew in 175% keeping the same level in 1981"
(SECOFI,1985,p.2). According to Grapa (1984), the computer market as a whole
grew by 280% since 1977 until 1982, and the microcomputer market, in
particular, grew by 400% during that period (138). In these circumstances,
(135) Other estimates put IBM's share of the Mexican market at 459b ( Business Week, 17
May 1982), and at 44% (Jacobsen,1983).
(136) See discussion on Mexico's legislation on foreign investment above.
(137) Until recently, IBM's subsidiary in Mexico produced only electric typewriters of three
different kinds (Standard, Executive and Selectric) typewriter ribbons made of high density
polyethylene and polyethylene rolls. Most of these products were exported and the greatest
part of the company's exports consisted of electric typewriters. On the other hand, the IBM
strategy of a worldwide division of labour within the company meant that the Mexican
subsidiary imported all the data processing equipment that the company sold in Mexico. As
a result, although a significant part of the company's production was exported, exports
represented less than 10% of the company's total sales" (Jenkins,1979,p.l63).
(138) Figures provided by Nochteff (1985) estimate in 186% the growth of the computer
market for the period 1977-1982. In that period, the microcomputer market would have
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computer TNCs were reaping large benefits as the industry's sales kept growing
at high annual rates of about 25% to 30% ( Business Week, 14 November 1983).
In 1982, a report estimated that 16,000 computers had been installed in Mexico
although, as the report put it "about a third of these are "illegal immigrants",
smuggled across the border by purchasers to avoid import licences and quotas" C
Business Week, 17 May 1982,p.50).
4.3.3. Impact of the First National Computer Plan and Recent
Computer Policies
Prompted by the fast growth of computers and its increasing impact in the
country's balance of payments, in 1981 the Mexican government began its first
serious attempt to stimulate local production of computers by launching its
Development Programme for the Manufacture of Electronic Computing Systems,
Central Units and Peripheral Equipment. In fundamentals, this programme
purported to promote the "generation of a wide and efficient national supply of
electronic computing systems" (SEPAFIN,1981,p.7) very much in the Mexican
government tradition of using incentives and controls to direct foreign capital
into local productive and technological activities, preferably in alliance with
private national capital. The rationale behind the programme was well exposed
by J. Warman, then director of Electronics Industry at SEPAFIN.
"The definition of the role of foreign or national investment in the
development of the electronics industry must take into account the
following points:
In diverse areas of electronics, the national technological backwardness
makes autonomous development impossible in the short term...The
penetration of the international market in several areas (for instance,
mainframes) is complex and it is not possible to consider it
realistically in the short term...The magnitude of the national market
may not be enough in many instances to justify an industry which,
because of its scale economies, will need to export..-Foreign investment
involves technological dependence and may inhibit national development
in technology...
In this way, the combination of these mechanisms leads us to the
following objectives:
Penetration of the international market through association with the
large companies which dominate it, seeking the best possible conditions
of technology transfer...Development of national technology in those
areas in which it is feasible, in the short- and medium-term, to aim
for a degree of technological self-determination" (Warman,1981,p.l0).
In pursuit of the above objectives, therefore, the first national computer
grown by 300%.
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programme combined mechanisms such as tariff protection, tax reliefs,
preferential prices for inputs and preferential purchases from the state, with a
control system of import quotas which progressively reduced both the permitted
level of imports by local distributors vis-a-vis those by local manufacturers and
the permitted level of imports vis-a-vis local production for companies producing
in Mexico. In addition, specific requirements in terms of both national content of
the products manufactured and R&D expenditures were also introduced by the
programme in an effort to advance the development of local technological
capabilities. Overall, the explicit productive goals of the programme were to be
achieved in a period of 5 years so that "the national supply of electronics
computer systems is satisfied in 70% by national production" (SEPAFIN,1981,p.8).
This was not an across-the-board target, however, and, as we can see from table
4.36, targets and requirements for foreign companies wishing to set up facilities
in Mexico varied depending upon the type of computing equipment to be
assembled. Mainframes, for instance, were not expected to be manufactured in
the short-term so that a rationalization of imports was basically proposed. On
the other hand, microcomputers, minicomputers and peripheral equipment had to
be assembled locally with varying but clear targets in terms of national content
of the final product, import/export ratio and minimum level of R & D
expenditure. In the area of microcomputers, for instance, where the market has
been growing the fastest, manufacturers were expected to achieve between 45%
to 60% of national content in three years; to balance their imports with exports
by 70% in five years; and to spend a minimum of 6% of their total sales in R
& D. In exchange, they were to receive the highest tariff protection (30%) apart
from their entitlement to the other incentives introduced by the programme. On
their part, minicomputer assemblers faced less demanding requirements in terms
of national content and R&D expenditures but they were expected to balance
imports with exports within four years of starting assembling.
In terms of ownership, the programme demanded a minimum participation
of 51% for national capital except for those companies already established in
Mexico with majority foreign ownership. The latter, of course, was in agreement
with the Law on Foreign Investment and this had to be reflected in the
framework established by the computer programme. In practice, however, the
issue of 51% ownership was clearly no longer a high priority -at least at the
present stage- in the minds of the Mexican planners as it was restricted mainly
to microcomputer manufacturers. For those foreign companies assembling
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exclusively minicomputers and more powerful computers, majority foreign
ownership was offered in line with the new policy of priority areas for foreign
investment (139). Also the latter companies had the option to register
themselves under the provisions for the "maquiladora" industry if no less than
75% of their production was to be exported (i.e.. a minimum export/import ratio
of 3 to 1 from the start) and commitments were made in terms of national
integration and R&D expenditure. The latter was fixed at a minimum of 5%
of total sales.
The above provisions for the computer sector in Mexico became official
policy in August 1981. By May 1982, driven by the attraction of the fast
growing Mexican market and the threat of being left out of it, some 45 US
companies had applied to assemble computers and peripherals in Mexico (
Business Week, 17 May 1982). Hewlett-Packard had been the first to be granted
permission to manufacture its major commercial minicomputer, the H-P 3000,
under 100% ownership of its plant. Table 4.37 shows some of the major US
computer makers which had or were setting up manufacturing facilities in
Mexico by 1984. Most of the companies appearing in the table are operating in
the minicomputer field with the exception of Apple which has set up personal
computer facilities. Tandy Corp., which before the regulations had some 20% of
its Latin American market of microcomputers in Mexico, has decided not to
produce locally under the conditions imposed by the legislation ( Business Week,
14 November 1983). The reaction of TNCs, however, has been variegated very
much in response to the changing economic environment in Mexico (140).
(139) See above pp.355-356.
(140) Jacobsen (1983) has assessed the reaction of US computer companies to the Mexican
computer programme in the following way, "...The response of these companies to the
Computer Decree and to its performance requirements has been very quiet...This industry
acquiescence, though at first surprising , is understandable. First, U.S. computer firms already
doing business in Mexico prefer to negotiate individually with the Mexican government. In
many cases, they have negotiated such arrangements. Indeed, the Computer Decree allows for
negotiation; performance requirements generally are administered with great flexibility.
Second, companies have not complained openly about the Computer Decree probably because
they fear retribution. The agreements already negotiated probably are less than secure and
are subject to change at any moment. Because the agreements are tenuous, most companies
would not want to be identified publicly with any criticism of the Mexican government.
Third, the Computer Decree, standing alone, is not significantly injurious to the individual
computer firms. For example, the decree offers tax credits, energy subsidies, and tariff
protection. These benefits may counterbalance the negative effects of the obligatory
requirements. In addition, to the extent that the Computer Decree discourages investment,
the few companies willing to make the investment will dominate a very profitable, protected
market. Finally, the Computer Decree is most harmful to those companies, especially the
smaller ones, not yet doing business in Mexico. Because these firms do not have an
established interest in the Mexican computer market, they have little incentive to complain
about the new performance requirements. The new rules will be just one of many factors
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Minicomputer makers, for instance, have been able to keep 100% ownership and,
as the crisis has brought severe foreign exchange restrictions on the country
(141), most of them seem to have little choice but to pay attention to Mexican
needs for exports. This is not at all contradictory to their interests. Rather, it
represents an accommodation to the new conjuncture since they can still sell in
the Mexican market which has remained strong despite of the crisis (142), while
using production facilities in Mexico to attack the Latin American market.
Interestingly enough, in the new critical conditions, the Mexican government has
been willing to relax the 51% national ownership rule even in the field of
microcomputers. However, Apple, the company involved in such an offer,
preferred to seek the safety of minority ownership (49%) given the present
conditions. Thus, for an investment of only $600,000, Apple expected to begin
assembly of 5,000 personal computers in 1984, and double that number in the
next year (143). For a company with the huge resources of IBM, however,
such need for Mexican partners does not arise. Thus, when the company decided
that they wanted to established production facilities for microcomputers in
Mexico, it made clear that this would be under 100% IBM's ownership. This
led to a showdown with the government, eventually settled by the sheer weight
of IBM's resources (144), which raised its proposed investment from $6 million
(141) At the height of the 1982 crisis, complete lack of foreign exchange forced some
companies to turn to barter for their import/export transactions. As a report put it at the
time, "...Barter is specially appealing to multinationals laden with large inventories already
targeted for export to Mexico. A major supplier to Telefonos de Mexico has already gone
the barter route, and the major U.S. automobile companies are scrambling to balance imports
with exports" ( Business 'Week, 4 October 1982,p.56).
(142) "Although overall computer sells in Mexico plunged 40% in 1982, to $300 million, and
a further 5% so far in 1983, minicomputer sales have remained strong" ( Business Week, 14
November 1984,p.64).
(143) "For Apple, the joint-venture formula will have many advantages. In addition to
sharing the risks, its well-connected Mexican partners are expected to give Apple de Mexico
an edge in selling to the government and state-run companies such as Petroleos Mexicanos" (
Business Week, 12 March 1984,p.30).
(144) In January 1985, the National Commission on Foreign Investment rejected IBM's
application arguing that the project did not meet the aims of the federal government's
economic objectives and would displace national capital, besides the fact that there were
already some companies, such as Hewlett-Packard and Apple, manufacturing the same line of
products ( Comercio Exterior, February 1985). In July 1985, the Commission finally
authorized IBM to manufacture its System/51 microcomputer, after the company had
presented a new plan offering important new financial and technological concessions. As it
was reported, "IBM finally got what it wanted: 100% ownership of new microcomputer
manufacturing facilities in Mexico. But it had to give up more than it planned to win
approval of Mexican officials. It agreed to sharply increase its capital investment to $91
million over five years... It further agreed that new technology it developed will be
exported quickly to its Mexican operation—Further, it will set up programs for developing
local suppliers, as well as provide a center for semiconductor development and the
production of IBM software and its distribution to Latin American countries" ( Electronics,
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to $91 million over a five-year period and committed itself to exporting 929o of
its production ( Comercio Exterior, Agosto 1985).
Under the galvanizing pressures of the economic crisis, therefore, and
stimulated by the size of the Mexican market and a host of legal incentives and
requirements, the Mexican government seems to have succeeded in bringing
transnational to produce computers within the country. The latter, however,
have done so in pursuit of their own interests and in accord with their global
strategies of capital accumulation which take into account the new conditions
arising in every country of operation. Whether the new place of Mexico in the
TNCs' strategies coincide with the government's long-term objectives for the
computer industry, is something doubtful given the past experience of Mexico's
industrialization. For the time being, however, some contradictory developments
have taken place. On the one hand, the dynamics of computer imports and
exports has undergone a major change since the heavy-imports days of 1979-
1981. Thus, between 1981 and 1983 imports actually declined by 65% while
exports grew sharply by 500%. In addition, the Mexican computer market has
become more competitive as some 80 national manufacturers of microcomputers,
peripheral and components were reported to have been successfully established in
1985 (Fernandez and Octavio,1985). This has brought about a reduction in
prices and also employment has increased as the new plants have created jobs
that were not there before. Horizontal integration of the national electronics
industry has also been helped as the growth of the professional electronics sector
has stimulated growth in the production of components and printed circuits.
Consequently, improvements in the quality and technology of these sectors is
envisaged for the near future. In addition, some five projects for the
manufacture of subassemblies have been initiated to further the process of
integration. Finally, some R&D projects have also been reported
(SECOFI,1985a). On the other hand, apart from the impact of the crisis which
seriously curtailed the start of various projects during 1982 and 1983, it is clear
that transnational companies have not welcomed the programme and some have
actually attacked it (145), thus contributing to a climate of uncertainty which
29 July 1985,p.14).
(145) Also, some US analysts of the Mexican computer programme have called for concerted
action on the part of the US government, since US computer companies operating in Mexico
prefer to negotiate individually and hence, may tend not to voice openly their opposition to
the programme because of fear of retribution. In this respect, Jacobsen (1983) has argued
that..."It is important that the United States respond to the Mexican Computer Decree
because its performance requirements distort the international flow of trade and capital and
directly affect U.S. imports and exports" (Jacobsen,p.l 188).
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has all but left Mexican private capital out of the current developments in the
computer sector. In effect, according to SECOFI (1985a) despite all the incentives
provided by the government, there had been no significant response on the part
of Mexican entrepreneurs. Thus, they seem to have adopted an attitude of wait
and see, until it becomes clear what there is in the computer sector for them.
In this respect, the reservation of the microcomputer market for national
companies has been seen very much as a crucial mechanism to gain the Mexican
entrepreneurs' confidence. The terms of the argument have been well summarized
by Grapa (1984).
"...transnational companies will apply pressure to open the
microcomputer market to companies which are one hundred percent
foreign; their importance in the market and the political pressures of
these companies will test the solidity of current policy. The struggle is
not simple, but if the government surrenders the microcomputer
market in the face of pressure and the promise of short-term economic
advantages related to export, it will have to be aware that it is giving
the market to the transnational and with it, the opportunity in the
medium-term to create a true national industry which will be able to
attack the Latin American market at an appropriate time. A denial of
the present policy would surely damage irreversibly the confidence of
Mexican entrepreneurs in the permanence of any other future policy
on this matter" (Grapa.p.20).
In this context, the original rejection of IBM's application was seen as
having a positive effect on the confidence of Mexican entrepreneurs
(SECOFI,1985a), although it is not clear what has been the effect of the
subsequent acceptance of the company's new proposal. It seems, therefore, that,
as one commentator put it, "...The near future will tell who has won the battle:
either the policy of nationalist integration or the transnational"
(Grapa,1984.p.2l).
But there is a related and, perhaps, deeper issue in the involvement of
transnational capital in Mexico's computer sector. This is whether or not the
transnational producing in Mexico can effectively further the long-term objectives
of a competitive an integrated Mexican electronics industry as envisaged by the
government. Some analysts question this possibility very strongly. Let us take
the issue of competitiveness, for instance. Here, the government's argument is
that "the programme ensures competition by never closing the border completely
to foreign-made computers. It also says that companies must export from
Mexico, guaranteeing the product will be competitive in the international
markets" (Salehizadeh and Garza-Adame,1984,p.98). The problem with this
argument is the assumption that because TNCs must balance imports with
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exports, then, they will be forced to produce in Mexico the best of their
products for the international competitive market. The fact is thus ignored that
Mexico is only one piece in these companies' worldwide productive and
marketing strategies which entails extensive international division of labour and
intra-company trade. In these strategies, to gain access to a market like the
Mexican and being able to import, TNCs will normally allocate the production
of one product, or one model of product, or part-component of product to that
country. They will then export this particular product mostly to affiliates in
other countries while importing from them different lines of products as well as
important components [Jenkins(1979),Unger(1985)] (146). In this way,
production and export markets are controlled by TNCs in a strategy which not
only takes advantage of the trade agreements between countries (147) but, also,
tends to make a nonsense of the idea of international competitiveness for a host
country like Mexico. IBM, for instance, exports finished products almost
exclusively to affiliates, and "IBM headquarters distributes orders between its
subsidiaries according to the work load of each company and the speed with
which the products can be delivered. In this context, costs of production are
secondary and the price of the final product to the customer is the same
irrespective of which IBM subsidiary has produced it" (Jenkins,1979,p.l64).
Obviously, such degree of freedom in terms of costs of production is something
that a truly Mexican industry striving for international competitiveness could
not afford. The strategy of other TNCs may not even include the export of
(146) "The auto industry is also required to balance imports with exports, and most of
them are doing just that. But are they exporting automobiles? The answer is no; most of
these companies are exporting Mexican-made engines and other parts mainly to their parent
companies. It is only recently that Ford announced $500 million investment in Mexico to
produce cars aimed at the U.S. and the Canadian markets" (Salehizadeh and Garza-
Adame,1984,p.97). In the 1970s, in order to generate foreign exchange, Volkswagen allocated
to its Mexican subsidiary the production of one model to be exported worldwide. The car,
however, failed to meet US safety regulations, thus deeply affecting the exports of
Volkswagen's finished products from Mexico. Like other motor manufacturers, therefore, the
company's exports has consisted mostly of parts and components to its German parent
company (Jenkins,1979).
(147) Although the LAFTA agreement has been terminated, the following example of the use
of its trade opportunities by TNCs shows the way in which these companies organize their
strategy worldwide. "As in the case of IBM...Olivetti is engaged in exchange of different
product lines between its various subsidiaries (in this case within Latin America) so that
exports only represent about a fifth of the total value of sales in Mexico. Production for
the Argentinian, Brazilian and Mexican market is divided between the Olivetti subsidiaries in
the three countries, Argentine specializing in manual and electronic calculators, Brazil in
electric and standard typewriters and Mexico in portable and semiportable typewriters. Such
specialization is facilitated by LAFTA agreements which give preferential treatment to these
products. In Mexico imports from other LAFTA countries pay lower duties and do not
require import permits" (Jenkins,1979,p.l65).
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finished products to fulfill the Mexican import/export requirements. Indeed, as in
the case of the auto industry ( see note 146), for those companies pursuing the
benefits of the protected Mexican market, the choice of exporting part and
components to their parent company may well be the most attractive. Thus,
"...Computer manufacturers could very well end up exporting keyboards and
knobs, thus satisfying that requirement and then enjoying a protected market at
the expense of the consumer" (Salehizadeh and Garza-Adame,1984,p.97). It seems
clear, therefore, that, on the basis of incentives and regulations only,
transnational capital is hardly the social force to be entrusted with the
development of a competitive Mexican electronics industry. As things stand at
the moment, the most likely development is that these companies will in fact
export a number of models of finished products with more or less national
content. The heart of the computer technology, however, specifically,
sophisticated semiconductors, will remain being imported from abroad, thus
defining the character of Mexico's TNCs-based computer industry as essentially
one of product assembly. In the latter respect, we can also see, therefore, that,
just like the aim of international competitiveness, the government's aim of an
integrated Mexican electronics industry is hardly a task that can be entrusted to
transnational capital on the basis of incentives and regulations only.
Admittedly, the government itself does not expect transnational capital to
contribute to the integration of the Mexican electronics industry in the context
of the present legislation and without bringing further pressure upon TNCs. The
risk of provoking a strong opposition from the TNCs, however, is something
that the government is not prepared to run in the present circumstances when
the official policy in response to the crisis has given foreign investment a major
role in Mexico's financial revival and technological development. In effect, earlier
in this work we have seen how in an effort to entice foreign capital the
government has quietly changed the ownership requirements established in the
Law on Foreign Investment by declaring various industrial sectors as priority
areas for foreign investment. One of these priority areas is computers and
related electronics fields where, as we have already seen, 100% foreign-owned
plants have become quite common.
As a result of the crisis.therefore, the dependence of the government's
model of electronics development upon transnational capital has grown stronger.
Thus, although the TNCs' interests in the Mexican market makes them
susceptible to make concessions too, it is clear that the government can only
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push its demands up to certain limits, mostly defined by the present correlation
of government-TNCs forces under the prevailing historical circumstances both at
national and international levels. Thus, Mexico's major foreign exchange and debt
problems have constituted an irrefutable reality which TNCs having interests in
Mexico have had little choice but to acknowledge in defining their production
and export strategy for that country (148). Although this implied concessions
on the part of computer TNCs, the latter were not prohibitive as the
government made simultaneous concessions on ownership, so that, on the whole,
it is possible to say that a convergence of interests on new grounds has been
possible under the galvanizing pressures of the recent economic crisis. From here
to the goal of an internationally competitive and integrated Mexican electronics
industry, however, there is a huge gap which is simply not in the interests of
transnational capital to bridge. At least this is the conclusion that emerges
from all we have seen regarding the role of TNCs in Mexico's process of
industrialization and development of the country's R&D system. In this
respect, whether the new critical conditions have changed the situation so
radically for transnational capital to become an effective agent in the
development of an autonomous Mexican electronics industry, is something that
not even the government is trying to suggest. Instead, the idea seems to be that,
under the present arrangements, Mexico's electronics industry will gradually
grow stronger on the shoulders of foreign capital, up to the point where further
concessions from the latter will be able to be negotiated. For instance, in a
recent interview, a key government official, Guillermo Funes (149), has rejected
criticisms in relation to the fact that foreign firms coming to Mexico will
continue importing semiconductors, the technology that Mexico really needs for
an integrated electronics industry. In his view, Mexico is simply not ready to
tackle chip production and there is still room for technology transfer in
assembly. Thus, although firms interested in the manufacture of some
components are being encouraged to come to Mexico, Funes' idea is quite clear,
"...We've lost the main train, and now we have to jump on and find a market
niche where we can. In 10 years, we'll be in a position to really negotiate"
[Quoted by Layton (1985),p.38).
(148) An example of international pressures favouring Mexico has been Brazil's exclusion of
some TNCs from segments of the internal electronics market. Thus, "...Sperry-Univac,
excluded from the Brazilian market, has identified Mexico as its largest potential market in
Latin America..." ( Latin America 'Weekly Report, 1981,p.l0).
(149) Guillermo Funes is general director of technology transfer and foreign investment in
the Ministry of Trade and Industrial Promotion; and also executive secretary of the National
Commission on Foreign Investment.
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What Mexico will be negotiating in 10 years is hard to envisage. What is
clear though, is that for many years to come transnational capital is set to
continue as the dominant social constituent in shaping the development of
Mexico's electronics industry. In this context, the role of Mexican private capital
is bound to remain weak with some presence in less complex fields as
microcomputer assembly and peripherals. In turn, the government constituent,
committed to its TNCs-based model of electronics capital accumulation, will
continue with its basic policy of stimulating and regulating Mexican but, above
all, foreign capital into developing Mexico's electronics capabilities. In this
framework, direct government involvement in the strengthening of these
capabilities will take place, primarily, at the level of R & D activities where
industry has traditionally done very little and where the government sees an
important way of strengthening its position vis-a-vis transnational capital,
without having to risk a serious conflict with the latter constituent which may
destabilize their strategic alliance.
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4.3-4. Electronics R & D in Mexico
A close look at electronics R & D in Mexico will serve to corroborate the
view that the government social constituent considers this particular area of the
electronics technical base as very important for the process of building up
Mexico's indigenous capabilities and hence, for improving its own position vis¬
a-vis transnational capital. First, as we have seen, in an effort to stimulate
industrial R&D demand, the government is expecting companies to allocate
around 59b of total sales for R&D expenditure and priority is being given to
projects contracted with independent research institutions with the purpose of
multiplying and strengthening the national technological capacity in this field
(Fernandez,1985). In the usual fashion, this regulation is supported by a decree
that establishes tax incentives to promote R&D and commercialization of
national technology. As a result, estimates from the government suggests a
substantial investment is expected to be channelled towards R & D in the
electronics sector (150). What kind of R & D is to be carried out, is not clear
but some R&D groups and activities have been organized at the level of
industry. The companies which are reported include Ericsson, INDETEL, IBM,
NCR, SISCOM, MEXEL, Micrologica Aplicada and Transdata and Link. In
telecommunications, the Instituto de Telecomunicaciones (INDETELEC) has been
created in 1981 involving INDETEL, the Mexican government and private capital
(151). In the latter case, however, we already see the direct participation of
the government in the formation of R & D centres. For INDETELEC is the
result of direct promotion by the Ministry of Communications and Transport
which has been entrusted, along with Telefonos de Mexico, with the task of
developing Mexico's R & D in the telecommunications sector (152). Another
ministry which is promoting research in electronics is the Ministry of Energy,
(150) UNIDO (1982) reports a sum of 500 million dollars. This amount must be a mistake,
however, given that the largest electronics market in Mexico, i.e., telecommunications, has
been estimated at around 300 million dollars. The figure may well be 500 million pesos
which converted to dollars at the time (1981/1982) would give some 20 million dollars.
(151) INDETELEC is the largest of Mexico's electronics R&D centres having approximately
275 employees of which 200 are engineers. Technological activities are shared between
adaptations of ITT's digital exchange to suit Mexican telecommunications conditions, and the
development of digital transmission and peripheral equipment. Already INDETELEC has
developed fairly sophisticated software expertise for the exchange system (Hobday,1985).
(152) For instance, the current national T & S programme states, "...To achieve the
technological capacity required for the national development of integrated digital networks in
services (RDIS), a coordinated multidisciplinary effort is required. The participation of the
Ministry of Commerce and Transport and Telefonos de Mexico in the research and
development programme on RDIS will be a factor of great importance. Their role will have
to be active and not just limited to that of funding source for some studies" (Poder
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Mines and State Industry which,
"...considers electronics...as an essential area in which it is possible to
use the purchasing power of the State, and the research and
development capacity of the sector, to promote electronics enterprises
that could become internationally competitive and could have also a
very important effect in the local manufacturing of material and
components...The Ministry is basing its programme on the activities of
the research institutes within its area of competence, such as in oil,
electricity, steel and nuclear research. The electronics activities of these
institutes are focused mainly on specific applications"
(Fernandez,1985,pp.18-19).
Table 4.38 gives a list of government supported research institutions
carrying out electronics R & D in Mexico. As we can see, direct government
participation tends to manifest itself through both institutions of higher learning
and governmental institutes, with the latter mostly related to particular areas of
application. The range of R & D activities touches upon all areas of professional
electronics and it is in the higher learning institutions where the widest range of
research is performed. In contrast, governmental institutions focus their R&D
activities on electronics applications relevant to their respective fields. In
addition, most of the institutions share their electronics R&D with other
activities which may include, for instance, oceanography (CICESE), molecular
biology (CINVESTAV), solar energy (IEE), etc. Indeed, only in the field of
telecommunications, the most important Mexican electronics sector, we find R &
D institutions dedicated specifically to electronics R&D. Here, INDETELEC is
the most important centre with 200 engineers. As far as the number of
researchers working in electronics in the other institutions is concerned, this is
unlikely to be higher than that of INDETELEC although the data given in table
4.38 are for 1979. From all these data, therefore, it seems that the government
has a long way to go in R & D if the latter is ever going to spearhead the
strengthening of Mexico's electronics capabilities and hence, the government's own
position vis-a-vis transnational capital.
In effect, a closer analysis of the present situation reveals an electronics R
& D system which is not only very small in comparison to the standards of
advanced capitalist countries but which also suffers from the general
underdevelopment problems affecting the Mexican R&D system at large (153).
Let us take INDETELEC, for instance, the largest of the electronics centres in
the largest of the electronics sectors in Mexico. Its 200 engineers clearly compare
Ejecutivo Federal,1984,p.329).
(153) See discussion on Mexico's R&D system above.
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Research Institstlan or Broups
Munber of
Sestarohera Activity
Matlensl Autonooous University (UKAM) hlcasdical otulpaent
-Engineering Institute
-Iastrunent Centra
-Research Institute on Applied Sye-
teas and Bervices (IKASS) >,i






■ensuring eqtlpaect, data procttalag
data processing
aealccnductors
Rational Polytechnical Institute (IPK)
-Center for Research and Advanced
Studies (CIKVESTAV) 160
tel sconuniest 1 os, process control
data procssslng, seniconductors
-Mechanical and Electrical Enginee¬
ring School
bloaedical afslpaent and nessurlng
aqnlpaent
Metropolitan Autonoaous University (CAM) telecoaaunications , process eontrol
test and weesarlng equlpaent
Aatonoaous University of Pushls aeal conductors
Electrical Research Institute (IEE) 280 telecowaunicatlons, process eontrol
date processing
The Scientific Besearch and Blgber Edu¬
cation Centra of Ensecads (CICESE) 86 telecoBEunlcetlone
Telecoraunications Institute (IKBETXLEC) S00*£) telecoaaunlcatlona
Eesearcb and Developnent Centre In Tele-
coawunicatlons (C1DET) teleconaunleatlone
The Telephone Coapany Seseareh Group
(TEDtEl) telecoBBuclcstlons
Matlonal Institute of Astrophysics,
Optics and Electronics (IKADE) 40 aeal conductors
Patroleua Institute (IMP) 180 ■ensuring Ofulpnent, process eontrol
date processing
Rational Institute for Kuclear Sesearch
(XKIK) 592 ■ensuring a|slpaent
The Technological and Blgber Studies
Institute of Monterrey (ITESM)
Eegionsl Technological Institute of
Tlalaepactla DC machine tools
Social Security Institute biomedical oqulpaent




Table 4.?8.- Ititareb Institute or Croups Active in Electronics I I t ll Mexico.
Source.- Data froe Fernandez (1985). Marquez (1982), MAFIHSA (1979), Moreoo (1982),
'
Bobday (1985), Mucloo (1982).
(l) Id 1979 tbe Physic* and Materials Institute were separate institutions having
96 and 56 researcher* respectively.
(X) IKDETELEC was forwed In 1981.
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badly with the number of researchers employed in transnational companies like
Siemens and Ericsson which employ many times over (154). The latter without
taking into account that INDETELEC is in fact partly owned by a transnational
company (ITT) which means that its R & D policy is bound to reflect the
interests of this TNC too. Indeed, we have already seen that INDETELEC's R &
D activities have revolved around ITT's technology so that, in practice, the
contribution of the institute to Mexico's indigenous telecommunications
capabilities is, after all, as the country's industrialization process at large,
mediated by the power of transnational capital. In this context, it is hardly
surprising to find that, even when official forecasts are predicting a fivefold
expansion in Mexico's telecommunications infrastructure by the year 2000,
almost no R & D activities in advanced telecommunications technology is
currently taking place. As the latest T & S programme has acknowledged,
"in the coming years, technological advances are expected in
optoelectronic integrated circuits; in new processes for the fabrication
of components such as lasers, fibre and detectors that possess greater
reliability and lower production costs; and in systems of larger
transmission capacity. In Mexico, the research and development
activities in this area are practically non-existent" (Poder Ejecutivo
Federal,1984,pp.328-329).
For the area of electronics signal systems as a whole, the place to look for
R&D activities are the institutions of higher learning. Table 4.38 shows that
UNAM and CINVESTAV, for instance, are carrying out R&D activities across
most of the areas of electronics technology. The scale, however, is small, even if
we assume that the number of researchers may have doubled since 1979. In
other words, such a broad range of activities can only mean just a few
researchers per project and area of research. In addition, just as we saw with
the Mexican R&D system at large, there seems to be very little integration
not only between different research projects within the sphere of institutions of
higher learning but, also, between the R&D activities of these institutions and
the technological activities within the industrial electronics sphere. Thus, on the
first aspect, there is very little indication that the systemic and synergistic
nature of the development process of the microtechnology is having some impact
in the activities of Mexico's R&D institutions. For instance, nothing like the
multidisciplinary teams at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and Carnegie Mellon
University in the US (155) has developed in Mexico, and a CONACYT study in
(154) "Siemens employ around 2,000 engineers in R & D devoted to exchange
systems—Ericsson allocates more than 2,000 scientists, engineers and technicians to develop its
exchange and transmission systems" (Goransson,1984,p.l230).
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the late 1970s showed that there was no coordination in the research work of
higher learning institutions in Mexico (NAFINSA/ONUDI.1979) (156).
CONACYT itself was to undertake tasks of coordination but mostly to avoid
overlapping in the work of different institutions.
With regard to the integration of the educational R&D sector to the
industrial sector, the situation simply reproduces the general weaknesses of
Mexico's R&D system. As Warman (1984) has stated,
"In Mexico, as in other developing countries, there is an almost total
divorce between the productive sector and those capable of doing
research and development; the latter sustain themselves by means of
public expenditure, and the enterprises acquire their technology from
firms whose parent companies are in the developed countries"
(Warman,p.76).
Indeed, NAFINSA/ONUDI (1979) found that the R&D performed in
technical schools and universities in Mexico had only educational purposes, or
was aimed at developing and building electronic equipment and instruments
which were needed by the institutions themselves. At present, the study
concluded, "there is no link between industry and the academic institutions were
electronics development is performed, nor there is a coordinated programme of
research that may serve the needs of the industry" (ibid.,p.85). The whole
situation was put in a nutshell by Moreno (1982) when he said that R & D in
Mexico "is generally rickety" (p.43).
Currently, the National Programme of Technological and Scientific
Development, 1984-1988 has altered the situation somewhat by providing a
general programme of R & D for the technological development of the
electronics industry. As we saw at the beginning of the present section, the
programme sets the goals, justification and even the specific lines of research and
technological development which Mexico must pursue, across the entire area of
electronics signal systems, in order to advance towards electronics self-
determination or, in our terms, the possession of and indigenous microelectronics
capability. The goals, sector by sector, have been described earlier, here our
concern is simply to draw attention to the problems presented by the facts we
(155) See note 114, Chapter HI.
(156) An interesting example of the lack of integrated and cumulative electronics experience
in Mexico is given by Grapa (1984), who argues that Mexico has an opportunity to develop
software capabilities for the Spanish language market but that it is running the risk of
missing it, among other factors, because of "the absurd over-competition of Mexican
technologists (generally, every programmer states that his programs are better than those of
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have been recently discussing in relation to the characteristics of Mexico's
electronics R&D system and, indeed, the country's R&D system at large. In
this respect, it seems pretty clear that, in itself, the T & S programme is
merely a first step in the direction of an IMC. The actual achievement of the
latter, however, will demand not just huge commitments in human, financial and
material resources but, indeed, the very construction of an electronics R&D
system truly materializing the basic scientific and systemic nature of the process
of development of microtechnology and its industry. Here, the degree of
development and structural problems of the present R&D system alone,
suggest that the task facing Mexico is truly enormous. Indeed, the construction
of a systemic and industrially-integrated electronics R&D system, if achieved
at all, is certain to be a long-term process reaching deep into the 21st century.
Sector by sector, major advances will have to be made given the very low level
of R & D capability existing in most of them. For, it is simply impossible to
think of a systemic R&D structure when, as in Mexico, some key R&D
activities are virtually missing. Take R & D in materials for instance, only a
few educational institutions perform R & D in this area, while, thus far, the
"national electronics industry has not sponsored any research in the area of
materials" (Poder Ejecutivo Federal,1984,p.318). In instrumentation and control,
the situation is similar els the R&D personnel is estimated to be between 100
and 150 persons (50% researchers and 50% support personnel), all of them
scattered around more than a dozen groups (ibid.). In telecommunications, we
have already mentioned that research in advanced technology such as lasers,
optical fibre was practically non-existent in Mexico. The same is the case for the
technology of ICs design. Here, activities in the area of CAD are practically
null. "In addition, there are no CAD systems in the country, either in the R &
D sector or in the educational and industrial sector" (ibid.,p.331). In turn, in
the area of electronic components, there is practically no R & D in VLSI
technology. Here, the R&D institutions are mostly associated to higher
learning, and it has been estimated that their capacity will enable them to
develop, in the short-term, technology for the fabrication of discrete
semiconductor components. However, "...In general, the research centres are not
multidisciplinary, and this limits the range of their work" (ibid.,p.32l). In
computers, it is estimated that the R&D institutions of the country have the
capability to develop without difficulty an industrial prototype of microcomputer
(ibid.). More complex hardware, however, is not in the present R&D agenda
any other person)..." (Grapa,p.20).
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of Mexico. Finally, on the software side, where there are various institutions
working on R & D, the situation is still precarious. Thus, "...The country's
software R&D institutions have a limited capacity for determining
requirements, test criteria, quality control, estimates of development time and
costs, adequate documentation, etc., all of which...poses severe constraints to the
possibilities of commercialization of their products" (ibid.,p.333).
As we can see, therefore, the government social constituent will have to do
much more than producing a global electronics R&D programme if it expects
to bring about a truly systemic and industrially-integrated R&D system which
spearhead not only the build up of Mexico's IMC but, simultaneously the
strengthening of its own stand vis-a-vis transnational capital. On this score, the
establishment of the government-industry sponsored industrial laboratory in
advanced electronics proposed in the current national T & S programme may
represent an important step. According to the programme, such laboratory "will
be able to contribute significantly to develop the multidisciplinary programmes of
oriented research which are required" (ibid.,p.319).In the same line, other
commentators have recently written on the growing interest in Mexico for the
establishment of an electronics industry support centre which is probably very
much related to, if not the same as. the industrial laboratory just mentioned.
As it has been described, this support centre would "provide technical support to
the electronics industry for electronic circuits design, interaction with silicon
foundries and in general for the development and evaluation of electronics
equipment. This centre could also improve the collaboration between industry
and research institutions, facilitating the industrial application of research results
and also the identification of opportunities for new projects"
(Fernandez,1985,p.22) (157). In theory, therefore, such a centre would be in
itself the seed and the missing link of an industrially-integrated electronics R &
(157) The idea of a centre specifically dedicated to the generation and sale of electronics
technology in Mexico has been consistently put forward by J. Warman, present director of
electronics industry, SECOFI, referring, for instance, to the experience of the Korean Institute
for Electronics Technology (KIET) and, also, the Mexican Petroleum Institute (IPM) in
Mexico itself. According to Warman (1982), the centres of higher learning are not adequate
as source of technology for industry; therefore, centres specifically dedicated to that task,
"technological enterprises", are necessary. The latter centres must have the following
characteristics. They must be in direct and close contact with industry; they must establish
their R&D programmes based on the country's existing market for technology; they must
be in close contact with the academic centres of higher learning and technology; they can
organize educational programmes which serve the specific human resources needs of industry;
financially, they could, in the long-term, become partially self-sufficient given the income to




In Mexico, however, there are problems. One of them may simply be the
size and resources of the proposed centre, given the traditionally low level of
expenditure which the country has devoted to R & D activities generally. But
even more crucial is the fact that an industrially-integrated R&D system can
only materialize through the deep involvement of the electronics industry itself;
and this inevitably leads to the social issues in the development of the Mexican
electronics industry. That is to say, it leads to the nature of its social
constituency as well as the development purposes characterizing its unfolding as,
indeed, that of the entire process of industrialization in Mexico. In this respect,
we know from our analysis above, that in line with its TNCs-dependent model
of industrial capital accumulation, the government social constituent not only has
defined international competitiveness in the world market as the development
purpose of Mexico's electronics industry but, also, has given transnational capital
the task of developing the technological and productive foundations of this
electronics industry. Its own role in the process has been self-defined as
primarily one of promoter and regulator, while the small role of Mexican
private capital has been basically the result of the latter constituent's own
structural weakness.
Thus, by a dubious logic, in Mexico's present electronics strategy the main
responsibility for materializing the industrial integration of the country's
electronics R&D system has effectively fallen on the shoulders of transnational
capital, the same social force whose overriding interests in global capital
accumulation and hence, global control of the electronics infrastructure, tends to
contradict the development of Mexico's autonomous technological capabilities.
From another angle, the same social force whose dominance of the electronics
world market is based on the power of its technology has the task, in Mexico,
to effectively contribute to develop the country's international competitiveness
and the technological capabilities sustaining it. Admittedly, it is true that
transnational can help with some technological developments here and there and
even make use of Mexico's government-promoted R&D system. But it is a
completely different matter to think that, because of some incentives and
controls, they may become the fertile ground, the active agents of a systemic
and industrially-integrated autonomous R&D system whose materialization can
only lead to enhancing Mexico's indigenous microelectronics capability and hence,
to simultaneously diminishing the TNCs' own relative weight vis-a-vis that of
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the Mexican social constituents. Certainly, from all the evidence we have seen
throughout our analysis of the country's long experience with TNCs-based
industrial accumulation, there is no indication that the latter could actually
happen. The same is still valid under the new historical pressures created by the
recent crisis since, if anything, the dependence upon transnational capital and
hence, the latter's relative weight within the social constituency of Mexico's
industrialization, has increased. It seems, therefore, that as it stands today
Mexico's path towards its goal of a capitalist EMC is fundamentally flawed. For,
unless the Mexican social constituents are able to increase, gradually and
consistently, their relative weight within the social constituency of the
development process, such a constituency can only be described as the social
constituency of Mexico's indigenous microelectronics uncapability.
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4.3.5. General Discussion
A simple way of starting the present discussion would be to say that
Mexico neither has an IMC nor it is in the process of building up one which
would materialize the goal of technological self-determination advocated by
Mexican policy-makers.
The absence of an IMC in Mexico is a straightforward fact which emerges
from the comparison between the characteristics of Mexico's electronics
infrastructure and those characteristics which we have identified as intrinsic to
an IMC in our discussion in Chapters II and III. In effect, in Chapter II we
concluded that the systemic and synergistic convergence of electronic signal
systems constituted a feature intrinsic to the development process of
microtechnology and hence, of an IMC. In Mexico, however, we have found
nothing of the sort in the country's technological base. Indeed, not only there is
very little indication of the systemic and synergistic convergence of electronic
signal systems but, more dramatically, whole areas of production of such
systems have either a rudimentary development or are virtually missing.
Consequently, in Mexico neither there is such a thing as the convergence of
industries materializing the convergence of technologies taking place in the
electronics technical base of society, process which in Chapter III we identified as
an intrinsic feature of any IMC too. Finally, at a fundamental level, the
science (R & D) constituent, which in Chapter III we also identified as intrinsic
to any IMC, actually plays a negligible role in furthering the development of
microtechnology in Mexico. In this respect, it is clear that the roots of the
problem go deeper and beyond the limits of the electronics case alone, for, in
the final analysis, it is the Mexican R&D system as a whole which is small,
weak and disarticulated. In the abstract, therefore, the above findings in
themselves suggest that the build up of an IMC in Mexico is a truly complex
and long-term task which, among other things, passes through the very need to
generate the intrinsic science social constituent of microtechnology in Mexico.
An IMC, however, does not exist in the abstract. It can only develop as
part of a particular strategy for its build up which is inseparable from the
country's general development strategy., in Mexico, this has translated itself in
the pursuit of a particular kind of IMC, namely, a capitalist IMC.
As we have seen in Chapter 331, the particular kind of capitalist IMC
incorporates the social force of capital as one of its intrinsic social constituents
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along with the science social constituent. Moreover, we have also seen that, as
the process of electronics development has unfolded, a tendency has developed
for governments to also become intrinsic social constituents of microtechnology,
mostly due to the fact that the resource-requirements necessary to get into and
stay in the struggle for control of the electronics infrastructure have increasingly
surpassed the ability of even the largest units of capital. This process has been
reinforced by the governments' own perceptions of the crucial role of
microtechnology for the realization of their overriding social interests.
In Mexico, however, government and capital alike have hardly acted as
social constituents for the build up of a Mexican capitalist IMC. The reason has
laid deep in the very nature of the development process pursued by these
forces, which has been predominantly a process of industrial capital
accumulation based on a high dependence on foreign transnational capital in a
context of low development of the national technological base. For Mexico, this
process has meant that its electronics development has become inextricably linked
to the global struggle for control of the electronics infrastructure being waged
by the electronics corporate capital of developed countries. Or to put it in
another way, Mexico's capitalist electronics development has become a
subordinated part and parcel of one and the same process of electronics capital
accumulation at world scale. It is within this context that what we have
referred to as the social constituency of Mexico's indigenous microelectronics
uncapability has actually taken shape. Briefly, the main characteristics of such
uncapability can be summarized as follows.
i) Fundamental weakness of the Mexican social constituents of an IMC, with feeble
interrelations and a lack of convergence of specific interests leading to the non-
development of a capitalist IMC. In Mexico, the science constituent is small and
basically concentrated in academia, performing R&D activities with little
concern for the interests of the electronics industry. On the other hand, Mexican
private electronics capital is itself very weak and technologically dependent,
seldom contributing to electronics R&D either in terms of its demand or in
terms of its production. This means that there has been little material conditions
for the convergence of the overriding interests of science and capital as the
latter force has neither demanded the fruits of science nor supported its
activities. In turn, the government social constituent has not until recently
played any major role in the development of an autonomous electronics base in
Mexico, and its recent commitment has been mainly indirect in nature, relying
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on the promotional power of incentives and regulations but leaving the
fundamental decisions on the shaping of electronics development to the
unconnected interests of capital and science. In this respect, to the extent that
there has been any direct role played by the government, this has been in the
establishment of intermediate R&D mechanisms (R&D institutes) for the
possible integration of science and capital. Such mechanisms, however, although
an important advance in the conditions of general weakness of Mexico's
electronics infrastructure, cannot in themselves provide a solution to the lack of
dynamism of such electronics infrastructure. Ultimately, the latter is something
that depends deeply on the existence of a strong social constituency consistently
committed to the autonomous development of a Mexican IMC in such a way
that the overriding interests of all the social constituents truly and effectively
converge in the realization of such a task. In Mexico such a constituency does
not exist and there is no indication that it is in the process of development.
ii) Dominant relative -weight and contradictory role of foreign transnational capital
(mainly US) in the social constituency of Mexico' electronics development. In
Mexico, transnational capital, els a result of a TNCs-based development strategy,
has acquired the effective control of the country's electronics industry from the
beginning. The result has been that, on the whole, the development of such
industry has primarily reflected transnational capital's overriding interest in
global capital accumulation which, in practice, is always materialized within the
limits imposed by its interrelations with national social forces under given
historical circumstances. Thus, in this context we have seen that for most of the
post-World War II period, Mexico has been primarily a market outlet for the
products of electronics TNCs. While, more recently, in response to the
conditions brought about by the critical conjuncture facing the Mexican social
constituents, transnational capital has began to contribute modestly to the
development of some productive and even R&D facilities in Mexico. This
shows that the TNCs' potential for contribution to the development of the
electronics technical base of Mexico cannot be overlooked Eind that it certainly
should form part of any strategy pursuing such a development. From here,
however, to the likelihood of transnational capital effectively becoming the pivot
of a process leading to the development of an autonomous Mexican industry,
there is a huge abyss of contradictory interests to breach which, in practice,
renders the realization of such a process a completely illusory goal. The
participation of transnational capital in the Mexican electronics industry has no
other ultimate purpose but the incorporation of this industry in its own strategy
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of global capital accumulation. And insofar as this entails the practical control
of the Mexican industry by foreign interests in opposition to its national
autonomy, it is clear that the dominance of Mexico's electronics industry by
transnational capital is intrinsically contradictory to, and represents a negation
of, the goal of national autonomy.
Given the characteristics just described, therefore, it is plain to us that
while they remain in force within the general context of the country's TNCs-
based development strategy, there can be no other conclusion than to state that
the social constituency of Mexico's electronics development is the constituency
not of an IMC but, indeed, of an indigenous microelectronics uncapability.
Theoretically, however, from the conclusion that Mexico's goal of a
capitalist IMC is being intrinsically negated by its TNCs-dominated social
constituency, it does not necessarily follow that it is the goal of a capitalist
IMC which is fundamentally flawed. Indeed, from our analysis, we can only say
for certain that it is Mexico's particular TNCs-dominated model of capitalist
IMC which presents the fundamental flaws. In this respect, the more successful
experience of countries such as Brazil and South Korea, who are also pursuing a
capitalist IMC, is particularly revealing. In effect, although is too early to say
whether Brazil and Korea will succeed in their long-term strategies, in both
cases the development of national electronics capabilities has been more
successful than in Mexico. Interestingly enough, in both countries the key to
their progress can be said to lie in a strategy of gradual and selective
development of national electronics capabilities based on the combination of two
factors. On the one hand, the subordination of transnational capital to the needs
of national electronics development, sometimes even to the extent of its exclusion
from specific electronics sectors. On the other hand, the stronger commitment by
the national social constituents, particularly government, to the development of
national electronics capabilities. To put it in another way, in both Brazil and
Korea, the relative weight of the national social constituents is much greater
than in the case of Mexico and, consequently, their role in, and control of the
process of national electronics development is much greater too.
In the case of Brazil, for instance, without going into details (158)), we
(158) For details of the Brazilian strategy in electronics and its achievements and problems,
see Tigre (1983), Nochteff (1985), Fernandez (1985), Hobday (1985a,1986), Goransson (1984),
Turner (1984), McCrone (1985), Kucinsky (1983), ErbeT (1985), Wajnberg (1985),
Brundenius and Goransson (1986), Latin America Weekly Report (1981), American Machinist
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can characterize its strategy as one of government-driven strengthening and
integration of the science and national capital social constituents to the increasing
detriment of transnational capital's early dominant control of the country's
electronics industry. This strategy which took a definite shape by the mid-1970s
with the elaboration of a national plan for electronics development has led to
the establishment of a network of national companies and government R&D
institutions which has strengthen and tied closer together the interests of
government, national private capital and science in the development of a national
electronics industry in Brazil. Simultaneously, the government social constituent
has sought to reduce directly the relative weight of transnational capital within
the social constituency of Brazil's electronics development. More conspicuously, it
has done so, first, by "Brazilenization" (i.e., 51% Brazilian ownership), then
increasingly by a policy of reserved markets in priority sectors which means the
virtual exclusion of transnational capital and its products from the Brazilian
market. This latter policy which began in the field of microcomputers has more
recently been expanded to include, among others, telecommunications and
CAD/CAM products and even some integrated circuits. The reaction of foreign
transnational capital has been strong and currently the US government is putting
strong pressure with the likelihood of retaliation against Brazil's products
imported into the US. This shows that the path of confrontation with TNCs is
not easy since the latter are not going to relinquish their control of any market
without a battle. At any rate, the greater success of Brazil's strategy of
development of a capitalist IMC puts clearly in a relief the intrinsic limitations
of the Mexican strategy.
The same is the case with the Korean experience (159), where in a context
of much less natural resources and smaller size than Brazil and Mexico, the
government and private national capital have since the 1960s worked together in
the development of Korea's electronics capabilities and industry. Indeed, already
in the five year economic plan of 1962 the government selected electronics as
one of Korea's priority industries. In this context, beginning with the
development of an import-substitution consumer electronic goods industry,
Korea's strategy has consistently emphasized a combination of aspects involving:
exports to the world market; protectionism to infant Korean electronics sectors
in the national market; promotion of foreign capital investment mainly for the
(1985).
(159) For details, see UNCTC (1983), Chon (1984), Park (1984), Berney (1985), BeTger
(1985), Nam (1986), Jung-nam (1984), Parthasarathi (1978), Ahn (1985), Choi (1983),
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export sector and particularly successful in the semiconductor sector in the
1970s; upgrading of national electronics technology and production through the
generation of an important electronics R&D base involving both large and
advanced research institutes supported by government and private capital and the
R&D facilities of Korean large electronics companies themselves; transfer of
technology and its appropriation mainly through the mechanisms of licencing and
joint-ventures between foreign transnational capital (mostly Japanese and US)
and Korean corporate capital. In the latter respect, not only many Koreans have
gone to study to the US but some large Korean companies have even established
subsidiaries in that country to facilitate and expedite the process of transfer of
technology. As a result, it can be said that Korea has steadily strengthened a
national social constituency of government, capital and science which is strongly
committed to the development of national electronics capabilities and which has
become more able to control and, more significantly, incorporate the activities of
transnational capital into the development process of a Korean electronics
industry. On this score, what is most particular in the Korean experience as
compared with those of Brazil and Mexico, is the development of large
Japanese-style integrated electronics companies such as Samsung and Goldstar
which have emerged strongly into the world market, particularly of consumer
electronic goods, and have move gradually into different and more complex areas
of electronics technology. It has been these companies which have become the
nucleus for the Korean appropriation of foreign technology being able to enter in
licencing and joint-venture agreements on the basis of a technological capability
which effectively enables them to profit from such agreements. No similar
companies exist in Mexico with the result that any joint-venture agreement for
instance, always involve Mexican companies which are weak electronically and
which are thereby neither able to appropriate the foreign technology nor to
exercise the role of equal or majority partner in the venture. Thus, if anything
can be learned from the Korean experience of development of a capitalist IMC,
this particular aspect of promoting the development of integrated electronics
companies -which tend to reproduce the integration of electronics technologies
taking place in the technical base of society- seems to be one that deserve
paramount attention. Sure enough, such companies can only develop out of the
strong commitment of the national social constituents for the development of
autonomous electronics capabilities. And the latter has not been the strong point
of the Mexican case.
Westphal et al (1984), Kaplinsky (1986).
- 460 -
The fundamental weakness of Mexico's pursuit of a capitalist IMC,
therefore, shows even clearer when we compare with the cases of Brazil and
South Korea (160). Admittedly, due to the relatively early stage of the latter
two countries' electronics development, it remains to be seen whether they will
eventually succeed in their endevours of achieving a capitalist IMC, faced as
they are with strong competition and pressures from the countries leading the
struggle for the control of the world electronics market. The crucial point for
the present discussion, however, is that in the pursuit of a capitalist IMC no
universal strategy actually exists and that Mexico's strategy has been one of the
less successful, relying as it does on the dominant and contradictory role of the
social constituent of foreign transnational capital.
In the Latin American context, the situation just described has important
implications for the possibility of effective regional cooperation in the field of
microelectronics: one of the alternatives most strongly advocated by those
commentators propounding the development of indigenous microelectronics
capabilities in Latin America (161). In effect, this alternative sees in the
microelectronics challenge a real need and opportunity for Latin American
countries to integrate their efforts and resources in pursuit of a collective Latin
(160) It is relevant to note that, unlike in Mexico, in both Brazil and Korea the military
have played a critical and long-term role in the machinery of government of the respective
countries. In fact, since the military takeovers of 1961 in Korea and 1964 in Brazil, the
military effectively became the government in both countries for at least the next two
decades. This means that the military has undoubtedly been a prominent element of the
social constituency of the industrial development process and hence, of the electronics
development process in both nations. Unlike in Mexico, military pressures have had an
important galvanizing role, particularly in South Korea where in the aftermath of the
Korean War the country has come to live under an almost permanent state of war
preparedness. In Brazil, the pressures arise from the traditional struggle for the hegemony of
the South American region which the country dispute with Argentina. In Brazil as much as
in Korea, therefore, military interests and the issues of military strength and national
security have clearly informed and shaped the development of industry and the search for
autonomous electronics capabilities. This can be seen, more generally, in the fact that both
countries have developed important military industries and are among the most important
Third World producers and exporters of weapons [Lock(l986),Nolan(l986)] and, more
specifically, in the fact that the development of an autonomous electronics industry is taken
not just as an economic necessity but also as a matter of national security. For instance, in
rebuking the US pressures against Brazil for its policies of reserving markets for national
companies, the recently-installed first civilian president since 1964, Jose Sarney, has defended
Brazil's right to build its electronics industry on the basis of the country's debt problem as
well as on the basis of national security (McCrone,1986). Despite the obvious importance of
the military social constituent in the electronics build up of Brazil and Korea, no
generalization as to their necessity is possible as it is shown by the Chilean experience where
the monetarist oriented military government has been responsible for the virtual destruction
of that country's nascent electronics industry.
(161) See Galli (1982), Lahera and Nochteff (1982), UNIDO Secretariat (1985a,1985b),
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American electronics self-reliance. It is argued that the complexity and
magnitude of the technological challenge is such that no single country can
easily master it so that cooperation offers the best and, perhaps the only, path
to enhance the individual efforts of every country while developing the
collective self-reliance of the region at large. It is often noted that Latin
America has a tradition of regional cooperation and efforts of integration with
many multilateral and bilateral agreements, including industrial and technological
agreements such as the Andean Pact where even a common treatment to regulate
the activities of transnational capital was involved. In the field of electronics,
two regional associations are in existence: the Latin American Association of the
Electronics Industry (ALAINEE) and a similar association for the Andean Pact
countries (ANDINEE). Currently, a UNIDO programme has made it its goal to
establish a Regional System for Microelectronics in Latin America (REMLAC).
Such a system, which was due to start as a pilot experience in 1985, is mostly
concerned with microelectronics technology and has been conceived as a network
of institutions based in different countries and having as its essential function
the establishment of effective mechanisms for flows of information and
organization of events among its members. This will link together scientific and
technological activities between the countries involved; facilitating the
preparation and implementation of cooperative activities: and keeping its members
informed not only of their own activities but also of the international trends in
the microelectronics field (UNIDO,1985a,1985b).
The implementation of the REMLAC concept is certainly a very worthwhile
effort, as indeed have been all the previous efforts to implement the variety of
mechanisms which have been proposed to advance the cause of Latin American
scientific and technological integration (see Campos,1972). In this sense, an idea
which seems particularly attractive, given the Japanese and Korean experience,
would be to target the creation of multinational Latin American integrated
electronics companies which are able to galvanize massive resources and reflect
the systemic convergence of electronics technologies in the technical base of
society. In a context of planned cooperation, the existence of such an industrial
base would incorporate the REMLAC concept providing it with the fertile
ground the latter now lacks. Indeed, within the framework of regional
cooperation, it is clear that this and many schemes could be devised which are
highly desirable, for, in the final analysis, their effective implementation would
mean the materialization in practice of the old dream of Latin American unity.
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Whatever the desirability and obvious potential benefits of regional
integration schemes, however, it is clear from our analysis that without the
existence of a coherent Latin American social constituency which is committed to
the development of a Latin American IMC, the likelihood is that international
cooperation will continue to play the limited role it has played thus far,
hampered by the many contradictions implicit in often divergent development
strategies and ready to be sacrificed in the face of any major crisis or political
change. Chile's withdrawal from the Andean Pact in the aftermath of the 1973
military coup, for instance, and, quite significantly, the dwindling of the 1970s
efforts to generate Latin American multinational enterprises which never actually
took off within the subcontinent for all their worth (Raddavero,1985), are just a
couple of the many instances where regional integration has shown to be a
fragile reality in a societal context which is unable to produce a consistent social
constituency for the success of such efforts. It is in this light that the
divergence of the Mexican strategy in relation to that of Brazil for instance,
augurs little hope for the prospects of the country ever achieving an IMC
through the collective path of a Latin American IMC. This means that
notwithstanding Mexico's keen involvement in the development of the REMLAC
concept since its beginnings, it is unlikely that the latter will have any dramatic
impact on the present course of development of the country's electronics
capabilities and industry, and will probably follow a similar fate to that of
Mexico's various R&D institutions which have been unable to root themselves
in the fertile ground of a national industrial base.
Finally, in bringing the present discussion to an end, we return to where
we started, namely, Mexico's ultimate development goals and the possible role of
microtechnology in bringing them about. Here, the conclusion that emerges from
all the issues we have discussed in the course of the present chapter is
unavoidably pessimistic: within the context of the present dominant social
constituency of power and associated development strategy, all the ideals of
national independence and social justice and equality for the Mexican people are
bound to continue as little else but the recurrent theme of a rhetorical discourse
only mystifying the reality of a process of development which is simply not
leading to their fulfillment. Thus, unless some important changes in the
fundamental social forces and tenets of Mexico's development strategy actually
take place, it is plain that the promises and potential benefits of microtechnology
will hardly materialize themselves in the solution of the acute social problems
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affecting the millions of the dispossessed people of the country. The specific
ways and exact nature of such changes, however, is not for us to say. For.
undoubtedly, this is a task that belong to nobody but the Mexican people alone.
Fernandez and Octavio (1985), Aguirre and Heiedia (1982).
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Chapter V
By Way of Conclusion: From an EMC Towards a Sociotechnical
Theory of Indigenous Technological Capabilities.
As a conclusion to this thesis we could have taken the option of keeping
the focus of our analysis strictly related to the theme of an IMC and, basically,
bring together under one chapter heading the concepts which we have exposed
throughout the present work, particularly, in the general-discussion sections of
Chapter II, III and IV. However, since this would have amounted mostly to a
repetition of these sections which somehow have as their proper place the end of
the respective chapters abovementioned, we have decided to take a somewhat
more demanding option, namely, that of trying to contribute to the
conceptualization of a more general theory of ITCs as sociotechnical systems
using the findings and theoretical underpinnings of previous chapters. Thus, in
what follows our aim is clear: to advance the systematization of the general
workings of an ITC sociotechnical process, particularly of a large-scale and
complex ITC, from its basic components to its international dimension.
Obviously, the much broader and systematic analysis involved in such a
generalization means that some new ground will have to be covered in the
present conclusion given that not all its conceptual elements and argumentation
will have been dealt with or used in the course of the previous chapters. Hence,
it is necessary to say that while substantial parts of the analysis will indeed
find its roots in the various concepts and many processes dealt with above, some
other parts will be primarily the result of logical analysis. In addition, since
both the field of ITC and a sociotechnical approach to technology do not start
with this chapter but have already an important tradition, we have also thought
necessary to review some of the most relevant contributions which have been
made so far, as a way of putting our own conceptualization into perspective.
This chapter, therefore, is divided in three distinct parts. First, a review of ITCs
conceptualizations, then, a review of sociotechnical approaches to technology and,
finally, our attempt to contribute to a sociotechnical theory of ITCs.
- 465 -
5.1. Indigenous Technological Capabilities in UDCs. Technological
Self-Reliance
The concepts of indigenous technological capabilities and technological self-
reliance are intimately related in that without an ITC there can be no effective
technological self-reliance (1). For this reason, when, by the early- to mid-
1970s, some scholars, particularly from Latin America (2), began to concern
themselves with the issue of scientific and technological (S & T) self-reliance in
UDCs, their work tended naturally to focus on the kind of technological
capabilities necessary for the materialization of the goal of self-reliance as well
as on the problems affecting the development of such capabilities. As it normally
happens with all concepts, however, the concept of S & T self-reliance was
liable to be interpreted in different ways with the corresponding differences being
reflected in the content of the specific capabilities identified as necessary for
UDCs. For instance, Sagasti (1976) identified three different interpretations of S
& T self-reliance.
"a) As the capacity for autonomous decision-making in matters of
technology... In this case it is not necessary to possess the technology
to meet development needs within the country. Decision autonomy
refers to the capacity for defining technology requirements, identifying
alternatives available elsewhere...and determining the best way to
acquire, incorporate and absorb the technology. This in turn is related
to the capacity for obtaining and processing information about
technology.
b) As the combination of decision autonomy and the capacity to generate
independently the critical elements of technical knowledge required for a
particular product or process... This capacity is closely linked to the
development of engineering design skills and does not necessarily imply
that the totality of the 'critical elements' is to be produced within the
country. What is required is the capability to design the process or
product (and its critical elements in particular), to define standards
and specifications for the components to be manufactured and to
assemble the components into the complete design.
c) As the autonomous potential for producing within the country the goods
and services considered essential in the development strategy... In this
sense technological self-reliance involves autonomy of decision and the
possession of technical knowledge and skills, as well as the capacity to
transform them into goods and services. The country would be able to
'rely on its own capabilities' if forced to do so, although under
normal conditions it would not attempt to engage in all of the
(1) It is true that a country may possess a capability in some aspects of a given
technological process, for instance, capability to use, without having an indigenous capability
in other more complex aspects, for instance, capability to produce a given technology. In this
case, as we shall see, we can hardly talk of a country's technological self-reliance, although
we may conceivably talk of self-reliance in that particular aspect of the technological
process.
(2) For instance, see Sagasti (1975,1976), Herrera (1972,1978), Sabato (1975).
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productive activities it is capable of performing" (Sagasti, pp.939-940).
As we can see. therefore, all the goals of self-reliance imply a search for
clear degrees of autonomy which only the effective possession of specific
combinations of ITCs can materialize. Obviously, specific countries can pursue
one or another form of self-reliance and, in principle, they may always progress
towards the highest forms of self-reliance given the right set of conditions.
Indeed, the latter forms of self-reliance very much constitute the implicit goal
assumed by those studies which tend to posit the situation in the developed
countries (DCs) as the goal for the UDCs. Sabato (1975), for instance, compares
the situation of the R&D infrastructure of UDCs with that of the DCs and
points to the importance of the capabilities to take decisions, predict (forecast),
adapt and create technology. In his view, once the stage of import substitution,
which demands primarily a capacity to adapt, has been achieved, the capacity to
create becomes ever more important as the search for new products and
processes must now follow, not only to satisfy existing demands but generate
new ones. At this point, "it is necessary to have a creative system of research
and development: a system designed only for adaptation would not do"
(Sabato,p.7l).
Implicit in the concepts of self-reliance is of course the aim of breaking
with technological dependence in varying degrees. In this respect, as some more
recent writings have pointed out, technological self-reliance does not necessarily
mean the absence of dependence [Ernst(l980), Makange(1980)]. It does mean,
however, "the ability to choose and control the areas of partial technological
dependence, which in any country will remain unavoidable for many years to
come" (Ernst,1980b,p.56). A similar view is stated in UNIDO (1981), where
"technological self-reliance is defined as the autonomous capacity to
make and to implement decisions and thus to exercise choice and
control over areas of partial technological dependence or over a
nation's relations with other nations. It follows that technological
self-reliance can be effectively pursued only when a nation understands
the nature and extent of its technological dependence and possesses the
will and self-confidence to seek to overcome it and to maintain its
cultural identity. Technological self-reliance must thus be conceived in
terms of the capacity to identify national technological needs and to
select and apply both foreign and domestic technology under conditions
that enhance the growth of national technological capability"
(UNIDO.p.ll).
The strategy which emerges from this view of self-reliance is thus twofold.
On the one hand, it involves the selection and appropriation of foreign
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technological inputs, demanding the existence of well developed capacities to
select and acquire, and to adapt and absorb technologies for their effective
operation in their new environment (ibid.). This would be roughly what Dore
(1984) denominates as an independent technology learning capacity (ITLC). On
the other hand, it involves the stimulation of indigenous supplies of technology,
demanding the mobilization of the national technology system in pursuit of
technological innovation and development (UNID0.1981). This would in Dore's
terms be an independent technology creating capability (ITCC) (Dore,1984).
Various other authors have concerned themselves with the problem of self-
reliance and indigenous technological capabilities and have distinguished the
various specific capabilities involved. By and large, however, little can be added
to the concepts reviewed above, since they tend to embrace most of the
distinctions which can be made within the broad spectrum of technological
capabilities. This is the case, for instance, for the capacity to select appropriate
technologies (Cooper and Maxwell,1980); the capacity to master and duplicate
imported technologies (Desai,1984); the capacity to introduce a degree of novelty
in the production of products and processes (Fransman,1984); and also for
Morehouse's broader capacities "to create, acquire, adapt and use technological
solutions appropriate to their economic and social conditions" (Morehouse,1980,
pp.532). In this respect, if anything can be added, it is from the point of view
of a detailed content of the different capabilities rather than from their overall
definition. Dahlman and Cortez (1984) have attempted such a more detailed
approach and have distinguished five broad types of technological capabilities.
"The first type of capability has to do with the acquisition of existing
product and process knowledge. It includes the capability to search for,
assess and select technology appropriate to specific local needs and
conditions. It also includes the capability to negotiate favourable terms
for the acquisition of that technology...The second has to do with the
translation of product and process knowledge into products and
productive facilities. It includes the capability to conceive, plan, design
and implement products, plants, processes and equipments to produce
specific products...The third has to do with the efficient operation of
those plants, processes and equipments. It includes the capability to
produce the specified outputs with the given plants and processes,
equipment and raw materials, including the repair and maintenance of
the productive facilities involved...The fourth has to do with the
capability to adjust and/or improve plants, products, processes, inputs
and equipments, in order to remain competitive in light of different
and often changing conditions in demand, technology, government
regulations, and input factor prices and availability...Finally, the last
has to do with the capability to create new technological knowledge
(products, processes, and equipment), which satisfy specific needs and
local conditions better or more efficiently" (Dahlman and Cortez,p.602).
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Clearly, a lot has been said and identified in relation to the concept of
indigenous technological capability. However, what we have seen so far is
basically a static picture of the content of ITC with little indication of its
relation to the wider societal framework within which it develops. In this
respect, the existence of a social connection has been widely acknowledge by
most writers although, as we shall see later on, the meaning attached to it has
been the subject of a great deal of theoretical variations. For some authors such
as Dahlman and Cortez (1984), for instance, different social factors seem only to
affect the development of a technological capability but they are not part of one
and the same process. A similar position is found in Sabato (1975) when he
deals with economic, political and sociocultural factors as either forces
compelling or obstacles retarding the process of innovation. Here, the latter
process although immersed in a social milieu still possesses a separate identity of
its own which seems to be valid for every form of society. This means that in
order to appropriate the process of innovation of most advanced nations, "closing
the gap" as others have put it, the task for UDCs becomes mainly one of
removing the societal obstacles which neutralize the effect of the forces
compelling the technological process. Sagasti (1975,1978,1980) also sees the role
of internal socio-economic and political transformations as crucial for the goal of
technological self-reliance. In his view, however, the social and technological
dimensions interact with each other insofar as "technological self-reliance cannot
be pursued out of the context of an autonomous development style and strategy.
Therefore, the issues of technological self-reliance and alternative development
styles interact with each other, to the extent that cannot be considered
independently" (Sagasti,1975,p.942). For the same commentator, the orientation
and pace of S & T growth at present are determined by the interests of power
elites in the industrialized North. Such interests, however, have nothing to do
with the aspirations and goals of UDCs, with the result that there is a need for
the UDCs to break with their dependent mode of insertion into the world
economy and seek new ways of linking up with it. Hence, his conclusion that
"socioeconomic transformations must take place before endogenous S & T
capabilities could be developed in order to escape from the condition of
underdevelopment" (Sagasti,1980,p.602). Herrera (1972,1978) shares this
conclusion in his analysis of, and search for, alternatives forms of technological
development for UDCs. His own argument also emphasises that "technologies are
created in response to social demands based on certain social, economic and
cultural determinants" (Herrera,1978,p.l470). Looking at some of the experiences
of both DCs and UDCs, he contends that there are implicit and explicit policies
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in the scientific and technological development of a given country. The explicit
policy can be found in laws, regulations, etc. but the implicit policy is far more
difficult to identify because, although it determines the real role of science in
society, it has no formal structure; in essence, it expresses the scientific and
technological requirements of what Herrera (1972) calls the 'national project' of
each country, i.e., "the set of objectives (or model of the country) to which the
social classes which have direct or indirect economic and political control aspire"
(Herrera,p.28). With Herrera, therefore, it is the concrete interests of those
exercising power which ultimately determine the shape of the S & T process and
not any supposedly broad 'national interests' unless the latter two actually
coincide.
Morehouse (1980) has argued along similar lines of power groups
controlling the S & T process in DCs and UDCs but has pointed towards the
determinant role played in such a process by an international alliance of power,
privilege and technology in industrialized and Third World countries. This
'unholy alliance*, as he refers to it, is basically between the rich countries,
which collectively generate their own technology, and that 10-20 percent of the
population of poor countries which have adopted rich country consumption
patterns. The latter are largely the urbanized upper income groups in the TW
which include most of those with political and economic power -and the
privileges which go with that power- and who, for the same reason, interact
with those in rich countries who also occupy positions of power and privilege
there, that is, political leaders and senior official of banks, multinational
corporations, and international agencies. Out of this 'unholy alliance', there
emerge the social determinants of the technological process, or in Morehouse's
own words, "we are thus confronted with an alliance of those within rich and
poor countries who determine the direction and character of technological change
in order to maintain their own status and power and to serve in the first
instance their own needs and only secondarily the needs of others"
(Morehouse, 1980,p.538).
The theme of the interrelation between the technical and social dimensions
of an indigenous technological capability is also found in various other writers.
For instance, Kaplinsky (1985) states, "we reject the perspective that technology
determines social relations, for technology is, itself a product of social relations"
(Kaplinsky,p.423). From within the Marxist tradition, Leys (1984) argues that
"technology is never neutral but is intimately related to the social relations of
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production; indeed it is an aspect of those relations" (Leys,p.l75). This means
that where "the dominant relations of production are in conflict with a given
technology, the technology is replaced" (ibid.,p.l76)). Ernst (1980b) expands
upon this view when he argues that technology, as a product of science, fulfills
a twofold function: it is a force of production, and an instrument of social
control. He specifically defines technology as "the specific way in which labour
and means of production are combined, to use knowledge for the appropriation
of and change in one's material and social environment" (Ernst,1980b,p.49). More
importantly, while Ernst (1980b), points out that a technology is determined by
the material conditions of the object which has to be processed, the final
product, and the process of production which makes possible that transformation,
he also clearly emphasizes that the development of such a technology does not
take place in a social vacuum. In his words, technology
"...is the result of a specific historical mode of accumulation. In other
words, each historical mode accumulation requires a specific mode to
produce and supply technology, its dominant technology system. A
technology system will be dominant, if it fits some basic material
characteristics of the mode of accumulation and the class structure and
patterns of state intervention underlying it. On the other hand, those
technology systems which happen to be ineffectual or even counter¬
productive to the development of a historical mode of accumulation,
will be displaced and suppressed" (Ernst,1980b,p.5l).
With different shades or emphasis, therefore, the social understanding of the
problem of an indigenous technological capability is a well established viewpoint.
For this reason, Stewart (1984), in her review of different theoretical approaches
to the ITC problem, has concluded that "a major element in any work on
indigenous technical change should be to trace how the interests and rewards of
the major decision-makers relate to a static or dynamic environment and to local
or foreign sources of technology" (Stewart,p.88). Hence, after criticizing the
limitations of some prevailing approaches, particularly within the field of
economics, Stewart (1984) proposes her own "comprehensive/eclectic approach",
which is graphically depicted in figure 5.1. As it is possible to see, in this
model, technology institutions, class interests, factor prices and technical change
all interact with each other in a process which emphasises multiplicity of causal
factors. As Stewart (1984) herself explains in relation to a UDC's context,
"In this comprehensive approach, class interests, for example, in the
form of foreign interests, an industrial bourgeoisie with foreign
connections and an urban 'elite' working class, would contribute to the
determination of factor prices (low capital prices, relatively high urban
wages) and would directly, and indirectly via these factor prices, help
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Figure5.1.-AComprehensive/Ecl cticpproa h
determine the nature of technology change. But the factor endowment
would also play some independent role in that the price of labour
would still be relatively (compared with developed countries) low.
Technology institutions are themselves influenced by the conglomeration
of class interests and by the prevailing factor prices. Yet they may
also have some independent role, depending on their own logic, itself a
function of their design, the interests they serve and the training and
objectives of the scientific community. The outcome of this complex
interaction is a certain type of technical change, which is of
significance in determining the configuration of variables in the next
period - what class interests emerge, for example, how factor
availability is influenced, and so on" (Stewart,p.92).
Stewart's "comprehensive/eclectic approach", therefore, clearly puts the social
and technical dimensions in a closely knit structural process of multiple and
interactive cause-and-effect relationships between the major factors distinguished.
From our point of view, however, this approach is still limited with little
indication, for example, of the role of contradictory struggles and alterations
under changing historical circumstances. It conveys the idea of a process evolving
on its own with an intrinsically a-historical dynamic. Indeed, in a feature very
much in common with all the other views we have seen previously, Stewart's
approach does not really help us to understand the whys and hows of the social
determination of the process of an indigenous technological capability. The
fundamental realization of such social determination is thus left at levels of
generality which overlook too many critical problems. For instance, what is the
basic nature of the process which accounts for the interpenetration of technical
and social factors within an ITC ? Or, on which basis and why the specific
social interests which are said to influence the development of technology in a
given society actually converge or interact ? On the latter question, for instance,
the views we have just examined appear to imply a total lack of contradictions
between the dominant groups of society with the result that technology seems to
evolve through a coherent path reflecting the control and influence of a non-
conflictive power alliance. Among Marxist scholars in particular, there is a
tendency to subsume the role and interests of all social forces to the particular
process of reproduction of the capitalist social relations of production. This has
meant that the main thrust of the analyses normally focuses upon capital as the
dominant social force, by and large dealing with government and the military,
for instance, as subservient to capital and the needs of the process of capital
accumulation. Thus, although degrees of autonomy are explicitly acknowledged,
the role of contradiction within the power structure upon technological
development is generally overlooked. Inevitably, this leads to levels of
generalization which make it difficult to explain, for example, the basic
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differences seen in the development process of an ITC in different capitalist
countries. From what we have seen in the course of this thesis, we believe it is
possible to improve upon and, consequently, offer a more elaborate approach or
framework which contributes not only to the explanation of the problems we
have raised in our critique but, more broadly, to the understanding of the
complex problematique involved in the nature of an ITC. In the following, our
aim is to advance in the direction of such a framework by examining the
theoretical tradition of the sociotechnical approach to the understanding of
technology.
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52~ The Theoretical Tradition of the Sociotechnical Approach to
Technology
It is the theme of the present section that there is a fundamental unity
which somehow relates to a common realm all those technical and social
processes, artifacts, knowledge and skills which are constantly referred to as
technology in diverse studies. In the past, as we shall see below, this
fundamental unity has been present in different forms in the work of various
writers, although, in practice, it has seldom been treated systematically with the
aim of producing a formal theoretical framework for its understanding. On the
other hand, it is much more common to see studies concerned with technology,
which cancel from the very start the possibility of such a systematic treatment
by reducing technology to only one or some of its partial aspects. To mention
just a few instances of the latter case, technology is dealt with as mostly
knowledge by authors such as Mansfield (1969), Mesthene (1970) and UNESCO
(1979). While knowledge and devices is the essence of technology for authors
such as Derry and Williams (1975) and Leikind and Miles (1975). Childe
(1965) sees technology as the study and result of those activities directed to the
satisfaction of human ends. In turn, Stewart (1978) is not as keen on devices
but sees skills (3), knowledge and procedures for making, using and doing
useful things as the essence of technology. Clearly, in all these views the nature
of technology is limited by definition, a feature which is mostly absent in the
approach of those authors who have understood the broad technical and social
nature of the constituent elements, and historical process, of the development of
technology.
In efFect, going as far back as Marx (4) and his dialectical materialist
analysis of the development of the productive forces/social relations of
production within capitalism, various scholars, particularly those finding in the
interpenetration of technology and society an interpretation to the actual shape
of society's development, have understood technology not only as a dynamic
social process embracing and interrelating devices (i.e., tools, machines, products,
etc.), people, organization, procedures, etc., but also as a process which is
inseparable from society at large, influencing the latter's development as much as
(3) Fefbleman (1966) had also argued that skills are components of technology.
(4) See Marx (1977a,1977b), and various works dealing with Marx's conceptualization of
science and technology, particularly, Mishra (1979), Mackenzie (1984), Rosenberg
(1974,1975), Cooper (1971). See also Muller (1980) for a systematic sociotechnical
conceptualization along Marxist lines of thought.
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being influenced by it. Among these scholars, theoretical constructs, perspectives
and emphases dominating the analyses of the technology/society interpenetration
have certainly been varied and even contradictory, but, ultimately, they all
share what we refer to as a sociotechnical approach to technology in that the
social and the technical pervade each other in the course of society's
development.
In Marcuse's analysis of advanced industrial societies (5), for instance,
modern technology, as the totality of instruments, devices and contrivances
which characterize the machine age, is at the same time a mode of organizing
and perpetuating (or changing) social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent
thought and behaviour patterns, and instrument for control and domination. In
the latter sense, technology, through its material achievements and rationality, as
productive force and ideology, has come to provide the legitimation of the
expanding political power which absorbs all spheres of culture. Today,
domination perpetuates and extends itself not only through technology but as
technology, for in the medium of technology, culture, politics and the economy
merge into an omnipresent system which swallow up or repulses all alternatives.
For Marcuse, therefore, the technological and social world are inseparable in
advanced industrial societies as both intermingle with each other in a single
system of domination, namely, the technological society.
Other authors have tread a similar path to Marcuse. In particular, Ellul's
work (6) has also identified technology as having taking over all of man's
activities, not just his production activities. Indeed, man himself has become the
object of technique with the development of such human techniques as medicine,
genetics and propaganda. For Ellul, however, more than a system of total
domination, the technological society has become a world of its own where the
quest for the one best means, in a mathematical sense, in every field has given
technology the primacy of social developments over any other consideration or
social force. This has come about because, ultimately, all major social groups in
society (e.g., workers, capital, the state, the public, etc.) have become possessed
by a technical state of mind which posits an identification between technical
progress and their own special interests. On this basis, technology has become
the prime mover of societal development eliciting and conditioning social,
political and economic change, As with Marcuse, therefore, although with a
(5) See Marcuse (1941,1964) and also Habermas' critical analysis of Marcuse
conceptualization of technology published in 1971.
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different theoretical construct, technological and social development are
inseparable aspects of the same technological society.
Lewis Mumford's work (7) puts forward an equally all-embracing
interpretation of the way technology and society have come to pervade each
other in present-day advanced society. His megamachine involving people, devices,
organization, etc., represents the dominant reality in today's society which tends
to subsume all forms of human expression and social relations to those forms of
mechanical relations intrinsic to all machines. For Mumford there axe specific
social machines (e.g., the labour machine, the military machine, etc.) which
fulfill specific tasks but the megamachine is their projection to the entire societal
realm; a realm where increasingly only those expressions of humanity which are
consistent with the workings of the machine become the valid ones and are able
to develop unhindered. For Mumford, the coming into being of the modern
megamachine has been the result of a historical process where the crystallization
of a dominant complex of power, under enormous pressures such as war, has
gone hand in hand, in a process of reciprocal compulsions, with the development
of the megamachine itself. The Pentagon of Power which merges dominant social
interests in a dynamics of power and prestige, property, productivity and profits
is thus the social counterpart of the megamachine, reproducing and furthering
itself through the latter's own reproduction and further development. In this
process, society becomes increasingly totalitarian, for not only is the
megamachine intrinsically authoritarian but, also, its development is intrinsically
monotechnical in that it tends to embrace all areas of human activity while
excluding polytechnics, i.e., all forms of techniques other than those consistent
with the megamachine. Polytechnics, for Mumford, are intrinsically democratic
in that they are under the direct control of the participants, providing them
with security and a means of self-expression. Thus, as they are gradually wiped
out by the development of the megamachine, it is the very base of society's
democracy which is actually disappearing. The shape of present-day society,
therefore, is inseparable from the shape of present-day technological development.
They give each other their respective characters.
From the field of economics, it has been J.K. Galbraith's work (8) on the
nature of the new industrial state which has produced one of the most wide-
ranging interpretations of the ways in which technical and social factors
(6) See Ellul (1963,1965,1967,1972,1981).
(7) See Mumford (1934,1957,1969,1964,1966,1967,1970).
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interplay with each other in the shaping of modern industrial society. In
Galbraith's analysis advanced technology possesses intrinsic characteristics in
terms of size, complexity, costs, time and organization which within a market
environment of risk and uncertainty lead to sociotechnical forms of economic
organization whose result is the negation of such a market and its replacement
by a planning system where all factors pertaining to the reproduction of the
economic organization (i.e., the large corporation) are sought to be incorporated.
The technostructure thus emerge, a kind of sociotechnical structure which is the
technical brain of the corporation as well as its controlling power. The
technostructure has as its overriding goal the growth of the organization and
hence its own reproduction. In this process, the technostructure seeks not only
to control the market but, indeed, to influence all those social forces, such as
the government, which are important for the materialization of its goals. In
practice, the result is a process of confluence of interests whereby the values
and purposes of the technostructure pervade the other social forces and vice-
versa. A power alliance is thus created which not only is ultimately rooted in
advanced technology but, conversely, reverts its influence upon it by shaping the
direction of its development in accordance with the interests of the controlling
forces. Social and technical factors, therefore, reciprocally influence each other in
Galbraith's sociotechnical account of the new industrial state.
Thus far, with the above scholars, the main preoccupation has clearly been
that of unveiling the nature of human society, particularly, advanced industrial
society, where technology is perceived as having become a pervasive reality
whose process of development involving people, machines, organization, values,
etc., expresses and shapes more than any other the development of what has
gradually evolved into the technological society itself. In this sense, with writers
such as Marcuse, Ellul, Mumford and Galbraith, the sociotechnical
conceptualization of technology is not for the sake of understanding technology
alone but it leads to the understanding of society from the start, for in it
modern society and technology defines each other's fundamental character. In the
technology literature, the influence of such a wide-ranging approaches has been
noticeable so that it is not difficult to find some of the important perceptions of
the above scholars' analyses clearly present in the work of other sociotechnical
writers who have concerned themselves more directly with the nature of
technology.
(8) See Galbraith (1952,1958,1963,1967,1971,1974).
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D. Goulet (9), for instance, acknowledges the premise that in modern
societies, technology has come to play a dominant and pervasive role so that the
organization of contemporary modern society itself is along dominantly
technological lines. Ultimately, this means that, in these places, the tendency is
for technology to reduce the totality of human meaning to those elements which
are amenable to problem-solving. In his work, Goulet has sought to highlight,
primarily, the character of modern technology as a dynamic system of its own;
a system which, although constantly evolving and interacting with broader forces
of social change, has its own value universe which unrelentingly pervades all
societal activities wherever technology becomes the dominant reality. This value
system is what Goulet identifies as a particular Western approach to rationality
and efficiency which associates the former with decomposition of reality and
quantitative measurement and the latter mainly with productivity. This Western
approach also exhibits a predilection for the problem-solving stance in the face
of nature and human events, and a Promethean view of the universe which
emphasises the control and domination of nature. In modern society, this value
system is paramount, helping to shape both technology and society through a
reciprocal interplay of such dynamic forces as the infatuation of contemporary
human beings with their own creativity (technology's imperative), the search for
the competitive edge, and the interests of identifiable social groups (e.g., TNCs)
using technology as instruments of social control. Out of this mix, technical and
social factors become a single sociotechnical system where only a change in
society's dominant values can alter the present state of affairs.
Another scholar, whose sociotechnical approach to modern technology has
much in common with some of then concepts we have seen earlier, is J.
McDermott (10). In his own interpretation, however, McDermott sees modern
technology primarily as systems of rationalized control over large groups of
men, events and machines by small groups of technically skilled men operating
through organizational hierarchy, these systems tend to impose their basic
characteristics on all those areas of activity or supporting systems related to
their own development. Thus, like in Ellul's quest for the best method, in all
these areas of activities sharp pressures exist for improving and rationalizing the
performance of machines, men, techniques, etc. In so doing, technology acquires
its own momentum, tending to resist and exclude intervention from outside the
system. Thus, in McDermott's view, technology is not influenced by the "politics"
(9) See Goulet (1975,1977,1983).
(10) See McDermott (1969,1972).
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of a given situation, rather technology creates its own politics in the same way
as it has created its own ideology, value system and its own elite. It has
become, in short, an institutional system of its own; a system whose social and
technical factors interact in a single process of rationalized control by a technical
elite.
In a similar way to McDermott, Dickson's work (11) has also used the
concept of institution in his particular sociotechnical view of technology. His
idea is that technology is in itself a social institution just like the legal and the
educational systems. As such, he argues, that not only technology has become
an integral part of our social environment but, simultaneously, it does possess a
fundamentally political nature. Unlike McDermott, however, Dickson does not
argues that technology creates its own politics. Rather, his point is that
technology and social patterns reinforce each other in a dialectical process at
both material and ideological levels. By this he means that technology does not
just provide the physical means by which a society supports and promotes its
power structure, it also reflects, as a social institution, this structure in its
design. As a result, for Dickson, a society's technology can never be isolated
from its power structure and technology can never be considered politically
neutral.
The latter theme has also been the kernel of D. Noble' work (12), whose
sociotechnical approach has clearly emphasized the social determination of
technology's development by the interplay of social forces characteristic of
capitalist society. In Noble's view, technology is an essentially human
phenomenon, a social process which does not simply stimulate social development
from outside but, rather, constitutes fundamental social development in itself. In
this character, technology is but one important aspect of the development of
society as a whole and, in its own development, inescapably reflects the contours
of that particular social order which has produced it and sustained it. For
Noble, the latter means that technology does not unfold automatically but, in
fact, contains a subjective element which drives it, in such a way that its
particular form of development is determined by the most powerful and
forceful people in society, in struggle with others. Hence, in his perception, it is
ultimately people and the basic relations of domination which bind and divide
them, the share dreams and delusions which inspire and blind them, that shape
(11) See (Dickson 1974a,1974b).
(12) See Noble (1977,1979,1984,1986).
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the actual development process of technology as much as of society. For Noble,
this is the substrate from which all technology actually emerges, the power and
promise which give technology its shape and meaning. Thus, in following the
history of automation in America for instance. Noble's analysis shows how
dominant institutions, ideas and social groups operating in a context of class
conflict and informed by what he calls the irrational compulsions of an all-
embracing ideology of progress, have actually determined the design and use of
a particular technology. Noble's sociotechnical conceptualization of technology,
therefore, again underlines the inseparability of technical and social factors in
the understanding of technology and, indeed, societal development.
Somewhat in contrast to Noble's emphasis on the social shaping of
technology, the sociotechnical approach of another scholar, L. Winner (13), has
primarily followed the theme that technology is itself a political phenomenon.
He has argued this point, mainly, in relation to the momentum of large-scale,
complex, centralized, high-energy sociotechnical systems which dominate the
modern age. In these systems, he sees technical and social factors deeply
interpenetrating each other in such a way that, in their operation, they
ultimately constitute ways of life. In this sense, technologies are never neutral
they are deeply political insofar as they legislate and govern the fundamental
patterns which much of modern life assumes. Technology is itself legislation,
for it legislates the conditions of human existence. Winner is also clearly aware
of the social determination of technology, i.e., that technology is itself shaped by
the interplay of social forces. In this respect, the shape of a specific technology
can be the result of a particular struggle within a particular community and,
eventually, a way of settling that particular conflict, as it would be the case,
for instance, with the introduction of machinery in a particular labour process
to break a workers' strike. The distinctive trait of Winner's technological
politics, however, is that it draws attention to the characteristics of technical
objects and the political meaning of these characteristics. In this respect, his
perspective looks at the shaping of society's politics by what he calls inherently
political technologies, i.e., man-made systems that appear to require, or to be
strongly compatible with, particular kinds of political relationships (14). For
(13) See Winner (1977,1979,1985).
(14) For a similar argument, see Edquist and Edquist (1979), Edquist (1985). For these
authon...The development of techniques is conditioned by the laws of nature, and
techniques are formed by the limits and constraints set by such laws: physical, chemical,
biological, etc. No human wish can create techniques that go against natural laws...[As a
result A.M.]...many techniques have intrinsic properties: with important social, economic and
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Winner, these technologies (e.g., the atomic bomb with its inherent need for
security and centralization) are political phenomena in their own right, and by
looking at them as thing in themselves, an explanation may be found to what
he sees as the all too common signs of adaptation of human needs to technical
means.
To an important extent. Winner's suggestion has been precisely what the
work of historian T. Hughes (15) has tried to do by looking at the historical
development of some concrete large-scale technological systems, particularly, that
of the electric power network. Hughes, however, possesses his own sociotechnical
conceptualization, which emphasizes the category of systems as crucial for the
understanding of the development of technological processes (16). In Hughes'
general meaning, systems are coherent structures comprised of interacting,
interconnected components. But. more specifically, he differentiates technical
systems, such as an electric transmission systems, from large technological
systems where the interacting components are not only technical but also
institutional. In the latter system, interconnected components are as diverse as
physical artefacts, mines, manufacturing firms, utility companies, academic
research and development laboratories, and investment banks. For Hughes, they
constitute a system because they fall under a central control and interact
functionally to fulfill a system goal, or to contribute to a system output. In
addition, when the technological systems' sphere of control grows to encompass,
for instance, regulatory and law-making bodies and even educational institutions
are coordinated to satisfy the needs of the system, then Hughes chooses to talk
of sociotechnical systems rather than of simply technological systems. A crucial
characteristic of these sociotechnical systems is their high momentum or inertia
of development which, according to Hughes, is rooted not only in the substantial
amount of capital invested in machines, devices, structures and other physical
artefacts but, also in the commitment of many people whose professional skills
are particularly applicable to the system. Furthermore, supportive legislation is
involved as well as the commitment of many institutions such as business
concerns, government agencies, professional societies, educational institutions, and
political consequences...Some techniques require social structures with a high degree of
centralization of power and economic resources. In this sense, they are less 'democratic'
than others" (Edquist and Edquist,1979,pp.316). In a similar vein, Ernst (1980b) states
that..."Basically, a technology is determined by the material conditions of the object that has
to be processed, the final product, and the process of production which makes possible this
metabolism" (Ernst,p,50).
(15) See Hughes (1969,1979,1981,1983,1986).
(16) For an early discussion of technology as systems, see Drucker (1970).
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other organizations that shape and are shaped by the technical core of the
system. Taken together, in their dynamic interaction, all these factors generate
the momentum of the system, a powerful conservative force tending to exclude
technological change in directions which may fulfill radically different social or
economic goals. Hughes does not see these systems as autonomous, however,
rather he points to the fact that values may need to be changed, institutions
reformed, or legislation recast, if an attempt to control and change their present
form of development is ever likely to be effective. As we have seen with other
sociotechnical writers, therefore, in Hughes' conceptualization of technology
clearly technical and social factors collapse together in an integrated framework
of understanding. His is a "seamless web" approach to use the illustrative power
of his own metaphor.
Finally, to bring the present excursion into sociotechnical approaches to an
end, we must mention some recent contributions emerging from the field of
sociology. First is the work of Pinch and Bijker (17) which has sought to
expand into the technology field concepts originally developed in the area of
sociology of science. The main contention is that both technology and science are
both socially constructed cultures sharing various basic developmental
mechanisms. On this basis. Pinch and Bijker make an effort to explain
technology wholly in terms of societal processes but focusing their analysis,
primarily, on the interaction between those who design the technology and the
social groups most directly defining the particular problems being addressed by
the technology. A second current is the actor-network approach (18) which has
sought to erase all societal boundaries (e.g., technical, political, economic, etc.) in
the conceptualization of the development of technology. For actor-network
writers, from physical laws to legislative bodies, including machines and tools,
researchers and companies, consumers and producers of a technology, they all
constitute actors of a coherent and heterogeneous sociotechnical network. In this
network, actors lose their individual entity and are transformed and shaped in
such a way that their interaction produces the harmonious integration and
working of the system. Both in the process of generation of a sociotechnical
network or in its continued development, the heterogeneous engineers or actor-
network builders (e.g., innovators, entrepreneurs, etc.) are the driving actors who
mobilize all others, i.e., the human and non-human elements necessary for the
(17) Pinch and Bijker (1984,1986), Pinch (1986). See also Russell (1986) for a critical
review.
(18) Callon (1980), Latour (1983,1986a,1986b), Law (1986), Callon and Law (1982), Callon
- 483 -
system to be materialized. But the process of mobilization never stabilises since
particularly human heterogeneous actors tend continuously to alter the roles
designed by the system builder. Thus a process of mobilization and/or creation
of new actors, technical or social, is constantly under way. In this mobilization,
the systems builders choose from many alternatives, all leading to the furthering
of the system. For instance, they may decide between different qualitative and
quantitative mixes of human and non-human actors. Also they may see it
appropriate to attempt to raise feelings such as passion, love, fear, etc., from
human actors such as consumers or workers, etc. It is for these reason that
some actor-network writers actually talk of the technological process as a cloth
weaving together such different elements as stones with laws, telephones with
love, fears with atoms, etc. In addition, for this school of thought, in the
process of actor-network building, what is actually taking place is the constant
remaking of power relations. In this sense, society and power relations do not
exist as causes of the sociotechnical process, rather, power and society are the
result of the sociotechnical process and the changing relations between the
myriad of its heterogeneous actors. As one actor-network writer has put it
"science and techniques are politics by other means" (Latour,1986b,p.25). In all,
in the actor-world of these scholars, all societal dimensions (e.g., economics,
politics, techniques, psychology, etc.) loose their separate identity and collapse
together in a single process where actors interpenetrate each other moving freely
through a societal fabric where there are no real boundaries.
As it is possible to realize, therefore, the sociotechnical approach to the
understanding of technology has a long and well-established tradition as well as
a great deal of theoretical variety among its many exponents. Obviously, in the
review above our aim has been basically to expose some of the main tenets of
the views of each of the selected writers and/or schools of thought rather than
to criticize them one by one. As we shall see below, the latter was not a task
necessary for our purposes of advancing a sociotechnical conceptualization of an
ITC, mainly because such a conceptualization will revolve primarily around the
main concepts we have used in trying to grapple with the sociotechnical nature
of the microtechnological process. In this respect, the review of sociotechnical
approaches was necessary for two reasons: first, to show that a sociotechnical
approach to technology is nothing new and that several of the points we are
about to raise in our discussion of the nature of ITCs have been made before
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although mostly in a different fashion, and, secondly, to establish the state-of-
the-art base whereupon the contribution of our systematic treatment of the
interpenetration of sociotechnical elements within an ITC can be more distinctly
highlighted. At a more general level, however, before beginning with such a
systematic treatment, it is necessary to point at two major aspects which, from
the start, will differentiate our approach from those we have discussed above.
a) Almost without exception, the main focus of the analyses above is limited to
the experience of developed countries in isolation. That is to say, a systematic
treatment of interrelated international issues is mostly lacking in the
conceptualization of technology of most of the above writers. In particular, for
our purposes, the systemic interpenetration of UDCs' technological development
with that of DCs has seldom been given attention.
b) Closely related to point a), and basically due to the prevailing attitude to
associate the concept of indigenous technological capabilities exclusively to
technological development in the Third World, almost without exception the
analyses above only indirectly touch upon the conceptualization of ITC which
constitutes the main focus of our attention. True enough, we shall find that
there is a great deal of overlapping in the sociotechnical conceptualization of, for
instance, technology, the technological process or an ITC. In this sense, it is also
true that most of what we shall say in relation to an ITC will be valid for
the conceptualization of technology too. Yet, at the same time, the focus on the
concept of ITC necessarily introduces particular emphasis on certain issues of
technology and the technological process while leading to forsake the emphasis
on others which may be of greater relevance for some other scholars. For
instance, insofar as the study of an ITC implies the desire to understand the
workings and factors involved in the appropriation and development of specific
technologies such as microtechnology, it means that concerns about the
rationality and morality of modern technology and the need for either its total
rejection or acceptance in the abstract can hardly be a main line of
preoccupation in ITC studies. In this respect, moral issues may certainly find an
expression in the analysis of the content and dynamism of specific ITC
sociotechnical processes themselves, but hardly in the rejection and/or acceptance
of modern technology at large. On the other hand, the focus on ITC leads to
put greater emphasis, for instance, on identifying the qualitative and quantitative
and Latour (1981).
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sociotechnical factors implied in the possession of the resource-requirements
necessary for the materialization of a given technological process. By contrast,
the latter issue is seldom given any prominence by scholars dealing with
technology basically in the advanced industrial countries, where the possession of
such resource-requirements is commonly taken as a matter of fact.
With these two general points, therefore, we now turn our attention to the
sociotechnical conceptualization of indigenous technological capabilities which is
the central objective of the present chapter.
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5.3. Towards a Sociotechnical Theory of Indigenous
Technological Capabilities
For purposes of clearer presentation, the discussion in the present section
will revolve around figures 5.2 and 5.3, which provide a useful way to
systematically represent the national and international character of the elements
and forces involved in the unfolding of an ITC sociotechnical system. We have
to emphasize, however, that these figures are strictly intended as a kind of
visual support to the discussion and, in no way, they suggest either the actual
shape of the sociotechnical process or an exhaustive list of the elements involved
in such a process. In this respect, the three points made below should be always
kept in mind in order to derive the greatest benefit from the illustrative power
of the visual representation while, at the same time, avoiding the possibility of
being misled by it into conceptual interpretations which bear no relation to the
realities of the processes involved.
a) The rigid cube-like shape dominating the diagrams as well as their splitting
into three interconnected blocks is just a convenient way of allocating space for
many variables while, simultaneously, emphasizing the character of some crucial
interrelations and the overall unity of the whole process. In no way, they
suggest, for instance, that the ITC technological process is an orderly, well
proportioned set of neatly structured interrelations amongst the elements shown.
b) The encapsulation implied in the closed cube-like shape should not be
interpreted as if the elements and relations illustrated in the diagrams
constituted in themselves the totality of a largely self-contained sociotechnical
process. Far from it, for, in practice, the unfolding of a sociotechnical system
does not occur in a vacuum, but is vitally related to socio-structural factors
other than those immediately making up the system itself. These are, for
instance, infrastructural resources of many kinds from transport and
communications, power and water supplies, to educational and training
infrastructure concerned with schooling and formation of human resources. It is
clear that the development of a sociotechnical system is bound to be conditioned
by the state of development of such an infrastructural base, in the same way as
the latter may be itself influenced by the development of a given sociotechnical
system. There is undoubtedly interrelation but here we cannot concern
ourselves with the systematic treatment of all these factors; instead, our focus
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Figure 5.2.- Constituents and Galvanizing Forces Involved in the Historical Unfolding of a Sociotechnical System (Capitalist Science-Based).
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Figure 5.3»- International Interpenetration of Different Countries' Sociotechnical Systems.
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sociotechnical process of an ITC (19).
c) The inevitably static appearance of the cube-like shape should not be taken as
a suggestion of static relations in the sociotechnical system itself. Indeed,
through the use of the three axis surrounding the cube-like shape, we have
already tried to suggest that there is nothing static about the elements and
relations comprising any sociotechnical system but that, in practice, such a
system unfolds historically in a process involving constant motion and
alterations. Here, as we shall see, national and international galvanizing forces as
well as social constituents and their interrelations within the sociotechnical
systems themselves play a fundamentally dynamic role.
The three points above, therefore, constitute a sort of basic guidelines of
how not to see, or interpret, the shape and content of figures 5.2 and 5.3. In
this respect, were we to alter the negative emphasis and briefly suggest a sort
general guideline of how to see the diagrams, the best way would be to say
that, by and large, what we are asking is simply for the reader to dissolve in
his mind the specific cube-like shapes in the diagrams and, through the power of
his/her imagination, not only compress all the elements shown into a total and
systemic interpenetration but, simultaneously, dynamize this interpenetration into
historical motion, thus providing it with a past as well as a future however
uncertain the latter may be. With this general approach in mind, we can now
begin to explain the fundamental tenets of the sociotechnical conceptualization of
ITCs we wish to put forward.
5.3.1. Some Broad Properties of the Development of Large-Scale
and Complex ITC Sociotechnical Processes: Aggregate
Development Trends, the Momentness of the Sociotechnical
Process and the Role of Historical Galvanizing Forces
For the sake of greater generality, but primarily because throughout this
thesis we have dealt with the case of fundamentally capitalist IMCs, i.e., large-
scale and complex capabilities evolving as part of, shaping and being shaped by,
the context of capitalism, figure 5.2 will specifically refer to capitalist science-
based sociotechnical systems where government themselves tend to play a crucial
and inseparable part in the possession and development of such a system. True,
(19) For an illuminating discussion on the role of infrastructural factors in the development
of technological processes, see Muller (1980).
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simpler technological processes may not be science-based and/or they may
involve government in only a remote fashion. But in such cases, the content of
the diagram in figure 5.2 needs only be simplified to account for the simpler set
of constituent elements and relations characterizing such simpler processes. The
latter would similarly apply, for instance, if we were to reduce the
sociotechnical content of a technological capability merely to the ability to use a
given technology in contrast to the goal of autonomy and production capability
commonly implied in the concept of ITC. In the present discussion, however, as
we have already said, the content of figure 5.2 is based primarily on the case of
a capitalist IMC and this means that our point of reference will not be a
technological process with limited relevance within the sociotechnical realm of
society. Rather, it will be a large-scale, complex technological process involving
the interpenetration of a wide range of technical and social factors into an
autonomous capability which, by definition, implies the ability to choose, use,
apply and produce the technical products and processes most relevant to the
development strategies of given countries or regions. It is to the conceptual
interpretation of the latter kind of sociotechnical system that we expect to
contribute by using a systematic combination of such categories as basic
resources of technological processes; institutional depositories of basic resources;
intrinsic and dominant social constituents; overriding and particular interests of
social constituents; national and international galvanizing forces, etc. It is these
categories and various others that will enable us to deal with a complex ITC as
a sociotechnical system in constant motion; a system not only possessing
identifiable aggregate development trends but also constituted by clearly
identifiable moments which are part of one and the same process of constant
metamorphosis of elements and relations whereby the entire system actually
materializes, alters, and reproduces itself in time and space. In addition, in its
movement along the axis of historical time, such a system is constantly flowing
from itself either in its reproduction and furtherance or in its waning and
decadence as we shall see later on in our discussion of competing momentum-
gathering/momentum-losing technological systems. That is to say, at any given
time in history and whatever the power of the interests and galvanizing forces
pushing in one or other direction, the future development of the system is
completely conditioned by the nature and immediately prior state of
development of, and specific interrelations between, the technical and social
constituents of the system. In this respect, given the large number of elements
and complexity of interrelations in large-scale and complex sociotechnical
systems, major transformations of such systems are only likely to materialize
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after many years of changes and accommodations whose character and pace will
depend upon a myriad of specific factors but, more broadly, upon the
combination of such aggregate factors as the quantitative and qualitative state of
development of the sociotechnical system at any given time, its conflict and
interaction with other competing and/or complementary sociotechnical systems
within the socio-cultural and juridical context of the time, and the nature and
strength of the galvanizing forces pressurizing for the furtherance and/or
disintegration of one or the other of the conflicting and/or interacting
sociotechnical systems.
With regard to the identifiable aggregate development trends of
sociotechnical systems, they can be said to reside in the very nature and
quantitative and qualitative development of both technical and social factors and
determinants interacting in the development of such a system. The role of
technical determinants in shaping the aggregate development of a sociotechnical
system has already been dealt with by analysts such as Winner and Edquist
and Edquist (see section 5.2 above), who have pointed out that there are man-
made systems whose intrinsic technical characteristics appear to require, or be
strongly compatible with, particular kinds of socio-cultural relations. As a
result, in the present conceptualization our concern will be basically with the
nature and role of social determinants in shaping the aggregate development of a
sociotechnical system, although always keeping in mind that social determination
is never arbitrary or voluntaristic but is realized in interpenetration with (i.e.,
within the limits and possibilities afforded by) the unfolding technical
determinants themselves. In this respect, in the course of this thesis, we have
seen, for instance, that in the case of a capitalist IMC not only was there an
aggregate technical trend towards systemic convergence and synergistic
development of signal technologies and corresponding industries but,
simultaneously and in profound interrelation, there was an aggregate socially
determined trend towards concentration and centralization in the process of
electronics capital accumulation at a global scale. At the more specific level of
countries, we also saw how in the case of the US, for instance, the aggregate
socially determined development trends of that country's IMC showed a
predominant biased towards competitive commercial and politico-military concerns
which was consistent with the overriding interests of the social forces making
up the dominant social constituency of the US's IMC. In other words, the
aggregate development trends evident in the aggregate national patterns of
utilization of the basic resources of the IMC sociotechnical process (e.g..
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investments, general character of projects, etc.) has reflected, by and large, the
dominant patterns of social control of those resources and hence, the relative
weight or correlation of forces between the social interests interacting in the
heat of national and international historical galvanizing forces. In the case of the
Japanese IMC, we saw the existence of a similar aggregate development trend
but, in contrast to the US case, the dominant patterns of social control of the
basic resources of the IMC technological process showed themselves in a much
less militaristic utilization of these resources, with commercial concerns clearly
dominating the aggregate development trends. Finally, in the case of Mexico,
the aggregate development trends of the IMC sociotechnical process manifested
themselves not in an aggregate pattern of utilization of basic resources of an
autonomous sociotechnical system at work but, more specifically, in an aggregate
pattern of system building which implies the very creation of various technical
and social constituents currently missing or undeveloped, or simply under the
control of social interests whose historical role has not been consistent with the
goal of an autonomous Mexican IMC. The contrast of the Mexican case to that
of advanced industrial countries is quite revealing since in a sort of negative
way, via the absence or weakness of certain constituents of the sociotechnical
system, it has highlighted the importance of their existence and systemic
integration for the autonomous workings of the entire ITC sociotechnical process.
From a different angle, if, as we have mentioned above and shall explain below,
such sociotechnical process is constituted by clearly identifiable moments which
are part of one and the same process of constant metamorphosis of elements and
relations whereby the entire system actually materializes, alter, and reproduces
itself in time and space, then it is clear that the absence or serious weakness of
some important elements and relations, or the existence of some contradictory
relations, can only mean that some moments must be either missing or crippled
and hence, that the development of the entire sociotechnical system must suffer
from a pattern of general distortion. Let us look at the "momentness" or
moment-composite nature of an ITC sociotechnical process to understand more
clearly the meaning of the latter contention.
The first thing that is crucial to grasp in relation to "momentness" is that
an ITC as a sociotechnical process only exist in action, that is, it exists through
the permanent and practical realization of all its constituents elements in the
development process of a given society. This means that the technological process
can neither be seen as static nor be reduced to any of its constituent parts, for
in themselves each of these parts is largely sterile as far as the materialization
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of an ITC is concerned. Financial resources without R & D or labour, for
instance, are technologically meaningless in the same way that the latter factors
may not fulfill themselves without financial resources. R&D without
production process is also equally sterile in terms of an ITC as it is tools and
machinery without raw materials and products. Hence, in an ITC sociotechnical
process, partial aspects cannot fulfill themselves in isolation from the whole,
they can only do it in interrelation with the others in such a way that their
essential character, the meaning of their very existence, can be said to be for
and from the others parts of the sociotechnical system. It is this essential
characteristic of an ITC in action which underlies its moment-composite nature
mentioned above.
In practice, such "momentness" assumes not just one expression. One
particular form of "momentness", for instance, is that implied in the process of
metamorphosis of financial resources which leads all the way to final products
and back to financial resources, in a process which Marx lucidly unveiled in his
analysis of the circulation of capital in capitalist society. Here, however, we
want to highlight, in particular, the existence of another expression of ITC's
"momentness" which is generally overlooked by sociotechnical commentators who
tend to reduce technological processes primarily to the sociotechnical moment of
knowledge and/or artefacts creation (20) and from here jumping, as in the case
of Latour (1983), to the ensaiing social transformations implied in the massive
diffusion of the product or artefact. Completely missing in this conceptualization
of technology is any reference to the necessary sociotechnical moment whereby
the created product or artefact is made massively available for its ulterior
diffusion moment. In other words, there can be no massive diffusion without
massive production, and it is the latter production moment - which is so dear,
for instance, to economists with their focus on costs of production, economies of
scale and so on - that is mostly missed out by the sociotechnical
conceptualization of the abovementioned scholars. It seems to us that this kind
of implicit reductionism carries in itself various conceptual problems from the
point of view of understanding the technological process as a whole. For the
importance of the sociotechnical productive moment is not just for logical
reasons of a missing link fulfilling the creating moment as a moment for
production and diffusion. It is also because by flowing into the productive
moment, the sociotechnical process actually undergoes a qualitative alteration in
itself, not only in its structure and utilization of basic resources of the
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technological process but, also, in its specific form of interrelating to the other
constituents, relations and galvanizing forces involved in the development of a
sociotechnical system (21). For instance, different tools, machinery, and
knowledge and skills will be needed along with different forms of organization,
management and labour. Industrial relations become important along with
competitive and market relations and legislative dispositions concerning the
development of the technological process, etc., etc. Most importantly, the creating
activity does not stop with the development of the artefact. All the way in the
materialization of the productive moment, it continues under different forms, not
only in the demand for, and generation of, technical processes, skills, tools,
machinery, etc. but, also, in the minor innovations improving the production
process and products themselves. This creative activity which make the
implementation (diffusion) and further development of the sociotechnical system
possible, is clearly reflected, for instance, in the learning curve characterizing the
development of the production process of any product (22). In the production
process is where workers, the great missing actor in the actor-network writings,
play their creative role in the technological process (23), although as Layton
(1977) points out, their contribution often goes unreported or is credited to
management apart from the historical fact that the deep separation between
manual and mental labour long fostered by advanced capitalist societies, has
meant that effective systematic mechanisms for releasing workers' creative
(20) For instance, see the work, of Pinch, Latour and Law.
(21) In the context of the diffusion of a new technology, Rosenberg (1977a) has dealt with
some of the mechanisms in the flowing of a new technology from its creating moment to its
production moment.
(22) In this respect, Rosenberg (1977a) states that..."While the existence of learning curves
within the framework of an established technology is well recognized, the role of learning
experiences in accounting for gradual improvements of new technologies and their slow
diffusion has not received much attention (Rosenberg,p.198).
(23) Describing the nature of incremental innovations, Freeman (1986) states,..These
innovations may often occur, not so much as the result of any deliberately research and
development activity, but as the outcome of inventions and improvements suggested by
engineers and others directly engaged in the production process, or as a result of initiatives
and proposals by users...They are particularly important in the follow-through period after a
radical breakthrough innovation... and frequently associated with the scaling up of plant
and equipment and quality improvements to products and services for a variety of specific
applications. Although their combined effect is extremely important in the growth of
productivity, no single incremental innovation has dramatic effects, and they may sometimes
pass unnoticed or unrecorded" (Freeman,p.28). From a different angle, Shaiken (1985),
discussing the possible consequences of completely automating the manufacturing process,
points to the fact that removing the hiccups of a production process "without sacrificing
creativity may be difficult if not impossible" (Shaiken,p.23). In this connection, he quotes a
former vice-president of engineering as saying..."If you carry a process like this too far, you
tend to suppress new ideas...We don't want to standardize one landing gear to the extent
that we don't give anybody the opportunity of building a better one" (ibid.).
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energies have been seldom in existence. In this respect, such managerial concepts
as suggestion schemes or the Japanese concept of quality circles (24), recognize
at least in principle the importance of the creative role of labour. It is in the
production moment, therefore, where workers become not just an intrinsic part
of the technological process as a whole but, indeed, an intrinsic part of the very
creative core of such a process. In other words, it is not possible to reduce the
overall creative activity in a sociotechnical system in action to that of engineers,
scientists and laboratories working in a specifically creating moment, for such an
activity also extends itself into the production moment, altering itself in its
form, but essentially fulfilling the existence of one and the same sociotechnical
system in action. In practice, creation, production, and diffusion are all
inextricably interrelated moments in the life of a sociotechnical system and by
this we mean not a one-flow process but a dialectical process of reciprocal
influences, where constant interpenetration and feedbacks take place between all
moments in such a way that the production moment, for instance, not only
represents the materialization (diffusion) of the results of an specifically creating
moment but, to the extent that it contains creativeness of its own, is in itself a
metamorphosized prolongation of that specifically creative moment. In short, the
production moment of an unfolding sociotechnical system clearly influences the
specifically creating and diffusion moments of such a system as, in turn, the
latter two not only influence each other but, simultaneously, the former
production moment of the system. For example, when a product fails to diffuse
in the market because it is too expensive or unreliable, this may feedback to the
(24) "The quality control circle is a Japanese innovation, circa 1962, that formally mobilizes
small voluntary teams of workers in order to improve quality and productivity—The agenda
and procedures of a quality control circle are usually quite structured, but the details vary
somewhat from firm to firm, depending upon the objectives that are being
emphasized—Methods and quality objectives are generally important in Japanese quality
control circles but are sometimes not emphasized in U.S. circles. In both Japan and the
States, morale-enhancing ideas -softball leagues, vending machines, repainting the lunchroom
and sc on- are legitimate topics for QC circle discussion, and motivational benefits are
expected from the employee participation that takes place in circles" (Schonberger,1982,
pp.181 and 185). A more colourful description is given by Chrysler's president Lee
Iacocca,..."Of course, quality doesn't stop with the engineer. It has to be part of the
consciousness of the workers in the plants. Through the establishment of "quality circles",
our plant workers have become far more involved than they used to be in the building
process. We sit them down in a room and we say: "How about this operation ? Can you do
it ? The engineer says you can, and the manufacturing guy says you can. But you're the
ones who have to build the thing. What do you say ?...So off they go to try it for a
couple of days. If it doesn't work, they come back and tell us: "That's a bad idea. Here's a
better way to do it". The word get around pretty quickly that management is listening,
that we really care about quality, that we're open to new ideas, we're not just a bunch of
dummies. That may be the most important consideration of all when it comes to quality -
that the worker believes his ideas will be heard" (lacocca,1984,pp.l84-185).
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production moment as a need for improvements in the production process;
eventually, it may prove that the very design was intrinsically flawed, thus
reverting the influence of the market diffusion moment to the originally creating
moment. Likewise, if a product has undesirable side effects which become
apparent only at the diffusion moment, then the feedback goes right back to the
creating moment and, indeed, in extreme circumstances, the entire sociotechnical
process crystallyzed in the diffusion of such a product may collapse altogether.
On the other hand, a product or artefact may never reach the diffusion moment
simply because the technical constituents or basic resources required for its
materialization in the production moment are not available. It is clear that many
other instances could be given showing the reciprocally interacting and
inextricably interrelated nature of all moments in the development of a
sociotechnical system. For our purposes, however, this is not necessary since all
we have said suffices to support the contention that sociotechnical systems in
action possess a broad moment-composite character, and that in such action the
moments are not just inseparable but reciprocally interact with each other giving
the unity to the whole process. Admittedly, we have looked primarily at one
particular expression of "momentness" in the workings of a sociotechnical system,
namely, that involving creating, production, and diffusion moments. In this
respect, as we have indicated earlier, a somewhat different expression is given by
the metamorphosis of financial resources into human and material resources and
the latter into the final products crystallizing the sociotechnical process of
transformation and utilization of resources. Here, we shall only mention the
existence of such a different expression since it leads us straight into the
analysis of the basic resources or technical constituents of all technological
processes and hence, into the detailed work of theoretically reconstructing the
workings of a capitalist ITC sociotechnical system.
Before doing so, however, we need to say a few words about the category
of national and international galvanizing forces which we have often used in the
course of this thesis, and which is truly central to the understanding of the
historical unfolding of sociotechnical systems. In figure 5.2, we have sought to
depict some important national and international galvanizing forces in the
vertical axis on the left-hand side of the diagram. There, we have listed, for
instance, economic and social crises, wars and military pressures, competition and
market pressures, etc., that is, all historical phenomena and events which, as the
name galvanizing forces implies, truly exercise strong pressures on societies and,
particularly, societies' social constituents, for actions in directions that are
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consistent with, and indeed demanded by, the overriding interests of such
constituents. Below, we shall discuss the concept of overriding interests, Here,
suffice it to say that they relate to the very existence and raison d'etre of each
one of the social forces making up a given society. This means that, in the final
analysis, the galvanizing forces themselves relate to the very existence and raison
d'etre of social constituents, which would account for the imperative character
of their pressure upon the historical behaviour of all social forces, individually
as well as in interrelation with each other. In practice, this imperative character
of galvanizing forces is always present, playing a dynamizing and shaping role,
in the process of historical development of a given sociotechnical system. Its
particular manifestation, however, is a matter pertaining to the specific forms of
development of given societies and, particularly, to the specific nature of both
the galvanizing forces themselves and the social constituents interrelating in the
development of a sociotechnical system. Thus, if we consider the list of
galvanizing forces provided in figure 5.2, there are various relevant points which
can be made. Firstly, not all, or even the same, galvanizing forces appearing in
the diagram need be exercising a major role during a given historical period.
There may be one, another, or combinations of them and, also, with different
and varying degrees of strength. In addition, some of them may possess a
basically national character, whereas others may be more international in nature.
In practice, the range of possibilities is very extensive. Secondly, there are some
galvanizing forces such as international wars which may have catastrophic
consequences for a society as a whole, so that they will most likely be
perceived as threatening the overriding interests of all social forces with the
result that a national galvanization may more easily arise. As we have seen in
the present thesis, in these circumstances, the overriding interests of some social
forces (e.g., the military) will inevitably become much more prominent than
those of other forces in shaping the development of a given sociotechnical
system. Thirdly, there are galvanizing forces such as market competition which,
although may have wide implications for the development of a given society, are
first and foremost related to the overriding interests of capital accumulation and
hence, to the behaviour of those social forces directly involved in such a
process. In practice, because they pertain to the role of existing social interests,
the operation of this kind of galvanizing forces tends to assume a permanent
role in the shaping and dynamism of a sociotechnical system. In this sense,
they differ from the more eventful nature of galvanizing forces such as those
emerging from a major war or any other relevant event of a catastrophic
nature. It is interesting to note here that military galvanizing forces such as
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military competition may also become ingrained in the historical dynamics of a
sociotechnical process as long as war pressure are continuously reproduced.
Finally, while there are galvanizing forces which are inexorably beyond the
control of a given society (e.g., a geographical catastrophe, or a development
imposed from outside such as a military aggression, or a development beyond
national control such as an international economic crisis, etc.), this does not
mean that all galvanizing forces fall in this category as if they were something
exogenous to societies themselves, nor it means that all societies, or social forces,
are in the same position regarding their capability to influence the nature and
strength of the galvanizing forces involved in the unfolding of a sociotechnical
process. Thus, as we have seen in the present work, the galvanizing force of
international competition can be subject to control and attenuation by means of
a variety of protectionist mechanisms. In other words, at least within the
confines of a given country or region, international market competition is not an
inexorable galvanizing force and, indeed, since it relates to the overriding
interests of specific national constituents, it is very much to the latter
constituents to influence the role of this particular galvanizing force. Of course,
this is not in isolation but always in accordance with the development strategies
defined by the national constituents themselves within the context of their
specific interrelations and correlation of forces with other social forces in the
international arena. From a different angle, such possibility of exercising some
degree of control upon galvanizing forces can also be seen in the influence which
some social constituents do exercise in reproducing and/or increasing the strength
of these forces in accordance with the dictates of their own overriding interests.
Here, military galvanizing forces furnish the clearest example, being, on the one
hand, inextricably tied to the effective role played by military interests in
shaping the development of a technological process and, on the other, susceptible
to manipulation by means of diverse tactics, strategies and policies which may
either diffuse or increase international politico-military tension. In practice,
military interests possess a strong tendency to seek the reproduction of some
kind of military galvanizing forces as a means of reproducing and furthering
their own overriding interests vis-a-vis those of other social constituents. As we
have said, however, not all societies, or social forces, are in the same position to
actually influence the nature and strength of galvanizing forces. Thus, a country
which does not possess nuclear weapons is simply unable to influence the ups
and downs of nuclear-related military galvanizing forces. More generally, a
country which has scant military power is very unlikely to influence, by itself,
the strength of international military galvanizing forces. Whereas the strength of
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these forces may easily change as a consequence of action by military
superpowers. All in all, it is clear that there is a great deal of variety in the
nature and role of galvanizing forces in the development of sociotechnical
processes. In this respect, the crucial point to keep in mind is that, for the
analysis of any given place and historical period, there can hardly be thorough
understanding of the historical development of such sociotechnical processes
without the proper treatment of the nature and role of the galvanizing forces
involved.
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5.3.2. Basic Resources of an ITC Sociotechnical Process
As the left hand side of the cube-like shape in figure 5.2 seeks to portray,
the materialization of all technological processes demands the systemic integration
and utilization, of financial, human, material, time and space resources.
Organization and final products are also included among the resources, for the
former is what ties the discrete elements systemically together and the latter
represents a crucially crystallizing moment of the systemic process whereby
financial resources metamorphose into other resources and all of them into the
final products whose realization as use values and commodities leads to the
reproduction of the entire sociotechnical process along the axis of historical time.
In this conceptualization, the category of basic resources or technical constituents
is a dynamic one just like all other elements and the sociotechnical system as a
whole. To make this point clear, one has to consider that the reproduction of a
sociotechnical system does not mean in any sense a process of exact replication
of the same quantity and quality of basic resources and their relations time and
again. On the contrary, given the combination of a constantly changing mix of
historical galvanizing forces with the dynamism implicit in the conflict,
convergence and pursuit of overriding interests by the social constituents
controlling in one way or another the resources of the technological process, the
fact is that such basic resources and their basic relations are in a state of flow,
experiencing unending qualitative and quantitative transformations which,
ultimately, become themselves part of a single sociotechnical dynamics of
galvanizing forces, overriding interests and technical and social change. Basic
resources, in consequence, are not something completely and readily available in
a society's "technological shelf". Rather, there is a process of constant creation
going on which is most manifest in the emergence of new forms of knowledge,
skills, processes, machinery, instrumentation, products, etc. Indeed, all sort of
innovations, major and minor, are the permanent expression of the dynamic
character of the basic resources of technological processes.
The dynamic character of organization, financial, human and material
resources and their inextricable relation to each other in the realization of a
sociotechnical system in action is not difficult to perceive. Thus, it is clear that
no resource is in itself sufficient for the realization of the sociotechnical process
and, indeed, we have already pointed out the relation of metamorphosis and
"momentness" existing between financial and other resources, between the latter
and final products, and between the realization of final products in the diffusion
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moment of the sociotechnical process and financial resources and so on and so
forth. Another expression of the same dynamic interrelationship is apparent in
the way changes in some of the basic resources affect the quality and quantity
of others and hence, the entire mix of relations bringing them systemically
together. The introduction of new and more powerful machinery in a
production process, for instance, will affect the quality and quantity of labour,
the skills, procedures and organization as, indeed, the concrete way assumed by
the transformation of financial resources into all others (25). Something similar
will happen when an important R&D breakthrough diffuses throughout the
technological process demanding changes at every point. But changes in basic
resources need not be important innovations in order to affect the quality and
quantity of the whole mix, for minor, gradual innovations bringing changes in
productivity, for instance, will equally alter the interrelation between such basic
resources as raw materials and labour to mention just a couple.
In the diagram of figure 5.2, we have also included time and space as basic
resources of the technological process. To a certain extent this may appear as an
obvious choice since the materialization of a sociotechnical system in action can
only take place in time and space. What may be not as obvious, however, is
the dynamic character of time and space as basic resources in interrelation with
organized financial, human and material resources. Time, for instance, is
intrinsic to the "momentness" of a sociotechnical system in action and in this
respect it can be imagined as stretching and contracting depending upon the
variations of tempo in the materialization of the different moments of the
sociotechnical system. Within the US and Japanese IMCs, for instance, we have
seen that the tempo of creation, production and diffusion of semiconductor
technology is quite high and this means, in a very real sense, that the time
resource available for the reproduction of the sociotechnical system is much
more limited than for other industries (26). In this case, high volumes of
(25) An interesting example is provided by Bessant and Haywood (1985) who have studied
the results of the introduction of Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMSs) in various
companies. "In most cases, FMS led to a major revision of product planning, with grouping
of parts into families, rationalisation and pruning of product ranges and much more
integrated design for manufacturing. This often led to surprising savings - as in one case
where the number of operations (handling and machining) for a particular part was cut
from 47 to 15 simply by revising design...It also became clear that when the product range
is rationalised, the operations and layout may need rethinking, and this has led to group
technology, smoother flow-lines and other alternative layouts, all aimed at making the most
of the new plant and existing facilities...Another area where the firms acknowledge the need
for new approaches is manning levels. In a nutshell, flexible manufacturing needs flexible
manning, both in terms of the skills required and the working practices involved" (Bessant
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financial resources devoted to R & D under the galvanizing pressures of
competition have done much to contract the time resource, at the same time that
the contraction of the latter has, in turn, reinforced the high volumes of
financial expenditures, in a process which has constantly involved the
transformation of the entire resource-base of the semiconductor technological
process and eventually that of an IMC at large. Of course, Marx, in his
discussion on necessary labour time, already showed the dynamic and historical
nature of time as a resource of the technological process. He related increases in
productivity and the consequent reduction in the value of labour per unit of
production to a decrease in the necessary labour time to produce such a unit.
For him, the minimum necessary labour time set the historical standards for all
those involved in the process of production of a particular commodity, so that,
in practice, it played a direct role, just like the other resources, in shaping the
specific form of development of a sociotechnical system. Thus, initial changes in
socially necessary labour time as a result of technical change in the mix of
material and human resources, for instance, became themselves systemically
integrated into the sociotechnical process stimulating the spread of technical
change to the system as a whole.
Another expression of the dynamic interrelation of time to the other basic
resources of a technological process lies in the social constituents' struggle for its
control and utilization which is particularly manifest in the productive moment
of such a process. Again, it was Marx who showed that the control and
utilization of time for and in the labour process constituted a fundamental
expression of the capitalist class struggle. Thus, historically, the development of
a sociotechnical system under capitalism has reflected the effects of this class
struggle in the clear alterations of the systemic integration of time with the
other basic resources. The shortening of the working day, for instance, in all its
forms (e.g., less working hours per week, various breaks, holidays and even
and Haywood,pp.68-69).
(26) The following assessment* of the increasing tempo of technical change in the computer
industry provides a powerful example of the consequent reduction of the time resource for
those involved in the industry. "Companies that can't master the intricacies of niche
marketing will have to scramble to stay abreast of accelerating product cycles and the fierce
competition stimulated by network standards. Already, dozens of hot startups that make
midrange systems based on the Unix operating system have emerged. These companies—move
at a killing pace. As Sun and others start building mainframe power into their desktop
boxes, the entire industry will have to speed up. "The minicomputer companies are used to
building $500,000 machines with five-year cycles", says McNealy of Sun. "Our prices are
under $50,000, and our product cycles are only 18 months" " (Business Week, 21 April
1986a,p.95).
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stoppages), constitute a means by which labour has varied the time resource of
the sociotechnical system and, ultimately, affected the entire development of its
systemic action. Simultaneously, in reciprocal interaction, capital's struggle for
control and utilization of labour time can be seen in the efforts to extend the
working day, both by reducing workers' breaktimes and other stoppages and by
increasing the number of hours through overtime and multiple shifts. Most
importantly, for the historical development of sociotechnical systems, it can be
seen in the increase in the intensity and productivity of labour time, ultimately
leading to automation and hence, to the potentially absolute control of the time
resource in accordance with the dictates of capital. At this point, free from the
restrictive ties of the human resource of labour, the time resource of the
productive process may be stretched to its ultimate limit (no labour breaktimes,
strikes, etc.) in a development which most certainly will completely transform
the shape and workings of sociotechnical systems as we know them today.
Interestingly enough, as we have seen in the course of this thesis, it is in the
unfolding of the IMC sociotechnical process where the foundations and most
advanced developments of this process of automation are actually taking place.
As regards the role of space as a basic resource of the technological process,
it is clear that the development of a sociotechnical system such an IMC has
effectively claimed the terrestrial as much as the extra-terrestrial space as an
intrinsic element systemically integrated and interacting with other basic
resources of the technological system. To make an obvious point, there could
have been no satellite communications without the orbital space necessary for its
materialization. In this sense, the orbital space with all its particular physical
characteristics has certainly conditioned the specific technical characteristics of
satellites, determining with its existence and physical laws, in the same way
that all sociotechnical systems are determined by the existence and physical laws
of the specific space they claim as a basic resource. On the other hand, space as
a basic resource of a sociotechnical process is only meaningful in relation to this
process so that without its practical and systemic integration, for instance in an
IMC, a given space is not an actual resource in the same way as any one
person is not a human resource of a sociotechnical system in action. In this
context, therefore, space can undoubtedly be seen as a dynamic resource; as a
resource in constant creation and alteration through its systemic interaction with
other basic resources of the sociotechnical system as a whole. An important
expression of this dynamism lies, just as we have seen with the time resource,
in the social struggle for control of space which sometimes becomes openly
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manifest in the geographical restrictions or even total denial of space for the
development of a given sociotechnical system. In the case of satellites, for
instance. Third World countries, who can hardly use orbital space as a resource
since they lack most of the other resources of a satellite capability, are
concerned that the most advanced nations will control and use space primarily
for their own interests (27). Thus, what has been expanding as a resource for
advanced nations has been hardly a resource for the underdeveloped ones. In
other instances, it may well be that a nation may potentially count on the
financial, human and material resources necessary for the development of a
sociotechnical process, but such a process may be denied space (and time) for its
materialization by social opposition which may be based on prevailing socio-
cultural and juridical relations under the historical circumstances of a given
period. In this case, which may be exemplified by the absence of a nuclear-
weaponry sociotechnical system in Japan, only an important change in the latter
circumstances (e.g., military galvanizing pressures) may lead to the creation of
the necessary conditions and hence, space for the development of the
sociotechnical system. Conversely, it is in the struggle for control of space where
groups such as conservationists, anti-nuclear lobbies, etc., possess an important
chance for limiting or shaping the development of a given sociotechnical system,
although this will clearly depend upon the relative strength of all the social
interests involved in the development of such a system.
Finally, to bring the discussion on the basic resources of sociotechnical
systems to an end, it is necessary to underline some aspects related to the
creative core of the technological process. In this respect, we have already draw
attention to the weakness of some writings which, by overlooking the
importance of the productive moment in their conceptualization of the
sociotechnical process, have implicitly reduced the creative core behind technical
change, primarily, to scientists and engineers working in specifically creating R &
D activities. In contrast, in the present conceptualization, labour and management
are also seen as part of the creative core of a sociotechnical system in action,
although their activities may not be specifically designed for searching and
producing technical innovations as in the case of R & D personnel. In other
words, while we acknowledge the dominant creative role played by R & D
(27) So far, only India and China, two of the largest nations of the Third World, have
developed a satellite capability of their own, although they lag considerably behind the
capability of the most advanced nations. See Vidal-Hall (1982) and Whitehouse (1986).
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organizations, particularly in science-based sociotechnical systems such as an IMC,
we also raise the point that this should not obscure the fact that labour and
management can and do play a creative role in terms of the sociotechnical
system as a whole. In effect, products and process innovations emerging from
the labour process, new forms of organization and even new techniques in social
relations (e.g., incentive schemes, etc.) are all forms in which the creative role
of labour and management influence the practical realization of a sociotechnical
system. The fact that often the creative potential of labour and management
remains untapped, or is stifled by organizational practices which are in
themselves forms of socio-cultural relations, does not cancel the existence of the
creative potential of labour and management, it rather points to the role of
socio-cultural relations in shaping the development of a sociotechnical system via
its influence upon the workings of the elements of the very creative core of
such a system (28). Socio-cultural relations, however, are not the only factors
interacting with the action of the creative core of a technological system; indeed,
just like the technological process as a whole, the specific realization of the
creative core in practice can only take place in systemic integration with the
other resources of the sociotechnical system. Thus, financial, material, time and
space resources, their quantity and quality and the specific way in which they
are systemically utilized to enable the creative activity of human resources, are
all factors which condition not only the very possibility of the creative activity
but, also, its form, content and dynamism. For instance, the fact that the
creative potential of labour has seldom been fully realized within the capitalist
sociotechnical process clearly constitutes both immediate cause and effect of the
specific form, content and dynamism of such a process. On the one hand, it
reflects a specific form of systemic utilization of creative resources which tend to
neglect the creative potential of labour while giving complete preeminence to the
R&D laboratory within the creative core of the technological process. On the
other hand, it clearly affects the form and content of such a process by the
very mechanism of emphasizing the contribution of one source of technical
(28) In this connection, it is interesting to note that currently a wave of creativity training
for management is sweeping the world of US corporate companies. As a report has put
it..."With the intensity of itinerant evangelists, "creativity consultants" are roaming the
corporate landscape preaching an appealing gospel to management: You can learn to be
creative. And business is listening. This year more more than 20,000 executives will...attend
workshops that they hope will help them to invent new products, conceive new strategies,
and become better managers" (Business Week, 30 September 1985,pp.46-52). By now, there
are several leading creativity consultants offering a variety of training programmes. It is
acknowledged, however, that the first in the field was Edward de Bono who developed in
the 1960s the concept of lateral thinking as way to improve creativity. De Bono has written
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change (i.e.. R&D constituent) over the contribution of another (i.e., labour
constituent) which, as we shall see below, may bring different interests to bear
into the shape of technical change. The latter is important since, in the final
analysis, as we have consistently argued throughout this thesis, it is the conflict
and convergence of interests between the social constituents of the technological
process which actually determines the shape of such a process under given
historical circumstances and state of development of the basic resources
themselves.
Finally, we must point to the crucial and dynamic role of non-human
resources in the creative activity of a technological process, particularly in the
shape of instrumentation and all forms of real-time and abstract data processing
machinery. As we have seen in the case of microtechnological development, the
increasingly powerful sensing, measuring and processing capabilities of
instrumentation and computers used for creative purposes has fundamentally
amplified the ability, particularly of R & D constituents, to deal with large and
complex technical problems. Moreover, to the extent that this development has
in itself enabled the generation of even more powerful instrumentation, it is
clear that a sort of "virtuous circle" effect is in operation which, as we have
observed in the case of advanced countries' IMCs, is constantly creating new
knowledge resources which, when systemically integrated, eventually leads to the
alteration of the socio technical process itself. For the future, AI scientists hope
to create machines themselves capable of creating new knowledge. If that
promise ever materializes machines will then join human beings as legitimate
parts of the creative core of the technological process. For the time being, as it
is indicated in figure 5.2, we prefer to reserve the place of creative core for
human beings alone, although in the fulfilment of this capability it is clear that
human beings and instrumentation go hand in hand as inseparable parts of a
dynamic system which involve the participation of all other basic resources too.
many books. See, for instance, de Bono (1971,1978).
- 507 -
5.33. Institutional Depositories of the Basic Resources of an ITC
Sociotechnical Process
The systemic integration of basic resources of sociotechnical systems can
only take place in and through institutions or complex«of institutions which, in
fundamentals, represent a direct embodiment of the interpenetration of social and
technical factors characterizing the development of the sociotechnical process. In
effect, it is in institutions such as companies, banks. R&D laboratories,
universities, etc., where the specific character of basic resources merges with
specific socio-cultural and juridical relations in a process ultimately determined
by both the material determinants of the technical relations involved and the
overriding interests implicit in the very raison d'etre of the institutions
themselves. In this sense, institutions are not only the dynamic depositories of
the basic resources of a technological process but, simultaneously, forms of
technical and socio-cultural and juridical relations mediating the systemic
integration of these resources in agreement with the overriding social interests of
those who exercise their control. To develop this argument further, we need to
explain at this point the pair of concepts of overriding/particular interests which,
by and large, enable us to conciliate the apparent contradiction between the
determining role of imputed interests in the technological process and the
obvious flexibility and manifold manifestations assumed by the concretization of
these interests in practice [see Callon and Law (1982)]. This problem is an
important one since it also holds the key to understand the sociotechnical
process as one of constant and simultaneous alteration and reproduction of the
socio-cultural relations of a given society. The latter is the process of change
without change that Noble so aptly characterized in his Forces of Production
(1954).
5.33.1. Overriding and Particular Interests
Overriding interests, as we saw in Chapter III, relate to the raison d'etre
and, indeed, to the very existence of social constituents (29), whose members are
(29) "„we shall define the overriding interests for all social forces as the need to ensure
access to, or the control or share of those resources which constitute the lifeblood of the
specific activities which define their raison d'etre and which make them distinctive forces in a
given society. It is the control, share or access to these resources which enable the
reproduction and furthering of these activities and with it that of the social forces
themselves. In the last analysis, such command or access to resources may be simply reduced
to the possession of effective social power either directly by controlling economic and/or
political power, or indirectly by having relation or access to and hence, influence upon those
- 508 -
bound by ultimately common generic pursuits and activities which they seek to
imprint in, and express through, the development of the sociotechnical system.
On the other hand, particular interests relate to the concrete and manifold ways
in which the overriding interests are actually fulfilled in the specific historical
circumstances characterizing the development of a sociotechnical system at any
given time and place. Particular interests and overriding interests, therefore, are
part of the same process but while overriding interests imply the existence and
reproduction of ultimately unavoidable pursuits by the members of a social
constituent, particular interests imply the existence of unlimited and constantly
altering forms of practically fulfilling these unavoidable pursuits by the
members of such social constituent. To put it in a different way, overriding
interests, because they pertain to the very reason d'etre of social constituents,
ultimately dominate the overall sociotechnical activity of these constituents and
hence, the overall or aggregate development of the sociotechnical system itself.
Whereas particular interests, because they pertain to the practical day to day
activity of institutions and people, are not only informed by the overriding
interests themselves but also by many factors such as concrete economic and
political circumstances, organizational traditions, legislation, quality and quantity
of available technical resources, and even the personalities of the individuals
working and making the day to day decisions in particular institutions. In this
respect, to use the terminology of sociologists such as Callon and Latour,
particular interests would undoubtedly be the subject of transformation and can
hardly be imputed as unchangeable realities. Furthermore, in historical
perspective, one can only say that particular interests are truly in a process of
constant transformation reflecting the fluidity of the interaction and
interpenetration between diverse social and technical constituents. Such fluidity
manifests itself in varying and multiple ways and interrelations between these
social constituents in a process informed and dominated by changing national
and international galvanizing forces and changing correlation of forces between
social constituents and hence, the institutional structures housing them. The point
of the overriding interests, however, is that, notwithstanding the fluidity and
process of constant transformation of particular interests, such transformations
ultimately take place within a context of no change, or more precisely, within a
context of reproduction of social constituents and the pursuits implied in their
raison d'etre.
in direct command of power and resources" (see Chapter HI above).
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Overring interests, therefore, set the general goals and also the ultimate
limits for the possible transformation of particular interests. Thus, the latter
cannot transform themselves into forms which would imply a permanent
negation of the overriding interests and hence, a negation of the very raison
d'etre of a social constituent. True enough, occasionally and in the short-term
particular interests may and do assume forms which are contradictory to the
overriding interests implied in the raison d'etre of social constituents. For
instance, capitalists, whose overriding interests is to make profits for capital
accumulation, do consciously indulge themselves in money-losing activities such
as dumping. On closer examination, however, these apparently contradictory
pursuits always reveal themselves in consonance with the long-term overriding
interests of social constituents. Dumping for capitalists, for instance, is not a
pursuit in itself, it is in fact a pursuit for the long-term objective of capital
accumulation since, by breaking competition, it is expected that greater shares of
markets will result which, in turn, will have a positive effect in the process of
capital accumulation. A similar case would be that of integrated (electronics)
companies which may run losses in a particular division (e.g., semiconductors)
while keeping overall profitability because the technology is strategic for the
long-term accumulation process of the company. In this sense, overriding
interests represent the bottom line always guiding the pursuits and activities of
social constituents and they themselves cannot be transformed but only given
concrete expressions which fulfill them. This is the reason why in this thesis,
when referring to the process of interaction of two or more social constituents,
we have preferred the term convergence of interests to emphasize the basic
agreement of overriding interests which actually takes place, whatever the
specific form assumed by the particular interests expressing such a basic
agreement. Of major relevance, this conceptualization enable us to explain the
problem of conflict of interests and particularly, the existence of antagonistic
interests which cannot be transformed into conciliation without the very denial
of the raison d'etre of at least one of the social constituents. For instance, the
anti-nuclear lobby has as its overriding interests the abolition of all nuclear
weapons. These interests are untransformable to the extent that were this lobby
to accept the need for the existence of nuclear weapons, whatever the reasons,
its anti-nuclear raison d'etre would immediately collapse. As a result, the
particular interests, pursuits, and actions of the anti-nuclear lobby are bound to
never converge with those interests which Eire pro-nuclear weapons for whatever
reasons. Ultimately, there is here an antagonistic relation which denies from the
start the possibility of any convergence fulfilling the overriding interests of all
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parties. Only conflict reigns supreme in such circumstances. But, as we saw in
the course of the present work, conflict and tensions are not just antagonistic,
they can also arise between one time convergent interests as a result of changing
national and international galvanizing forces and changing relative weight of
social constituents. In the case of the US's IMC, for instance, we saw how the
heavy weight of military interests and pursuits in the face international market
competition has led to concerns that US's electronic corporate capital may
eventually loose its leadership to other advanced capitalist nations. So far, US's
corporate capital and military interests have had every reason to converge since
they have both clearly benefited from a dynamics of profits and military power,
but were the latter to become truly a hindrance to the process of capital
accumulation, thus threatening capital's overriding interests in the long-run,
then such a contradiction in terms of overriding interests would almost certainly
leads to a process of divergence, as opposed to convergence, of particular
interests, pursuits and actions between capital and military constituents. This,
of course, if we disregard the possibility of other alternative developments such
as a trade or, indeed, a military war which would completely change the
prevailing wind of national and international galvanizing forces. In all, therefore,
to round up this discussion on interests, we have talked of raison d'etre of
social constituents, overriding and particular interests, convergence and divergence
of interests, changing national and international galvanizing forces, and changing
force correlation between social constituents. Taken together, and as we have
already seen in the case of an IMC, it is our view that these elements, along
with the understanding of the material determinants arising from the very
nature and state of development of the technical relations involved, constitute a
basic set of conceptual tools which effectively contribute to a systematic and
unified analytical treatment of sociotechnical systems in action. Most particularly,
these concepts hold the key to understand the development of sociotechnical
systems not only as a process of constant alteration of sociotechnical systems
themselves but, also, as a process of simultaneous reproduction of social forces
and relations in and through the sociotechnical systems themselves. By the same
token, they also hold the key to understand the dominant features and trends
characterizing the aggregate development of a sociotechnical system.
5.33.2. Some Common Forms of Institutional Depositories of
Basic Resources
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Going back to the role of institutions in the ITC sociotechnical process,
therefore, we are now in a position to explain our previous statement that
institutions are the dynamic depositories of the basic resources of the
technological process and, simultaneously, forms of technical and socio-cultural
and juridical relations mediating the systemic integration of these resources in
agreement with the overriding interests of those who exercise their effective
control. In figure 5.2, we have listed what are perhaps the most common
institutions involved in the materialization of a sociotechnical system in action.
In effect, companies, banks, government institutions, foundations, international
organizations are all clearly identifiable depositories of basic resources of
technological processes. Taken separately, however, these institutions, although
interrelating through and in the sociotechnical process, can be said to differ in
their raison d'etre and, consequently, not only in the specific character of the
basic resources they are depositories of but, equally, in the very relationship of
their overriding interests to, and hence their role in, the sociotechnical process as
a whole. Of course, we must make clear that, in practice, the situation is
seldom one of clearcut separate institutions, since, for all analytical purposes, the
variety of existing institutional forms is simply unlimited. This means that in
relation to the classes of institutions named above, in a developed sociotechnical
system in action one can find not only a myriad of qualitatively and
quantitatively different intra-institutional forms but, also, a great deal of inter-
class institutional overlapping and arrangements. For instance, there are many
forms of companies, some large and diversified, some small and narrowly
specialized, some producing a broad range of products and possessing a broad
range of technical resources, some revolving around the production of a
particular piece of equipment, or even just knowledge as in the case of
consultancies, etc. The same happens with banks and other institutions. Banks,
for instance, may be involved in a given sociotechnical process in all sorts of
degrees and, of course, as only one in a set of other financial activities. Also,
banks and industrial companies may be just parts of a larger economic group, or
they may be industrial development banks particularly and more fully
committed to the development of a sociotechnical system in a given country. In
the latter case, banks themselves are more likely to be government institutions
directly inputting financial resources into the technological process. This takes us
to government institutions which not only can have various sizes and purposes
or be just direct depositories of basic resources, but may also be direct
depositories of all other resources of the technological process through, for
example, public companies and government R&D institutions directly involved
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in the development of such a process. In the latter case, there is a clear
institutional overlapping between government and companies, for instance.
Likewise, where the military exercise a direct command of basic resources and
their institutional depositories, a similar situation to that of government
institutions applies. After all, government and the military are inextricably
related within the state with the resources of the military very much as a
special case of government use of technological resources in accordance with the
weight of the military and their concerns within a given historical period. The
military, however, although part of the state, possess a distinctive set of
interests of their own and, in this sense, it is useful to treat them as a separate
social force in the development of the socio technical process. In addition, and
reminding the reader that, in the final analysis, all the institutions and
constituents depicted in figure 5.2 interact with each other in the ITC
sociotechnical process, I am also inclined to include those government institutions
such as policy-making bodies which act as indirect depositories of basic resources
through their possession of regulatory powers and hence, the ability to influence
the availability of resources through, for instance, taxation, price-regulation,
royalty and tariff policies, etc. Also, in the line of depositories of basic
resources, we can consider those institutions which act as banks of information
and diffusion of basic resources of a sociotechnical system. These may be
specialized libraries or data-banks and may be public or private enterprises as in
the case of consultancy firms. Finally, to say a word about universities,
foundations and international organizations, they also may exist in a variety of
sizes and shapes and may be depositories of a variety of basic resources of
technological processes. Foundations, for example, may provide financial resources
for the activities of individual researchers or other institutions such as
universities but they may also run their own R&D laboratories. Universities
carry out R&D activities and constantly reproduce necessary human resources
for the technological process, but they may also run their own companies
commercializing knowledge and expertise through patenting and consultancy, for
instance, or even through commercial production of artefacts. As to international
organizations, they are more commonly associated with United Nations-type of
institutions which, particularly in the case of Third World countries, may make
available financial and some human and material resources for the development
of an ITC sociotechnical process. In principle, however, international organizations
are not just the UN-type of organizations, they are indeed all sort of bilateral
and multilateral international institutions involving all sort of institutional
arrangements between companies, government institutions, universities,
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foundations, etc., which are relevant to the sociotechnical process. We shall
discuss the international dimension of an ITC later on, for the time being, we
need only to underline the point that, in practice, nationally and internationally,
the number of institutional forms and arrangements that can fulfill the role of
institutional depositories of basic resources of an ITC is virtually unlimited.
At this point, from the perspective of our theoretical conceptualization of a
sociotechnical system in action, there are two paths which the present discussion
can follow. The first would be to go right down to the level of real-life
institutions, as it were, and explore some of the theoretical implications and
limitations for our model which are present there. The second would be to go
right up into more abstract levels and discuss a model of institutions as forms
of technical, socio-cultural and juridical relations mediating the systemic
integration of basic resources in agreement with the overriding interests of the
social constituents who exercise their control. Here, we shall briefly explore the
theoretical implications of the first path to proceed later to the second path
where we shall bring together the analytical tools we have been developing so
far.
5.333. Development of Real-Life Institutions. Transformation of
Particular Socio-Cultural Relations for Reproduction of
Fundamental Socio-Cultural Relations
In this section, the main point that has to be made immediately is that at
the level of real-life institutions one can hardly expect to produce some kind of
general model explaining why real-life institutions assume the specific form and
behaviour they assume in practice, both internally and in their relation with
others. For, at this level, the number of explanatory variables will touch not
only upon such factors as national and international galvanizing forces, interplay
of overriding and particular interests, and nature and state of quantitative and
qualitative development of basic resources. It will also touch upon general
cultural factors such as the technological rationality identified by Goulet and
Winner and specific cultural factors such as institutions' own idiosincratic
practices and, indeed, right down to the character and values of individuals
who, by making specific day-to-day decisions, lead institutions into shapes and
path of developments which are unique to each one of them. Thus, on the one
hand, it can be said that at this level the variety and richness of institutions
are such that they do not lend themselves to general, simplifying models as the
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one we are trying to elaborate here. On the other hand, however, and because
of the same variety and richness, it can be said that it is at this level where
the character of particular institutions as dynamic forms of specific technical,
socio-cultural and juridical relations of the sociotechnical process reveals itself in
its most conspicuous and detailed expressions. In other words, it is here, in the
concrete sociotechnical world, where the historical unfolding of sociotechnical
institutions can be more clearly seen as actually transforming as much as
reflecting the written and unwritten legislation, i.e., legal provisions, customs and
values prevalent in a given society. In effect, if we consider, first of all, that by
transforming themselves in the course of the sociotechnical process, particular
institutions are actually altering past as well as leading into new forms of
relations between people -individually or in social groups-, artefacts, processes,
ideas, attitudes, etc., (30) then their role as transformers/creators of socio-
cultural and juridical relations and hence, written and unwritten legislation (31),
becomes clearer. In this respect, perhaps the most powerful illustrations are
likely to be found in periods of large-scale institutional transformations such as
those involved in technological revolutions, (e.g., the current microelectronics
revolution, or the transformations accompanying the substitution of the
machinofacturing system for the manufacturing system of production described
by Marx in Capital). But gradual, cumulative institutional transformations are
also likely to bring about changes in the written and unwritten legislation of of
a given society, although in a less dramatic fashion. The constant expansion and
transformation of the Bell System in the US in the first half of this century,
for instance, not only led to, and was reinforced by, its legal recognition as a
(30) An interesting example in this respect is provided by the current attempt within some
US institutions to introduce computer networks at various levels. Two of these institutions
are American Can Co. in Greenwich, Conn., and Bank of America. As a report describes,
"...installing such a network in a company as decentralized as American Can, where
subsidiaries price their independence was complicated. "We had to agree on technical issues,
but that wasn't the hardest part", says M. Smalley who heads technical services at the
corporate level. "Dealing with corporate culture issues was harder"...Bank of America is
facing similar challenges. Such a network, says R. Dennis Wayson, head of professional
support services for the San Francisco-based bank,..."won't be good foT anything until we
solve the management and cultural questions it raises"..." (Business Week, 21
April,1986a.p.94).
(31) Written and unwritten legislation are both expressions of socio-cultural relations of a
given society, and both are equally important in the development of an ITC sociotechnical
process. Thus, although until now we have talked of socio-cultural and juridical relations to
emphasize the presence of the latter, from now on, we shall use socio-cultural relations as
including juridical relations too. In the final analysis, technical relations can also be seen as
forms of socio-cultural relations. However, in order to emphasise their particular importance
regarding sociotechnical systems and because of their intrinsic properties relating to the laws
of nature, we shall continue to talk of sociotechnical systems as ensembles of technical and
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natural monopoly but. also, completely altered the shape of the sociotechnical
constituency of the US communications system and, indeed, the very customary
patterns of communication of American people (including social constituents, of
course) by introducing the telephone in their daily life. This particular argument
may be more generally illustrated by referring to the diagram in figure 5.2.
Here, we would have to say that what is implied in the role of sociotechnical
institutions as creators/transformers of socio-cultural relations is, in fact, the
existence of a flow of changes which from left to right of the diagram, that is,
from basic resources and particular institutional depositories themselves to socio-
cultural relations and the social complex of power, ultimately encompasses not
just the sociotechnical system but indeed society at large. By and large, this is
the process which actor-network writers have focused on most, and which lead
them to deny the existence of an actual society shaping the technological process.
As we saw before, for these writers society is in itself in a constant process of
creation, flowing out from the continuously changing interrelations and
interactions between sociotechnical actors themselves. While agreeing with the
actor-network writers in the existence of such society transforming/creating flow
of sociotechnical changes, in the present conceptualization, however, we have
argued that the historical unfolding of sociotechnical institutions and hence, basic
resources, also and simultaneously reflect society's socio-cultural relations and
thus its written and unwritten legislation. In other words, we argue for the
simultaneous existence of an opposite and interacting flow of influence which
from right to left in the diagram in figure 5.2 truly informs and broadly shapes
the development of real-life institutional depositories of basic resources. More
specifically, as we have made it clear in our discussion on overriding/particular
interests, our argument is that not only there are ultimate limits (technical and
social) regarding the kind of society-creating transformations which satisfy the
reproduction of those interests controlling the basic resources of technological
processes but, also, that in all their possible variety and richness, real-life
institutions are ultimately informed by, and indeed represent themselves dynamic
crystallizations of society's fundamental forms of socio-cultural relations. In this
way, in the development process of real-life sociotechnical institutions we have
both, transformation of socio-cultural relations and reproduction of such
relations. Or more precisely, just as with particular/overriding interests, we have
transformation of particular relations for reproduction of fundamental relations.
In effect, if we consider that at any given time a society's written and
socio-cultural relations.
- 516 -
unwritten legislation not only contains the guiding principles and rules broadly
governing the societal behaviour of the members and institutions of that society,
but that this legislation is in itself a kind of evolving historical register of that
society's past and present process of social conflicts and changes involving
dynamic social interests in a context of changing national and international
galvanizing forces, then we shall see that, in a society where definite social
interests exercise the dominant control of the basic resources of sociotechnical
processes, there is a continuous process of transformation for reproduction taking
place. This is so, because in such a society, its evolving legislation will show
that there indeed exist fundamental socio-cultural relations which throughout
history and many particular changes tend to remain unaltered because they
pertain to the very existence and continuous reproduction of such dominant
interests. In a capitalist society like the one which concerns us here, for
example, the relation of private property of basic resources of technological
processes is fundamental to the very existence of capital as a dominant social
constituent of the sociotechnical process. Thus, although particular socio-cultural
relations may change into many forms in the historical development of a
capitalist society, it is clear that, while capital continues to exercise its dominant
role, such particular relations will hardly evolve into negating the relation of
private property of sociotechnical resources and. on the contrary, they will be
ultimately shaped by it, expressing it and reproducing it, in accordance with the
changing historical context of a given society. In the same vein, there are other
fundamental socio-cultural relations which, like the property relations, have
tended to remain unaltered while deeply shaping and expressing themselves
through the particular forms of development of sociotechnical institutions in
advanced industrial societies. For instance, the hierarchization of organization
which goes hand in hand with the control of basic resources by dominant social
interests and, also, the kind of general relations and rationality which various
scholars such as Ellul and Goulet have imputed as intrinsic to the very nature
of the present technological society.
These fundamental forms of socio-cultural relations, therefore, ultimately
shape the society transforming/creating flow of changes which is constantly
emerging from the development process of real-life sociotechnical institutions. As
such, rather than the arbitrary society-creating flow of changes offered by actor-
network writers, what we have in our conceptualization is a dialectical process
where such a flow of change is ultimately shaped into a process of reproduction
of fundamental socio-cultural relations in a context of changing historical
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circumstances and force correlation between the social interests controlling the
basic resources of the sociotechnical process. Again, referring to the diagram of
figure 5.2, we can illustrate this process by saying that it goes from left to
right and right to left in a kind of spiral development which has no definite
starting point, or which, as we said at the beginning, should be seen as truly
compressing all the elements of the diagram into a single sociotechnical process.
In this way, the social and the technical interpenetrate each other and the
sociotechnical system not only flows from itself but for itself.
Finally, before finishing the present discussion, it must be said that
throughout the argumentation bringing out the dialectics of change and
reproduction of the sociotechnical system, we have implicitly assumed the
existence of an effective control of the basic resources of the technological
process by dominant social constituents seeking to reproduce and further
themselves in and through such a process. It is clear, however, that there may
be periods of severe crisis where such control may be seriously undermined and,
indeed, the social constituency itself radically altered -for instance, in a
revolutionary situation altering the fundamental socio-cultural relations of society
as a whole- with the result that it will be hardly possible to talk of a process
of reproduction of the sociotechnical system. Perhaps, not to the same extent,
other cataclysmic situations such as wars may also lead to major alterations of
the social constituency and hence, of the development of the sociotechnical
system as a whole. The latter we saw quite clearly in the course of the present
thesis when both the First World War and the Second World War brought
about momentous changes in the historical development of the US's R&D
system. World War n, in particular, effectively galvanized a complex of power
which clearly and greatly altered the previous development process of the US's
R&D system. And, once it was operational, we saw how the postwar
development of the R&D system tended itself to reflect and reproduce the
constituents and interacting interests of the very same complex of power which
during the war came to dominate the control of the R&D system's basic
resources. The latter, in a process which not only reflected changing historical
galvanizing forces and relative weights between social constituents but, equally,
involved the continuous efforts to reproduce the very galvanizing pressures
keeping the social constituents both necessary and together. Thus, we can say
that whereas World War II was a highly disruptive historical moment which
broke with the pre-war evolution of the US's R&D sociotechnical system, the
postwar period has been substantially one of reproductive evolution of the
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dominant and interacting social interests of the complex of power crystallized
during the war. In the present conceptualization, our main concern has been
with the dialectic dynamic of the process of transformation for reproduction of
the sociotechnical system since, clearly, cataclysmic situations can hardly be
anticipated in their character, extent, and consequences. Thus, in the following
our discussion will continue to refer mostly to the more analytically manageable
reproductive evolution of sociotechnical systems.
5.33.4. Institutions, Systemic Integration of Basic Resources and
Overriding Interests. Ensembles of Technical and Socio-
Cultural Relations
Above, we have said that sociotechnical institutions are dynamic forms of
technical and socio-cultural relations of an ITC sociotechnical process; and that,
in a society where definite social interests exercise the dominant control of the
basic resources of this sociotechnical process, their historical unfolding actually
materializes a process of constant transformation of particular relations for
reproduction of fundamental relations associated to the very existence and
furtherance of such controlling social interests. In the present section, our
concern is to offer a general explanation regarding the workings of the latter
process by formulating a model of institutions as forms of socio-cultural
relations mediating the systemic integration of sociotechnical constituents
primarily in agreement with the overriding interests of those social constituents
who exercise the control of the basic resources. For these purposes, we shall first
make abstraction of all the rich variety and complexity present in the concrete
world of real-life institutions and particular interests. In other words, as we
have done through this thesis, we shall work with highly aggregate levels of
classes of institutions as dynamic expressions of highly aggregate levels of classes
of overriding interests. On this basis, the following fundamental point are useful
to summarize the gist of our approach.
a) In a given society, at any given time, there are definite social interests who
express themselves and interact with each other in the sociotechnical process on
the basis of their overriding interests and in fulfilment of their raison d'etre. In
the course of this thesis, we saw, for instance, how in the case of the US
capitalist IMC, the convergence of the overriding interests of capital, science,
military and government has clearly dominated the development process of such
a sociotechnical system.
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b) In the sociotechnical process, social interests express themselves and interact
with each other within institutions and in between institutions. By and large,
what takes place is a process of convergence between distinct social forces into
institutional forms, which tends to develop, as we argued in Chapter HI, when
the product of the activities of one force, or the basic resources possessed by
that force, are perceived as important to the reproduction and furtherance of
another force commanding resources which, in turn, are essential to reproduce
and further the activities of the former force. In this case the interests of the
latter force, say, capital accumulation in the case of capital, will tend to shape
the content and the product of the activities of the latter force, say, the
scientific and technical knowledge produced by science. Altogether, what would
have happened is a social convergence into institutional forms between these
forces which would come to fulfill the overriding interests of each one of them,
within the limits afforded by the nature and state of development of the
technical knowledge and relations involved.
c) In a class society such as the capitalist society, definite social interests
exercise a dominant control of the basic resources of technological systems. As a
result, in this kind of society, the same interests effectively dominate the social
process of convergence of overriding interests into institutional forms as much as
the very unfolding of such institutions in practice. Analytically, this means that,
in this kind of society, separate institutions as well as a complex of institutions
can be dealt with as ultimately sharing the same general character. Namely, that
they are all forms of systemic integration of overriding social interests and basic
resources dominated by the overriding interests and hence, raison d'etre of those
social interests in dominance of the basic resources of an ITC sociotechnical
process. Such dominance and the form of systemic integration itself depend,
among other factors, upon the nature of the technical relations involved and
upon the correlation of forces between different constituents within the context
of changing national and international galvanizing forces.
d) In the sociotechnical process, there are institutional forms such as public
companies or development banks, which tend to embody a duality of overriding
interests such as the accumulating interests of capital and the political interests
of government. In this case, one or the other overriding interest may well
predominate in the pursuits of the institution, in a process which is very much
related to the character of the prevailing galvanizing forces and the particular
interests of those forces in control of government. For example, it may well be
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that, in the name of government's politico-economic strategy, public companies
can run long periods of losses financed by the government; or, alternatively, that
in the face of an economic crisis threatening the political stability of
government, public companies must become a profitable part of the capital
accumulation process. In the latter case, the overriding interests of capital tend
to coincide in both private and public companies and specific policies of
privatization sometimes just materialize this situation.
Let us now see how the approach just summarized works to explain the
fundamental character and role of some of the broad classes of institutions
within the sociotechnical process of a science-based capitalist ITC as the one
illustrated in figure 5.2. We shall first deal with separate classes of institutions
and then with the complex of institutions basically involved in such an ITC. In
both cases, however, it is necessary to characterize the overriding interests and
raison d'etre of the aggregate social interests we are about to distinguish as
major constituents of a science-based capitalist sociotechnical process. Thus, in
Chapter III, in following the convergence and ups and downs of the capital-
science-military-government social complex of power which has dominated the
post World War II development of the US' R&D system and IMC, we already
characterized the overriding interests and reason d'etre of each one of these
aggregate forces by saying that, for all cases, they may be reduced to the
pursuit of quantitative and/or qualitative accumulation and implementation of
some form of power factor. In the case of capital, this manifests itself in the
accumulation of capital through profit-making activity; for the military, in the
accumulation of destructive power through improved weaponry; for science, in
the accumulation of scientific and technical knowledge through the advancement
of the frontiers of this knowledge; and for government, in the accumulation of
political power both nationally and internationally, among other ways, through
the economic, military, and scientific-technical power derived from the other
forces. Of course, within each of these aggregate social forces there are not just
a myriad of institutional manifestations but, also, some important social
subdivisions which manifest in their own particular way, sometimes in conflict
with others, the overriding interests we have just mentioned. Within capital, for
instance, there is financial, industrial and merchant capital; within the military
there is the different branches of the Armed forces; within science there is
university, industry and government R&D; and within government, there is
not only a complexity of ministerial subdivisions but also overall changes in
political-economy strategies which may have momentous implications for the
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development of sociotechnical systems. Clearly, these social subdivisions go right
down to the level of real-life institutions, but, it is our contention that always
the overriding interests we have identified above remain valid as the ultimate
common factor enabling us to talk of the aggregate social forces of capital, the
military, science and government.
As figure 5.2 illustrates, however, the abovementioned aggregate social forces
are not the only social constituents of an ITC sociotechnical process nor, indeed,
are they all necessary as we saw with the case of the military in the
development of the Japanese IMC. In this respect, the fact that, in the course of
the present work, we focused primarily on the convergence of interests between
those forces making up the dominant social constituency of an IMC, certainly
justified our assumption that the interests of all other social forces were
subsumed in the specific interplay of such social constituency. In the present
discussion, however, where we are attempting to conceptualize the workings of
sociotechnical institutions as both depositories of basic resources of technological
processes and as forms of systemic integration of sociotechnical constituents
primarily in agreement with the overriding interests of those social constituents
in control of the basic resources, the role of other social forces and, particularly,
the role of labour cannot be disregarded. In effect, as we have already seen in
our discussion on basic resources and, indeed, on the creative core of the
technological process, labour is an intrinsic dynamic constituent of a capitalist
science-based sociotechnical system in action as much as science and, indeed,
financial (capital) and material resources themselves are.
In figure 5.2, the intrinsic role of labour is illustrated on the left-hand side
of the diagram where labour appears along with R&D and management within
the category of human resources. Within this category, although fulfilling
different specific roles in the capitalist science-based sociotechnical process, it can
be argued that, ultimately, has a great deal in common to management and R &
D personnel within the unfolding of such a process. To put it in a different
way, as human resources, both R&D personnel and management can be seen as
specialized forms of labour, both as necessary as skilled and unskilled labour for
the materialization of the ITC sociotechnical process - at least until full
automation does not become a reality - and all equally moved by the overriding
interest to ensure access to, or the control or share of those resources which
constitute the lifeblood of the specific activities which define their raison d'etre
and which makes them distinctive forces in the capitalist science-based
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sociotechnical process. In the latter respect, we have already said that science's
raison d'etre lies in the accumulation and implementation of scientific and
technical knowledge through the advancement of the frontiers of this knowledge.
In the case of labour, the raison d'etre is different in that generally within
capitalist sociotechnical systems and whatever the satisfaction and creativity
attached to particular forms of work, such raison d'etre lies primarily in the
embodiment and realization of skills and labour power through and in the
production process and into the final products of such a process. Thus, unlike
science, the raison d'etre of labour does not pertain, by definition, to the
advancement of the frontiers of knowledge dynamizing the unfolding capitalist
science-based ITC, it rather pertains to the actual working, to the systemic
operationalization of all basic resources at every stage of development of such an
ITC. In this framework, the overriding interest of labour is, by definition, the
same as that of all social forces, namely, to ensure access to, or the control or
share of, those resources which are vital for its own reproduction within the
context of historically and culturally determined social needs, galvanizing forces
and force correlation vis-a-vis the other sociotechnical constituents. In practice, in
a society where labour possesses no basic resource other than its own skills and
labour power, such resources for its social reproduction relate primarily to a
workplace, working conditions, and an income which enables the reproduction of
its skills and labour power under socially determined conditions. It is on this
basis that the overriding interests of labour converge with those of the other
social constituents within the capitalist science-based sociotechnical system.
However, it is not a smooth convergence, for in the unfolding of such a
sociotechnical system the fulfilment of the overriding interests of labour tends to
have a simultaneously contradictory effect upon the process of capital
accumulation. This is so not only in that what goes to labour does not go to
capital but also in that the process of science-based capital accumulation is
constantly demanding increases in the productivity of labour and hence, the
embodiment of new skills as well as the displacement of existing ones in a
dynamic which threatens the very raison d'etre of many forms of labour as
constituents of the sociotechnical system. The resolution of such contradictions
certainly pertains to the realm of history and, in this sense, will depend largely
upon the socio-cultural relations of a given society, the nature of the national
and international galvanizing forces and, indeed, the force correlation of the
constituents involved in a context of changing relations between the basic
resources of the sociotechnical process. Sometimes such contradictions will reach
highly conflictive levels, manifesting themselves in ways which may disrupt the
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workings and development of the sociotechnical system itself. As we shall see
later on, it will correspond to the social organizations of labour, i.e., trade
unions, confederations, etc., to further the interests of labour both in particular
institutions and the sociotechnical system as a whole, by attempting to influence
the entire realm of technical and socio-cultural relations associated with the
development of such a system.
In the case of management, we can define its raison d'etre as one of
planning, organizing, supervising and controlling the institutional workings of the
capitalist science-based sociotechnical system. As we said before, like science,
management can be taken as a highly specialized form of labour which
ultimately has similar overriding interests in ensuring access to the resources
enabling its own social reproduction and hence, the reproduction of its raison
d'etre within the sociotechnical system. In this respect, like other forms of
labour, management can only fulfill itself within the sociotechnical system in
action, but given the planning-organizing-supervising-controlling nature of its
raison d'etre its overriding interests additionally entail the accumulation of
organizational power, not necessarily authoritarian power, to enable it to fulfill
itself as a management constituent of the sociotechnical process. In this way,
management is not just a constituent distinct from the labour constituent above
but, to the extent that its raison d'etre is normally exercised on behalf of the
overriding interests of those social constituents dominating the basic resources of
the sociotechnical process, management interests can be hardly distinguished from
those of the dominant constituents and, indeed, they generally only gives
practical expression to the overriding interests of such dominant constituents of
the sociotechnical system. In this respect, only when the very existence of
management is threatened, for instance, in a period of drastic organizational
adjustments affecting managerial levels too, one is able to see the separation and
even contradiction of interests between, say, management and capital. But this is
mostly in a partial way since such readjustments are normally the work of
higher levels of management still acting on behalf of the overriding interests of
dominant constituents. All in all, we have briefly characterized the raison d'etre
and overriding interests of management and labour as sociotechnical constituents
of a capitalist science-based ITC. These theoretical elements, together with those
already in store from our characterization of the overriding interests of the
capital-science-military-government social complex of power, are all we need at
the moment to broadly reconstruct the fundamental character and role of some
aggregate classes of institutions within the sociotechnical process of a capitalist
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science-based ITC. Let us illustrate the case of some of the separate classes of
institutions named in the diagram of figure 5.2.
First, let us take banks and other financial capital institutions which are
involved in the sociotechnical process as depositories of financial resources alone.
From our conceptual point of view, they are ultimately forms of technical and
socio-cultural relations not only bringing together the interest of financial capital,
management and labour (plus individual customers at large) (32) but, above all,
bringing them together into a dynamic institutional system dominated by the
raison d'etre and overriding interests of financial capital. In other words,
financial capital, because it possesses the control of basic financial resources, is
the dominant social constituent and hence, it is its overriding interests in capital
accumulation which ultimately shape and dynamize the raison d'etre of the
institution as a whole. For the sociotechnical process, this means that the very
involvement of a financial capital constituent will be enough to inject this
dynamizing and shaping force of capital accumulation in the development of a
sociotechnical system as a whole. The shape and dynamics of the latter,
therefore, begin with the institutions and, indeed, the overriding interests of the
social constituents themselves.
Undoubtedly, and although in practice a capitalist science-based
sociotechnical system is made up of the whole complex of institutions, it is
companies and industrial capital institutions geared to production for profit
which form the core of such a sociotechnical system. Indeed, it is here where all
the different basic resources of technological processes are normally found in
systemic integration, materializing the interpenetration of technical and social
constituents through all the moments (i.e., creating, production and diffusion
moments) of such sociotechnical process. Ultimately, however, this does not alter
(32) Science seems also to be finding a place within financial capital institutions, at least
since the 1970s as it has been recently reported. A new breed of scientists has moved into
Wall Street where they have become known as the "rocket scientists" or "quants". "These
former academics, trained in mathematics, and the whiz kids, most from the physical
sciences, who have come after them, aTe revolutionizing the stock and bond markets...Today
the top firms employ more than 1,000 rocket scientists and usually pay them well over six
figures...The first rocket scientists on Wall Street were cut from a different mold. In the
early 1970s they and their computer programs were used for back office functions such as
data processing to handle increased trading volume. Although they vastly increased the
efficiency of the brokerage industry, they were pigeonholed by top management...By the end
of that decade, as interests rates began fluctuating wildly and the deregulation of the
financial markets was picking up steam, Wall Street houses turned to the quants in
increasing numbers...Now the quants are in the mainstream of virtually all activity in the
markets" ( Business Week, 21 April 1986,pp.84-85).
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the fact that, just like financial capital institutions, industrial companies
(science-based) are equally forms of technical and socio-cultural relations
bringing together different sociotechnical constituents into a dynamic institutional
system dominated by the raison d'etre and overriding interests of those
constituents in control of basic resources. In effect, in capitalist science-based
industrial institutions, the raison d'etre and interests of industrial capital, science
(R & D), management and labour organically integrate together into an
operational sociotechnical system of financial, human, material, time and space
resources. Most importantly, this system is dominated by the overriding
interests of industrial capital which means that, inevitably, its shape and
dynamism is fundamentally pervaded by the profit-making driven process of
capital accumulation. For R&D, management and labour, this means that while
their raison d'etre are certainly fulfilled in the actual workings of industrial
capital institutions, this fulfilment is generally mediated by, i.e., takes place
through and in pursuit of, the overriding accumulating interests of industrial
capital. As we have said before, it is a case of the activities of one force, or set
of forces (i.e., R&D, management and labour), being important for the
reproduction and furthering of another force (i.e., industrial capital) possessing
resources which, in turn, are essential to reproduce the activities of the former
set of forces. A social convergence into institutional forms takes place here in
which the overriding interests of the dominating force of industrial capital tend
to shape the product of the activities of the other force or set of forces. It is
only when the shape and consequences of the developments stimulated by capital
accumulation or, indeed, when the particular interests and actions of any of the
social constituents tend to contradict the overriding and particular interests of
another, that social conflict and disintegration result which may eventually
disrupt the systemic workings of an industrial institution as a whole. In this
respect, we have already mentioned the potential for conflict implicit in the
contradictory nature of the convergence between labour and capital overriding
interests. At any rate, it is difficult to generalize in this area as it is clear that
the materialization and specific nature of conflicts and their resolution is
something that belong to the level of real-life institutions and hence, to the
specificity of, among other things, the technical and socio-cultural relations
pertaining to an institution, the prevalent national and international galvanizing
forces and the force correlation between diverse sociotechnical constituents. Here,
what is most relevant for our purposes of conceptualizing the role and character
of industrial capital institutions within the sociotechnical system, is that, through
the shaping and dynamizing of their development by the overriding interests of
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capital accumulation, it is indeed the sociotechnical system itself which is being
generally shaped and dynamized in accordance with the interests of the
controlling force of capital.
A third major class of institutional depository of basic resources of the
sociotechnical system is found in universities and other scientific and technical
institutions where relevant R&D activities are pursued. Obviously, as forms of
technical and socio-cultural relations embracing all forms of knowledge and
educational development and, in principle, as major depositories of the critical
consciousness of society, these institutions are larger than R&D and, indeed,
than any particular ITC sociotechnical process. For our purposes, however, it is
their role as depositories of R & D resources that we are concerned with insofar
as it is in this role that they most directly shape, dynamize and express the
unfolding of a given science-based sociotechnical system. In other words, as
sociotechnical institutions distinct from the institutions of financial and industrial
capital, we shall consider universities and other scientific and technical
institutions as autonomous forms of technical and socio-cultural relations whose
raison d'etre is primarily that of producing, accumulating and diffusing
knowledge resources through the continuous advancement of the frontiers of
scientific and technical knowledge for its ulterior publication and/or
implementation. In this character, and additionally assuming that the control of
the basic resources enabling the reproduction and furthering of such raison d'etre
rests within the institutions themselves and not with any other social force such
as capital, the military, etc., we can then say that, as forms of technical and
socio-cultural relations, university institutions and the like not only bring
together into an operational system of interests and basic resources the
overriding interests of science, management and labour but, they do so
ultimately in line with the raison d'etre and interests of the science social
constituent. In fact, as we have defined them, the latter constituent's raison
d'etre and overriding interests actually become those of the institutions
themselves. In practice, these overriding interests of science converge with those
of management and labour not just because, often in R & D institutions, science
and management and even labour constitute different expressions of the same
constituent but, also, because on the reproduction and furthering of the activities
of the science constituent truly rests the reproduction of the other interests and,
effectively, of the sociotechnical institution at large. Given the autonomy and
control of the necessary basic resources, therefore, one is bound to find that it is
in universities and the like institutions where the shaping and dynamizing of the
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sociotechnical system take place more in accordance with the overriding and
particular interests of the science constituent. In effect, given these conditions, it
is here where the science constituent will be able to influence decisively the
direction, content and pace of its own R&D activities both informed by the
general state of the art in the respective fields and by the general development
of society. By the same token, it is here where the written and unwritten
legislation of its own culture (e.g., ethical principles such as freedom to pursue
knowledge for common good and free flow of knowledge) is most likely to
pervade the workings of the sociotechnical system in action. In practice,
however, as we have seen in the course of this thesis, the basic resources for
the reproduction of the science constituent and its institutions are not always
easily available and, indeed, when the availability of these basic resources is in
control of other major social forces whose own interests have come to be
perceived as depending upon the product of the activities of the science
constituent, then the most likely result is a convergence of interests which will
transform the particular interests while advancing the overriding interests of
each one of them.
To a large extent the broad classes of institutions we have discussed above,
i.e., financial and industrial capital institutions and university and other scientific
and technical institutions, represent the most basic forms of institutional
depositories of basic resources of a capitalist science-based sociotechnical system
in action. In effect, leaving aside institutions such as government policy-making
bodies which are indirect depositories of basic resources, it is not difficult to
relate the role and character of most of other direct institutional depositories to
those of one or another of the institutions examined above. Let us take, for
example, major government institutions such as public companies, development
banks and government R&D institutions. Clearly, as institutional depositories,
they are essentially the same as their private counterparts with financial
resources deposited in banks, R&D resources deposited in laboratories and all
resources in systemic integration deposited in industrial companies. Likewise, as
their private counterparts, they are all forms of technical and socio-cultural
relations bringing together different sociotechnical constituents and basic resources
into dynamic institutional systems dominated by the raison d'etre and overriding
interests of those constituents in control of the basic resources. In the latter
respect, it is only when we look at the systemic integration of social
constituents and, most particularly, the character of the dominant social
constituent whose overriding interests ultimately shape and dynamize the raison
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d'etre of the institutions themselves, that relevant differences can be found
which justify their distinction as separate classes of institutions. In effect, unlike
financial and industrial capital institutions and autonomous university and
scientific institutions, government companies, banks and laboratories not only
have government as a social constituent but have it as that social constituent
ultimately in control of the basic resources of the technological process. This
means that while the interests of financial capital, industrial capital and science
were dominant in the systemic integration of overriding interests specific to their
respective institutions, in government sociotechnical institutions such dominant
influence corresponds to the overriding interests of government. Thus,
development banks, for instance, can be seen as the organic integration of the
interests of government, acting simultaneously as financial capital, and
management and labour, into an operational system dominated by the interests
of government/financial capital. This would give rise to the duality of overriding
interests which we mentioned at the start of the present section. Similarly with
state companies where the dominant interests will be those of government acting
simultaneously as industrial capital. Finally, in government R&D institutions,
the overriding interests of science, management and labour will converge with
those of government who will exercise the dominant control, thus shaping the
product of the activities of the other social constituents. Previously, we have
broadly characterized the overriding interests of government as the pursuit of
political power accumulation both nationally and internationally, among other
ways, through the economic, military, and scientific-technical power deriving
from capital, the military and science. This means that to an important extent,
and as we have seen in the course of this thesis with the development of the
capital-science-military-government social complex of power shaping and
dynamizing the unfolding of the US's IMC, the reproduction and furthering of
the interests of capital, the military and science implies the furthering of the
interests of government themselves. The coincidence, however, can never be
complete and since, in practice, the interests of government are broader them
those of any of the forces abovementioned, it follows that it is in the
government's own sociotechnical institutions (e.g., companies, banks and
laboratories) where such interests acquire it most direct expression shaping and
dynamizing the development of the sociotechnical system as a whole. In other
words, it is here where government directly materializes itself as an intrinsic
social constituent of a capitalist science-based sociotechnical system just like we
have seen with capital, labour, management and science.
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Finally, and since it is not our intention to discuss here the role and
character of all the variety of aggregate classes of institutional depositories of
basic resources of an ITC sociotechnical process, we shall merely point to the
fact that institutions such as military R&D research centre or other military
sociotechnical institution follow a similar logic to that of government R&D
institutions but with the overriding interests and raison d'etre of the military as
the dominant force ultimately shaping the activities of the other constituents. On
the other hand, institutions such as foundations and other funding bodies which
are depositories of financial resources, can be either autonomous in which case
the interests of science are most likely to shape the direction of their funding
activities; or they can be instruments of the corporate image of private capital
or specialized government bodies devoted to funding R&D primarily in
universities and other scientific and technical centres, in which case the interests
of capital and government are likely to mingle with those of science in shaping
the funding patterns of these institutions. Certainly, in the world of real-life
institutions, the aggregate classes of institutions we have distinguished above
need not exist separately and, in principle, all sorts of interrelations and
overlaps of raison d'etre and overriding interests are possible. The latter,
however, does not alter the fact that, in the final analysis, the conceptual
elements we have just exposed constitute a coherent base for the interpretation
of most of them.
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53.4. Networking of Institutions and Sociotechnical Interests in
an ITC Sociotechnical Process. Momentum of the
Sociotechnical System
In a sociotechnical system in action, the interests and institutions we have
characterized above are found in a mesh of interrelations which is the
sociotechnical system itself. Here, all the basic resources, interests and
institutions come together and interpenetrate each other in a complex ensemble
of technical and socio-cultural relations which, under conditions of relative
stability and, indeed, reproduction of major galvanizing forces, will tend to
acquire a great deal of historical momentum, i.e., the sort of inertia of
development identified by T. Hughes and described earlier in our review of
sociotechnical approaches. The achievement of such a momentum is clearly a
system
slow process equivalent to the build up of the sociotechnicaKitself. Thus, all the
relevant variety of basic resources, interests and institutions need be in existence
for such a sociotechnical momentum and, indeed, as Hughes (1983) has argued,
it is precisely the substantial commitment of basic resources, interests and broad
range of institutions involved in a sociotechnical system that explain the
existence of the momentum itself. In this respect, once a particular sociotechnical
system (e.g., the capitalist science-based system illustrated in figure 5.2) has
achieved a high momentum as a broad ensemble of technical and socio-cultural
relations, expressing and shaping the interrelations between sociotechnical
constituents under given historical circumstances, the likelihood is that such a
system will keep its aggregate direction of development for long periods until
changes in the galvanizing forces or, indeed, the emergence of new competing
technological processes effectively introduces powerful disruptive elements and
tendencies which will alter or stop the momentum of the system. In the course
of the present thesis, for example, we have seen how the post-World War II
development of both the US's R&D system and the US's IMC has followed a
definite aggregate direction of development consistent with the dominance of both
systems by the capital-government-science-military complex of power galvanized
during the war. Indeed, it can be said that after the war both sociotechnical
systems developed and acquired a momentum which, under the galvanizing
forces of national and international economic and politico-military competition
has by and large remained in force, reproducing as much as being reproduced by
their continuous dominance by the abovementioned social complex of power. It
was only when the galvanizing force of war dwindled during the 1970s in the
aftermath of the Vietnam War and the rise of strong social concerns threatened
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the stability of the very social complex of power, that the postwar momentum
of the US's R&D and US's IMC sociotechnical systems underwent some
noticeable alteration. Historically, however, such a period was shortlived and
the postwar social complex of power has been re-strengthened again with the
result that the pre-Vietnam War momentum of both the US's R&D and US's
IMC has been generally regained too. As we have seen, however, this time the
mixture of national and international galvanizing forces and internal force
correlation within the social complex itself is not as clearcut as in the pre-
Vietnam War period so that contradictions may develop within the social
constituency which may threaten the newly regained stability and hence, the
very momentum built up for both sociotechnical systems. But let us go back to
our conceptual reconstruction of the network of sociotechnical interests and
institutions which is the ITC sociotechnical system itself.
Our main point is that the interpenetration of basic resources, interests and
institutions which takes place in an ITC sociotechnical system in action follows
basically the same principles of convergence (and contradictions) of overriding
interests we have disclosed in relation to the aggregate classes of institutions
discussed previously. Thus, in broad terms, an ITC sociotechnical process can be
seen as a complex ensemble of technical and socio-cultural relations bringing
together different institutional depositories of sociotechnical constituents into a
dynamic and systemic process dominated by the interrelating raison d'etre and
overriding interests of those social constituents in control of the basic resources
or the different institutions which are their depositories. This time, however, the
situation is much more complex than with the case of separate institutions
where normally the raison d'etre and overriding interests of the dominant social
constituent defines the raison d'etre of the institutions themselves. Instead, in an
ITC sociotechnical system no such clearcut raison d'etre is possible since what we
actually have is an institutional interaction mainly determined by the
convergence of overriding interests of social constituents who remain dominant in
their own institutions. As a result, and as this thesis has shown, in an ITC.
more than a raison d'etre, we shall find aggregate patterns of historical
development which will be broadly related to the relative weight of the
different aggregate dominant social interests under changing historical
circumstances. In the present thesis, for instance, and at the level of aggregate
social forces, we have clearly seen how in the case of the US's IMC, the
relative weight of government-military interests plainly dominated the first
period of post-World War II development of microtechnology in the US. Later,
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under changing historical circumstances and increasing relative weight of
corporate capital, the latter force became the most important and the shape of
development of the US's IMC reflected this fact clearly, while lately the
military constituent has been making a come back which will enable it to
influence the shape of microtechnology's development in accordance with its own-
overriding interests once again. Thus, all the time the dominant aggregate social
constituents have been realigning themselves in terms of their relative weight
and this has been reflected in the aggregate shape of development of the US's
IMC sociotechnical system which has become the common ground for the
reproduction of all of them. The important fact is that throughout the postwar
period these dominant social forces have remained as a complex of power
converging around, shaping and expressing themselves in and through,
microtechnology which has come to be perceived as a decisive input to the
process of accumulation of economic, socio-political and military power. In other
words, to the extent that the overriding interests of all the dominant forces
have become constituent parts of a microtechnological ITC, it has been the
interplay of these overriding interests in conditions of changing relative weights
and galvanizing forces which has determined the " raison d'etreor aggregate
shape of development of the US's IMC. In this respect, it can be said that
while the overriding interests and raison d'etre of each of the constituent social
forces and institutions express themselves in and through the sociotechnical
system in action, the latter's raison d'etre can only be the result of the specific
convergence, contradictions and force correlation characterizing the dynamic
interplay of such sociotechnical forces and institutions at any given historical
period and place.
Let us now look at the sociotechnical system from an institutional
standpoint rather than from that of aggregate dominant social forces in order to
see how the convergence and contradictions between sociotechnical constituents
broadly take shape in the systemic network of institutional depositories which
constitute the sociotechnical system itself. We have already said that the same
basic principles we have used in the conceptual reconstruction of sociotechnical
institutions are valid for the case of an ITC at large. Only that this time the
situation is more complex because there will be, along with the intra-
institutional interaction of social interests discussed above, an inter-institutional
interaction which will bring into systemic convergence and contradiction the
overriding interests not only of different social constituents who remain
dominant in their own institutions (e.g., capital, military) but, also, of
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generically similar social constituents whose existence is fragmented in a myriad
of similar but autonomous institutions such as different companies, universities,
etc. In addition, particularly in the case of different companies, there would be
inter-institutional interrelations between labour constituents seeking to enhance
their relative weight by overcoming, through unions and other broader labour
organizations, the fragmentation attached to their individual as well as their
institutional-specific stand vis-a-vis the dominant institutional constituent. Of
course, to the extent that such option is also opened to other sociotechnical
constituents, this will give rise, as we shall see later on, to the existence within
the sociotechnical process of what we have called as the constituents' socio¬
political organizations (see right-hand side column of diagram in figure 5.2)
because they do not play a direct role of institutional depositories of the
sociotechnical system in action but can have an important influence in shaping
the development of such a process. For the time being, let us stick to the
analysis of the sociotechnical interlinking of the institutional depositories of an
ITC sociotechnical process.
To a large extent, the interaction of overriding interests between different
social constituents who remain dominant in their own sociotechnical institutions
has been already dealt with in the course of the present discussion. It has also
been a main theme of the whole thesis in the form of our analysis of the
dominant social constituency of microtechnology in different countries. The basic
principles of such interaction were briefly exposed in point b) at the beginning
of section 5.3.3.4. Here, we shall only add what we said in Chapter HI that, in
fundamentals, the main feature of the social constituency which emerge from
the networking of overriding interests of different dominant social constituents is
that it makes available all the basic resources for the advancement of the ITC
sociotechnical process while shaping its development, by and large, in accordance
with the interests and relative weight of the constituents in control of these
resources. In practice, this is the process which manifests itself in the
sociotechnical networking of the variety of institutional depositories which we
have discussed earlier. Here, institutional depositories converge on the basis of
their reason d'etre and hence, overriding interests of their controlling constituents,
thus giving rise to the broad technical and socio-cultural ensemble which is the
sociotechnical system and whose raison d'etre, as we have said, can only be the
result of the convergence and contradiction between the different dominant
institutional constituents in a context of changing relative weight and historical
galvanizing forces. In this respect, it is relevant to remember that not all
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institutions have a clearcut raison d'etre and that there are those, such as
government companies, which will tend to embody a duality of overriding
interests and hence, raison d'etre susceptible to important alterations with
important changes in the historical galvanizing forces. Whatever the situation,
through the overriding interests of dominant social constituents who have
come to perceive a given technological process as fundamental for their own
social reproduction, the fact is that institutional depositories will converge into
systemic and dynamic interactions, thus constituting the ITC sociotechnical
system itself. In the course of the present thesis, we saw, for example, how in
the case of the US's IMC, various kinds of formal links have been established
between different institutions under the control of the social interests making up
the dominant social constituency of microtechnology in the US. As a result of
this interlinking, institutions such as companies, banks, universities, military and
government institutions have been giving rise to large-scale networks of basic
resources and interests which clearly represents the most effective
interpenetration of social and technical factors shaping and expressing the
development of the technology itself. Formal arrangements, however, are not
the only kind of links that qualify as parts of an ITC sociotechnical process
and. indeed, as we shall see below in the case of companies competition for
instance, all other links are equally important. In our view, this is the case as
long as institutional depositories and social interests make the shaping and
development of a given ITC the focus for the convergence of their overriding
and particular interests and, above all, the focus for their own reproduction as
dominant social forces in society. On the other hand, as we have said, such
convergence is not one of smooth accommodation of totally complementary
interests. In practice, insofar as it involves interests who remain dominant in
their own institutions, it is prone to generate tensions and conflicts when the
interlinking of institutions which are in practice different ensembles of technical
and socio-cultural relations leads to affect the interests of some of the social
forces involved. The most typical case is that of the science constituent in
institutions such as universities where its own overriding and particular interests
can be said to be the dominant ones. In effect, unlike in companies or military
R&D laboratories where the science constituent is mostly subordinated to the
overriding interests of capital or the military without much ado, in the
institutional arrangements bringing together universities and companies or
military institutions, for instance, it is most likely that traditions, values and
mechanisms which are part of the particular interests and culture of the
scientific community will come under severe strain from contradictory demands
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implicit in the overriding interests of social forces such as capital and the
military. In the course of this thesis, for example, we have seen how freedom
to pursue research for common good, freedom to disseminate knowledge and
even the peerage and reward system of science have come under strain in the
US as capital and military interests demand, in exchange for financial and
material resources enabling the social reproduction and furtherance of the
scientific community, priority access to newly-created knowledge or even outright
suppression of its dissemination in the name of national security, for instance. In
principle, for the scientific community there is always the alternative of
disassociating itself from the direct shaping of the product of its own activities
by social forces such as the military (33) who command resources necessary for
the reproduction and furtherance of its knowledge-accumulating raison d'etre. In
practice, however, that alternative only exists when the same crucial resources in
the hands of capital or the military are available from alternative sources,
otherwise it is the very existence and social reproduction of the scientific
community which is at stake. Thus, in a capitalist society such as the US's
where currently, as we have documented, capital, government and the military
not only control the bulk of the basic resources needed by science but, also,
have plainly come to perceive the products of science as crucial for the
reproduction and furtherance of their own overriding interests in a context of
national and international economic and politico-military competition, the
likelihood of a massive disassociation of science interests from those of capital
and the military is very small (34). Therefore, and although there may be
some instances of such disassociation taking place with regard to particular
arrangements, the latter seem to be more examples of the difficulties and
tensions involved in the process of interlinking of different socio-cultural
relations than the denial of such a process. Indeed, the current thrust of events
in the US is clearly dominated by the convergence and networking of overriding
interests and the consequent renewed strengthening of what we have called the
capital-science-military-government social complex of power. In this context,
conflicts of particular interests have clearly remained subordinated, with the
particular forms of accommodation very much reflecting the relative weight of
(33) Illustrative of this case is the current revolt amongst academic scientists against the
so-called Star Wars research programme developed under the aegis of the US military
[Shulman(l986), Computing (28 November 1985)].
(34) In this respect, it is interesting to note that the current revolt of academic scientists
against SDI is not a revolt against the involvement of the military in the development of
science at large. It is a revolt focused on the specific SDI project which is considered
technically dubious and politically and morally objectionable (ibid.)
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different social constituents under the pressures of prevailing national and
international galvanizing forces.
From the standpoint of an ITC, therefore, we can already see how the
inter-institutional interlinking which bring into systemic convergence and
contradiction the interests of social constituents who remain dominant in their
own institutions, makes its conceptual reconstruction much more complex than
with the case of separate institutions. But, as we have said before, in an ITC,
along with this kind of inter-institutional interaction, there is also that which
bring into systemic convergence and contradiction the overriding interests of
individual fragments of generic social constituents. In effect, we know that all
social constituents materialize themselves in and through the action of a myriad
of real-life institutions which are dynamic ensembles of technical and socio-
cultural relations in themselves. The military, for example, have their different
armed services, science its different universities, government its different
ministries and agencies, industrial capital its many companies, etc. In an ITC
such institutional fragments of generic social constituents are always found in
interaction with each other in multiple ways which are very much the logical
result of the fact that, in practice, overriding interests exist and manifest
themselves only in the action of the institutions which house them. Thus,
capital accumulation, for instance, is primarily capital accumulation within and
for each one of the separate companies themselves. This is why in pursuit of a
same generic overriding interests companies compete as well as enter into
agreements with each other in a process which fundamentally influence the shape
and dynamism of the sociotechnical system at large. Let us illustrate this point
with the case we have seen most clearly during the present thesis, namely, the
interaction between individual companies representing the inter-institutional
convergence and contradiction between separate fragments of corporate capital.
Here, we have seen how in the IMC sociotechnical process, companies have
interlinked with each other in various ways which go from formal
complementary arrangements to outright competition for the control of
microtechnology's development. Many semiconductor companies, for instance,
have established formal arrangements with electronic systems manufacturers in a
way which fulfill the overriding interests of capital accumulation on all sides.
Not that formal arrangements are the only form of sociotechnical
complementarity, for simple market deals are equally valid expressions of this
kind of systemic interlinking between separate fragments of the capital social
constituent. To the other extreme of this systemic interaction, we have
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competition between different companies producing for the same market which,
by constantly threatening each other's processes of capital accumulation,
effectively interlock them in a contradictory dynamics which permeates the
development of the ITC sociotechnical system as a whole. In addition,
competition does not exclude partial collaboration between competing companies
in aspects where common efforts and mutual benefits are perceived as possible,
convenient or even necessary in the face of market pressures which either
threaten their existence side by side or simply stimulates them into collaboration
in pursuit of mutual advances in capital accumulation. In the US's IMC, for
instance, we have sen how in the struggle for control of the electronics
infrastructure, competing semiconductor companies have entered into research
agreements in the face of Japanese competition. And the same has happened
between various computer companies stimulated by IBM's drive to maintain or
increase the control of the market. In both these case, collaboration in
competition has taken place in the face of a third competing force and has taken
various forms, from common support to relevant research in universities to the
creation of formal institutions pooling financial as well as R&D resources for
the performance of activities which are expected to benefit all the parties
involved.
In practice, it is possible to say that, like the companies themselves, such
collaboration agreements have now become part of the IMC ensemble of technical
and sociocultural relations reflecting as well as creating the written and
unwritten legislation of the US society. Specifically, they can certainly be
described as crystallizations of the systemic interlinking of convergent and
contradictory fragments of the US electronics capital social constituent, reflecting
the relative weight and particular interests of the interacting fragments in a
context of specific national and international galvanizing forces. More generally,
for our conceptualization of an ITC sociotechnical process, we can draw the
following conclusion: that the shape and dynamism of a capitalist science-based
ITC not only rests on both the pursuit of overriding interests by its diverse
social constituents and the systemic interaction of these overriding interests in a
context of specific national and international galvanizing forces and degree of
development of the basic resources of the technological process. It equally rests
on the systemic and dynamic interlinking which results from the pursuit of
overriding interests by the separate fragments of generically the same social
constituents.
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One crucial form of interlinking of the overriding interests of
institutionally fragmented sociotechnical constituents is through socio-political
organizations specifically designed to overcome the weakening effect of
fragmentation in their relative weight vis-a-vis other sociotechnical constituents.
This socio-political organizations, illustrated on the right-hand side column of the
diagram in figure 5.2, constitute the clearest recognition that, notwithstanding the
differences and particular interests normally associated with fragmentation,
institutional social constituents sharing the same overriding interests tend to
identify with each other as part of a generic social constituent of a
sociotechnical process. Thus, capital, despite all inter-company competition, will
have its industry associations and confederations, etc., to articulate and press
forward for demands which generally advance the overriding interests of capital
accumulation for companies at large. The same is true for the other social
constituents. Thus, labour will have trade union organizations, science and
management their scientific and professional institutions, the military their
military agencies and lobbies, etc., while the government constituent will have
its agencies and planning committees, etc., which, in practice, are the socio¬
political organizations par excellence. Because of the necessarily wider perspective
of the latter institutions, however, they will not only articulate the interests of
government which are more broadly based than those of any of the other social
constituents but, also, they will incorporate the interests of these other social
constituents, reflecting their relative weight and dynamic interaction and hence,
that of their socio-political organizations, in the sociotechnical policies
implemented. In the latter respect, government socio-political organizations,
because of their power on policies and legislation, which can have a powerful
shaping influence in the technical and socio-cultural interplay of an ITC
sociotechnical process, can be said to be not only organizations of the
government social constituent but, simultaneously, a dynamic arena where the
interests of all social constituents meet in a struggle for shaping the policies and
legislation of the sociotechnical process involving them all. Of course, this is
why, and although we have not included them in the diagram of figure 5.2,
different political parties in control of the machinery of government can make a
relevant difference to the development of a sociotechnical system insofar as they
may favour the overriding interests of some social constituents over those of
others or simply articulate the complex interplay of interests in different ways.
Conversely, and for the same reason, different social constituents such as labour
and capital show a tendency to identify themselves with different political
parties purporting to favour or represent the respective interests of each one of
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them under given historical circumstances. Obviously, in practice the problem of
political identification is one of a much greater complexity and there are many
other variables involved. For purposes of our reconstruction of an ITC
sociotechnical system, however, the latter is a problem we need not concern
ourselves with. For what is most relevant for our argument is the very
inclusion of the social constituents' socio-political organizations in the
development of an ITC sociotechnical process. Through them not only is the
fragmentation of social constituents overcome and hence, the relative weight of
each constituent vis-a-vis others strengthened but, most particularly, these
organizations actually contribute to shape the sociotechnical process in its very
societal framework of written and unwritten legislation through their articulation
of the social constituents' overriding interests in the socio-political arena. As
ensembles of technical and sociocultural relations themselves, therefore, they at
the same time operate to alter and/or reinforce the socio-cultural relations of the
ITC at large in accordance with the overriding interests of the social constituents
they represent. By so doing, they become, on the one hand, the result of the
particular forms of, and interactions between, the diverse institutional
depositories of basic resources and interests making up an ITC sociotechnical
system and, on the other, a causal factor within such an ITC by seeking to
influence the very development of these forms of interactions in the fashion we
have mentioned above. In other words, while the fortune of these institutions
depends very much upon the relative weight of their specific social constituents
in given historical circumstances, conversely, such relative weight depends itself
to an important degree upon the strength of the socio-political institutions. In
this connection, an example particularly relevant to microtechnology is that of
labour displacement by automation whose threat to the very existence of many
kind of workers in the IMC sociotechnical process and, indeed, the sociotechnical
realm of society at large, is also a threat to the very existence of these
workers' unions organizations. Simultaneously, however, it is clear that the
actual shape and dynamism of the automation process and hence, whether or not
such threats materialize and when and how, and even the issue of the share of
its benefits among the different social constituents, is something that will depend
to an important extent upon the strength and struggle of the latter organizations
in the context of specific national and international galvanizing forces. At any
rate, if the strength of workers' unions organizations is continuously eroded by
automation, it is clear that a vicious circle of diminishing strength tends to set
in whereby the depletion of specific forms of the labour constituent in the
sociotechnical process leads to the depletion of their socio-political organizations
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so that the latter are increasingly unable to effectively influence the development
of the sociotechnical process, with the result that more depletion of the labour
constituent can more easily follows and so on and so forth.
Obviously, in principle, the vicious circle of diminishing strength is
something that can happen to all social constituents and, indeed, as we shall see
later on, is a process that is always involved, in one way or another, in the
total or partial displacement of one sociotechnical ITC for another which is
posed to achieve high momentum under the dynamism emerging from the
interplay of basic resources, overriding/particular interests and historical
galvanizing forces which drive all technological systems. Before coming to the
analysis of this process, however, it is necessary to explain more systematically
the conceptual place in the sociotechnical system of the different forms of social
constituents, i.e., intrinsic, dominant, and other likely social constituents, we
have identified in the diagram of figure 5.2.
5.3.5. Intrinsic, Dominant and Other Likely Social Constituents
in the Development of an ITC Sociotechnical Process
In the course of the present thesis, we have said that, in the final analysis,
it is all the social forces and interests concerned with, and affected by, the
development of a sociotechnical system which make up its social constituency.
This means that, in practice, the specific shape and dynamism of a sociotechnical
system is not the result of any one force but that of the convergence and
contradictions characterizing the technical and socio-cultural interplay of all of
them in given historical circumstances. As we have seen throughout, however,
this is not to say that all social forces have an equal role in shaping the
development of a sociotechnical system and, most particularly, this is not the
case in a society where the control of the basic resources of technological
processes rests primarily in the hands of a few powerful interests. Indeed, in
the latter form of societies, the most likely situation is that, for any given ITC,
there will always be an associated social constituency involving what we have
called intrinsic, other likely and dominant social constituents.
In effect, in the analysis of the capitalist science-based ITC (IMC) which
has dominated this thesis, we have found that there axe social constituents who
axe rooted in the very nature of microtechnology and others who are rooted in
the capitalist societal framework dominating its process of development. We have
- 541 -
called both constituents intrinsic social constituents, for without them the
technology could not possibly exist or develop into a concrete sociotechnical
system shaping as much as being shaped by the historical context of a capitalist
society. In the case of the science constituent, for instance, its role as intrinsic
social constituent of microtechnology lies in the unquestionable fact that had it
not been for the scientific understanding of crucial properties of matter and
energy, this technology would simply not have developed under any societal
conditions. On the other hand, although the same degree of immanency cannot
be attached to the capital social constituent given its socially determined
character, its role as intrinsic social constituent lies in the fact that, by
definition and whatever its form, a capitalist ITC can only exist when the
overriding interests of the social force of capital fundamentally shape its
development. This is the reason why in the diagram of figure 5.2 -which
follows the capitalist science-based pattern of microtechnology's sociotechnical
system which we have mostly dealt with in the course of the present work-
both capital and science appear under the heading of intrinsic social constituents
of a capitalist science-based sociotechnical system. Of course, if we look at the
left-hand side column of the diagram in figure 5.2, we shall also remember that
already in our characterization of basic resources of all technological processes
and their institutional depositories, science and capital figure prominently as
sociotechnical constituents pertaining to the very nature of, and giving their
character to, the ensemble of resources, interests and institutions which constitute
the ITC sociotechnical system itself. In particular, the necessary presence of R &
D within human resources and, indeed, the creative core of a sociotechnical
system, accounts for the very deep relation of science as an intrinsic social
constituent to the development of such a system. Science, however, is not the
only sociotechnical constituent to find its intrinsic character rooted at the very
level of basic resources of the sociotechnical system. In fact, both labour and
management share a similar standing as it is illustrated in the left-hand side
and right-hand side columns in figure 5.2. Earlier in this chapter, we have
discussed the role of labour and management as basic resources in themselves so
that here we shall only register their consequent standing as intrinsic social
constituents. To complete the list, in figure 5.2, we have also included
government as an intrinsic social constituent although, unlike labour, management
and science, its intrinsicality is not directly rooted at the level of basic resources
but, rather like capital, at the level of institutional depository of basic resources
in a capitalist society. In this respect, before in this thesis, we have concluded
that in the case of a large-scale ITC sociotechnical process like the capitalist
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science-based IMC, government is bound to become an intrinsic social constituent
not only because the development of such a process is certain to concern the
government's own overriding interests but, also, because the resource-
requirements imposed by such a process in a context of national and
international competitive galvanizing forces is equally certain to exceed the
ability of the institutions of private capital and other non-government social
constituents to satisfy them. Last but not least, it is also necessary to consider
the crucial and direct role of government in technological policy-making and
hence, in the creation and alteration of the very framework of written and
unwritten legislation shaping and mediating the materialization of a sociotechnical
system. Undoubtedly, these are all powerful reasons for government to join
labour, science, management and capital within the ranks of the intrinsic social
constituency of a large-scale capitalist science-based sociotechnical system.
Intrinsic social constituents cannot be left out of consideration, but, as we
said at the beginning of this section, it is all the social forces and interests
concerned with, and affected by, the development of a sociotechnical system
which make up its social constituency. This means that, along with the intrinsic
social constituents which give the technology its capitalist science-based character
for instance, in our conceptualization we distinguish the existence of other
constituents who, whatever their powerful influence in shaping the development
of such capitalist science-based system, in the last analysis are simply not
necessary or do not play a truly internal part in the fulfilment of its character.
In practice, the main role of these non-intrinsic social constituents, or other
likely social constituents as we have referred to them in figure 5.2, is that their
interests will contribute to determine the particular form of manifestation of
capitalist science-based sociotechnical systems (e.g., helping to explain relevant
differences between the development of similar systems in different countries).
The actual extent of such an influence will depend very much upon their degree
of control, or influence upon those who control, the basic resources of the
technology under the pressures of given historical galvanizing forces. For
example, in the case of the capitalist science-based IMC we have dealt with in
the course of this thesis, we have found that, notably in the case of the US,
under the galvanizing force of war the presence of strong military interests
within the social constituency of microtechnology has given strong militaristic
overtones to the particular US's capitalist science-based IMC. In contrast, in the
particular case of the Japanese EMC, the role of military interests, if anything,
has been conspicuous by its small participation. The military, therefore, while
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influencing the particular manifestation of a capitalist science-based IMC, do not
actually constitute an essential requisite for the development of such an IMC.
For this reason, in figure 5.2 we have included the military constituent and its
social organizations under the category of other likely social constituents. It
would be only if we consider the possibility of a militaristic ITC that we can
begin to talk of the military as an intrinsic social constituent to the
development of any sociotechnical process. But this is not the example we have
been dealing with in this discussion.
Besides the military in figure 5.2, we have also listed as other likely social
constituents all pressure groups and lobbies which, when they exists and have
some strength, are likely to have some say in the development of an ITC,
although their action will be mostly of an indirect nature. In effect, by various
means, pressure groups generally seek to influence the decisions of those
constituents in direct control of basic resources, most often the decisions of the
government social constituent, so as to stop or divert an ITC sociotechnical
process from developing into specific directions or, conversely, to support its
development into others. In this respect, pressure groups may often be
contradictory with anti- and pro-specific technological development stands, and
the strength of their action will depend very much upon the impact of changing
historical circumstances upon what is loosely referred as society's public opinion.
For the same reason, it is hardly possible to establish any definite pattern for
the role of these groups in the development of an ITC sociotechnical process
since sometimes they may go almost unnoticed and in other times they may
have quite a relevant impact.
Finally, we have used the rather vague term other consumers to account
for the role of all other groups, institutions and even collectively unrelated
individuals, who by demanding, consuming as well as rejecting the products of a
sociotechnical system in action, actually contribute to its shape and dynamism
by exerting direct influence at the very diffusion moment of its global unfolding
(35). This category of constituents would include, for instance, other ITCs'
(35) An interesting example illustrating this point in relation to steel is quoted by Soete
(I985),..."while the manufacturer of steel had to attain chemical control over the vagaries of
his resource inputs in order to produce a satisfactory product, he also confronted an
increasingly stringent set of requirements for steel imposed upon him by a widening set of
customers. Each one was likely to be interested in a different property or, more likely, in
different combinations of properties. Steel requirements in the electrical industries might
revolve around conductivity, machine tool manufacturers required steel that retained its
cutting edge at very high temperatures, manufacturers of steam engine boilers sought
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sociotechnical constituents and institutions (e.g., companies) which will use and
demand particular forms of products from the sociotechnical system under
analysis. In the case of an IMC, for instance, given the pervasive nature of
electronics products into the entire technical realm of society, the range of other
ITCs' sociotechnical constituents and institutions exerting influence at its market-
diffusion moment is truly vast. This, of course, accounts for micro technology's
clear potential to revolutionize the sociotechnical realm of society but, most
importantly for our present argument, points to the fact that, in turn, the
concrete form, dynamism, and sociotechnical interests involved in the existing
sociotechnical realm of society will effectively influence the particular way in
which such revolutionary potential is practically materialized. It is not our
concern here to pursue the analysis of the nature and role of other consumers
further, for this is a task very much related to the level of real-life
institutions. Thus, to end the present discussion aimed primarily at registering
the importance of their existence and role, suffice it to add that we have chosen
the name 'other consumers', basically, because all the social constituents we have
already dealt with, i.e., labour, capital, science, government, military and
pressure groups, are themselves consumers of the products of a sociotechnical
system in action. In fact, as we have seen in this thesis, it is often by offering
a market (e.g., military, government) that the technological process is actually
stimulated into particular directions by the overriding interests of a particular
social constituent. All in all, therefore, with other-consumers we complete the
list of other-likely-social-constituents which together with the intrinsic social
constituents (see figure 5.2) make up the full range of social interests involved
in the evolution of a capitalist science-based sociotechnical system. In
consequence, we can now turn to the conceptual category we have used most in
the course of the present work,namely, that of dominant social constituency of
an ITC sociotechnical process which seeks to account for the hegemonic role
played by particular combinations of intrinsic and other-likely social constituents
in the development of such an ITC.
The basic character of the dominant social constituency was defined in
Chapter IE in relation to microtechnology. There, we saw this constituency as
the embodiment of the convergence and interplay of social interests who, by
possessing a dominant control of the basic resources of the technological process,
corrosion resistance, army ordnance increasing strength and hardness, etc." [N. Rosenberg
(1984). "The Commercial Exploitation of Science by American Industry", quoted in Soete
(1985),p.412].
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are able to effectively control the specific form of systemic integration of these
resources and, ultimately, within the limits of the physical world, the shape and
dynamism of the technology itself. In other words, it is the actions and interests
of these forces under specific historical circumstances and development of basic
resources which, primarily, explains the particular form of development of an
ITC sociotechnical process in any given society. Although, as we have said, such
a development is ultimately the result of the convergence and contradictions
between all the forces and interests concerned with, and affected by, the
development of the technology.
Above, we have already seen how a dominant social constituency actually
materializes itself at the level of institutional depositories of basic resources
through the process of inter-institutional interaction which brings into systemic
convergence and contradictions the overriding interests of different social
constituents who remain dominant in their own institutions. The main feature of
such inter-institutional constituency was said to be that it makes available all
the basic resources for the advancement of an ITC sociotechnical process while
shaping its development, by and large, in accordance with the interests and
relative weight of the constituents in control of these resources. Obviously, it
is not necessary to repeat here the argument of the institutional level. Thus, all
is needed to round up the concept of dominant social constituency is to say
some words from the point of view of its embodiment of the convergence of
overriding interests of aggregate dominant social forces. In this respect, the first
thing that one has to point out is that such aggregate convergence is in itself to
a large extent the reflection of the abovementioned process of inter-institutional
intersections between different dominant institutional constituents. However, it is
not only that, and in the same way that the specific socio-political organizations
of aggregate social constituents constitute the expression and the medium to
further the collective interests of the respective constituents, here, in the realm
of the dominant social constituency, the convergence of interests of aggregate
constituents also finds its expression in the existence and particular actions of
various joint socio-political organizations such as joint bilateral and multilateral
committees and institutions, etc. In the diagram of figure 5.2, we have tried to
illustrate both these aspects of the dominant social constituency at an aggregate
level through the latter's representation in the upper-layer of the cube-like
shape. Thus, in the figure, the separation of the upper layer from the main
body of the diagram and its subsequent joining by dotted lines implies, on the
one hand, that the convergence of aggregate social constituents into an overall
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social complex of power dominating the development of the sociotechnical process
is in fact not different from, but, indeed, a reflection of the interplay of
dominant interests between the sociotechnical institutions themselves. In other
words, the capital-government-science social complex of power which in figure
5.2 appears as the basic dominant social constituency of a capitalist science-based
sociotechnical system is not a superimposition of some external power upon the
sociotechnical system but a reflection of the convergence and contradictions of
the overriding interests of intrinsic social constituents whom we have already
seen exercise the dominant control of the basic resources of the technological
process. On the other hand, such a separation of the upper-layer in the diagram
also implies that, at the aggregate level, in the convergence of dominant social
constituents into an overall social complex of power, there are some important
institutional features of their own. In particular, these would refer to the
existence of various forms of bilateral and multilateral socio-political
organizations whose raison d'etre lies exclusively in the convergence of aggregate
constituents and whose activities are bound to have an influence in the
development of the sociotechnical system at large. From the standpoint of the
latter system, therefore, it is possible to say that what we have is a kind of
dialectical interaction whereby the convergence of aggregate social constituents
and their institutions not only emerges from the interplay of dominant interests
between the sociotechnical institutions themselves but, simultaneously, exercises
an influence in the particular form of materialization of such an interplay of
dominant interests. In addition, since it is not illustrated in figure 5.2, one has
to say that it is not only the interplay of overriding interests of intrinsic
dominant social constituents which is involved in the dominant social
constituency and its bilateral and multilateral institutions. For, as we have seen
in this thesis, in the prominent role played by the military and their
institutions in the dominant social constituency of US's microtechnology, other-
likely social constituents may equally be an important part of such a
constituent. Likewise, socio-political organizations materializing the convergence
and contradictions of different aggregate social constituents are not only
restricted to the interactions between dominant social constituents. In fact, all
sorts of bilateral and multilateral organizations can in principle exist,
correspondingly expressing all sorts of possible combinations in terms of
convergence of social interests. Here, however, our concern has been primarily
with the socio-political organizations emerging from the convergence and socio¬
political institutions of those overriding interests whose control of the basic
resources has given them the most important role in shaping the development of
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an ITC sociotechnical process. In this respect, we can finish this discussion by
saying that, in figure 5.2, this important role is somehow reflected in the
position of the upper-layer with its complete coverage of the main body of the
cube-like shape which does imply that the capital-government-science social
complex of power effectively has the upper hand in the social shaping of the
overall development of the capitalist science-based sociotechnical system of our
example. Of course, as we have seen consistently throughout this thesis, within
the dominant social constituency the convergence of interests is not free of
contradictions and, in the last analysis, it will be the changing relative weight
of the different social constituents under the pressure of specific galvanizing
forces which will determine whose overriding interests are in fact the most
influential.
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5.3.6. Competing and/or Interacting Sociotechnical Systems:
Momentum-Gathering and Momentum-Losing in the
Unfolding of Sociotechnical Processes
In practice, as complex ensembles of technical and socio-cultural relations
involving basic resources, interests and institutions, it is hardly possible to talk
of sociotechnical systems as closed systems with definite boundaries within the
sociotechnical realm of society. Indeed, we have already seen in our discussion
on other-likely social constituents of a particular technological process how other
sociotechnical systems' institutions, even without a direct role in the realization
of the creating and production moments of a sociotechnical system in action, can
and do play a part in the shape and dynamism of such a sociotechnical system
by demanding and consuming its products and hence, contributing to materialize
the diffusion moment of its overall development. In the latter case, a clear
interpenetration of sociotechnical systems takes place insofar as the products of
one system actually become part of the basic material resources (input) of
another, or what amounts to the same thing, the consumption at the creating
and production moments of the latter system actually become the product
realization at the diffusion moment of the former. In this way, if, as happens
with microtechnology for instance, the products of one ITC sociotechnical system
have a pervasive and widespread impact throughout the entire sociotechnical
realm of society, then the interaction of sociotechnical systems is widespread and
the diffusion stage of the pervasive system becomes the result of the sum-total
of interactions with other sociotechnical processes in addition to product
consumption realized within the institutional ranks of the pervasive system
itself. When two or more pervasive sociotechnical systems exist, the interaction
goes full circle with the products of one becoming part of the material resources
of the other and vice-versa. This would be the case, for instance, of the
electronics and chemical ITCs and, more generally, of electronics and all those
ITCs whose products are part of the material inputs of the creating and
production moments of microtechnology. Clearly, therefore, technological processes
and, particularly, large-scale and complex processes such as the capitalist
science-based IMC do not and cannot exist on their own in a kind of self-
sufficiently evolving world of technical and socio-cultural relations. In practice,
at all moments of their materialization, they need to interact and interpenetrate
with other sociotechnical processes, thus explaining why the existence and
development of an IMC for instance, truly depends upon the characteristics and
dynamism of the entire sociotechnical realm of society. And having already
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analysed what is involved in the sociotechnical nature of a technological process,
it is not difficult to see the variety and complexity of interrelations which will
emerge from the interpenetration of different sociotechnical systems' basic
resources, interests and institutions.
One particular expression of the complex reality of interrelations involving
the entire sociotechnical realm of society is that relating to the development and
diffusion of a technology through the economic realm of society. In this respect,
Rosenberg (1976), Nelson and Winter (1977) and Dosi (1982) have introduced
such concepts as 'compulsive sequence' based on imbalances, 'natural trajectories',
'selection environment', 'technological regimes' and 'technological paradigms'.
Basically, this set of concepts permits them to portray the development of
technology in the following manner. Within the technological realm, which
involves knowledge, know-how, procedures, experience, and physical devices and
equipment, it is possible to distinguish what Dosi (1982) calls technological
paradigms. A technological paradigm, which is a more elaborate version of
Nelson and Winter's technological regime is a 'model' and a 'pattern' of solution
of selected technological problems, based on selected principles derived from
natural sciences and on selected material technologies (Dosi,1982) (36).
Consequently, such a paradigm determines the fields of enquiry, the procedures
and the tasks to be accomplished by technologists by focusing their imagination
within its confines and into the problems implicit in the fulfilment of its
potential. In this sense, a technological paradigm once established is in itself a
strong determinant of the direction of technical change. The establishment of
such a paradigm, however, is a matter of selection by economic forces together
with institutional and social factors which would involve the role of public
agencies, the military, etc. These factors constitute what Dosi (1982) calls 'the
selective device' and Nelson and Winter (1977) call 'the selection environment".
This selective device, therefore, would establish the development of one paradigm
over that of other possible paradigms and later, primarily through the market, it
would also select among internal developments by awarding or denying the
possibility of commercial success. A technological paradigm, however, once
established does show a momentum of its own which contributes to defining the
'normal' problem solving activity of technologists operating within the paradigm.
This momentum of problem solving activity constitute the 'natural trajectories'
(36) Dosi's concept of technological paradigm represents an attempt to transfer into the
technological field T. Kuhn's concept of scientific paradigm used in his conceptualization of
scientific revolutions. See Kuhn (1962).
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of Nelson and Winter (1977) and Dosi's 'technological trajectories' and has also
been identified by Rosenberg (1976) through such concepts as 'the compulsive
sequence' of technical change emerging from imbalances and disequilibria in the
evolution of a technical system. As we can see, therefore, within this
perspective, the development and diffusion of technological processes would
proceed, first, via their establishment and clustering into technological paradigms,
a process which is in itself one of selection by the economic, institutional and
social environment and, finally, once established, the process acquires a
momentum of its own following natural trajectories implicit in the technical
potential of the paradigm.
A similar conceptualization of the development and diffusion of
technological processes, although with a much broader perspective, is that more
recently put forward by Perez (1983a,1983b,1985) and Freeman (1985,1986) in
the context of long-waves and the diffusion of microtechno logy throughout the
economic realm of society [see also Wolfe (1986)]. Here the concern is with
technological processes whose diffusion lead to what is seen as technological
revolutions, i.e., changes that affect the structure and the conditions of
production and distribution for almost every branch of the economy
(Freeman,1986) (37). According to Perez (1983b,1985), what is involved in
these changes is the adoption and diffusion of a new techno-economic paradigm
and the displacement of an old one which has exhausted its productivity
potential. In this context, techno-economic paradigm is understood as a set of
common sense principles indicating a best practice frontier for the activities of
designers, engineers, entrepreneurs and managers. As such, the set of common
sense principles defines a broad technological trajectory towards a general 'best
practice" frontier and it is applied in the generation of innovations and in the
organization of production within and across firms, branches and countries. In
turn, the best practice frontier embodies the full productivity and profit
potential implicit in the techno-economic paradigm and constitute the ultimate
goal of the trajectory towards its fulfilment in the economic structure of
society.
(37) "For a change to justify the description of technological revolution it must not only
lead to the emergence of new leading branches of the economy and a whole new range of
new product groups, but also have deep-going effects on many other branches of the
economy by transforming their methods of production and their input cost structure. Thus a
technological revolution virtually requires a new input/output matrix for a satisfactory
reclassification of economic activities" (Freeman,1985,p.217).
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In practice, the emergence, establishment and fulfilment of a new techno-
economic paradigm is a very long process most likely to run into decades. First
of all, as with previous authors, there is a process of economic selection leading
to the crystallization of one form of paradigm from a range of alternative
technical possibilities and, subsequently, its diffusion process is a complex process
of societal transformations involving an interplay between technological,
economic, institutional and social factors. In the latter respect, the crucial fact to
take into account is that the unfolding of a new techno-economic paradigm
involves of necessity the emergence of a whole new socio-institutional
framework (e.g., educational, financial, legislative framework, etc.) whose
matching enables the widespread and full realization of the new paradigm's
potential in the economic sphere. Thus, if we consider that normally such an
unfolding of a new paradigm is simultaneously the process of displacement of
an established but now exhausted paradigm with its own matching sociotechnical
framework, it is not difficult to imagine the complexity of the interactions,
struggles and transformations involved in the fulfilment of the new paradigm.
In particular, Perez's argument is that at the technoeconomic level the profit
motive will propel the adoption of the new paradigm because the latter
represents a quantum jump in terms of potential productivity for all the
economy at a historical conjuncture when the previous paradigm no longer has
that potential. This process will start in a few leading sectors of the economy
which will thus attract a great deal of capital investments and stand out from
the rest of the economy for their high productivity and profits. Eventually, as
the advantages of the new paradigm become clearly demonstrated and the crucial
conditions of falling costs, rapidly increasing supply, and pervasive applications
are satisfied, the widespread generalization of the paradigm leads to the
technological revolution involved in its embracing by the whole economy. Such
technological revolution, however, does not take place automatically within the
economic realm of society and, indeed, it only materializes itself after, or along
with, a major process of transformation and adaptation of society's socio-
institutional framework to match the requirements of the new techno-economic
paradigm. This means that a great deal of socio-institutional innovation is
required involving not just the emergence of new institutional forms but
simultaneously the overcoming of the inertia, resistance and vested interests of
individuals, social groups and institutions associated with the old paradigm. In
the context of long-waves, for Perez (1983a,1983b,1985), it is this period of
socio-institutional adaptation to the emerging techno-economic paradigm which
explain the long periods of depression in the long waves. Conversely, it is only
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when a good match is achieved between the paradigm and the socio-institutional
framework, and the entire economy enjoys a quantum jump in its productivity
potential, that the economy enters into a long period of prosperity until the
productivity potential of the new paradigm becomes itself exhausted and the
whole process begins once again. Perez and Freeman both argue that, at the
present time, we are witnessing a period of socio-institutional adaptation to a
new techno-economic paradigm based on microtechnology (38). The current
paradigm which began to emerge in the 1960's and began to penetrate most
industries and services in the 1970's is still far from having realized its full
potential in any sector and, indeed, many socio-institutional changes, from
management practices to the educational system, and government involvement,
etc., will be required before this actually happens. In this respect, the shape of
the appropriate socio-institutional framework for microtechnology is not at all a
predetermined reality but it will emerge from a process of trial and error where
various alternative forms may actually fulfill the technology's potential. Here,
the important fact for policy-making is to acknowledge the basic characteristics
of the new techno-economic paradigm (39) in order to implement social
innovations which effectively lead to the satisfaction of its potential in the
knowledge the faster social adaptation takes place, the sooner the full economic
benefits of its widespread implementation will be reaped by society. From the
perspective of international competition, this situation becomes even more urgent
since, in both Perez's and Freeman's views, competitiveness and hence, success
and the place of different economies in the international arena will be eventually
decided by the effectiveness and appropriateness of their social adaptation to the
requirements of the microtechnological paradigm.
All in all, therefore, going back to the conceptualization of the development
and diffusion of a technological process within the sociotechnical realm of
society, Perez's and Freeman's approach offers the most systematic account of the
development and diffusion process of a pervasive new technology. In
fundamentals, however, it is clear that all the approaches above mentioned share
a similar understanding of the nature of technological processes. Thus, they all
start with a paradigmatic concept of technology which emphasizes its specific
intrinsic characteristics and potential and which posits the fulfilment of that
potential as the general base for 'natural trajectories' in the development and
diffusion of technology. Likewise, in all the approaches the main concern is
basically with the establishment and diffusion of the paradigm and hence, with
the process leading to the fulfilment of its potential particularly within the
(38) "This paradigm is based on a combination of microelectronics, computerization
(microprocessors in the 1970s) and telecommunications and may be described as the
'information Revolution " (Freeman,1985, p.218).
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economic sphere of society. In the latter respect, insofar as there is no pre-fixed
path of development, all the approaches emphasize a process of selection from
feasible technical alternatives; a process where economic factors such as the
profit motive, productivity and the market, play a determinant role. In addition,
in all the approaches other societal factors (e.g., social, political, institutional) do
play an important part in the process of selection, thus emphasizing the role of
their interaction with economic factors in accounting for the specific form of
materialization of the technology's potential. In this respect, the analytical role
of these other societal factors is generally subordinated to the central role of the
economic sphere in such a way that they either contribute to, or hinder, the
process of realization of the paradigm's intrinsic technical and economic potential.
In the case of technological revolutions, this leads to the conclusion that a
process of socio-institutional adaptation to the requirements of the paradigm
must take place. Notwithstanding differences of scope and problematique,
therefore, it is clear that we can talk of the existence of a single school of
thought, i.e., the paradigmatic school, offering a coherent set of concepts to
interpreting the development and diffusion of a technological process in the
sociotechnical realm of society.
From the point of view of our own conceptualization of an ITC
sociotechnical process, it is possible to identify both clear similarities and
differences with the paradigmatic school in terms of the overall approach to the
problem of the development and diffusion of such technological process. The
major similarity is that, ultimately, both approaches 'understand the unfolding of
a technological process as involving the interplay of technical, economic, socio¬
political and institutional factors. Likewise, both approaches recognize the
existence of intrinsic technical characteristics defining the broad nature and
potential for development of every given technological process. These intrinsic
technical characteristics are rooted in the very nature of the physical processes
involved in the technology and, although we have not given them much
importance as an organizing concept for the present general conceptualization of
sociotechnical systems, in Chapter II we certainly did so as we unveiled the
technical nature of the specific technology of the microrevolution. Here, we have
preferred to deal with these intrinsic technical characteristics mostly in implicit
terms, acknowledging in the very idea of the historical development of a specific
ITC sociotechnical process, the existence of a broad technical path and potential
for development within the ensemble of technical and socio-cultural relations
which is the ITC itself. In this connection, therefore, we already begin to see
(39) Peiez (1985) attempts a characterization of what she calls the techno-economic paradigm
based on microelectronics.
- 554 -
some relevant differences between the paradigmatic approach and the
sociotechnical approach. For, as we know from above, in the paradigmatic
approach the intrinsic characteristics and potential for development of a
technological paradigm are at the very core of the conceptual reconstruction of
technological processes. It seems to us, however, that such an approach while
offering a coherent way of organizing historical factors, events and processes in
the development of technological processes, particularly in long-term historical
perspectives, has at the same time limitations insofar as tends to reduce and
reconstruct the richness and complexity of the interrelations between such
historical factors, events and processes, primarily, in terms of the fulfilment of
the technology's intrinsic potential and, here again, primarily within the
economic structure of society. True enough, a process of materialization of
intrinsic potential does take place in the development of a sociotechnical system,
and certainly the economic structure and the process of capital accumulation and
productivity do play a fundamental role in it. The problem is, however, that
by giving these factors the primary role in the analysis, one is somehow led to
organize all other factors, even such major historical events as wars, for
instance, or the clear importance of the arms race and military involvement in
shaping the actual development of a sociotechnical system such as an IMC, as if
their relevance revolved largely around the materialization of the techno-
economic process (40). It seems to us that, by so doing, a great deal of
necessary analytical flexibility is sacrificed eventually leading to substitute the
(40) Dosi (1982), for instance, deals with institutional variables such as public agencies, the
military, etc. as part of the selective device which determines the nature and development of
a technological paradigm and its trajectory. In particular, he stresses "the role often played
in the establishment of a particular technological trajectory by public ('political') forces. An
obvious example is electronics, especially in the fields of semiconductors and computers
during the first two decades of the postwar period. Military and space programmes operated
then as a powerful focussing mechanism toward defined technological targets, while at the
same time providing financial support to R & D and guaranteeing public procurement"
(Dosi,p.l55). On the other hand, Perez (1983) deals with the role of the military and the
importance of World War n, primarily as crucial elements in the process of harmonization
('good match') of the socio-institutional framework with the mass-production technological
style characterizing the postwar upswing of the fourth Kondratieff. In her view, this process
involved the transition "into a mass production system catering to consumers and the
massive defence markets"...and..."The big upswing of the world economy after the second
world war was then a period in which there was a good 'match' between the requirements
of a mass production technological style, based on the almost universal availability of cheap
oil, and the social and institutional framework within which this technological style could
flourish. But this good 'match' was only achieved after a period of deep depression and
social turmoil in the 1930s and after a major world war. During the 1930s, it was by no
means clear how to achieve a set of appropriate institutional and social responses... It was
only after the second world war that gradually a mode of development crystallized in the
leading industrial countries, which did create the necessary harmonization of institutional
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understanding of the sociotechnical process as it unfolds in practice for a model
which simplifies the reality of such a process, reorganizing it conceptually in
such a manner that it is hardly possible to penetrate in a fruitful way the
nature and workings of the complex web of interrelations between basic
resources, interests, institutions and galvanizing forces which are involved in its
actual development. Ultimately, this is the reason why we prefer to talk of a
sociotechnical system as a complex ensemble of interpenetrating technical and
socio-cultural relations instead of a techno-economic paradigm implying the
adaptation of the socio-institutional framework to the requirements of its
materialization. For, in the concept of sociotechnical system, every relevant
sociotechnical constituent is as far as possible recognized on its own right,
ideally reflecting its relative importance in a systemic network of convergent and
contradictory interests where relative weights are by and large determined by
the constituents' degree of control of basic resources of the technological process
in a context of changing historical galvanizing forces. Consequently, in the
sociotechnical approach, the emphasis is not put a priori on a somewhat
inevitable process of materialization of a technological paradigm in the economic
realm of society. Instead, the objective is that the interpretation of the
technological process and hence, any policy-making which may be derived from
it, should follow its unfolding out of the dynamic ensemble of factors and
interrelations we have been trying to expose in the course of this discussion.
This means, for instance, that, as we have seen in the present thesis, along with
economic determinants, other, such as politico-military determinants, will also
shape the development of a given sociotechnical process on their own right and
not as subordinate to productivity and capital accumulation. As a result, the
profit motive cannot be taken as the exclusive dynamizing force of a
sociotechnical process for, from our perspective, this would imply total control
of such a process by the overriding interests of capital and, as we have seen,
this may not be so even within a capitalist form of sociotechnical system. From
a different angle, this means that nor can the interests of capital be taken
implicitly for granted as being the inevitable, let alone the most desirable,
alternative to shape the development of a sociotechnical system. Indeed, other
alternatives are possible and their emergence will basically depend on the ability
of other social forces to participate within the ensemble of interests making up
its social constituency and, of course, upon the state of development of the
technology's basic resources in a context of given historical galvanizing forces. In
framework with technological style" (Perez,p.370).
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practice, this is of particular relevance for the case of the IMC sociotechnical
process in underdeveloped countries, not only because in most of these places the
overriding interests of capital have done little to shape the sociotechnical process
in relation to the acute problems facing the mass of their population but, also,
because with micro technology we are in the face of a pervasive system whose
developments and implications will protract themselves for decades, affecting the
lives of generations of people. From the point of view of a sociotechnical
approach, therefore, one is obliged to suggest caution against taking for granted
the overriding interests of capital and, above all, to suggest the need for a
broader and more democratic social constituency where the interests of other
social forces are also effectively represented in the shaping of the technological
process. Whether the latter can materialize, however, is something that will
depend upon the societal conditions of every country or region within the
international context, but, in all instances, it seems highly unlikely that changes
involving loss of power by entrenched interests will take place without some
kind of social strife.
Having seen what the important paradigmatic school of thought had to say
in terms of the development and diffusion of a technological process within the
sociotechnical realm of society, we can now continue with our own
conceptualization trying to show how an explanation to the same problem can be
constructed out of the concepts previously discussed in this chapter. Thus, at the
beginning of this section, we have already argued that a large-scale complex ITC
such an IMC, truly needs, at all moments of its materialization, to interact and
interpenetrate with a wide range of other sociotechnical systems, thus shaping as
much as being shaped by the characteristics and dynamism of the entire
sociotechnical realm of society. We have also identified the basic mechanism
explaining this fact as a process embodying a full circle of interaction between
sociotechnical systems and where the products of the pervasive system actually
become part of the material resources of all others and, conversely, many of the
material resources of the pervasive system are, in turn, the products of other
systems. In other words, what is involved here is the development of the
pervasive system into a true nodal sociotechnical system interacting in a push-
pull fashion with other systems within the sociotechnical realm of society. The
pervasive system must push its products and processes into the process of
materialization of other sociotechnical systems, while it must pull from the
latter the products and processes necessary for its own materialization. Not only
that, the pervasive system's push and pull action must, in turn, broadly coincide
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with the corresponding push and/or pull action of interacting socio technical
systems. That is to say, the products and processes either coming in or coming
out of an IMC must of necessity come to be perceived as important for the
reproduction and furthering of the overriding interests, primarily, of the
dominant social constituents of the interacting sociotechnical systems. Only when
this happens, one is entitled to say that the development and diffusion of the
pervasive sociotechnical system throughout the sociotechnical realm of society
effectively depends, on the one hand, on the magnitude, speed and product-
specificity of the consumption of its products by other sociotechnical systems
and. on the other hand, on the availability, in quality and quantity, of those
other systems' products which are consumed as material resources by the
pervasive system itself.
The above process sounds straightforward enough. In practice, however, it
involves an enormous complexity not only because, in the interaction of
sociotechnical systems, we are in fact dealing with different technical and socio-
cultural ensembles of basic resources, interests and institutions but, above all,
because the diffusion of a pervasive sociotechnical system by and large implies a
double dynamics of mastering new forms as well as displacing existing forms of
systemic integration of basic resources, both with their corresponding complexes
of interactions and interrelations within the sociotechnical realm of society.
In the case of em IMC sociotechnical process, the latter is particularly true
because of its systemic and synergistic interlinking of acquisition, measuring,
storing, processing and transmission of real-time and abstract data which cut
right across the turf of mechanical, pneumatic, hydraulic, electromechanical and
other capabilities used to fulfill similar functions with real-time and abstract
data. But not only that, for, as we have seen in Chapter II, the intrinsically
superior range of technical possibilities implied in the very nature of the
physical processes mastered by an IMC also means that a whole panoply of new
products and processes has become feasible, hence expanding the realm of
diffusion of an IMC not only into areas untouched by previous capabilities (e.g.,
AI) but, also, into all sorts of technological processes where until now the
manual and mental activities of human beings have constituted one of the
necessary basic resources. Put in a different way, the present process of
development and diffusion of microtechno logy throughout the sociotechnical realm
of society involves, simultaneously, the displacement of already diffused
sociotechnical systems whose products are already part of specific combinations
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of material resources of other sociotechnical systems, and the emergence and
creation of quantitatively and qualitatively new combinations of basic resources
across the entire sociotechnical realm of society. Taken together, this constitutes
the basis for a large-scale and contradictory process involving the emergence,
rearrangement and dissolution of countless forms of systemic integration of
sociotechnical constituents. In this process, all the kinds of interests and
institutions we have dealt with earlier will actively participate and its shape
and dynamism can only be the result of a complex struggle between entrenched
and emergent interests both linked to a myriad of competing investments, skills,
machinery, institutions, etc., and both acting within a specific context of given
historical galvanizing forces. Ultimately, this is a process which can only be
described as one of momentum-gathering of an IMC sociotechnical system given
the broad span of sociotechnical forces and problems which have to be both
mobilized and overcome to materialize its spread across the sociotechnical realm
of society. Let us see how this process of an IMC momentum-gathering broadly
operates.
To start with, one must acknowledge the fact that, in the development of
an IMC, momentum-gathering has been first and to an important extent a
process internally related to the systemic and synergistic convergence of the area
of signal systems as a whole and hence, to the transformation of basic resources,
interests and institutions involved in such a convergence. This has meant, on the
one hand, a displacement of existing forms of technological processes related to
the non-systemic development of the area of signal systems and, on the other, a
great deal of momentum-gathering emerging from the very synergy of
development implicit in the systemic convergence of previously separated
sociotechnical systems. In the latter respect, it seems to be a particular
characteristic of an EMC that an important part of its products has from the
very beginning diffused internally, i.e., they have been internally and
synergistically consumed by the convergent industrial constituents themselves
and, indeed, by the institutions controlled by its dominant social constituency at
large. In effect, in the course of this thesis, we have seen, for instance, how
semiconductors have become important for computers and telecommunications,
how telecommunications products have become important for computer
networking, and how computers have become important for telecommunications,
control, the production process of semiconductors and even for their own
production process. Likewise, we have also seen how in the case of the US's
IMC, for instance, such social constituents as government, military and science,
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who have directly controlled the basic resources of the IMC sociotechnical
process in the US, have simultaneously been among the first and most important
consumers of such IMCs products. Hence, it is true to say that, for an IMC, to
an important extent its momentum-gathering process has depended upon the
constituents of an IMC themselves and, primarily, upon the institutions of the
dominant social constituents who in pursuit of the reproduction and furtherance
of their own overriding interests and raison d'etre have first and decisively
contributed to the materialization of the IMC's diffusion moment in a similar
manner as they have contributed to its creating and producing moments, as we
have indicated earlier, however, such an internal diffusion has gone hand in
hand with the displacement of existing forms of technological processes related
to the non-systemic development of the area of signal systems. Hence, it is also
true to say that to an important extent it has been within the institutional
realm of the IMC's dominant social constituents themselves where the process of
transformation of sociotechnical ensembles of basic resources, interests and
institutions associated with the diffusion of microtechnology has achieved its
clearest and deepest manifestation. Of course, this is hardly surprising, not only
because the very development of microtechnology has been largely in consonance
with the overriding interests of the dominant social constituency but, also,
because, technically, it is clearly in the sphere of its creation where the
micro technology's characteristics, advantages, limitations, and requirements for its
implementation have been most clearly and easily understood. It seems to us
that this combination of factors has certainly been at the very root of the high
rates of growth, productivity and technical change that has transformed the
electronics industry (e.g., semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, etc.)
into the current growth industries within the economies of developed countries
and hence, into what Freeman (1986) sees as the leading branches in absorbing
and adapting themselves to the new 'information technology' paradigm. The
important fact for our purposes, however, is that such an achievement has
involved the gradual displacement of competing, previously established,
technological processes and hence, from the vantage point of our
conceptualization, a complex struggle between different ensembles of technical and
socio-cultural relations which has gradually transformed the sociotechnical realm
of the entire area of signal systems. Ultimately, it has been an interacting
process of momentum-gathering and momentum-losing of competing technological
processes manifested at both the socio-institutional and the aggregate levels of
their historical unfolding.
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In effect, as the alteration in the mix of basic resources has manifested
itself in and through the simultaneous dissolution of existing sociotechnical
relations and the emergence of new ones, deep intra- as well as inter-
institutional transformations within the socio-institutional realm of the competing
systems have taken place. In this respect, intra-institutionally. i.e., within the
institutional depositories of an existing technological process, many forms of
investments, skills, knowledge, machinery, etc., associated with, for instance,
electro-mechanical capabilities, or vacuum tube capabilities have come to give
way to the emergent IMC's semiconductor capabilities. Initially, this could not
be an easy transition since it involved the interplay of interests of many people
who as human resources, capitalists, etc., were constituents of the previous
technology. In time, however, under the pressures of historical galvanizing
forces and as the unfolding of the emergent IMC technology has gradually made
available, in a constant stream of innovations, all the necessary basic resources
for its competitive implementation and, above all, as it has become more
advantageous (and indeed necessary) in terms of the overriding interests of
dominant institutional constituents, the previous systemic integration of
sociotechnical constituents has lost its momentum coming gradually to
disintegrate in a process dominated by what we have earlier called as a
sociotechnical constituent's vicious circle of diminishing strength (41). At this
stage, therefore, through a process of intra-institutional transformation, the same
institutional depositories of basic resources related to the non-systemic
development of the area of signal systems evolved into the institutional
depositories of an IMC technological process. In general terms, however, in a
process of the kind we have just described, it seems clear that not all the
institutional depositories of the momentum-losing technological process can make
(41) It is interesting to note here that, as Rosenberg (1977a) points out, innovations related
to the 'old' existing technological processes do not stop with the advent of the new one,
"...the 'old' technology continues to improve after the introduction of the 'new', thus
postponing even further the time when the old technology is clearly outmoded"...In fact, the
advent of a new techno logy..."often appears to induce vigorous and imaginative responses on
the part of industries for which they are providing close substitutes" (Rosenberg,pp.203 and
205). From our perspective, this would be a natural response of a systemic ensemble of
sociotechnical relations which is threatened in its very existence. In this respect, the 'new'
technological process would act as a strong galvanizing force in itself, giving a renewed lease
of momentum to the existing system and, consequently, protracting the very process of its
own momentum-gathering. An example of this case was the attempt by vacuum tube maters
to follow the path of miniaturization opened by the transistor. As Electronics (1980)
wrote,..."A strong attempt to stave off the threat of the transistor was made by RCA in
introducing the Nuvistor, a miniature ceramic tube with low power drain and high-
reliability. Despite many merits, it failed to halt the inexorable march of solid-state devices"
( Electronics, p.319).
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the transition in the same way. First of all. as we know, there are different
classes of institutional depositories so that in some of them, e.g., universities, the
transition is more likely to proceed smoothly while in others such as industrial
companies it is likely to be much more time consuming and controversial given
the involvement not only of the dual dynamics of learning/displacement of
skills, knowledge, investments, etc., but, also, of the contradictory nature of the
convergent relationship between capital and labour (for capital the technological
process is just a means towards accumulation, for labour it is its existence as
such). In practice, not all companies actually manage to overcome the difficulties
involved so that some of them eventually collapse under the pressures of
galvanizing forces and, particularly, the pressures emanating from the advance of
the new sociotechnical system; others merge with or are absorbed by more
dynamic or stronger companies, etc.; all in a process which manifest itself most
clearly in a restructuring of markets associated with the competing technological
processes. Ultimately, the specific concrete way in which this process materializes
itself is dependent upon many factors, amongst them, the previous structure of
the market, the legislative framework concerning the companies involved and,
above all, the quantitative and qualitative character of the companies as
institutional ensembles of technical and socio-cultural relations themselves.
Of course, as we have said before, the intra-institutional dimension is only
part of the complex process of socio-institutional transformations involved in the
momentum-losing/momentum-gathering dialectics of competing technological
processes. For, along with it and, indeed, interpenetrating with it, is the inter-
institutional dimension accounting for the transformation of previous forms of
interlinking between separate institutions which bring into systemic convergence
and contradiction the overriding interests not only of different social constituents
who remain dominant in their own institutions but also of generically similar
but institutionally fragmented social constituents. In this respect, going back to
the competing technological processes in the area of signal systems as a whole, it
is clear that several major inter-institutional transformations were involved in
the process of IMC momentum-gathering. Among them, for instance, a host of
new companies associated with the new IMC technology entered the industrial
and market scene; an expansion of old and emergence of new university and
private and public R&D institutions associated with the IMC technological
process took place; financial institutions, foundations, etc., opened themselves to
the new technological process providing necessary basic resources; most
conspicuously, government institutions and, in the case of the US's IMC,
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military institutions become much more involved in the development of the
momentum-gathering technology than they had ever been in the development of
the momentum-losing technological process. Indeed, to the extent that the
intrinsic technical potential of an IMC enabled the materialization of such
activities as space, completely new government organizations such as NASA
actually emerged as strongly interacting components of the socio-institutional
complex of the US's IMC. However, the most crucial socio-institutional
transformation, and the one truly underlying all others, laid in the very
systemic and synergistic convergence of the entire area of signal systems which
the momentum-gathering process of the emergent IMC technology brought about.
In effect, this process not only gave rise to completely new industries such as
semiconductors and computers but, also, brought into systemic interaction the
sociotechnical realm of the entire area of signal systems in a way that the
momentum-losing technological process could have never achieved. With the
dissolution of competing, previously established, technological processes, therefore,
and their substitution by the IMC technological process, a completely new world
on intra- and inter-institutional interrelations actually developed, making the
transformation occurred at the socio-institutional level of the area of signal
systems as a whole one of a truly radical character. Illustratively, in the
diagram of figure 5.2, where the phenomenon of competing technological
processes has been depicted on the left-hand side column, what occurred may be
seen as a process where, from left to right and vice-versa, the whole ensemble
of technical and socio-cultural relations involved in the entire area of signal
systems was profoundly altered through a dialectics of dissolving and emergent
systems whose concrete manifestation was, at every step, the result of such
factors as the qualitative and quantitative development of the basic resources of
the competing systems; the interactions, convergence and conflicts between the
different social constituents' overriding interests and their social organizations; the
qualitative and quantitative development and interlinking of institutional
depositories; the development of the written and unwritten legislation of society;
and the changing pressures of historical galvanizing forces both informing and
interacting with the other factors above. In all, this was a truly complex
historical process of deep transformations whereby the IMC sociotechnical process
not only established itself within the area of signal systems as a whole but,
simultaneously, began its diffusion journey into the sociotechnical realm of
society. In effect, as we shall see below, the same kind of transformations as
those above have been taking place throughout the sociotechnical realm of society
as the IMC has gradually transformed itself into a nodal system interacting in a
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push-pull fashion with all others in a process characterized by a similar
dialectics of competing momentum-gathering/momentum-losing technological
processes. Before coming to the sociotechnical realm of society, however, we need
to deal with the changes accompanying the manifestation of such dialectics at
the aggregate level of the social constituency of the area of signal systems.
At the aggregate level of social forces, the main point one has to make is
that the transformations associated with the IMC momentum-gathering process
were not as revolutionary as those we have identified at the socio-institutional
level of the IMC diffusion process within the area of signal systems as a whole.
Indeed, it is possible to say that, at this level, what did take place, in the US's
case for instance, nicely fits our previous characterization of the development of
sociotechnical systems not only as a process of constant alteration of the
sociotechnical systems themselves but, also, as a process of simultaneous
reproduction of dominant social forces and relations in and through the
sociotechnical systems themselves. For, notwithstanding the particular
characteristics of the capital-science-military-government dominant social
constituency of the US's IMC, it is clear form our analysis in Chapter III that
the deep transformations which occurred at the socio-institutional level of the
area of signal systems did not involve any substantial alteration in. but rather a
clear process of reproduction and furtherance of, the overriding interests
dominating the historical development of such area of signal systems. True
enough, some relevant changes took place in the magnitude, form, and degree of
participation, as well as in the interrelations between, such aggregate social
constituents as capital, government, the military and science. For the most part,
however, this does not alter the fact that the overriding interests of capital
clearly dominated the development of the non-systemic signal technologies as
they have come to dominate that of the competing IMC technological process.
Likewise, considering that electricity was one of the first science-based
technologies, it is clear that the overriding interests of science were as much an
intrinsic constituent of the electromagnetic development of the area of signal
systems as they have been in the semiconductor-based development of an IMC.
Furthermore, as we also saw in Chapter III (Appendix III), even the integration
of the overriding interests of capital, science, the military and government into a
well defined social complex of power actually finds its roots in the pre-IMC
period of development of the area of signal systems. At the aggregate level of
social forces, therefore, and with due consideration of differences between
different historical periods, we can conclude that, in spite of the deep
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transformation of the area of signal systems as a global ensemble of technical
and socio-cultural relations, no qualitative alteration of the complex of
overriding interests dominating such area of signal systems actually took place.
On the contrary, if anything, the substitution of an IMC for the competing
technological processes was not only presided over by, but indeed the result of
the reproduction and furtherance of overriding interests of, the same aggregate
social forces. We have seen the outcome in the course of this thesis: with the
development of an IMC, under the pressures of historical galvanizing forces of
economic and politico-military competition, not only the power accumulated by
these aggregate social forces has increased for each one of them individually but,
more so, it has increased collectively in their long-term structuring as a complex
of social power controlling and shaping the development of US's
micro technology.
Finally, to bring the conceptualization of the momentum-gathering process
of an IMC to an end, we turn our attention to the process involved in its
diffusion into the broader sociotechnical realm of society, i.e., to the process
whereby an IMC is gradually transforming itself into a nodal sociotechnical
system interacting in a push-pull fashion with other systems of the
sociotechnical realm of society. In this respect, the first point that has to be
made is that this process is fundamentally the same, or more precisely, an
extension of the process of IMC momentum-gathering just analysed above. Hence,
it follows that most of the crucial features of the latter process will also
characterize the unfolding of the IMC momentum-gathering throughout the
sociotechnical realm of society. This would be the case, for instance, of the
dialectics of change without change, that is, of the process of deep
transformations at the socio-institutional level for reproduction at the aggregate
level which has dominated the IMC momentum-gathering within the area of
signal systems as a whole. In the present discussion, therefore, we shall not
repeat the latter kind of analysis since it would add little new to our
conceptualization: instead, we shall content ourselves with pointing out those
general features which are specific to the process of IMC momentum-gathering
throughout the sociotechnical realm of society. On this score, the fundamental
point is that, as we noted earlier, a complex and pervasive ITC such as an IMC
truly needs, at all moments of its materialization in practice, to interact and
interpenetrate with a wide range of other sociotechnical systems, thus shaping as
much as being shaped by the characteristics and dynamism of the entire
sociotechnical realm of society. Ultimately, this means that in the process of
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IMC diffusion throughout the latter realm, apart from the emergence of
completely new IMC-based technological areas such as AI, a complex dynamics
of simultaneous interpenetration with, and displacement of, other sociotechnical
systems is always involved. More specifically, this means that for an IMC to
diffuse at all. the two following conditions must always be satisfied. Firstly, the
products and processes either coming in or coming out of an IMC must, of
necessity, be perceived as important for the reproduction and furtherance of the
overriding interests, primarily, of the dominant social constituency of the
interacting sociotechnical systems; that is, the IMC system's push-pull action
must broadly coincide with the corresponding push and/or pull action of
interacting sociotechnical systems. Secondly, the IMC push-pull action must, in
the specific historical circumstances of given historical galvanizing forces, be
perceived as superior to that of any previously established competing
technological processes so as to overcome the resistance implicit in the latter
processes' momentum and successfully underpin the complex socio-institutional
transformations involved in the dual dynamics of learning and displacement of
skills, knowledge, investments, machinery, etc. In practice, only when these two
conditions are satisfied does the diffusion of an IMC spread beyond the area of
signal systems as a whole taking the dialectics of competing momentum-
gathering/momentum-losing technological processes into the sociotechnical realm of
society as a whole. And in the case of an IMC, given the potential all-
pervasiveness of microtechnology, the latter means not just the displacement
from the sociotechnical realm of society of the full circle of interactions
materializing the diffusion of competing technological processes associated to the
non-systemic development of the area of signal systems but, also, as we have
said before, the potential displacement of a much wider range of sociotechnical
relations where the manual and mental activities of human beings have
constituted necessary basic resources. In short, it means the potential
transformation of the entire ensemble of technical and socio-cultural relations
making up the unfolding sociotechnical realm of society. In practice, as we have
seen during this work, the above process of global transformation is already on
its way in the most advanced DCs, manifesting itself in a dialectics of
dissolving and emerging ensembles of technical and socio-cultural relations whose
sum-total truly tends to embrace the entire sociotechnical realm of society. In
this respect, in a way determined by specific and changing historical galvanizing
forces, it is possible to say that, in the long-term, the aggregate crystallization
of this complex process of transformations is clearly leading to the realization of
an IMC as a nodal sociotechnical system and, consequently, to the
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transformation of the aggregate ensemble of technical and socio-cultural relations
which make up the sociotechnical realm of society itself. Thus, from basic
resources to legislation and social constituents' socio-political organizations, the
IMC sociotechnical realm of the future is certain to differ substantially from its
pre-IMC historical manifestation. It is this process, particularly in its aggregate
socio-institutional transformation, which has led some scholars of the
paradigmatic school of thought to talk of an adaptation of the socio-institutional
structure of society to the requirements of the unfolding microelectronics
paradigm. Here, however, we prefer to see the transformation of the
sociotechnical realm of society as flowing out from itself in a process whose
shape and dynamism is, at every step, the result of the qualitative and
quantitative interpenetration of competing/interacting basic resources, interests,
institutional depositories, written and unwritten legislation, historical galvanizing
forces, etc. In this way, the overall shape of the process reveals itself not just
as an envelope of aggregate transformations but as an outgrowth of what is in
fact a very heterogeneous reality of sociotechnical interactions stemming from
the fact that the relative development of an IMC vis-a-vis interacting/competing
sociotechnical systems tends to vaxy for different areas within the sociotechnical
realm of society. Thus, in some instances there can be a greater degree of
resistance to change, specifically in those areas where the displacement of
systemic ensembles of skills, knowledge, investments, etc., is bound to affect
deeply the interests of entrenched social constituents. In other instances, the
resistance to change can be minimal or even non-existent as in the extreme case
of a complete absence of a competing momentum-losing sociotechnical system. In
the latter case, in principle, the situation should be more favourable for a
process of IMC momentum-gathering, if only because its unfolding can proceed
unhindered by the contradictions emerging from the struggle with a competing
sociotechnical process. To a large extent, it is the latter realization which has
led some commentators to note the beneficial side of the weakness of non-
systemic signal technological capabilities in underdeveloped countries, thus
emphasizing the possibility for them not only of more easily 'leap-frogging' such
previous technologies but even of catching up, or closing the gap, with developed
countries in the process of IMC momentum-gathering .given the more complex and
contradictory nature of this process in the latter countries. For instance, Soete
(1985) has argued that, in a context of intense competition in the electronics
market and rather easy international accessibility to inventions and innovations
due to difficulties of implementing legal protection, the potential for UDCs,
specifically semi- and newly-industrializing countries, to leapfrog into
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microelectronics has never been greater than today. He recognizes that there are
great difficulties in this undertaking but emphasizes that the techno-economic
advantages of electronics technology, particularly in labour and capital
productivity growth, make it very favourable for UDCs to attempt to leap-frog
into it. This is so, because electronics technology favours UDCs on two major
accounts: first, on their general capital shortage problem and, secondly, on their
bottlenecks in highly specialized technical skills which, at the same time, imply
less resistance to the electronics technology's deskilling effects than it will be the
case in developed countries. The science-based character of the technology would
be an additional advantage given that scientific and technical education is not a
crucial bottleneck in semi- or newly-industrializing countries (42) In all
instances, appropriate government policies play a fundamental role.
Undoubtedly, this view is correct so far as it goes and, in principle, leap¬
frogging and catching up are possibilities in the global unfolding of the
microelectronics revolution. It seems to us, however, that insofar as the
sociotechnical nature of an IMC technological process is not unveiled in this kind
of analysis of the international diffusion of microtechnology, then certain crucial
difficulties may be underestimated. This seems to be the case, for example, with
the development of a powerful and coherent social constituency which, as we
have seen, is needed in and for the development of any ITC sociotechnical
process. In this respect, considering that microtechnology has originated in the
developed countries under the shaping control of a particular social constituency,
in the leap-frogging analysis there is a certain tendency to emphasize the
advantage of the late-comer and the 'willingness' of transnational capital to
transfer its technology under the pressure of competition without much attention
to its contradictory role in the social constituency of the host country. In other
words, the fact is overlooked that microtechnology -as it was the case with
previous competing signal technologies- is truly an outgrowth of an
internationally interacting/competing sociotechnical system, which means that
although there may be less contradictions emerging from the momentum-
gathering/momentum-losing dialectics of different competing technological
processes, simultaneously, there may be quite a lot more emerging from the
international interplay of basic resources, interests, institutions, galvanizing
forces, etc., which make up the international dimension of the development of
sociotechnical systems. It is to the basic tenets of this international dimension
that we now turn our concern in the last section of the present conceptual
(42) for a similar view applied to the field of telecommunications, see Hobday (1985,1986),
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framework for the understanding of ITC sociotechnical processes.
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53.1, International Dimension of the Development of ITC
Sociotechnical Processes: Interaction and Competition
Between National Sociotechnical Systems
Thus far, we have dealt with the historical unfolding of large-scale and
complex ITCs as if such an unfolding took place within the confines of a
particular country or region and oblivious of the contradictions emerging from
its interlinking and projection in the international arena. In practice, however, as
we have seen in the case of the capitalist science-based IMC, large-scale and
complex technological processes are subject to a double form of expansion. On
the one hand, they do tend to project themselves internationally through both
the overriding interests and actions of their social constituents and the
requirements of their basic resources (i.e., sociotechnical autarchy is hardly an
option). On the other hand, they tend to replicate themselves in other countries
or regions where, as indigenous ensembles of technical and socio-cultural
relations, they assume forms and dynamism which are very much the result of
the character and quantitative and qualitative development of basic resources and
social constituents in those countries or regions. This double and interacting form
of expansion gives rise to the process of internationally interacting/competing
sociotechnical systems which not only involves most of the issues dealt with
above but, indeed, adds some important new dimensions to the reconstruction of
the historical unfolding of ITC sociotechnical processes.
At the core of the new dimensions lie the contradictions and tensions
implicit in the simultaneous development and interpenetration of the two forms
of sociotechnical systems' expansion abcvementioned. In particular, the replication
of sociotechnical systems in various countries or regions plays a crucial role for,
being commonly informed by the pursuit of national technological self-reliance,
it clearly interlinks as well as counterposes both the national and the
international unfolding of different countries sociotechnical systems. Of course, as
we have seen in the course of this work, this national and international
differentiation is never a clearcut matter of countries interrelating on the basis
of national interests in the abstract. Nor is it one of a replication of some
universal sociotechnical system valid for all countries. Rather, the situation is
one of much greater complexity involving not only the interlinking and
counterposition of overriding and particular interests of nationally-based social
constituents operating nationally and/or internationally but, more generally, the
interlinking and counterposition of different national ensembles of technical and
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socio-cultural relations. In this respect, there are various aspects which is
important to highlight.
a) As we know, in the case of a specific sociotechnical process such as a
capitalist science-based IMC, there are intrinsic sociotechnical constituents rooted
in the very nature of certain fundamental technical and social relations
associated with microtechnology and a primarily capitalistic control of its basic
resources and hence, development. This means that whenever a specific
sociotechnical system tends to replicate itself in two or more countries, then the
inevitable consequence is for those countries to acquire and possess the intrinsic
sociotechnical constituents of such sociotechnical system. This necessary level of
intrinsic sociotechnical constituents, therefore, offer a first and basic channel for
the international interaction of nationally-based sociotechnical systems. In the
case of a large-scale and complex capitalist science-based ITC, for instance, we
have distinguished capital, science, labour, management and government as
intrinsic social constituents of the technological process. As such, it can be said
that each and every one of these constituents represent, among other elements, a
potential channel for an international interaction which, as we shall see later on,
will manifest itself in and through many and variegated forms of international
socio-institutional combinations.
b) Beyond the level of intrinsic constituents, and as ensembles of technical and
socio-cultural relations, nationally-based sociotechnical systems tend to differ
from each other substantially in both the quantitative and qualitative shape and
dynamism of their development. The reason is simple, no two countries are alike
technically, culturally and legislatively just to name a few relevant aspects.
Thus, not only do nationally-based sociotechnical systems tend to differ in the
aggregate magnitude and state of development, and even in the specific character,
of the basic resources nationally available at any given time. They also tend to
differ in the process of creation and systemic integration of these basic resources
into sociotechnical institutions which are ensembles of technical and socio-cultural
themselves. The latter is particularly the case as the evolving cultural and
legislative differences between countries are necessarily incorporated and reflected
in the respective developments of nationally-based sociotechnical systems. More
specifically, as we have seen in this work, these systems may differ markedly in
the complexion of their respective social constituents and, most importantly,
their dominant social constituents. In this respect, disparities may involve not
only differences in the composition of the complex of social interests making up
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the respective social constituents but, simultaneously, differences in the particular
correlation of forces characterizing the evolving interrelations between social
constituents themselves. Ultimately, the combined effect of these disparities only
emphasizes the uniqueness characterizing the complexes of overriding and
particular interests shaping the development process of different countries'
sociotechnical systems in the context of changing historical galvanizing forces.
Furthermore, since there is a plain relationship between some galvanizing forces
and the overriding interests of some social constituents, this uniqueness is only
reinforced by the fact that differences in the social constituency tend to involve,
simultaneously, differences in the very nature and role played by historical
galvanizing forces in the development of given nationally-based sociotechnical
systems. Of course, all this without mentioning that, in practice, galvanizing
forces such as social crises, geoeconomic and demographic pressures, etc., tend to
assume very particular expressions in the historical development of particular
countries.
c) The international interlinking of sociotechnical systems materializes itself in
and through a complex interplay of basic resources, overriding and particular
interests, institutions, galvanizing forces, etc. In such an interplay, each one of
the nationally-based social constituents involved will pursue the fulfillment of
its overriding and particular interests, thus entering into complementary as much
as contradictory interrelations with other social constituents. In this framework,
one can say, for instance, that the overriding and particular interests of science
are more likely to lead into complementary international interrelations between
different nationally-based science constituents. Socio-institutionally, this amounts
to Saving that it will be between those institutional forms where science interests
remain dominant that one is more likely to find bilateral as well as multilateral
arrangements interlinking in a more complementary fashion different nationally-
based sociotechnical systems. On the other hand, if we take the accumulating
interests of capital, the clear likelihood is for contradictory as well as
complementary international interrelations between different nationally-based
capital constituents. Thus, in socio-institutional terms, while various kinds of
formal arrangements may interlink some nationally-based capital institutions in
complementary fashion, at the same time, the need for control and competition
associated with capital accumulation may lead not only to inter-institutional
relations of domination and control but, most importantly, to contradict the
very development of the aggregate process of capital accumulation in some of
the countries involved. Of course, the latter is something that will depend upon
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the relative strength of the interrelating institutions and, ultimately, upon the
nature and strength of the overall nationally-based sociotechnical system of
which they are essential constituents. In the latter sense, it must be noted that
social constituents relate internationally not only with those of their own kind
(e.g., capital-capital) but with other generic social constituents too. For example,
in the internationalization of the productive activity of corporate capital, the
latter normally enters into interrelations with governments, labour, management,
etc., from those countries where they establish operations. Indeed, the range of
possible combinations is quite variegated.
d) Basic to the process of interrelations just mentioned is the rooting of social
constituents into nationally-based social constituencies and, more generally,
ensembles of technical and socio-cultural relations, which imbue their
international activities with the basic tenets of both the historical character of
their raison d'etre and the character of their integration and relative weight
within the abovementioned ensembles. Thus, if we look at the role of their
raison d'etre, it seems clear that while for some social constituents such as
science and capital the international arena has increasingly become the natural
and accepted ground for the unfolding of the respective processes of knowledge
and capital accumulation; for others, such as government and the military -
with the strengthening of national political sovereignty - the international arena
has tended to become more restricted as an area of direct operations and control
in pursuit of dominant national interests. On the other hand, if we look at the
role of the particular character of the social constituents' integration and relative
weight within nationally-based social constituencies, it seems clear that it
strongly influences the practical manifestation of the trends emerging from the
constituents raison d'etre. In particular, such constituents as science and capital
may see their international activities mediated and even curtailed by
requirements arising from the overriding and particular interests of other
dominant constituents such as government and/or the military. The latter is a
case which we have seen clearly in relation to the US's IMC, where the
military, alleging national security interests in a context of re-strengthened
military galvanizing forces, have curtailed the international diffusion of certain
kinds of knowledge, machinery and products, thus contradicting the natural
international tendency which emerge from the interests of science and capital.
e) The interlinking of nationally-based sociotechnical processes, which takes place
on the basis of resource requirements and through the international expansion
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and/or interaction of different countries' sociotechnical institutions, does not
simply involve an international diffusion of resources or an interlinking of social
interests. Ultimately, it is the very nature of ITC sociotechnical processes as
ensembles of technical and socio-cultural relations which is projected
internationally through the diffusion of their basic resources and the activities of
their socio-institutional constituents and interests. That is to say, in the
interpenetration of sociotechnical systems, the written and unwritten legislation
of institutions and, indeed, societies, comes into a dynamic interaction which
expresses itself in a process of adaptations and transformations whose mutual
character or one-sideness greatly depends on the relative strength of the
interacting sociotechnical systems themselves and on the historical role of the
galvanizing forces. In a previous section (see 5.3.3.3), we have discussed how the
unfolding of sociotechnical institutions can be more clearly seen as actually
transforming as much as reflecting the written and unwritten legislation, i.e.,
legal provisions, customs, values and attitudes prevalent in a given society.
More precisely, we argued that, in such an unfolding of sociotechnical
institutions, what actually takes place is a process of transformation of
particular socio-cultural relations for reproduction of fundamental socio-cultural
relations. The international projection of this fundamental reality has momentous
implications for our conceptualization of the international dimension of
sociotechnical systems. Above all, it enables us, on the one hand, to distinguish
some basic conditions underlying the very possibility and character of
international interlinking and, on the other, to provide a common ground for
understanding the deep international socio-cultural role of the actual and
variegated ways and mechanisms whereby such interlinking takes place. On the
first account, assuming a two-country process of interlinking of sociotechnical
processes through the intended actions of, above all, their dominant social
constituents, it seems clear that a basic precondition for an interlinking of such
sociotechnical processes is that, by and large, such development should imply, or
be perceived as implying, the furtherance of the overriding and particular
interests of the dominant parties involved, particularly, in a context of
reproduction of fundamental social relations on both sides. In other words, on
both sides there must be a perception of complementarity and mutual benefit,
which stimulates interlinking and hence, changes in particular socio-cultural
relations for reproduction of fundamental relations. This precondition would help
to explain, for instance, why an international interlinking of sociotechnical
systems is more readily accomplished between capitalist countries themselves, or
between socialist countries themselves, than it is the case between capitalist and
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socialist countries. In addition, it would help to explain why written and
unwritten legislation, or changes in one country's government policies which, in
the context of given historical galvanizing forces, are perceived as harmful to the
interests of the other country's social constituents, normally, give rise to
contradictions which may lead to showdowns and confrontations whose
resolution is very much determined by the actual correlation of forces between
the countries involved. On account of the second aspect, it is first necessary to
point out that the variety of ways and mechanisms whereby such an
interlinking can take place is in principle unlimited. Not only that, for even if
we assume a two-country process, we have the additional fact that the
differences between the two countries involved may assume innumerable
expressions too. Thus, just to illustrate the argument about the deep socio-
cultural role of interlinking mechanisms, we shall not only assume that our two
countries possess similar and well-developed ITCs but, also, select the particular
case, most commonly exemplified by the operations of TNCs, where institutional
constituents rooted in one country's sociotechnical system operate directly within
the national environment of another country's sociotechnical system. In this case,
our contention is that while both parties are basically complemented in a general
dynamic of reproduction of fundamental social relations, at the level of
particular socio-cultural relations the situation is much more fluid. Specifically,
the trend or pressure is for the subsidiaries of institutions of one country
operating within the environment of the other to adapt themselves to the
written and unwritten legislation of that country while, simultaneously,
contributing to its transformation through the insertion of its own ensemble of
technical and socio-cultural relations within the workings of the host country's
sociotechnical system. Conversely, in a reversal of the inter-country flow of
influences, the same institution becomes itself a vehicle for the insertion of
foreign technical and socio-cultural relations back to the parent organization and
hence, the home country, with the result that the flow of society-transforming
changes may go from one country to another and vice-versa. Obviously, such
mutual flow of influence is reinforced when institutions of both countries
establish operation in the other country in a sort of, say, institutional exchange.
In this context, a general rule may be suggested, namely, that in the
international interlinking of sociotechnical systems through the
interacting/competing activities of their respective institutions, those forms of
technical and socio-cultural relations which give certain institutions an edge in
terms of the realization of their overriding interests and raison d'etre, will tend
to diffuse themselves into other similar institutions provided, of course, that such
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relations are not kept secret and the latter institutions all possess the ability to
appropriate them. Ultimately, if we relax our two-country assumption, this rule
provides a basic explanation to Perez's process of diffusion of the general best
practice frontier across firms, branches and countries (see previous section).
Indeed, we can say that the greater the number of countries, the larger the scale
of international diffusion of successful relations and hence, society-transforming
changes.
f) Finally, the national overtones present in the previous points, for instance, in
the use of terms such as particular countries' sociotechnical systems, does not
imply in any sense that the interlinking of such sociotechnical systems involves,
always and primarily, the simultaneous interaction and counterposilion of two
kinds of national blocks. This may well appear so from the standpoint of the
aggregate development of a given country's sociotechnical system, or, even from
the standpoint of more nationalistic social constituents such as the military,
particularly, in a context of strong military galvanizing forces. In practice,
however, at the socio-institutional level, the situation reveals itself to be much
more flexible as we have seen in the course of this work, for instance, in our
analysis of the global process of electronics capital accumulation carried out in
Chapter III. There, it was found that electronics corporate capital is not at all
operating on a nationalistic basis but, clearly, on a global basis which has led
increasingly to alliances of electronics capitals where companies are lining up
amongst themselves internationally rather than nationally. Thus, as it has
normally been the case throughout this enquiry, simpler and schematic
generalizations can be made only at the peril of denying the complexity and
richness of the actual processes taking place.
By and large, the series of points made above constitute a basic framework
for approaching the analysis of the international interpenetration of different
countries' sociotechnical systems. A more impressionistic view of the complexity
of the issues and interrelations involved at this level is obtained by looking at
figures 5.2 and 5.3 together. Figure 5.3. in particular, depicts that, in the
international interpenetration of sociotechnical systems, some or all the elements,
interrelations and forces involved in the workings of the system depicted in
Figure 5.3 may come into a process of interactions embracing not just two but
many countries. Additionally, such countries may differ substantially in the
qualitative and quantitative character and development of their respective
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sociotechnical systems. In this sense, our discussion thus far has assumed a basic
two-country (regions) process of interlinking with both countries (regions)
possessing well developed capabilities. As we know from our discussion in
previous chapters, however, this assumption relates more closely to the case of
the interpenetration of most advanced countries' sociotechnical systems (e.g., the
interpenetration of US and Japanese IMCs). While, as has been shown by our
analysis of Mexico's electronics capabilities with their deep dependence upon the
US, it does not correspond itself with the case of, let us say, DCs-UDCs
interlinking of sociotechnical systems or the case of UDCs-UDCs interlinking of
sociotechnical systems. In other words, in the variegated realm of international
possibilities, there is not just sociotechnical interlinking between DCs themselves
but, also, between DCs and UDCs and between UDCs themselves. In the
remainder of this section and, indeed, the present thesis, we shall concern
ourselves primarily with discussing some of the general characteristics present in
the DCs-UDCs form of interlinking of sociotechnical systems. We shall do so
because not only is this the case we have dealt with most in our treatment of
an IMC in UDCs but, also, is the case which clearly predominates in the present
stage of Third World development, where normally DCs are the actual
possessors of large-scale and complex ITCs and where UDCs-UDCs forms of
interrelations (i.e., the so-called South-South cooperation) for purposes of
sociotechnical development are far from being a widespread reality.
Again, in the context of DCs-UDCs interlinking, the variety of possibilities
is enormous with Third World countries alone differing widely between
themselves. In fact, even if we take as a common general trait for TW
countries the fact that they lack self-reliant ITC sociotechnical processes vis-a-vis
the most advanced nations, the differences can still be enormous. For instance,
they can differ not only in terms of such basic indicators as size, population,
GDP, literacy, etc., but, also, in terms of broader socio-cultural and institutional
characteristics such as governmental and educational systems, legislative
frameworks, etc. More specifically, if we take as a point of reference the
development of a given ITC sociotechnical process such as an IMC, at one end
of the Third World spectrum there will be countries which possess virtually
nothing in terms of the fundamental sociotechnical constituents of such a
process; while, at the other end, there will be countries such as the NICs where
government-supported efforts to develop an EMC have not only produced some
advances but are clearly in the long-term agenda of these countries' development
process. Through the case of Mexico, our concern in this thesis has mainly been
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with the latter end of the Third World spectrum. As such, it is only logical
that this concern should be reflected in the following discussion of the DCs-
UDCs case of sociotechnical interlinking between different countries or regions. It
will be the NICs, therefore, which will provide the background for the analysis
of this process and. again, for the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that only
two countries or regions are involved in such interlinking.
By and large, the most significant points in relation to UDCs-DCs
sociotechnical interlinking find their roots in the various arguments developed
above in points a) to f) and, particularly, point e). There, among other things,
we said that, as two countries come together on the basis of sociotechnical
interlinking, it is the written and unwritten legislation of their institutions and,
indeed, societies, which comes into a process of dynamic interaction leading to
technical and socio-cultural adaptations and transformations whose mutual
character, or one-sideness, greatly depends on the relative strength of the
interacting sociotechnical systems themselves. We also distinguished a sort of
general rule which related the diffusion of technical and socio-cultural relations
to the successful realization of social constituents" and institutions' overriding
interests, given, of course, that such relations are not kept secret and the
institutions concerned possess the capability to appropriate them. It seems to us
that these contentions offer a basis for the discussion of the sociotechnical
interlinking of DCs and UDCs and hence, for the treatment of what is perhaps
the most crucial issue dominating the unfolding of such interlinking, namely, the
relation of unequal interdependence expressed in the normally commanding
sociotechnical position of DCs vis-a-vis UDCs.
Let us consider for this purpose, the case of a capitalist science-based IMC
and our findings relating to the sociotechnical interlinking of the US and Mexico.
Here, the relevant point is that not only is the relative strength of the
interacting sociotechnical systems overwhelmingly in favour of the US but, mot
dramatically, that in Mexico there is in fact no sociotechnical reality as that
implied in a capitalist science-based IMC. Indeed, most of the intrinsic
sociotechnical constituents rooted in the very nature of microtechnology, and a
primarily capitalistic control of its basic resources, are systemically undeveloped
in Mexico. Consequently, if we take into account that the sociotechnical
interlinking between countries materializes itself in and through a complex
interplay of basic resources, overriding and particular interests, institutions,
galvanizing forces, etc., the fact is that, at the present stage, Mexico has very
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limited leverage to influence the shape of such a complex interplay, say. within
the US. In other words, from the standpoint of the interlinking of ensembles of
technical and socio-cultural relations manifesting itself in the mutual or one¬
sided transformation of both countries written and unwritten legislation, the fact
is that Mexico has very little to offer the US in terms of successful IMC
technical and socio-cultural relations while being herself mostly unable to
appropriate the kind of successful relations present in the IMC sociotechnical
process of the US. Such combination, which is typical of the majority of the
Third World countries, determines not only a greatly one-sided, or unequally
interdependent, process of interpenetration of technical and socio-cultural
interrelations but, above all, a process which is, from TW countries' point of
view, largely shaped by the overriding and particular interests of foreign
constituents and institutions and which, at least where capital is involved, tends
to reproduce the conditions of unequal interdependence which enable such foreign
constituents' influence in the first place. The international flow of society-
transforming influences, therefore, goes primarily from DCs to UDCs and,
because of the conditions (capitalistic) within which it takes place, it hardly
contributes to its own negation, rather to its own reproduction.
Obviously, as we have pointed out before, in the sociotechnical interlinking
of different countries, it is basically superficial to pose a view implying the
counterposition of two national blocks. Also, we have established the existence
of a fundamental pre-condition for such interlinking to take place, namely, that
among the interacting social constituents of both countries, particularly, the
dominant social constituents, there must be a perception of complementarity and
mutual benefit. This means, therefore, that, within a context conditioned by the
relative nature and qualitative/quantitative development of technical factors both
in DCs and UDCs, it is the overriding and particular interests of both countries'
social constituents and their institutions which effectively determine the shape
and dynamism of their sociotechnical interlinking. Put in a different way, while
it is true that the relation of unequal interdependence is generally rooted in the
technical and material determinants of both countries sociotechnical processes, it
is also true that the specific form of manifestation of such relation is
determined by the interests of not only DCs' social constituents, but of UDCs'
social constituents too. During the course of this thesis, we have seen this
situation quite clearly, particularly, in the comparison between different forms of
DCs-UDCs interlinking pursued by such UDCs as Mexico, Brazil and South
Korea. There we saw that, within a general context of reproduction of
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international capitalism and the associated need to preserve DCs-UDCs
interlinking, the respective social constituents of the above countries have
implemented different strategies for the development of their electronics
sociotechnical processes, including, most prominently, the specific form of
interlinking of these processes to those of developed countries. True, such
differences in strategy have been the result of a combination of factors.
Ultimately, however, there can be no denial of the fact that it has been the
differences between these countries in terms of both, the nature and relative
strength of their national social constituents' overriding and particular interests
and the particular context of historical galvanizing forces, which have played the
most dynamic part. In terms of the interlinking of these countries sociotechnical
process to that of DCs, therefore, the perception of mutual advancement of
interests between DCs and UDCs dominant social constituents has assumed a
different expression, with the result that the very form of the relations of
unequal interdependence has manifested itself differently too.
Normally, one of the most crucial and controversial areas of concern in the
process of sociotechnical interlinking between DCs and UDCs relates to the role
of DCs' transnational capital in the sociotechnical process of UDCs. The reason is
simple, not only do TNCs constitute the main channel or mechanism of
sociotechnical interlinking between DCs and UDCs, as most of the huge literature
on technology transfer to the Third World bears out, but, also, as we have
argued in point c) above, they tend to play a contradictory role in the national
process of capital accumulation, particularly in UDCs, where frequently their
superior basic-resources and technical and socio-cultural relations put them in a
clear position of strength vis-a-vis national capital. It is not surprising,
therefore, that in UDCs it is normally governments who strive to control the
activities of TNCs social constituents with the aim of, on the one hand,
enhancing their potential contribution to and hence, their complementary role in,
the development of the national sociotechnical process and, on the other, curbing
the negative effects of the trends implicit in the need for concentration and
control which accompanies the pursuit of profit-driven capital accumulation. As
we have seen in the case of Mexico, however, the latter is a path plagued with
difficulties given the global nature of TNCs operations, which also explains why
in other countries, like Brazil, the government constituent has sought to curtail
altogether the direct presence of TNCs from those sectors of the national market
where the development of national capabilities has been perceived as a matter of
priority. Notwithstanding this, however, it seems clear that the issue of whether
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TNCs can effectively contribute to the development of the national sociotechnical
process in UDCs, and to what extent, is not something that can be answered in
a black or white fashion. First of all is the fact that UDCs differ greatly
between themselves in the relative strength of their social constituents vis-a-vis
transnational capital. Secondly is the fact that, at the socio-institutional level of
particular companies, opportunities arise not only as a result of the international
competitive struggle which authors as Soete (1985) and Ernst (1985) have
clearly emphasized as favourable to UDCs but, also, as a result of the different
technical and socio-cultural structures of the transnational companies themselves.
An example of the latter, we saw clearly in the case of Mexico where the
different international structures of Ericsson and ITT were somewhat reflected in
the forms of interlinking of these companies into the Mexican electronics process,
with ITT entering into a bilateral arrangement technologically more favourable
to Mexico than it was the case with Ericsson. The argument can be put
forward, therefore, that at the level of real-life institutions, given the right set
of conditions and a carefully informed approach to the participation and role of
transnational capital, it may be possible for UDCs to incorporate TNCs into a
framework of operation which, while being based on the perception of mutual
benefits, is favourable to the development of a national ITC sociotechnical
process. Obviously, a crucial issue in this connection is that of correlation of
forces in the context of given historical galvanizing forces. For, while at one end
of the spectrum there will be companies much more powerful than many small
nations, at the other end, there will be large and more industrially diversified
countries relating to a variety of sizes of TNCs. For instance, within the
available range there will be countries whose dominant forces, while expecting to
benefit from the presence of TNCs, will hardly be able to influence the
technological role of these TNCs. In this case, regional integration seems to offer
the only possible alternative, but, even then, this would mean the formation of
a coherent regional social constituency. On the other hand, taking the case of
stronger UDC (basically NICs), it is reasonable to think that these countries
should privilege forms of interlinking with TNCs whose relative strength clearly
afford them a better leverage for the favourable incorporation of transnational
capital into the national ITC sociotechnical process. The difficulty with the latter
alternative, however, is that it demands a strong discriminatory stand on the
part of UDCs against, perhaps, the most powerful TNCs wishing to bring that
country into their sphere of capital accumulation. Thus, conflict is almost
certain to develop, eventually leading to the involvement of not only
transnational capital but, also, of other dominant social constituents of those
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countries wherefrom the discriminated TNCs originate. The reason is
straightforward enough. Although we have been considering UDCs-TNCs
relationships, the fact is that, in the final analysis, TNCs are basically a
mechanism whereby the interlinking of two nationally-based sociotechnical
processes is taking place. This means that action against powerful TNCs is in
fact action against powerful fragments of the corporate capital constituent of the
dominant complex of power shaping the development of an ITC sociotechnical
process in a given DC. Therefore, the perception of threat to overriding interests
may easily pervade all members of the DCs dominant social constituency with
the result that retaliatory action may ensue. In practice, the form and content
of these actions may go from simple pressures derived from threats of action to
actual trade sanctions for instance and, even further, attempts to destabilize
governments to alter the very nature of the dominant social constituency shaping
the unfolding of the sociotechnical process in UDCs. The considerations to be
taken into account in this respect are numerous and vary from every country-
to-country situation, depending clearly on the countries' relative strength and
particular combination of historical galvanizing forces. On the whole, however, it
is clear that looking at the UDCs-DCs sociotechnical interlinking, not from the
standpoint of UDCs-TNCs interrelations, but from the standpoint of the
involvement of their overall social constituencies, then the correlation of strength
is certainly in favour of DCs, which may go a long way to explain why UDCs
wishing to involve TNCs in the unfolding of their sociotechnical systems find it
hard to implement effective measures of discrimination and control. On the
other hand, it has to be emphasized that, however unbalanced the sociotechnical
interlinking of DCs and UDCs may be, the latter countries clearly possess
sociotechnical factors which are important to the materialization of DCs
sociotechnical processes and which, for the same reason, have led us to talk of a
relation of unequal interdependence between DCs and UDCs, instead of using the
most common term of dependence. With the term unequal interdependence, we
have sought to capture the imbalance in the relation between DCs and UDCs
while at the same time making it clear that the development of a DCs
sociotechnical system not only depends upon, but indeed incorporates in its very
shape, important sociotechnical elements from UDCs. Let us take, for instance,
the development of a capitalist science-based IMC in DCs. Here, UDCs markets
are crucial to the global nature of the accumulation process of DCs electronics
capital and of capital as a whole for that matter. Historically, so it has been
the incorporation of UDCs in the internationalization of the production process
of electronic components and equipment. The latter has meant, for instance, that
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not only has labour from UDCs played (under the direct control of DCs
corporate capital) an integral part in the development of an IMC in DCs; also,
specific UDCs socio-cultural relations such as tradeunionism, tax regulations,
safety standards, etc., have been important. In addition, it is also a fact that, in
some UDCs, various national companies have become market suppliers of some
parts and equipment to DCs companies and have also entered into formal
technical agreements with them. All these developments, suggest a clear presence
of UDCs in the unfolding of an IMC in DCs. Indeed, we can go even further
and argue that, from the point of view of an international interpenetration of
sociotechnical systems, what we have here is undoubtedly a process whereby
sociotechnical constituents from UDCs have become part of the social
constituency of a DCs sociotechnical system operating on a global scale. In other
words, in the same manner as this global expansion of DCs sociotechnical
processes has brought the latter's products, machinery, etc., and, above all,
transnational capital into the UDCs sociotechnical realms, so UDCs markets,
labour, space and capital have become part of the global constituency of the
DCs sociotechnical processes. The crucial point to keep in mind here is that we
are no longer thinking of the action of DCs sociotechnical systems as confined to
one country or region alone but truly as globally unfolding processes. When this
happen, the inter-country limits begin to blur as far as the materialization of
the system is concerned and factors from other countries can legitimately be
seen as constituents of a DCs sociotechnical process. For instance, UDCs labour
under the direct control of TNCs can be seen as both, part of the intrinsic
social constituents of a UDCs sociotechnical process (just like transnational
capital itself) and, simultaneously, part of the intrinsic labour constituent of a
globally unfolding DCs sociotechnical process. Likewise, UDCs markets bring
consumers such as governments, UDCs companies and other-likely consumers into
the global constituency of DCs sociotechnical processes.
To a certain extent, therefore, we can compare this process of sociotechnical
interlinking between countries with that of the interlinking of different
sociotechnical system discussed above (see section 5.3.6). Certainly, there is a
general analogy to be made from the fact that, in both cases, a clear
interpenetration of sociotechnical systems takes place insofar as components of
one system actually become part of the make up of the other system and vice-
versa. The difference, of course, lies in the fact that in the case of DCs-UDCs
sociotechnical interlinking, we are dealing, not with essentially different kinds of
sociotechnical systems in one country, but rather, with essentially the same kind
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of sociotechnical process in different countries joined by a basically unequal
relation of interdependence. In such kind of relation, which need not arise in the
former case, the crucial factor is that, although sociotechnical constituents of
DCs and UDCs are effectively playing a direct role mainly in the production
and diffusion moments of both countries sociotechnical processes, for UDCs
constituents operating in the global DCs sociotechnical process the trend is to be
either dominated (labour) or weak (national capital), while the DCs constituent
operating within the UDCs sociotechnical processes is normally transnational
capital, a very prominent member of the DCs dominant complex of power. No
doubt that this situation is at the very heart of the UDCs-DCs relation of
unequal interdependence.
In practice, however, unequal interdependence is clearly not a static
situation. It not only varies from one UDC-DC sociotechnical relationship to
another, but, equally, is continuously changing as the interacting countries alter
themselves naturally in the course of their historical developments. In this
context, therefore, the fundamental problem for those UDCs aiming at developing
a self-reliant ITC sociotechnical process is how in their relations with DCs they
can stimulate a process of transformations leading to the disappearance of the
profound inequality of these relations while using in this process the reality of
interdependence bringing together the social interests dominating in both
countries. Obviously, there can be no universal answer to this problem but,
from all we have seen in this work, it seems clear that the following general
points must be taken into account by UDCs policy-makers when dealing with
the potential contribution of international interlinking to the development process
of UDCs sociotechnical systems.
a) Although transnational capital is by far the most important institutional
channel or mechanism whereby the sociotechnical interlinking of DCs and UDCs
is materialized, it is plain that, as a fresh look at figures 5.2 and 5.3 will help
us to remember, there are others which must also be given careful consideration.
In this respect, the variety of institutional depositories of basic resources and
socio-political organizations depicted in figure 5.2, shows that there might be
significant opportunities for UDCs in the interlinking through institutions
controlled by social constituents other than DCs corporate capital. Therefore,
intelligence about the overriding and particular interests of specific DCs
institutions such as universities and other educational and scientific institutions,
foundations, internationally-oriented and, above all. Third World-oriented
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governmental or private institutions, and also about supranational UN-type
organizations, becomes highly relevant to a well informed approach to developing
fully the potential for favourable international interlinking present in the very
nature of ITCs sociotechnical processes. Such an approach should of course
include intelligence and ways of benefiting from forms of sociotechnical
interlinking with DCs socio-political organizations such as relevant trade union
organizations and scientific and professional institutions which, because of their
weight at the level of aggregate social constituents, may influence the aggregate
development trends of any process of sociotechnical interlinking between
countries. From what we saw in our discussion on the raison d'etre and
overriding interests of the social constituents of a capitalist science-based ITC
sociotechnical process, it seems plain that it is within the ranks of the science
constituent, particularly, within the institutional sphere where science interests
remain dominant, that an important mechanism for sociotechnical interlinking
favourable to UDCs exists. Let us not forget, however, that, under the pressures
of historical galvanizing forces, the practical manifestation of science's raison
d'etre can be mediated by the overriding interests of other social constituents in
such a way that the potential implicit in its own interests can be seriously
curtailed. On the other hand, although much more unlikely to happen, it is
theoretically conceivable that there may be historical conjunctures when it might
be in the interests of even DCs social constituents such as the military to
contribute to the development of an ITC sociotechnical process in a given UDC.
Although no example comes to my mind, the theoretical possibility exists and
it is to UDCs policy-makers to assess whether the practical possibility is there
too.
b) Within the UDCs own jurisdiction, it seems clear that the long-term pursuit
of an ITC sociotechnical process for development purposes will inevitably
demand a selective approach to the content and direction of the sociotechnical
interlinking with DCs as a way to stimulate desired trends and developments
while discouraging unwanted ones. If we again think that the interpenetration of
sociotechnical processes is in fact the interpenetration of ensembles of technical
and socio-cultural relations, the need for such a selective approach becomes even
clearer for those countries, or dominant social constituents, aiming at encouraging
the development of technical and socio-cultural relations in line with the
country's ultimate development goals. In this context, a first line of policy¬
making and action relates to the presence and activities of transnational capital
in UDCs. Here, for all we have seen in this thesis, it is plain that, if any
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contribution is to be made by TNCs to the UDCs sociotechnical process, their
operations can hardly be allowed to pursue, without controls and
counterbalances, the dictates of their own global process of capital accumulation.
Therefore, a clear policy towards transnational capital and direct foreign
investment is necessary; a policy which must seek to guide the latter towards
making an effective contribution to the development of the UDCs sociotechnical
process. When deemed necessary such policy may certainly include selective
delinking of TNCs presence through such mechanisms as the market reservation
practiced in Brazil. It goes without saying that, at all times, a careful
assessment of force correlation between the parties involved in the context of
specific historical galvanizing forces must inform the policies actually
implemented. Along with the treatment to TNCs, however, there is a second
broad line of policy-making and action necessary to a selective approach to the
content and direction of the sociotechnical interlinking with DCs. This relates to
the very level of basic resources of an ITC sociotechnical process and,
particularly, to such material resources as DCs machinery and products which
penetrates the UDCs ensemble of technical and socio-cultural relations. As we
have argued before, and is illustrated in Figure 5.2, such material resources are
effectively crystallizations of specific combinations of financial, human, material,
time and space resources and, more generally, of the very nature and workings
of DCs ensembles of technical and socio-cultural relations. This means, therefore,
that they carry with them potential needs and consequences which may not
only discourage the growth of related UDCs basic resources, but overall,
spearhead forms of technical and socio-cultural interlinking which rather than
contributing to the effective development of UDCs sociotechnical process, may
actually contribute to reproduce its condition of unequal interdependence by
deviating resources from the priorities demanded by the strengthening of the
national sociotechnical process. Consequently, a clear policy of selective
interlinking through basic resources is needed to complement that related to
transnational capital. Such a policy must strongly favour the diffusion of those
DCs basic resources which are necessary and consistent with the strengthening of
the UDCs sociotechnical realm while discouraging the diffusion of others which
are superfluous or damaging to such purposes.
c) Most importantly, it is clear that the above recommendations can only be
fruitful in a context of long-term policies of consistent support to the
development of UDCs sociotechnical constituents. This is an absolute need for
the development of an ITC sociotechnical process consistent with the development
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goals of given UDCs. The international interlinking of sociotechnical systems is
no solution on its own and, indeed, is a contradiction in terms to talk of ITC
self-reliance without the presence of a strong social constituency to materialize
it. It is only the presence of national social constituents with their
sociotechnical institutions which will enable UDCs to benefit from their
sociotechnical interlinking with DCs. They will constitute the necessary
foundation and the means for realizing the appropriation of those DCs technical
and socio-cultural relations which are consistent with both the
qualitative/quantitative development of the UDCs sociotechnical process and the
ultimate purposes informing the pursuit of such a development. To use Edquist's
terms. in the DCs-UDCs sociotechnical interlinking, they will be the social
carriers of available DCs techniques (43) into the sociotechnical process of their
respective UDCs. Most crucially, for the purposes of self-reliance, however, the
presence of strong UDCs constituents will enable, more than benefiting from the
interlinking with DCs, the eventual creation and production of crucial basic
resources such as knowledge, machinery and products not only within the
confines of the UDCs sociotechnical processes themselves but, above all, in
accordance with these countries' development purposes and priorities. It seems to
us that the latter development would be the ultimate test in the long process
leading to the overcoming of unequal interdependence.
d) Finally, and although we have not discussed them here, forms of
sociotechnical interlinking between UDCs themselves undoubtedly represent an
important area of policy-making and action for UDCs. Just as we have done
(43) In the literature on technology theory, Edquist's concept of 'social carriers of
techniques' is the nearest one can find to our own concept of social constituent of
technological processes. 'Social carriers of techniques', however, has been developed to account
for the choice of techniques already available "on the shelf" and refers primarily to what
we have identified as the socio-institutional level of analysis of the unfolding of
sociotechnical systems. In Edquist's words..."A social carrier of a technique is a social entity
which chooses and implements a certain technique. It "carries" it into the society. It is
defined in the following way. For a certain technique to be chosen and implemented in a
specific context or situation, the technique must, of course, actually exist somewhere in the
world, i.e., it must be "on the shelf". But some additional conditions must also be
fulfilled:...1) A social entity that has a subjective interest in choosing and implementing the
technique must exist...2) This entity must be organized to be able to make a decision and
also be able to organize the use of the technique properly...3) It must have the necessary
social, economic and political power to materialize its interest i.e., to be able to implement
the technique chosen...4) The social entity must have information about the existence of the
technique and functionally similar ones...5) It must have access to the technique in
question...6) Finally, it must have, or be able to acquire, the necessary knowledge about how
to handle i.e., operate, maintain and repair, the technique"...If all the six conditions listed
above are fulfilled, the social entity is a social carrier of a technique" (Edquist,1985,p77). See
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with the DCs-UDCs form of interlinking, however, the difficulties as much as
the difficulties of this path must be clearly recognized, lest the idea prevail that,
in practice, Third World countries form some kind of brotherhood of interests
which makes sociotechnical interlinking easier. It seems to us that, by and
large, history does not bear out this assumption with the result that UDCs-
UDCs interrelations are not essentially better or closer than those between DCs
and DCs for instance. True enough, within specific regions sharing cultural and
historical traits the chances of closer interrelations are better, as the existence of
various regional common markets would testify. In the development of a
regional ITC sociotechnical process, however, much more than the limited
achievements of common markets are needed. As it can be implied from the
previous point, the need for a consistent regional social constituency of an ITC
sociotechnical process is a fundamental requisite. Thus far, there is hardly any
historical precedent of a successful generation of a UDCs-UDCs social
constituency. In principle, however, the possibility of its occurrence cannot be
discarded for the future. It might conceivably happen that specific combinations
of historical galvanizing forces may greatly stimulate national social constituents
into a process of integration leading to the emergence of an effective regional
social constituency. Obviously, this is a matter difficult to predict, but, from
what we have seen in our discussion on overriding interests, if such a process
of integration is to develop at all, the likelihood is that it must first begin with
the effective interlinking -under a regional plan of action leading to the
development of a regional ITC sociotechnical process- of government and science
sociotechnical institutions from different UDCs. All in all, within the context of
the sociotechnical characteristics of countries involved and the historical
circumstances of the time, it is to policy-makers to consider all the benefits
while facing the difficulties involved in the UDCs-UDCs path of sociotechnical
interlinking.
In this way, therefore, with the four points just made, we now bring our
discussion on the international dimension of the development of ITCs
sociotechnical processes to an end. This means, therefore, that we have also come
to the end of the present conclusion where we have attempted to conceptualize
the workings of large-scale and complex ITC sociotechnical processes from their
basic sociotechnical constituents to the international dimension of their practical
materialization. Obviously, we are aware that any attempt at systematically
- 588 -
theorizing on such a wide range of issues is bound to leave untouched problems
which, inevitably, will appear as important to other analysts. We believe,
however, that, whatever its weaknesses, the conceptual system exposed in this
conclusion constitutes, not merely a well-spent effort, but, above all, a relevant
contribution to the much needed theoretical systematization of the complex
reality of ITC sociotechnical processes, which is so fundamental to the
implementation of effective policy-making aiming at directing its path of
development.
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The Science-Related Nature of an Indigenous
Microelectronics Capability.
The one aspect which is immanent to the origin of the microtechnology is
scientific knowledge. Both the science of electromagnetism and quantum theory-
are generally acknowledged as having laid the foundations for the present-day
microtechnological revolution (1). In Atherton's words,
"From the discovery of electromagnetism it is possible to trace a
continuous development of understanding spanning more than a
century that incorporates the electromagnetic theory of light, the
beginning of relativity, and quantum theory and quantum mechanics.
From the latter came our understanding of semiconductors and the
path to the silicon chip" (Atherton,p.l4).
Electromagnetism and the advances made in the 19th century had open the
way for electronics telecommunications as well as for the generation of
(1) Electricity and magnetism, thought as separate phenomena, had already attracted the
attention of the ancient Greeks. But according to Mason (1962), their study in modern times
"may be said to have begun with the researches of William Gilbert of Colchester during the
sixteenth century" (Mason,p.474). On the other hand, Atherton (1984) relates the beginning
of modern electrical science to the discovery of conduction by Stephen Gray in 1729.
However, the science of electromagnetism as such may be said to have started only in 1820
with Hans Christian Oersted's announcement of the existence of the unified phenomenon of
electromagnetism. Thereafter, during the 19th century, other great names contributed to
establish the foundations of this science. Among others, Andre Marie Ampere with his
mathematical work on electrodynamics (1820-1822), George Ohm with his work on the
relationship between current, voltage and resistance (1826-1827), Michael Faraday with his
work on electrolysis and electromagnetic induction (1831) and James C. Maxwell with his
mathematical formulation of the theory of electromagnetism [Dunsheath(1962),
Atherton(l984)]. The latter theory was first published between 1855 and 1864 and a definite
version was published in 1873 in a book entitled Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism.
Later, during 1877, Heinrich Hertz was to prove the validity of Maxwell's theory while
simultaneously building a rudimentary transmitter and detector of electromagnetic waves
which first demonstrated the basis of communications across the space. This scientific work
during the 19th century laid the foundations for further scientific advances during the 20th
century. Thus, in 1900, Max Planck postulated the principles of quantum theory, and
Einstein in 1905 suggested that light and electromagnetic radiations in general had both, a
particle- and a wave-nature. In 1924, Louis de Broglie extended this concept and suggested
that all matter has dual wave/particle properties. De Broglie's work was furthered by other
scientists, notably, Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrodinger and Paul Dirac, and, in 1926,
Schrodinger gave mathematical formulation to the wave behaviour of the electron
[Mason(1962), Atherton(l984), Bernal(l969)]. In this way, mostly since the 19th century,
scientists gradually produced the knowledge base leading to the understanding of matter and
energy and hence, to the understanding of the semiconducting phenomenon at the base of the
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electricity. The discovery of the Edison effect in 1883 (2) had established the
basis for the development of the vacuum diode by John Fleming in 1904 and
later the vacuum triode by Lee de Forest in 1906. Both elements, acting as
detector and as amplifier and switch respectively, became the elementary active
components of all electronics (e.g., telecommunications devices and computers) up
to the advent of semiconductor devices based on the scientific knowledge of the
20th century.
The scientific base of solid-state electronics is a well-documented fact,
particularly, in relation to the epoch-making discovery of the transistor (3).
The roots of its invention are often traced far back to Faraday's discovery in
1833 that the conductivity of silver sulfide increases with temperature (while
metals display an opposite effect) and to the observation of other phenomena
which in the 19th century puzzled the minds of great scientists (4) and found
explanation only with the 20th century development of quantum theory. Thus,
in 1932, A.H. Wilson published his work on the quantum theory of
semiconductors which culminated the work of other scientists like F. Bloch and
A. Sommerfield (5). By 1933, as the same Wilson claimed, "all the basic
principles concerning the solid state had been established" (Quoted by MacDonald
et al,1981,p.l77).
The transistor, however, was developed only in 1948, ushering the era of
solid-state electronics and the process of convergence of signal systems. That its
development took fifteen years from the date referred by Wilson shows that
scientific knowledge does not lead automatically into technology and hence, that
in the case of the transistor, it was not the only ingredient necessary for its
microrevolution.
(2) "In that year Thomas Alva Edison, in his effort to increase the life of his early carbon-
filament lamps, introduced a metal electrode into the vacuum envelope containing the
glowing filament. He discovered that when a positive voltage was applied to the electrode, a
current flowed across the vacuum between it and the filament. This phenomenon - the gTeat
inventor's only fundamental scientific discovery - is the basis of all electron tubes and of
all electronics up to the solid-state era" ( Electronics, 1980,p.60).
(3) See Gibbons and Johnson (1970), Braun and MacDonald (1977), MacDonald et al (1981),
Nelson (1962), Brooks (1976), Weiner (1979).
(4) In 1839, Alexander Becquerel discovered that he could generate a voltage by illuminating
the junction of an electrolyte. A century later, the latter would be termed a semiconductor.
In 1873, Willoughby Smith discovered photoconductivity by observing the reduction in the
resistance of illuminated selenium. Finally, in 1874, Ferdinand Braun discovered the
rectifying property of contacts between metals and semiconductors [Gibbons and
Johnson(l970), Electronics( 1980)].
(5) Wilson put forward a bond theory of conduction in semiconductors and explained the
existence of both positive and negative highly mobile charge carriers (holes and electrons) as
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materialization. Indeed, social and technical factors such as the need for
equipment to control the level of impurities in semiconductor materials and the
spur of commercial or military interests did play a crucial role in explaining the
advent of the transistor. Without science, however, there would have been no
transistor. As Braun and MacDonald (1977) have so forcefully argued,
"More than most innovations, the transistor was born out of scientific
discovery. No doubt the science was aided by a whole gamut of
techniques and instruments, but these served as the tools of science.
Many innovations are based on technology, often aided by science at
many stages. The transistor is one of the supreme examples of an
invention truly based on science" (Braun and MacDonald,p.167).
In the transistor, therefore, there was an integral participation of science in
the technological process in the same way as the science of electromagnetism had
been the base leading to the early developments in telecommunications. Indeed,
as we have indicated already, such a science-related factor is a permanent
feature in the development of microtechnology and the one that has made R &
D the most decisive element in a microelectronics capability (6). The latter
whether to push the frontiers of microtechnology or, more simply, to command
autonomy in its possession and application.
well as the effect of impurities on conductivity (Gibbons and Johnson,1970).
(6) It is also the feature that has made microtechnology an advanced or high technology,
that is, a technology which is at the very frontier of science.
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Appendix II
Concepts Relating to the Post-World War II
Social Complex of Power.
L. Mumford's Pentagon of Power controlling the modern Megamachine is
the ensemble of social interests formed by the military-industrial-scientific elite
plus the bureaucratic and the educational establishments. This Megamachine
emerged under the pressure of World War II but, in the aftermath of the war,
according to Mumford, "it did not give up its absolute weapons or the scheme
for universal domination by threat of total destruction that had given a
coalition of scientific and military agencies such inordinate power. Far from it.
Though nominally the older organs of industry and government resumed their
diverse activities, the militarized 'elite' fortified themselves in an inner
citadel...cut off from inspection or control by the rest of the community. With
the pusillanimous aid of Congress, they extended their tentacles throughout the
industrial and the academic world, through fat subsidies for 'research and
development', that is, for weapons expansion, which made these once-independent
institutions willing accomplices in the whole totalitarian process...[Thus A.M.]...
In a short time, the original military-industrial-scientific elite became the
supreme Pentagon of Power, for it incorporated likewise both the bureaucratic
and the educational establishments" (Mumford,1970,pp.226 and 269).
J. Ellul's techno-bureaucracy is the welding of the technologist, bureaucracy and
politicians on the basis of a rationality of science-based technology and progress
which absorbs science and is supported by the public and those in power. In
Ellul's words, "...Politicians and administrators are completely convinced that the
entire life of society, its economic development, and so on, is bound up with
scientific "research", with the growth of our laboratories, with the result of the
sciences...the bureaucrats exactly have the same conceptions as the technologists.
It is true, moreover, that they themselves have become the technologists of the
administration. More and more close ties are been knit between the group of
technologists and the bureaucratic organisms of power. Finally, all research
projects are made possible only by these administrations" (Ellul,1981,p.l9). This
social ensemble of power will exert total control over the development of
science and technology. Thus, in relation to data processing, for instance, Ellul
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thinks that "it is quite true that data processing (virtually) could be an
instrument of humanization, decentralization, a flexible organization of work, of
a real economy of time, etc...but in fact this possibility does not exist because
the issue has already been decided in advance. Information processing is taken
over by the techno-bureaucracy which only wishes to maintain its own
conception of progress and growth. Said in another way, it will serve as an
instrument of centralization, control, and rigidity" (ibid.,p.21). For an in-depth
treatment of Ellul's concept of technology, see his famous work The
Technological Society (1967).
J. Galbraith's systemic view of the technostructure-state-scientific- and-
educational-estate interrelations.- According to Galbraith (1978,1974), the big
corporations governed by the technostructure and the state are now deeply
enmeshed in a network of common interests and goals. Thus, "...No sharp line
separates government from the private firm; the line becomes very indistinct and
even imaginary. Each organization is important to the other; members are
intermingled in daily work; each organization comes to accept the other's goals;
each adapt the goals of the other to its own... [thus A.M.]...The state is
strongly concerned with the stability of the economy. And with its expansion or
growth. And with education. And with technical and scientific advance. And
most notably, with the national defence. These are the national goals;...[whereas
A.M.]... The technostructure requires stability in demand for its planning.
Growth bring promotion and prestige. It requires trained manpower. It needs
government underwriting of research and development. Military and other
technical procurement support its most developed forms of planning. At each
point the government has goals with which the technostructure can identify
itself. Or, more plausibly, these goals reflect adaptation of public goals to the
goals of the technostructure" (Galbraith,1978,pp.309 and 313). But, it is with the
military where the big corporations finds the best conditions to fulfill their
goals. "The Department of Defense supports...the most highly developed planning
in the industrial system. It provides contracts of long duration calling for large
investments of capital in areas of advanced technology...This leads the
technostructure to identify itself clearly with the goals of the Armed Services"
(ibid.,p.310). Finally, the interlinking of the scientific and educational estate
within the above complex of social interests takes place through two interrelated
processes. First, "...the educational and scientific estate is no longer small;... it
is very large. It is no longer dependent on private income and wealth for its
support; most of its sustenance is provided by the state...[Second A.M.]...the
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technostructure has become deeply dependent on the educational and scientific
estate for its supply of trained manpower. It needs also to maintain a close
relation with the scientific sector of this estate to ensure that it is safely abreast
of scientific and technological innovations" (ibid.,p.289-290). Another author who
has written in similar lines to Galbraith is D. Price. See The Scientific Estate
(1965).
The military-industrial(-scientific) complex.- Pavitt and Worboys (1977) define
the military-industrial(-scientific) complex (MIC) "as a coalition of certain
industrial interests, the military, big science and technology, and others who
profit from the proliferation of war and have an interests in preparations for
such eventuality" (Pavitt and Worboys,p.26). Various explanations have been
provided as regards the fundamental reasons for the existence of the MIC. Reich
(1977), for instance, argues that the "growth and persistence of a high level of
military expenditure is a natural outcome in an advanced capitalist society that
both suffers from the problem of inadequate private aggregate demand and plays
a leading role in the preservation and expansion of the international capitalist
system" (Reich,p.296). This explanation follows Sweezy and Baran's argument of
monopoly capitalism's need for a military machine in order to absorb the
surplus and to confront the socialist system. As regards the latter aspect, the
authors state that "the need of the American oligarchy for a large and growing
military machine is a logical corollary of its purpose to contain, compress, and
eventually destroy the rival world socialist system" (Baran and
Sweezy,1975,p.l90). See also Soukup (1976). The crucial economic role of the
MIC is also emphasized by Mandel (1977). For him, "...Armaments economy,
war economy, represent the essential replacement markets which the capitalist
system of production has found in its age of decline...[it A.M.]...is indispensable
for making profitable use of the capital of heavy industry and the
"overcapitalized" big monopolies. But the arms economy makes the state the chief
customer of this industry. The special ties between the state and monopoly
capital...thus assume a more specific form" (Mandel,pp.522-523). Finally, the
reproduction of the MIC has found in Kurth's follow-on imperative a different
explanation. In Kurth's view, the military production lines are seen as national
resources by all the interested parties involved. Thus, the "Defense Department
would find it risky and even reckless to allow...large production lines to wither
and die for lack of a large production contract...Such a contract renovates both
the large and established ...corporation that produces the weapons systems and




The Roots of the Social Constituency of the US's IMC:
Corporate Capitalism and R&D System During
the Late-19th and Early-20th Centuries.
By the late-19th century, the process of concentration and centralization of
capital, which Marx described in Capital, had taken capitalism into its monopoly
stage (1) and related stage of imperialism [Lenin(l944), Sweezy(1970)] (2).
That is to say, within the most advanced capitalist nations the rise of
monopolies, which Baran and Sweezy (1975) date from about 1870, had
signalled the end of the predominantly competitive stage of capitalism.
In the new stage, the dominant economic unit was to be the corporation, a
powerful instrument of centralization and accumulation of capital (3) which
(1) As Recabarren (1980) put it, "...The emergence of monopolies was a natural result of the
dynamics of concentration and centralization intrinsic to the process of capital accumulation",
but, at the same time, in a dialectical fashion, "with the development of monopolies an
acceleration of the very same process that was its cause, that is to say, capital
accumulation, had to take place" (Recabarren,p.l9).
(2) "Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of
monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has
acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of all territories of the globe among
the great capitalist powers has been completed" (Lenin,1944,p.77). In its most succint
definition, for Lenin, "imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism" (ibid.).
(3) The corporation, under the name of joint-stock company, had begun its development in
Marx's time. Among its consequences, Marx saw in the corporation an "enormous expansion
of the scale of production and of enterprises, that was impossible for individual
capitals"...[and also a]... "transformation of the actually functioning capitalist into a mere
manager, administrator of other people's capital, and of the owner of capital into a mere
owner, a mere money capitalist" (Marx,1977b,p.436). The latter issue of the transformation
of the role of the capitalist has been the focus of a great deal of attention, since it concerns
directly with the problem of power within the capitalist enterprise and, indeed, society at
large. By and large, there seems to be agreement that in the mature corporation control no
longer rests in the hands of the capitalist but in those of management [Baran and
Sweezy(l975),Kay(1977),Braverman(1974),Elliot and Elliot(1976)), or, in Galbraith's view, in
the hands of the technostructure, that is, the organization embracing "all who bring
specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group decision-making" (Galbraith,1974,p.86).
However, while for Galbraith (1974,1978), the technostructure rather than capital has
become the depositary of power, for other authors this is a questionable proposition. Elliot
and Elliot (1976) and Friedman (1977), for instance, argue that senior management and not
the broader technostructure is the actual policy-making centre of the firm. In a similar vein,
Sweezy (l972)states, "...The technostructure is hired and fired by top management"
(Sweezy,p.36). On the other hand, Braverman (1974) points to the basic unity of interests
between owner and top manager of capital to the extent that both "are drawn, by and
large, from the same class" (Braverman,p.258). A somewhat similar point is raised by
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would eventually grow into the present-day giant corporation commanding large
economies of scale and exercising oligopolistic control of extensive markets (4).
In Baran and Sweezy's words, under monopoly capital, the "dominant element,
the prime mover, is Big Business organized in giant corporations" (Baran and
Sweezy,1975,p.62) (5).
Briefly, this was the industrial-economic set up which saw the rise of the
first science-based technologies and industries, namely, the electrical and chemical
industries based on scientific knowledge of electromagnetism and chemistry
respectively (6). As we shall presently see, from the beginning the monopolistic
advantages associated to the possession of inventions protected by patents found
in the application of scientific knowledge a most powerful source of inventions
and hence, a means of constantly ensuring and extending such monopolistic
advantages. In the science-based industries, therefore, a symbiotic relationship
developed whereby scientific knowledge became effectively pressed into the
service of corporate capital providing it with a constant source of productive
growth and expansion, while corporate capital, in turn, became the social
framework actually shaping and materializing the specific form of integration of
the basic social constituents of the science-based technological and industrial
Winner (1977), who suggests that the technostructuxe may in fact be directed by tacit
limits and understandings reflecting the influence of the financial and business elite. Finally,
Kay (1977) does accept the loss of power by the capitalist but sees it not as the end of
capital but rather the unfolding of a new and superior stage of its historical development.
In the last analysis, all this discussion is intricately related to the issue of who holds the
reins of power in society. In this respect, the rise and spread of management to all spheres
of society, particularly government, has fueled the basic technocratic idea that power may
now rest in the hands of a technocratic or managerial class based on scientific and technical
knowledge and expertise. We shall not discuss this issue here and shall content ourselves
with directing the attention of the reader towards some important work on the roots of the
concept of technocracy. See Bacon (1900), Saint-Simon (1964,1966), Veblen (1964,1965),
Burnham (1941), Meynard (1968).
(4) The big corporation came into its own in the second half of the nineteenth century, first
in the fields of finance and railways spreading to industry around the turn of the century,
and later invading most other branches of the national economy" (Baran and
Sweezy,1975,p.40). See also Braverman (1974).
(5) For instance, "...Between 1896 and 1905 the size of the hundred largest American
companies quadrupled and by 1905 they controlled 40 percent of America's industrial
capital" (Friedman,1977,p.38).
(6) In his explanation of the transformation of industry by the late-19th century, Hobsbawn
(1978) argues that among the most important changes, the "first and in the long run most
profound change was in the role of science in technology...The major technical advances of
the second half of the nineteenth century were...essentially scientific;...Two major growth
industries of the new phase of industrialism, the electrical and the chemical, were entirely
based on scientific knowledge...The last major change was the increase in the scale of
economic enterprise, the concentration of production and ownership, the rise of an economy
comprised of a handful of great lumps of rock -trusts, monopolies, oligopolies- rather than a
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activity. As Noble (1977) put it in relation to the US. "...the history of modern
technology in America is of a piece with that of the rise of corporate
capitalism. Both contributed to a transformation of the modus operandi of
industrial capitalism - the one providing the wherewithal for unlimited
productive growth by implicating science in the production process, the other
offsetting the destructive tendencies in an unchecked competitive market economy
by making possible the regulation of production, distribution and prices"
(Noble.pp.xii-xiii)
The Emergence of the R&D System.
Along with the process of incorporation of science into the sphere of
technological and industrial activity there emerged a set of institutions whose
purpose was to enable and materialize such a process of science incorporation
and which has become known as the research and development (R & D) system.
The origins of this system may be traced back to the 18th century to the
formation of the first technical schools in France and Germany (7) and, more
directly, to the introduction of the experimental technical laboratory at the
Technishe Hochschule in Munich in 1868 (8). With the emergence of the
laboratory, technology finally became a field of research in itself
(Weingart,1978), incorporating science to supply the needs of the emergent
science-based industrialization.
large number of pebbles" (Hobsbawn,pp.l72 and 177).
(7) The first specialized technical schools emerged in France and they were organized by the
absolutist state "strictly to meet the needs of transportation, mining, the military and the
Navy (Bohme et al,1978,p.227). In this sense, as Weingart (1978) suggests, they "seem to
have been the result of an early utilization of science by the state" (Weingart,p.270). Among
some of the early schools in France weTe, the Ecole des Fonts et Chaussees ( 1750), the Ecole
du Corps des Ingenieurs des Mines ( 1778), the Ecole Royale Militaire ( 1753), the Ecole du
Corps Royal du Genie ( 1765). In England, similar institutions were the Mechanics Institutes,
and in Germany the Mining Academies in Berlin (1775), in Freiberg (1765), and the Schools
of Agronomy (Bohme et al,1978). In France, the movement of technical schools led in 1794
to the formation of the Ecole Polytechnique, which, according to Drucker (1961), marked the
establishment of the profession of engineer. The main focus of these schools was technical
training, but they incorporated the fundamentals of mathematics and natural science in their
curriculum. Hence, Weingart's statement that "they were not limited to purely technical
training function but also fostered natural sciences" (Weingart,1975,p.270).
(8) According to Hales (1982), "...The systematic application of research effort to problems
relevant to commercial practice took off most notably in Germany, where the chemistry
teaching laboratory of Justus von Liebig (founded at Giessen 1824) became a model of
future development" (Hales,p.89).
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Historically, it was in Germany where the incorporation of science into
industry achieved its most developed expression, during the last decades of the
19th century. There, a policy of fostering science and its industrial application
was to develop in a way which was unknown to other contemporary industrial
powers, notably Britain which remained very much in the grip of empiricism
(Bohme et al,1978). As Braverman (1974) has described,
"...at a time when British and American industry used university-
trained scientists only sporadically, for help on specific problems, the
German capitalist class had already created the total and integrated
effort which organized, in the universities, industrial laboratories,
professional societies and trade associations, and in government-
sponsored research a continuous scientific-technological effort as the
new basis for modern industry" (Braverman,p.l62).
The clearest demonstration of the situation above was the rise of Germany
as the undisputed world leader in the chemical science-based industry by the
turn of the century. In effect, although, as Landes (1969) has argued, the first
years of the new branch of chemical manufacturing belonged to Britain with
France in second place (9), by the late 1870s the German industry had captured
about half the world market and, by the turn of the century, its share was
around 90 percent (10). The large extent to which such a monopolistic
supremacy depended upon the systematic integration of science into the industrial
process is confirmed by Freeman (1974),
"The German industry in the 1870s had already established the new
pattern of in-house R&D leading to the introduction of new
products and processes. Bayer, Hoechst and BASF (Badische Anilin and
Soda Fabrik) were among the first firms in the world to organize their
own professional R&D laboratories" (Freeman,p.48) (11).
The impact of the experience of the chemical industry, and also that of the
(9) Braverman (1974) points out that the leadership in chemistry and its industrial
applications first belonged to France and it was forged during the Napoleonic Wars as a
result of the cutting of supplies of soda, sugar and other products. In Bernal's view, the
birthplace of chemical research was 18th century Britain. But starting with Lavoisier, France
gained and kept a 70-years supremacy in chemical research. Later, the leadership would slip
to Germany (Bernal,1969).
(10) As Bernal (1944) has stated, "in a few years the chemistry of dye-stuffs and
explosives, for which the foundation had been laid largely in France and Britain had been
captured as part of a new German industry which held the virtual monopoly of the world
market" (Bernal,p.29).
(11) "The six largest Germans firms for coal-tar products took out 948 patents between 1886
and 1990, as compared with 86 by the corresponding English firms" (Landes,1969,pp.352-
353). Also, "the six largest German chemical works employed more than 650 chemists and
engineers, while the entire British coal tar industry had no more than thirty or forty"
(Braverman,1974,p.l62). See also Barber (1970).
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other science-based industry of the 19th century: the electrical industry, had
momentous significance. In short, it definitely established the importance of
science for industry and capital accumulation. Indeed, in Hobsbawn's view,
"...by the end of the nineteenth century it was already clear...that the
output of technological progress was a function of the input of
scientifically qualified manpower, equipment and money into systematic
research projects" (Hobsbawn,1978,p.l74).
In other words, by" the end of the 19th century, the integration of human,
material and financial resources intrinsic to all technological development began
to revolve, as never before, around the systematic production and/or application
of scientific knowledge through the R&D system (12). More importantly, as
this process was actually mediated by the unfolding context of corporate
capitalism, it is true that, as Noble (1977) argued, from its inception, the
development of the R&D system and, more generally, of the science-related
technologies, came to play a major part in the process of capital accumulation
and monopoly power. In turn, in a dynamic of reciprocal compulsions, the latter
process also helped to shape the development of the R&D system itself.
Historically, however, the economic sphere was only the most immediate
place where the importance of the R&D system manifested itself in practice.
For, in time, the role of such a system was to reach deeply into other spheres-
of society, thus bringing other powerful social interests (e.g., military,
government) to bear their influence upon its development. In the latter context,
as we shall see below, the control of basic human, financial and material
resources of the R&D system will effectively outgrow the prerogative of
industry in such a way that its actual shape and dynamism will be the result
as much of the relative strength as of the convergence and contradictions
characterizing the interrelations between all the social interests involved.
Undoubtedly, the main tendencies emanating from the industrial sphere of
capital will still shape the development of the R&D system, but now in
interaction and interrelation with other social interests through the shared
(12) "Whatever the situation in the early nineteenth century, formal links between science
and industry were increasingly forged in the form of a distinct organization within the firm
- the research and development laboratory. Moreover, the specialization of inventive and
innovative activity was not restricted to modern, science-related industries; it was also found
in established industries like iron and steel...it became increasingly dangerous for firms to be
left behind by technical change and in turn more profitable for them to invest in the
exploration of new products and processes" (Pavitt and Worboys,1977,p.l7). In the same
vein. Noble (1977) defines modern science-based industry as "industrial enterprise in which
ongoing scientific investigation and the systematic application of scientific knowledge to the
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control of the R&D system's basic resources.
In the following by focusing on the particular case of the US. we shall
look at the social forces, and their interrelations, which have been involved in
the origins and development of the R&D system and hence, of science-based
technology. In so doing, we shall illustrate our discussion with particular
evidence from the science-based industries most directly related to today's
microtechnology. Thus, we expect to gain an insight into the historical roots of
the social constituency of an indigenous microelectronics capability. In line with
the historical development of the R&D system, we shall start by focusing our
attention on those' forces and tendencies emanating from within the industrial
and productive sphere. For, it was here where the R&D system and science-
related technologies actually began its development in earnest.
The Emergence and Development of the US's R&D System: Corporate Capital as
Its Dominant Social Constituent.
In the US, where the industrial R&D system has achieved a leading
position during the 20th century, the first research laboratory set up for the
specific purpose of systematic invention was organized by T.A. Edison at Menlo
Park, New Jersey, in 1876. According to Lindsay (1973),
"This was the forerunner of the modern industrial research laboratory,
which has revolutionized the relations between science and technology
in the twentieth century...[however A.M.]...Edison's laboratory was not
a laboratory for scientific research. His sole purpose was to dream up
and then produce gadgets which would have economic value, i.e., could
be sold at a profit to a public which found them useful or
exciting—Nevertheless, his laboratory had a well-defined program and
pursued it systematically" (Lindsay,p.216) (13).
process of commodity production have become routine parts of the operation" (Noble,p.5).
(13) Although not engaged in fundamental research, Edison's laboratory made full use of
the fundamental laws of electromagnetism. Thus, "...Having—defined the purpose, Edison
achieved it through the systematic application of the scientific discoveries which had been
made by Ohm, Oersted, Laplace, Joule, Faraday and others" (Sabato,1975,p.39). In his
Networks of Power, Hughes has dealt extensively with the characteristics of Edison's
laboratory. According to him, "...The Edison laboratory at Menlo Park was probably one of
the best electrical laboratories in the world. Moreover, Edison also equipped it, at great
expense, as a chemical research laboratory—Edison assembled a community of craftmen and
appliers of science and the tools and scientific instruments they needed in order to work on
problems of a systemic nature" (Hughes,1983,pp.24-25).
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Later, towards the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th
century the number of commercial research laboratories began to increase as
gradually the importance of R & D began to be recognized. In 1886, Arthur D.
Little, an applied scientist, started his independent firm. Others followed,
Eastman Kodak (1893), B.F. Goodrich (1895), General Electric (1900), and Du
Pont (1902) were some of the earliest manufacturing firms to establish
laboratories; and the Bell Telephone System (1907) was among the first utilities
to do so (Mansfield,1969). Also, the first government laboratories were in 1887
by the Department of Agriculture (Braverman,1974).
Before the 20th century, however, most scholars coincide in that R&D
activity in industry put little emphasis on fundamental research. Indeed, it is a
matter of agreement that organized industrial research, involving fundamental
research, actually began in 1900 at General Electric's (GE) laboratory at
Schenectady. New York, as a result of a conscious policy by the company to
bring scientific knowledge to play a major role in its future development
[Barlett(l94l),Lewis(l967),Allison(l980)]. In Lewis's words,
"Here under the leadership of Willis R. Whitney, formerly a chemistry
professor at M.I.T., a large staff of scientist and technical personnel
was formed and kept constantly at work on a variety of problems
involving electrical phenomena. By engaging in continuous education,
the company helped to keep abreast of any new developments in its
area of commercial interests, thus maintaining its dominance and
guarding against future competition" (Lewis,1967,p.626).
The laboratories organized by Du Pont in 1902 and Bell in 1907 followed
GE's path, as did other industrial laboratories set up later on (14). The reasons
behind such change were both technical and socio-economic but an immediate one
was the fear that the stock of scientific knowledge which had underlain the rise
of the science-based industries in the 19th century was no longer sufficient for
the demands of further technological progress (15). Thus, the frontiers of
scientific knowledge had to be pushed forward and, as it was apparent that they
could be done so indefinitely with obvious implications for the future of the
companies, a policy of in-house R&D activity, including fundamental research,
came to be perceived by corporate capital as an important asset in the long-term
(14) For a brief historical review of early laboratories in different industrial fields, see
Barlett (1941) and Fleming (1917).
(15) "A few people feared that technological improvement might be hampered by a lack of
scientific information. Some leaders at General Electric at the end of the century feared that
the industry was rapidly "using up" its scientific capital. The organization of the General
Electric Research Laboratory was one step in an attempt to rectify that situation"
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commercial strategy of science-based industries (16).
The industrial laboratories materializing a policy of in-house R&D,
however, demanded sizeable financial resources and, in practice, could be afforded
by only a handful of powerful industrial concerns, namely, the large
corporations. Such development clearly marked the end of the early period of
the industrial laboratory dominated by the figure of the inventor-entrepreneur.
The latter had been the original form and it had clearly established the
foundations of science-based activity (17), but, by the early 20th century, as
Birr (1966) put it, it "was left to the large corporations developing everywhere
in the American scene... to introduce organized industrial research" (Birr,p.68).
The reason was quite simple: it was these large corporations where there was
"sufficient financial resources and stability to support the laboratories and where
there was a rapidly changing, competitive technology which made successful
research imperative for the sponsoring firm "(ibid.) (18).
In the early 20th century US, therefore, large corporate capital effectively
became the dominant social constituent behind the development of the R&D
system. This meant that the latter's shape and dynamism became largely
influenced by the tendencies and needs flowing from the particular interests of
corporate capital. In this respect, profits, competition and the search for
(Birr,1979,p.l97),
(16) For instance, in reference to GE's decision to set up the Schenectady laboratory in
1900, Lindsay (1973) says, "...It was soon recognized by the directors of this new company
that the amount of technological development which could be drawn out of the scientific
knowledge already accumulated during the nineteenth century, though large, was finite and
that there would be a greater chance of ingenious developments if there were more science
to work with" (Lindsay,p.216).
(17) As one scholar has described, "the industrial research laboratory... grew up almost
imperceptibly from the workshop or private testing place of the inventor turned business
man, such as Siemmens or Edison" (Bernal,1969,p.569). The names of Alexander Bell and
Guglielmo Marconi are of particular relevance for the present study on electronics as they
were the inventor-entTepreneurs who did most in relation to the telephone and radio
respectively.
(18) "Nearly all of the basic research done by industry, as well as the bulk of applied
research, was restricted to large firms with ample financial resources, since they alone were
able to provide researchers with a relatively stable working situation and adequate facilities"
(Noble,1977,p.lll). Also, "only corporations of great wealth... can afford large research
organizations. Good industrial research of any kind, and specially relatively fundamental
research, is expensive for a number of reasons. In the first place, good research talent and
good research facilities are not cheap...In the second place, research is expensive because there
may be a period of anywhere from five to ten years between the original scientific
conception or "hunch" and its application in an actual industrial process or product—And,
last of all, the development work which lies between pure research and industrial
application is also very costly, not only in equipment but in engineering talent"
(Barber,1970,pp.220-221).
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monopoly positions through patenting and innovation, all became prominent
factors in accounting for the particular form of development of the science-based
technology. Let us try to systematize the process whereby all these factors came
together, mostly within the industrial sphere of society. The following major
developments can be distinguished.
a) The incorporation of science into the industrial sphere of society was
naturally pioneered by those industries which from the outset had depended
upon science for its development. These were the chemical and electrical
industries which, as we have seen earlier, were the first to incorporate R&D
as a systematic activity of their overall business activity. At the beginning, the
activity of the industrial laboratory was chiefly development and some applied
research. But, large-scale organized industrial R&D, involving fundamental
research, began in the science-related industries early in the 20th century (19).
From here, the example would later extend to other industries. In Barber's
words, "...Older industries were much less quick to bring science into their
activities" (Barber,1970,p.214) (20).
b) From the start, in-house R&D activity was an integral part of the
process of capital accumulation of the science-based industries. In consequence,
the shape and dynamism of this R&D activity was intimately bound up not
only to the specific technical problems facing the particular industries but,
indeed, to the very essence of the process of capital accumulation, namely, the
profit making activity. In the context of the market, this meant that
competition, or rather the constant attempt to negate it in the search for
monopolistic positions, came to play a major role in shaping and stimulating
specific technical challenges and hence, the specific content of industrial R&D.
Birr (1979) has explained how this process took place in the US context.
(19) In the telephone industry, for instance, the "Bell System's permanent commitment to
research came in 1907 with the consolidation of its research activities in the Western Electric
Company and AT & T, and was established institutionally in 1911 with the creation of its
first research branch" (Hoddeson,1981,p.515). This was not a sudden development, however,
since from the establishment of the Engineering Department in 1881, the Bell company had
been organizing departments to deal with the technical problems imposed by the growing
telephone industry. Thus, what took place in 1907 was in fact a major reorganization of the
various existing facilities, bringing them together under a greater commitment to research
[Fagen(l975), Coon(l939),Hoddeson(l98l)].
(20) "On the whole those industries born in the laboratory or directly dependent upon new
knowledge for their growth organized research activities earlier and more rapidly than the
industries which had long been established. In fact in 1920 approximately two-thirds of all
the research workers who were recorded in the first survey of the National Research Council
were employed in the electrical, chemical, and rubber industries" (Barlett,1944,p.34).
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"The late nineteenth century was a period of bitter competition,
deflation, and business upheaval in America as industrial leaders
desperately searched for security and stability. The search most
obviously led to methods of lessening competition, including interfirm
cooperation, price fixing, mergers and other activities which so aroused
the ire of the antimonopolists. But in some cases the search for
corporate security led towards science and technology...Such needs were
most deeply felt in those industries characterized by rapidly changing
technologies and particularly in those industries whose technologies
were dependent on science. It was no accident that the modern
industrial research laboratory first emerged in industries such as
communications, electrical machinery and chemicals. The first two had
never had a craft tradition in advance of scientific knowledge; indeed,
electricity had never been of practical use before scientific
understanding of the principles on which operated" (Birr,1979,p.l97)
(21).
However, the important part of the specific technical demands intrinsic to
the development of the science-based industries should not be belittled in the
face of the major role played by social factors. For, while it is true that
technical progress has no dynamism of its own, it is equally true that
competition, or more generally, the profit-driven process of capital accumulation,
cannot explain completely the specific form and needs of the R&D system at
any particular time. It seems clear that the latter also depends heavily upon
both the current state of development of the technology and the scientific-
technical requirements inherent to the technical goals associated to the overall
business strategy of the firms (22). Hoddeson (1981), for instance, specifically
gives technical factors an important role in explaining the incorporation of
scientific research in the R&D activity of the Bell System during the early
20th century. She suggests the following three principles.
(21) Both the American Bell Telephone Co. and Marconi in radio fought fiercely to control
their respective markets. This situation was reflected in the technological and R&D policies
of both companies. At Bell's, for instance, the establishment of the Engineering Department
in 1881 was particularly the result of a strategy to control the market through an
extension of the company's patent production. The Department was "to conduct research and
experimentation and to evaluate outside inventions for relevance to the telephone"
(Brocks,1981,p.103). For this reason Coon (1939) suggested that "...The Bell System is built
on patents. Its objective is the perpetuation of its monopoly" (Coon,p.7). Another example
within Bell was the company's decision to develop long-distance lines which was in practice
an important aspect of the strategy "to develop industrial control" (Brocks,1981,p.l04). On
the other hand, in the field of radio, as Maclaurin (1949) described, "...Marconi's plans for
marine wireless were large and ambitious. He hoped to control the basic patents in the art,
and to equip ships of all nations with wireless apparatus. He hoped also to erect shore
stations at key points around the world, through which all ships messages would be sent. In
the pursuit of these objectives, Marconi was determined to obtain a monopolistic position"
(Maclaurin,p.37).
(22) Our discussion in Chapter in has clearly emphasised this point by showing the
enormous range of technical-scientific requirements intrinsic to an IMC.
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"(1) nonscientific objectives lead the company to particular technological
problems; (2) technological problems so profound or complex that the
usual approaches to such problems fail, leading the company to seek
deeper understanding of the underlying physical phenomena; (3)
research that is successful in technological terms reinforces the
company's commitment to scientific studies in the particular area"
(Hoddeson.p.516) (23).
c) By pushing forward the frontiers of scientific-technical knowledge,
industrial R&D activity brought about, more than ever before, the likelihood
of two threatening developments for the market position of established firms.
(1) loss of technological control and competitiveness to other firms in the field,
eventually leading to loss of market and fall in the rate of profit.
(2) complete or partial technological and market displacement as a result of
radical innovations bringing about new and more competitive products and/or
processes.
The effort to prevent both possibilities from materializing became a major factor
in shaping the technological policy and, particularly, the R&D policy of
established firms. At the beginning, the pioneering science-based concerns sought
to protect their technological leadership by using the monopolistic protection
provided by the patent system (24). Here they would try to develop, or
(23) A particular instance described by Hoddeson (1981) relates to the influence on R & D
of the Bell System's decision to realize Alexander Bell's dream of a universal system by
constructing intercontinental lines. In her words, "...Out of Vail's [president of the Bell
System at the time, 1908-1909 A.M.] largely nonscientific goal to create a universal
telephone system grew his decision to build a transcontinental line, from which came the
technological problem of developing a non-mechanical repeater, and this problem in turn
contributed crucially to the start of Bell's formal commitment to in-house basic research.
"Basic" industrial research was now recognized as intrinsically dual in nature, being
fundamental from the point of view of the researchers while at the same time supported by
the company for its possible applications" (Hoddeson,p.534-535).
(24) According to Sherwood (1967) a patent proposal may have been advanced by
Hippodamus already in Ancient Greece, but "the earliest patent law on record was enacted in
1474 by the Republic of Venice" (Sherwood,p.488). In England, the patent system dates
from the 16th century and a statute was passed by the Parliament in 1623. It was geared
towards the promotion of new industries by granting monopolies to importers of inventions
as well as to inventors themselves. In the US, the first Patent Law was enacted in 1790
and empowered Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited times for Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries" (Quoted by Sherwood,1967,pp.488-489). Since then patents have been
considered to protect and reward the inventor, i.e., "to be either a reward to the inventor or
a result of a bargain between him and society" (Bernal,1944,p.l44). By 1860, this may have
indeed been the case when Abraham Lincoln praised the virtues of the patent system for
adding "the fuel interest to the fire of genius" (Quoted by Noble,1977,p.84). But with the
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simply, acquire the rights to all those patents relevant to the technological
control of the business. Indeed, as Noble (1977) has described for the case of
GE and AT & T,
"[their A.M.]...individual policies...were carefully designed to gain and
prolong monopolies over patents vital to their industry. Toward the
end, they employed such methods as incomplete disclosure of
information in patent applications, the use of trademarks, the outright
suppression or delayed introduction of patented apparatus, the
compulsory assingment of employee patents to the company, and the
deliberate production of auxiliary patents" (Noble.p.93) (25).
In this way, the big corporations could monopolize the market and, at least
for the monopolistic period of the patent, very little could take place which was
technically out of their reach unless some major innovation were to alter the
technical scene considerably. In practice, however, this policy could not offer
long-term security to companies since not only patents lasted for a limited
period of time (26) but, most importantly, the possibility of major competing
technical changes was quite real and it could not be effectively prevented by a
policy chiefly emphasizing the legal aspects of patents while overlooking their
systematic production through organized R & D. In fact, without the latter,
corporate capital realized that in time it might face loss of technological control
or leadership of the industry or, simply, technological displacement as a result
of technical development in other fields. Hence, the only effective way of
covering against such possible threats was to carry out a systematic policy of
industrial R&D seeking to keep abreast with most, if not all, aspects of
technological progress relevant to the industry (27). This became particularly
rise of the big corporations and the industrial laboratory seeking to control the process of
technological change, the situation has changed altogether. In Noble's words, "...Within a
half-century after Abraham Lincoln offered his glowing evaluation of it, the American
patent system has undergone a dramatic change; rather than promoting invention through
protection of the inventor, the patent system had come to protect and reward the
monopolizer of inventors, the science-based industrial corporations" (ibid.,p.85).
(25) In the 1930s, for instance, a report of the National Resource Committee claimed that
the Bell Telephone System had suppressed 3,400 unused patents in order to forestall
competition (Sherwood,1967).
(26) An illuminating example on this score is what happened at the end of the Bell
System's patent monopoly of the telephone in 1894. Prior to this date for 17 years Bell
had enjoyed a total monopoly of the telephone market and the annual rate of return on
investment had been approximately 46 percent (Brock,1981). After 1894, without the patent
monopoly, the situation changed markedly. "By 1900 telephone competition was widespread.
The independents controlled 38 percent of the phones installed in the United States...[and]...
Return on investment for the system as a whole declined...to 8 percent during the years
1900-1906" (ibid.,p.H7).
(27) Consider, for instance, how the invention of the vacuum tube by Lee de Forest and
the development of radio became major technical challenges to the Bell System's standing in
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true as the technical challenge emerging from the commercial strategy of the
firms grew in complexity. For. as we have seen in the previous point, the more
complex the technical challenge, the greater the need for scientific research and,
ultimately, a well-organized R&D system. In fundamentals, this was the
situation which the development of the large science-based corporations had
reached in the US by the early 20th century, and which led them to organize
the first industrial laboratories incorporating science as a systematic activity
[Noble(l977),Hoddeson(1981),Birr(l979)].
d) The success of the science-based corporations and the growing R&D
effort being demanded by the increasing complexity of the technical problems
resulting from their market strategy, brought with it two important
developments which were not only to expand the industrial R&D system
beyond the quarters of the large corporations into smaller business concerns but
also to bring the university within its sphere of influence. The first development
was the spread to a wider spectrum of industrial concerns of the importance
attached to R & D activities in relation to market success. The second
development was the growing costs of such R&D activities as the range of
scientific disciplines brought to bear into the technological process both widened
and deepened. As we saw earlier, in-house R&D laboratories were expensive
to keep and companies other than the large corporations could barely afford
them. With increasing technical complexity and costs this problem became more
critical since "even in those great enterprises which were able to support some
fundamental as well as applied research (notably Du Pont, GE, and the Bell
System), in-house industrial laboratories were not able to meet all their research
needs" (Noble,1977,p.l21). In addition, there had always been a crucial need that
no industrial laboratory could satisfy, namely, to generate the scientifically
the telephone industry [Reich(l977),Coon(1939),Brock(198l)]. Commercial and legal moves
"protected AT & T from existing competitors using the existing technology, it did not
protect the company against major technological change. Technological change could threaten
either by allowing another company to enter existing types of telephone service or by
creating a new product that would take business away from the telephone. Radio and the
vacuum tube threatened both kinds of changes. Because the vacuum tube was crucial to a
telephone amplifier for long-distance service, a company that controlled the vacuum tube
could provide severe long-distance competition. Because radio could communicate without
wires, it could lead to a new product to displace wire-based telephone systems"
(Brock,1981,p.l75). A policy of systematic R&D helped AT & T to contain both
challenges. First, it enabled the company to swiftly spot the strategic importance of the"
vacuum tube and eventually to acquire its patent from de Forest. Second, it enabled AT &
T to forestall any invasion of the telephone field by getting involved in the radio field first
and thus negotiating from a position of strength the spheres of influence to be left to
competing companies. As Reich (1977) put it, "...the use of patents rights could take both an
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trained manpower to constantly reproduce and expand the R&D system (28).
In these circumstances, there was a clear need for the galvanization of wider
social resources to ensure the further development of the R&D system and
satisfy the increasing needs of industry. In practice, this need crystallized not
only in a closer interrelation between industry and the university but also in
the emergence of a number of outside research institutions. In effect, as Dickson
(1984) has noted in relation to universities, "...The industrial interests in science
also meant drawing universities even more closely into the corporate sphere of
influence, since they were soon recognized as offering the most likely source of
ideas required for innovative products and processes" (Dickson,p.62) (29). As
for the outside research organizations, they took various forms which have been
well documented by various authors (30). The most important were university
research facilities, trade associations laboratories, non-profit research institutes
such as the Mellon Institute, commercial research laboratories such as the A.D.
Little Laboratory, private foundations such as the Carnegie Institution, federal
government research facilities in government bureaus such as the National
Bureau of Standards and also, particularly after World War I, military
departments research facilities. All these institutions, therefore, together with
both the facilities of colleges and universities and the in-house R&D
laboratories, greatly expanded the institutional web of human, financial and
material resources at the service of industrial R&D and, ultimately, of course,
at the service of corporate capital exercising the hegemonic control of such a
process.
From the first pionering efforts headed by the inventor-entrepreneurs,
therefore, industrial R&D had come a long way towards tin institutionalized
system involving wider social interests than industry's. For the. most part,
however, before World War I the development and shaping of the US's R&D
system had revolved around the industrial sphere dominated by corporate
capital. The impact outside the industrial sphere has been limited and this had
offensive and a defensive character, and the defense could be indirect" (Reich,p.209-210).
(28) As Purcell (1966) has commented, "...there were certain functions which were either
clearly unprofitable or impossible for industry to provide for itself" (Purcell,p.232).
(29) The influence of industry on university science was also noted by Bernal (1969),
"...university laboratories also grew, from the very fact that the new uses of science meant
new jobs and attracted more and more students. Thus, despite all the protestations and
des interes tedness, the academic science of the period was ultimately dependent on the success
of science in industry" (Bernal,p.569).
(30) For instance, see Barber (1970), Barlett (1941), Noble (1977), Brand (1941), Miller
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reflected itself in the small relative weight of other social interests in the social
constituency shaping the development of the R&D system. With the advent of
the First World War, however, all this began to change as the huge galvanizing
force of war forced powerful social interests other than corporate capital into
the process of shaping and controlling the development of science-based
technology. The main result of the new situation was to be the crystallization,
for the first time in an important scale, of what is today the most particular
characteristic of the dominant social constituency of the US's R&D system.
That is, the existence of a complex of social interests which has capital as only
one of its constituents along with and in interrelation with the powerful
interests of government, the military and science. As we shall see below, the
historical unfolding of this new social constituency was to bring with it new
problems and, indeed, a new dynamics of development for the US's R&D
system as a whole. For, in the last analysis, the interrelation which will bind
the diverse social constituents together will be inevitably one of simultaneous
convergence and contradiction. Let us examine now the formation and impact
of the World-War-I social constituency of the US's R&D system.
World War I and the Widening of the Social Constituency of the US's R&D
System.
Up to the First World War, the process which we have examining above
proceeded in a rather slow fashion. Thus, by 1920 the number of companies
carrying out R&D activities was reported to be around 300. As Barlett
(1941) pointed out, "...a small figure when compared with the number of
companies for which research was a sound undertaking" (Barlett,p.34). Moreover,
there was a great deal of concentration of industrial R&D activity in the
science-based industries as two-thirds of all the research workers were employed
in the electrical, chemical and rubber industries (ibid.).
With the outbreak of the war the strategic importance of science and
technology became apparent (Schroeder-Gudehus,1977). The crucial role of the
science-based technologies in military power and national defense was firmly
demonstrated by, for instance, the widespread use of chemical weapons in the
battlefield (31) and by the shortages, particularly of chemical products and
(1966), Coben (1979).
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equipments following the cut in exports from Germany. In the US, this situation
led to a greater involvement of the government and the military into the sphere
of the R&D system which so far had been developing largely under the
unchallenged control of corporate capital (32). Although in the past government
and the military had been involved in the development of science and
technology (33), such activities were modest in scale and did not represent the
manifestation of any systemic interrelation with science and industry. According
to Lasby (1966), for instance, the early relationships between science and the
military were superficial and marked by a continuous antagonism and tension. So
much so that, by the turn of the century, "the separation of science from the
services was nearly complete" (Lasby,1966,p.258). In addition, it was also the
case that in the US the military utilization of science to improve or develop
weapons was virtually nonexistent until World War I" (ibid.,p.252).
The advent of the War, however, was to provide the galvanizing force and
context within which the first links of a systematic interrelation between science,
industry, government and the military were forged. This was to be the actual
beginning of the broadly-based complex of social interests which by controlling
the basic resources of the R&D system has come to effectively shape the
development of science and technology in the US. The main practical effects of
the war period upon the development of the R&D system have been described
by Pursell (1966),
"World War I left its mark on American science. Research, though not
a complete stranger, was finally established as a strong partner of both
industry and the military, and its position in the government generally
was strengthened. Furthermore, the kind of cooperative assault on
large problems which had been the developing technique of government
bureaus for decades, now became a common experience for many
American scientists. And finally, the war had left behind a whole
string of new institutions, from the National Research Council [formed
in 1916 A.M.] to the nearly aborted Naval Research Laboratory
[finally set up in 1923 A.M.], which would have a vitalizing effect on
government science in general" (Pursell,p.237) (34).
(31) The First World War has been characterized as the "Chemists' War" [Lasby(l966), Rose
and Rose(l977)].
(32) "From the standpoint of industrial research...the obvious connection between Germany's
scientific establishment and its military prowess, combined with gTeat shortages of
commodities such as dyes and pharmaceuticals following the outbreak of the war in 1914,
went far to convince many influential Americans of the necessity to give organized science
strong support" (Lewis,1967,p.628).
(33) In this connection, see Pursell (1966), Lindsay (1973), Lasby (1966), Penick et al
(1972), Mark (1982), Pavitt and Worboys (1977).
(34) Another important effect of World War I upon science was a severe blow on scientists'
traditional values as they embarked in the cause of war. "The tradition of scientists'
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The war, therefore, clearly expanded the social constituency of the US's R
& D system beyond the realm of corporate capital interests. More crucially,
during the wartime period itself, the very internal dominance of the social
constituency was substantially altered. In particular, the relative weight of
corporate capital underwent a marked decline as the galvanizing force of war
propped up the relative position of military/government interests, who thus came
to effectively shape the development of the US's R&D system during those
years. The greatest effect of such internal alteration in the social constituency
was immediately felt in the direction and content of the technological process as
military goals swiftly displaced purely economic goals as the dominant
preoccupation of the country's R&D pursuits. This situation was clearly
depicted by Barlett (1941) when he wrote that, by the time of the armistice,
"practically every scientist possessed of any capacities for research had been
called upon to aid the country with his special knowledge" (Barlett,p.35). To
the changes within the social constituency of the US's R&D system, therefore,
there had followed changes in the very social purpose of such a system and,
consequently, in the final product of its activities.
From the point of view of the nature of the R&D process, two
important aspects were thus clearly highlighted. On the one hand, the profound
social nature of the process of development of the R&D system and hence, the
fallacy of any idea that technology possesses a "life" of its own. On the other
hand, the contradictory nature of this process insofar as changes in its social
constituency, by pressing into particular directions are bound to contradict its
progress in others. During the wax, for instance, as Lewis (1967) has described,
"The drain of scientific talent into projects of a military or semi-
military nature—caused the temporary cessation of research in various
areas of peacetime application and interfered with the progress of
fundamental exploration in basic science" (Lewis,p.628) (35).
In other words, while the diverse social interests could certainly converge
in their support to the R&D system on the basis of wartime military
neutrality and internationalism was rudely shaken, if not totally destroyed by the outbreak
of World War I. Scientists and technologists in all the combatant countries responded to
nationalistic propaganda and their own patriotic promptings by enlisting their talents in the
service of the nation-state" (Lakoff,1977,p.358).
(35) The impact of this situation for the case of AT & T's research, for instance, has been
described as follows: "From 1917 to 1918 long-distance telephony research was discontinued.
Efforts in the war years centered on the development of two-way radio telephone sets for
dispatch purposes on subchasers and airplanes. In 1919 AT & T resumed its former program"
(Maclaurin,1949,p.93).
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concerns, such convergence was not free of contradictions insofar as the resulting
militarization of purpose in the use of the basic resources of the R&D system
tended to alfect negatively the latter's progress into areas of mainly civilian
application (36). After the war, however, such a trend was reverted as the
waning of the galvanizing force of war was accompanied by a major decline in
the relative weight achieved by the military interests on wartime R&D
activities (37). As this took place, however, a new basis for the peace-time
convergence of social interests came to the fore, namely, international economic
competition.
In efFect, the war had greatly improved the position of the US's industry
in the world market (38). This meant that, in its aftermath, international
economic competition developed into a major preoccupation and hence, a major
new factor capable of galvanizing a social constituency behind the development
(36) This is not to suggest that an antagonistic contradiction between the diverse social
interests actually developed. After all, all of them shared a common interest in the
expansion of the R&D system and, as we know, the main overriding concern of capital is
not to produce necessarily for the civilian market but to ensure the reproduction of the
profit-driven process of capital accumulation. In this respect, the military market may well
offer important advantages in terms of profits and monopolistic protection, thus enticing
industrial interests into heavy military involvement . On the other hand, government may
well have strong interests in military power as part of its national and international
politics, while the overriding concern of scientific interests seems to be much more with the
the reproduction and expansion of research facilities than with any supposedly anti¬
militaristic ethical principle. Finally, it is also true that scientific and technological progress
for military purposes does not exclude the attainment of civilian technological benefits, since
many advances are of generic nature with application in both military and civilian fields.
(37) "Some useful work continued, especially within the Naval Research Laboratory, the
Ordnance and Signal Corps, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, but the
results weTe not such as to elicit enthusiasm" (Lasby,1966,p.263). See also Swain (1967).
(38) During the war, the US government confiscated all 4.500 German chemical patents and
use them as a base for the creation of a strong US chemical industry. The rationale of such
a policy was not simply that it would provide an immediate solution to the wartime
shortage of chemicals but that it "would also serve to protect the new industry against
German competition after the war" (Barlett,1941,p.36). Although not in such a dramatic
fashion, the creation of a strong US radio industry was achieved by a similar government
intervention in the face of major competition by the British and the German radio industry
[Maclaurin(1949),Reich(1977),Freeman(1974)]. In the case of radio, spurred by commercial
and strategic considerations, the US government and the Navy pushed forward the creation
of a unified American company which would give the country a powerful and autonomous
standing in the field of radio. With this end, GE was persuaded to buy a controlling
interest in American Marconi -the subsidiary of the British company controlling the world
market in the aftermath of the war- and in 1919, the Radio Corporation of America (RCA)
was established. In addition, in 1920 a pooling of the radio patents in possession of all the
companies with big interests in radio (i.e., GE, AT & T, and Westinghouse) was arranged.
We may say, therefore, that in the cases of the chemical and the radio industries, a clear
convergence of government, military and industrial interests gave these industries a powerful
social constituency which deeply shaped its development in the national and international
context.
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of the US's R&D system (39). Such postwar social constituency, however,
could not be the same as the wartime constituency with its dominance by
military interests. Indeed, we have already said that the relative weight of
military interests underwent a strong decline with the end of the war.
Ultimately, the fact was that, with the absence of military pressures, the very
historical basis for the convergence of the wartime social constituency of the
US's R&D system had dramatically changed. As such, the wartime social
constituency itself had become largely artificial and, ultimately, this expressed
itself in the alteration of the different social interests' relative weight in the
development of the US's R&D system.
In the new postwar conditions, therefore, the dominant social constituency
of the US's R&D system reorganized itself on the basis of international
economic competition. This meant that, on the whole, a new convergence of
social interests took shape which brought together, particularly the interests of
capital, science and government. In this respect, the arguments of prominent
scientists of the wartime social constituency of the R&D system leave little
doubt as to where the galvanizing pressures for the new postwar social
constituency actually were laid.
"George Ellery Hale, the astrophysicist, Robert A. Millikan, the
physicist, and other influential scientists used the argument that the
success of research in industrial products depended on the acquisition
of new knowledge attained through pure scientific research. American
industry, they claimed, might be endangered by postwar competition
unless aid were given to the basic science on which new products
depended" (Coben,1979,p.232) (40).
(39) A similar realization of the importance of R & D for industrial competitiveness also
influenced the British, as it is shown by a report of the Department of Scientific and
Industrial Research published in 1932. There it was argued that as a result of the war,
"there was a general awakening to the fact that for success in times of peace as well as of
war it was desirable that the resources of science should be utilized to the full. The perils
of war furnished the precepts for peace, and it was realized that on the conclusion of the
conflict a situation would arise in the world of industry which would call for increased
effort if British industrial supremacy was to be maintained, and if the manufacturing
product of the nation were to continue to hold their own in the world's markets"
(Bernal,1944,pp.30-31).
(40) Robert Millikan and George Hale had led the efforts to revitalize the US National
Academy of Science (NAS) taking advantage of the opportunity offered by World War I.
When the National Research Council (NRC) was formed in 1916 as, a subsidiary of the
NAS, to centralize the scientific war effort, Millikan became chief executive officer and "the
focal point of a large scientific enterprise" (Swain,1967,p.538). The NRC, with its numerous
committees, subcommittees and specialized panels, "became the vehicle through which
hundreds of individual scientists could participate in the wartime science program. The
National Research Council solicited the co-operation of both university scientists and
industrial specialists to carry out its mission. Moreover, it won the co-operation of the great
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For all its worth, however, the pressures of international economic
competition could not offer the same powerful galvanizing effect of wartime
military pressures. This could be seen, for instance, in the reduction in size and
influence of the NRC as a result of the decline in military and to a lesser
extent government involvement which followed the end of the conflict
(Swain,1967) (41). Thus, it was left primarily to industry, where the pressures
of competition and search for monopolistic positions constituted an immediate
concern, to retake its prewar role as the dominant social constituent of the US's
R&D system. The context in which this took place, however, resembled little
the situation of the prewar years as the impact of the conflict had clearly
broadened the base and scope of development of R & D in the US (42). In
particular, the awareness of the value of R & D was now wider than it had
ever been before and, for the first time, a national research coordinating
organization -the NRC which after the war, although reduced in scale, turned its
attention to peace-time problems- was in existence which could provide an
institutional set up not just for government support to research but for the
coordination of the various institutional expressions of the R&D system
(Noble,1977). In this context, according to Lindsay (1973), after "the mid-1920s
the claim of basic research to be an integral part of the program of every
industrial research laboratory was uncontested". At the same time, a sizeable
increase in the number of industrial laboratories and personnel engaged in R &
D activities took place. From 300 industrial research laboratories in 1920, the
number went up to more than 1,000 in 1927, more than 1,600 in 1931, and
2,200 in 1940 [Coben(l979),Birr(1979),Barlett(194l)]. Correspondingly, the
amount of personnel employed in industrial laboratories also increased markedly:
from 9,300 in 1920 to 33,000 in 1931 and 70,000 in 1940
[Birr(l979),Barlett(194l)] (43). Finally, the number of large-scale research
organizations also increased. "Only 15 companies had research staffs of more than
foundations who showered their largesse on the NRC when federal funds proved inadequate"
(ibid.).
(41) The postwar decline in the role of the government social constituent was greatly
deepened by the impact of the Great depression of the 1930s. "The Great Depression of the
1930s had a disastrous impact on government-supported science activity. The downward
spiral of appropriations for research forced virtually every scientific agency of the federal
government to retrench" (Swain,1979,p.539).
(42) For Dupree (1957) the impact of the war has such a decisive effect that, in his view,
"industrial research as a branch of the country's scientific establishment dates its rise to
eminence almost entirely from the war period" (Dupree,p.323).
(43) It is interesting to note that of the total research personnel reported in 1940, slightly
more than half (52.2%) were professionally trained, mainly as chemists and engineers. The
remaining part was about equally divided between technical (23.4%) and non-technical (e.g..
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50 persons in 1921: in 1939. there were 120 such companies"
(Barber,1970,p.214).
The quantitative increases, however, did not mean any substantial alteration
of the fundamental tendencies which had characterized the development of the
US's industrial R&D system from its beginnings. Thus, by 1940, three-
fourths of all the professional people were trained as chemists and engineers
clearly emphasizing the dominance of the science-based industries in the
industrial R&D system [Cooper(l94l),Barber(1970)]. On the other hand,
although industrial research had spread to companies of all sizes, by 1940 still
most of the effort was conducted by a "rather limited number of large
corporations" (Cooper,1941,p.l82). This fact highlighted as much as reflected the
continuation of the hegemonic control of the human, financial and material
resources of the industrial R&D system by the specific interests of large
corporate capital. In other words, while capital in general became the dominant
social force within the post-World War I social constituency of the US's R&D
system, it was in fact large corporate capital, particularly of the science-based
industries, which exercised the truly commanding role in the development of
such a system. By and large, this situation was to remain in force until the
outbreak of the Second World War when the resurgence of the huge galvanizing
force of war would once again change the historical conditions, bringing back to
life the wartime social constituency of power and consequently, initiating a new
period in the historical development of the US's R&D system.
administrative, maintenance) workers (24.4%) (Cooper,1941).
